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Abstract
In response to the call for first-hand accounts of individuals experiencing autism, this
study addresses the need for qualitative investigation of the thinking and learning of
gifted adults with Asperger syndrome (AS). The findings represent a broad
phenomenological ‘map of the landscape’ of the experience of the participants and take
the form of: (a) five case study reports; and, (b) a conceptual framework for
understanding thinking and learning in autism, which was developed from the research
literature. The need for such a framework is particularly relevant for professional
development of teachers of students with AS in mainstream schools, however, the
framework also addresses the need for information and understanding concerning
thinking and learning by: parents of children with AS; life partners of individuals with
AS; and, individuals experiencing AS.
Utilising phenomenological case study methodology, five in-depth case studies were
conducted and analysed employing interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA). The
case studies were interpreted in the light of an iterative review of the neuroscience and
autism research literature, which was also used to construct the conceptual framework
for teacher professional development: the ‘Thinking, Memory and Learning Framework’
(TML).
The five themes emerging from the case studies of thinking, memory and learning are:
(a) compensatory learning; (b) self-referential thinking vs. externally oriented thinking;
(c) enhanced perceptual functioning and giftedness; (d) temporality; and, (e) language.
The primary participants as a group demonstrated a distinct cognitive profile while
displaying some within-group differences. Their narratives exposed existential problems
with the trustworthiness of knowledge and identity formation: this led to the superordinate theme of ‘Knowledge and the knower’.
The conceptual framework that is an outcome of this doctoral study illuminates the
thinking, memory and learning of gifted individuals with AS and has implications for
the development of teachers’ understanding of learning per se. It also indicates a
hierarchy within explicit mental learning activities with learners with AS benefitting at
the lower end of the hierarchy and being challenged at the higher end. Pedagogical
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insights based on the findings are proposed. This thesis presents a new perspective on
thinking, memory and learning in gifted individuals with Asperger syndrome.
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Glossary
Anoetic, noetic and autonoetic consciousness
Also described as anoetic, noetic and autonoetic awareness: different forms of human
consciousness. ‘Anoetic’ means ‘without knowing’ awareness, described as implicit or
non-declarative (can’t be spoken about) and is the type of consciousness associated with
procedural and perceptual memory. ‘Noetic’ refers to ‘knowing’ consciousness, is
associated with semantic memory and is explicit and declarative (can be spoken about).
‘Autonoetic’ consciousness is ‘self-knowing’ awareness and is characterised by ‘mental
time travel’, which is the means of retrieval of episodic memories. Along with noetic
consciousness, autonoetic consciousness is explicit and declarative. See Figure 4.8:
‘Hierarchy of learning and memory systems and their associated forms of consciousness’.

Central coherence
An information-processing style: strong central coherence refers to a ‘top-down’, ‘global’
or gestalt style of thinking; weak central coherence refers to a ‘bottom-up’ or detailedprocessing style.

Eidetic imagery
Eidetic imagery, or memory, is defined as ‘a rare form of visual memory … distinguished
from ordinary visual imagery by its vividness and by the fact that it is “seen” projected in
front of the viewer as opposed to being merely remembered’ (Furst, Gardner & Kamiya,
1974, p. 603).

Episodic memory
The human long-term learning and memory system that registers personal experience.
Retrieval of memories from episodic memory is characterised by ‘mental time travel’.
Episodic memory is responsible for complex mental functions such as abstract reasoning,
relational memory, memory binding, simultaneous processing, executive functions,
temporality, source memory and attribution. It is explicit and declarative. Episodic
memories are said to be ‘episodic’ in that they are incomplete and change from recall to
recall, depending on salience and reason for recall. The latest maturing form of memory,
it relies on pre-frontal cortex development.

Human Learning and Memory Systems
The memory systems model proposed by Schacter and Tulving (1994) that has been
widely adopted in the neuroscience and autism research literature. Consists of five
‘systems’ of human learning and memory: procedural, perceptual, semantic, episodic and
working memory.
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Memory binding
Memory binding is a function of episodic memory, where the relationship between
elements is stored in memory in addition to the elements themselves, e.g., the spatial,
temporal, affective contextual elements of an experienced event are bound together with
the memory of the event itself in episodic memory.

Mental time travel
The means of recalling a personally experienced event: an act of autonoetic awareness.
One mentally travels into one’s past and re-experiences elements of an event, including
the event’s contextual detail (source memory) such as location, subjective sense of time
and emotion.

Neurotypical (NT)
A term used in the autism literature to describe typically developing individuals. Mostly
used in this thesis to refer to adults, while the term ‘typically developing’ is used to refer
to children and adolescents: e.g., neurotypical adult, typically developing child.

Perceptual Representation System (PRS)
The human long-term learning and memory system that registers experience and
sensation. Along with procedural memory it is implicit and non-declarative. Early
developing.

Procedural memory
Commonly referred to using terms such as ‘tactile memory’ or ‘muscle memory’,
procedural memory is long-term memory for motor actions and skills that become
automatic. It is implicit and non-declarative. Early developing.

Prototype
A symbolic representation in memory of an item, category or concept, e.g., a dog, a
happy face. Not a remembered instance of the category but a summary representation that
incorporates the salient criteria for membership of the category. Comparison with a single
representational prototype is more efficient than comparing an unknown item, in order to
label or categorise it, with every previously encountered instance.

Relational memory
Associated with memory binding, relational memory is a function of episodic thinking
and memory, where the relationship between events or ideas is stored in memory, along
with the ideas themselves. In contrast to the single-item processing of semantic memory,
relational memory affords a capacity for simultaneousness processing, where one idea or
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event is processed simultaneously in light of its relation to others. Foundational to
executive functionality, e.g., in prioritising, sequencing, planning, etc.

Remember vs. know responses
In Tulving’s human learning and memory systems model, acts of memory recall that are
attributable to noetic awareness are described as ‘know’ responses, such as the recall of
factual information: ‘I know Paris is the capital city of France’. Acts of memory recall
attributable to autonoetic awareness are described as ‘remember’ responses, which relate
to mentally re-experiencing a personally experienced event: ‘I remember how beautiful
Paris looked at night in summer’.

Schema
An abstract, mental representation of ideas, notions, phenomena or concepts that
incorporates relational information. An example of the use of mental organisational
strategies or top-down processing. More memory-efficient than, and confers
understanding beyond, processing and remembering single items without relationships.
From a constructivist perspective, a schema represents a personally constructed
understanding of a concept. Used in this thesis as a synonym for ‘conceptual framework’.

Semantic memory
The human long-term learning and memory system that symbolically represents singleitem factual information. It is explicit and declarative. Unlike episodic memories, the
content matter of factual memory does not change over time, e.g. 2 + 2 = 4, regardless of
how one feels or why one recalls the fact. Later developing.

Source memory
Memory for the contextual detail of a personally experienced event that is encoded, along
with the memory, at the source: spatial (location), temporality (subjective time), affect
(emotion). Source memory confers attribution: e.g. temporal – ‘before’, ‘during’ or ‘after’
my visit to Paris, location – ‘I remember standing in the queue to go up the Eiffel Tower’,
emotion – ‘I remember how beautiful the lights were at night’. Factual memories do not
include source information, they are context-less and are therefore said to be ‘single-item’.

Theory of mind (ToM)
The capacity for meta-representation: to know that oneself and other people have minds
and are capable of different mental states. Mental states include thoughts, emotions,
attitudes and physical sensations. Closely associated with the notion of metacognition.
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Typically developing (TD)
A term used in the autism literature to describe individuals whose neural developmental
pathway conforms to the expected pattern of typical development in contrast to the neural
development of an individual with AS. See also neurotypical (NT).

Working memory
Working memory is the location of time limited, ‘online’ information-processing.
Working memory is the interface with the long-term memory systems: encoding and
retrieval to and from the long-term memory systems is via working memory.
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Chapter 1 Introduction
1.1

Introduction

Utilising a phenomenological case study approach, this thesis reports an investigation of
thinking, memory and learning in gifted individuals experiencing Asperger syndrome
(AS). Semi-structured interviews of gifted adults with AS and key informants were
conducted. Key informants were close family members who provided elaborative
information, corroboration and interpretation, which guided the analysis of the case
studies. The study was conceived within the framework of interpretative
phenomenological analysis (IPA) (Smith, Flowers & Larkin, 2009). Data consisted of
interview transcripts, interview notes and artefacts. The study drew upon crossdisciplinary bodies of research literature: education, neuroscience and psychology. It
aimed to provide a broad phenomenological map of experiential aspects of AS
cognition in response to calls for such case studies by Gardiner (2008) and to assemble
and characterise, for educational purposes, the myriad findings from quantitative
research. Due to the open-ended nature of this doctoral study, many more questions for
future research were posed by the findings. The theoretical output of this doctoral
research was the development of a conceptual framework for understanding the thinking,
memory and learning of individuals with AS, for the purpose of professional
development (PD) of teachers. During the course of the study, relevance of the
developing framework for parents and individuals with AS was uncovered.

1.2

Background to the study

The study comprised personal and professional elements, which are presented later in
this chapter as my ‘personal journey’ and ‘professional journey’ in order to explicate
my situatedness and because the research question was separately and concurrently
posed within the two domains. This chapter assumes the first-person voice as being the
most appropriate means to provide the background to the study.
1.2.1

Rationale

After my husband’s diagnosis of Asperger syndrome (AS) in 2005, and the realisation
that there are lots of learners who have ‘differently wired’ brains (to use a common
metaphor), I began to appreciate that most of the pedagogical understanding I had
faithfully learned and practised in my teaching career failed to account for the
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‘differently wired brains’ of learners with AS. In the school where I worked at that time,
there were a number of students diagnosed with AS and more who were high in traits.
Most of their teachers reported in conversations, as word of my husband’s diagnosis
spread, that they, too, felt they had little or no understanding of how these students
learned: this was a school where teachers’ self-perceived understanding of the learning
of their students was highly valued as a guide to pedagogical decision-making. In 2008,
the decision to commence a part-time research doctorate with the support of the school
leadership was made. In the initial phase, the study provided the means to access
research journals and share that knowledge within the school but it became apparent
that, despite the advent of a plethora of neuroscience research giving new insights into
brain function that opened new opportunities for understanding, research studies that
reported the perspectives of gifted adults with AS on their learning and thinking were
absent from the literature, with the exception of a single case study (Boucher, 2007).
1.2.2

The educational problem: Thinking and learning

The educational problem identified was our lack, as a teaching staff, of conceptual
understanding of the differences between the thinking and learning of typically
developing (TD) students and students with Asperger syndrome (AS). We believed we
understood a significant amount about the thinking and learning of our students, with
and without AS, based around the Visual-Auditory-Kinaesthetic (VAK) learning styles
framework (Lovering, 2004), Bloom’s taxonomy of thinking skills (Bloom, 1974), leftbrain/right-brain thinking and Gardner’s Theory of Multiple Intelligences (MI) (Gardner,
2006). When these frameworks were promoted within the school, they occupied the
theoretical space that rightly should be occupied by evidence-based understanding of
cognition, both for students with AS and those without. The VAK framework and
Bloom’s taxonomy have been criticised for lack of research support (Pashler, McDaniel,
Rohrer & Bjork, 2009; Ravitch, 1986; Ritchhart, Church & Morrison, 2011) while leftbrain/right-brain thinking has been designated as a ‘neural myth,’ prompted by
misreported evidence from brain-imaging studies (Lindell & Kidd, 2011; Pasquinelli,
2012). On the other hand, the Theory of Multiple Intelligences enjoys wide acceptance
and performs an important role in this study (Section 2.7.11). A framework for
professional development of teachers that drew upon evolving understandings of
cognition and autism based on evidence from neuroscientific research was lacking. As a
teaching staff, our beliefs about the thinking of our students were partly influenced by
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trends and models that lacked research support and older behavioural and cognitive
psychology theories without the benefit of recent findings from neuroscience.
1.2.3

Research question

This study was a cross-disciplinary, open-ended investigation focused on the research
question ‘How do gifted adults with Asperger syndrome think and learn?’
1.2.4

Aim of the study

The aim of the study was to investigate the thinking and learning of gifted individuals
with AS in order to develop a conceptual framework for understanding Asperger
cognition for professional development purposes. The conceptual framework that
evolved over the course of the study was based on an iterative literature search
augmented by the findings of this doctoral study, with the interpretive analysis of the
case studies being informed by the research. It was ‘road-tested’ and evaluated in
conference presentations and presentations to teachers, parents, individuals with AS and
life partners of adults with AS, with adaptations in emphasis and language to suit each
audience. The aim was to provide a theoretical understanding that each teacher, parent,
individual or partner could apply to gain insight into their own context.
1.2.5

Change of scope and audience

Initially, the investigation of the thinking and learning of people with AS was to provide
teachers with structured understanding; to give generalisable insights for them to apply
to their own learning and teaching situations with individual students. However, during
the course of the study, two issues arose. The first was that high relevance to individuals
with AS and their family members was discovered through feedback from the data
collection process, professional development presentations and individual consultations,
so that the audiences for the study expanded, as shown in Figure 1.1.

Figure 1.1 Expanding audiences
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The second was that the scope of the study broadened from my local educational
context to a focus on theory development. Taken together, these two things mandated an
upgrade in December 2012 from a Doctorate in Education (a combination of
coursework and research focusing on an educational problem within a local teaching
context) to a Doctorate in Philosophy with a focus on theoretical outcomes and broader
audiences.

1.3

Personal journey

To a family in decline, my husband’s diagnosis of Asperger syndrome in 2005 was a
turning point. Long-term unemployment and low day-to-day functioning were affecting
our lives so that the family’s future looked bleak. One day, I had an epiphany that
dramatically altered my perspective.
Epiphanies…are sudden and abrupt insights and/or changes in perspective that transform
the individual’s concept of self and identity through the creation of new meaning in the
individual’s life. (McDonald, 2008, p. 90)

New meaning was suddenly constructed after lengthy, unproductive participation in
relationship counselling.
Determined to leave no stone unturned in order to support my husband of 17 years, we
had been seeing a gifted psychologist for some time. I had reached the point where I
realised that nothing was going to change for the better while I continued the role of
‘supportive wife’ during the counselling sessions as, while my husband was cooperative
and even seemed to enjoy the sessions, it bore little relationship to what was actually
happening in our lives beyond the counselling room. I made an appointment to see the
counsellor by myself to explain why I wouldn’t be participating in further counselling
sessions, but many things conspired against me keeping the appointment on the day.
Despite the delays, I resolved that the journey itself had symbolic significance and that I
still needed to make it, even if I couldn’t see the counsellor when I got there. The result
was that I arrived at the counselling rooms 15 minutes before the end of my 90 minute
session. From my perspective, more was achieved in that 15 minutes than all the
sessions previously.
The psychologist listened while my story tumbled out, beginning with, ‘This is what my
life is really like…’ I spoke about the dichotomy between the appearance and the
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reality and my confusion caused by a husband whose commitment to our family was
evident, but whose actions often seemed to indicate the opposite, and whose persistent
behaviours were counter-productive to achieving even his own articulated goals. The
epiphany came when the psychologist interrupted with the (to me) memorable words,
‘Sounds like Asperger’s’. As an educator with an interest in gifted education, I knew a
little about AS, however, the session ended and I left feeling angry with the
psychologist for having said, ‘Sounds like Asperger’s.’ In the three minute walk to the
car, I successively: (a) decided that the psychologist had ‘lost the plot’; (b) thought that
I should at least eliminate the possibility he raised; and, (c) resolved to keep an open
mind as this was an unexplored avenue. The epiphany was sealed as I reached the car
with the decision to think through how this knowledge would change our lives if it
proved to be true.
With this new frame of reference—‘perhaps he has Asperger syndrome’—my life was
transformed. Even in the weeks before formal diagnosis, my life changed powerfully for
the better due to the transformation in my interpretation of our reality. The
transformation in my thinking was like the Copernican Revolution where the chaotic
mapping of planets revolving around the earth was replaced with the simple, theoretical
elegance of planets revolving around the sun. The confused chaos of our lives which
had eluded my understanding for so many years resolved into a relatively easy-tounderstand paradigm. Understanding led to new strategies for management, individually
and corporately transforming the family’s quality of life. I re-imagined myself as an
empowered learner rather than a victim. Simple explanations and discussions with our
11 year old typically developing (TD) son allowed him to develop understanding and
management strategies. My husband consented to the diagnosis of Asperger’s as an act
of trust in the psychologists, both the original psychologist and the specialist
psychologist who completed the diagnosis, but stated it didn’t make a difference to him,
while accepting, also as an act of trust, that it made a difference to me and our son. It
wasn’t until some months later that my husband also had an epiphany.
Several months after the diagnosis, the Sydney Morning Herald (SMH), a leading
newspaper in Sydney, Australia, published a lift-out feature on AS with the dual themes
of diagnosis in adulthood and the benefits of acceptance and understanding (Molloy,
2005). The feature included our family as a case study. During the interview with the
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SMH reporter in our home, our son was playing a computer game nearby. After hearing
my story, the reporter asked my husband, ‘What difference does the diagnosis of
Asperger’s make to you?’ and he replied, ‘None’. She then asked if she could put the
same question to our son and we agreed. Our son described the changes for the better
that he had experienced since the diagnosis. Hearing his son explain the difference the
diagnosis had made in his life was the epiphanic moment for my husband. From this
point, he embraced the diagnosis with the result that it became a very powerful
paradigm-shift for all three family members.
1.3.1

Functional challenges

Lest such a positive outcome from diagnosis give an impression of ‘happily ever after’,
it is important to establish the level of impairment that accompanies our daily
experience. A recent event illustrates the challenge to communication and relationship
that is experienced, even in trivial matters. Interpreting and making sense of the
confusion is, for me, the key to the transformation from family-in-decline to familythriving-despite-challenges.
My husband (H) and I were facing each other across a café table having just finished
morning tea. I could see out into the main street of our home town and he was facing the
back of the café, behind which there is a car park.
Me:

My car’s that way. (I point over my shoulder in the direction my husband
is looking.) Where’s yours?

H:

I’m seeing the post office.

His reply, ‘I’m seeing the post office,’ stopped me in mid-communication as his assured
reply seemed to have no bearing to my question. I was expecting an answer about his
car being parked either in the street out front or the car park out back. I stared at him
and saw the post office across the street behind him, framing his head as I looked
directly at him: but he was looking at me, not behind himself. When I asked him where
he had parked his car, I had a mental map in my mind: of the street outside, the carpark
behind the café, and ourselves in relation to them. Figure 1.2 shows a sketch of the
location where this scenario took place.
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Figure 1.2 Map showing self (‘S’, represented by pink circle), facing into the street,
and ‘H’ (represented by blue circle), facing the car park.

I turned and looked in the same direction as H was looking, and saw a highly reflective
glass panel at our eye level on the staircase behind me. The glass panel was
perpendicular to us and mirrored the reflection of the post office across the street
(Figure 1.3). At that moment I realised that he was not referring to a mental construction
of the area we were in, which was well-known to us both. After a moment of thought, I
rephrased my question, which elicited the appropriate response.

Figure 1.3 Glass panel behind Self, in which H was seeing the reflection of the post office

On the surface, H’s response, ‘I’m seeing the post office,’ defied my understanding. I
had asked him about parking as we had arrived in separate cars and were about to leave.
Forgetting that H has great difficulty with abstraction and is mostly bound to the literal
perception of his senses, I believed he was imagining a similar mental map to mine.
However, understanding something of the differences between my thinking and the way
he thinks allowed me to reinterpret and respond a few seconds later with a re-phrased
question. H literally saw me point at the reflection of the post office, heard me talk
about car parking and was having trouble integrating those two sensory inputs and
understanding what I meant (Stevenson, et al., 2014). His attention was captured by the
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literal and, when he responded ‘I’m seeing the post office,’ he was yet to process what I
said: he was responding to what he saw me do, in isolation. Answering my question
required several more seconds of processing time before he indicated that his car was
also parked out the back of the café. Instead of referring to a mental map crossreferenced with location and temporal information about the current location of our cars,
which for me is an instantaneous process, he referred to what he could literally see.
Discussing this event with him helped me understand more about his literal thinking:
abstract mental constructions are not available to him in the same way as they are for
me. Whereas my sensory input is continuously updating my mental construction
without conscious effort (in this case an imagined map of the area), he is dependent
upon the perceptual input of the moment.
There are many instances each day where there is a functional communication
mismatch indicative of differences in thinking. These fuel my desire to know more
about cognition and thinking, both AS and TD, so I can better understand and contribute
to this partnership, which I now liken to a cross-cultural relationship. These experiences
also posed questions within my professional sphere, such as how a changed frame of
reference—like my ‘Copernican Revolution’—would impact on teaching and learning
for students with AS at my school. The desire to understand the thinking and learning of
people with AS culminated in the commencement of this doctoral study. With access to
research databases established in 2008, my early reading disclosed: (a) the relatively
new, highly productive field of functional brain imaging that facilitates understanding
of Asperger cognition beyond the limitations of behavioural and cognitive psychology;
and, (b) that phenomenological methodology had been successfully employed with
participants with AS. However, my quest for information about thinking and learning
from the perspective of individuals with AS was largely unaddressed within the
research literature.

1.4

Professional journey

At the time of my husband’s diagnosis, I was employed fulltime as an educator in the
professional development of teachers in the use of computing technology in teaching
and learning. The school where I worked was a co-educational K-12 (Kindergarten to
Year 12) independent school on the outskirts of Sydney with a focus on academics and
high-value co-curricular activities, catering to higher socioeconomic status families.
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Following the disclosure of my husband’s diagnosis, the school leadership was
supportive of my commencing a doctorate to investigate AS and learning as there was
an over-representation of students with AS, both diagnosed and undiagnosed. With the
commencement of my doctoral studies, I became, in effect, a consultant providing
advice and support for teachers and the school leadership to build knowledge and
understanding. Parents of students, both diagnosed and undiagnosed, were sometimes
referred by the school leadership. Numerous informal conversations in the staff
common room took place and I provided some formal training sessions. I observed
during this period that we, as a staff, did not have a theoretical understanding of the
learning of our students with AS and didn’t have the means to move beyond aiming for
behavioural compliance, social training and classroom management. This led to the
formulation of the educational problem and research question for this study. Although I
left the school part-way through my doctoral research to focus on full-time study, my
experiences there over many years formed the professional background to this research.

1.5

Contribution of the thesis

The thesis contributes a new perspective on thinking, memory and learning in AS
through the development of a theoretical framework for professional development of
teachers and other stakeholder audiences. It ‘maps the landscape’ of issues encountered
by five gifted individuals with AS based on their narratives and artefacts and draws
upon recent neuroscience research to interpret and represent this knowledge in a way
relevant to education. Specifically, this thesis: (a) is a response to the call by memoryin-autism researchers for first-hand reports; (b) extends the application of
phenomenological methodology in autism research; (c) provides a new educational
perspective on memory and learning; (d) considers the philosophical life questions that
impact on identity formation in AS; and, (e) provides a framework for teacher PD. Each
of these contributions will be addressed separately in this section.
1.5.1

Response to the call for first-hand reports

In an important book on memory in autism, John M. Gardiner (2008) discusses the
importance of converging sources of evidence overtaking older behaviourist and
cognitive theories of autism (see Figure 1.4). Newer brain-imaging techniques have
contributed a fresh round of evidence to information-processing theories and Gardiner
makes the point that theoretical assumptions must now be consistent with
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neuroanatomical function. Along with these two sources of evidence—neuroscience and
behaviourist/cognitive theories—he proposes that a third source of evidence is needed:
the reports of people experiencing the phenomenon of autism.

Figure 1.4 Three kinds of converging evidence (Gardiner, 2008, p. 16)

This is controversial in an area dominated by quantitative research but Gardiner argues
that memory theorists have ‘increasing willingness’ (p. 15) to consider first-hand
reports alongside more traditional forms of evidence: the case study of ‘JS’, which
examined memory in a gifted individual with AS, is a ground-breaking example
(Boucher, 2007). The move to recognise the value of qualitative studies in autism is
gathering support (Bölte, 2014). This doctoral study contributes by providing case
studies focused directly on thinking, memory and learning in response to Gardiner’s call
for first-hand reports of people experiencing autism to contribute to memory research.
1.5.2

Phenomenological methodology

A small group of phenomenological case studies examined educational and social issues
for people with AS and these studies, collectively, provided the model for the research
design of this doctoral study: Carrington and Graham (2001); Carrington, Papinczak,
and Templeton (2003); Griffith, Totsika, Nash, and Hastings (2011); Humphrey and
Lewis (2008); Hurlbutt and Chalmers (2002); and, Müller, E., Schuler, and Yates
(2008). These studies also demonstrated that people with AS are willing, and have the
capacity, to contribute to qualitative research and that interpretative phenomenological
analysis (IPA) has been utilised productively with this group. None of the studies,
however, focused directly or indirectly on thinking or learning. This doctoral study
follows the six studies noted above and is significant for its contribution to the extended
application of IPA through the provision of case studies that directly address thinking
and learning.

13

1.5.3

Memory and learning

In this doctoral study, when participants with AS were asked how they think and learn,
they talked instead about their memories of learning and their memories generally. The
ways in which they described their memories of learning became a central focus of the
study. It will be argued throughout this thesis that learning and memory are intrinsically
associated and that a key to understanding learning in AS is available in the memory
research. Studies of amnesia and selectively impaired memory with participants such as
‘KC’ (Tulving, 2002) have demonstrated that learning is not possible without the ability
to form new long-term memories. Work that began as amnesia research led to an
influential model of human learning and memory (Schacter & Tulving, 1994),
represented in Figure 1.5, which has wide acceptance among memory theorists (for
example, Ben Shalom, 2003; Boucher, 2007; Gardiner, 2008) and is employed within
education to conceptualise learning (Magnussen & Brennen, 2011).

Figure 1.5 Major systems of human learning and memory

Memory is required to process, encode, retain and retrieve past learning. The
relationship between memory and learning can be summarised as ‘there is no learning
without memory’. New memories must be encoded as a necessary prelude to
reconciling new knowledge with existing knowledge and using it to extend one’s
understanding of the world. See Section 2.6.1 for a more detailed discussion of learning,
which is viewed from within a constructivist perspective.
This doctoral thesis contributes significantly to educational research by providing case
studies focused directly on thinking, memory and learning, where previously only a
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single case study was described (Boucher, 2007). The emergent themes (Section 9.2),
and their significance for learning (Section 10.3), shaped the development of the
conceptual framework for teacher professional development. Furthermore, the
framework sheds light on learning processes per se that are relevant to education and
learning theory development.
1.5.4

Identity and knowledge in Asperger experience

Gardiner (2008) outlined the deep implications of the field of memory for its relevance
to an understanding of the formation of the ‘concept of self’ (p. 16). Inevitably, a
phenomenological exploration of thinking and learning in AS must encounter the
ontological and epistemological issues raised by the Asperger experience as, when
dealing with lived experience and naturalistic settings, the data do not neatly conform to
the research question. Questions of ‘knowledge of the self’ and ‘trustworthiness of
knowledge’ emerged from the data so the current study makes a contribution in these
areas by illuminating identity and epistemology in the perspectives of five gifted adults
with AS. The philosophical presumptions posed by Lincoln and Guba (2013) were
utilised as a framework for the consideration of identity and knowledge of the self
within the participants’ experiences.
Table 1.1 Four philosophical questions (Lincoln & Guba, 2013, p. 37)

The ontological question
The epistemological question
The methodological question
The axiological question

What is there that can be known? What is the nature of reality?
What is the nature of the relationship between the knower and the
knowable?
How does one go about acquiring knowledge?
Of all the knowledge available to me, which is the most valuable,
which is the most truthful, which is the most beautiful, which is the
most life-enhancing?

Knowledge of the self and identity formation in AS emerged as the super-ordinate
theme of this doctoral study using the phrase ‘Knowledge and the knower’, which was
coined from Guba and Lincoln’s question: ‘What is the nature of the relationship
between the knower and the knowable?’ (2013, p. 37). This doctoral study makes a
significant contribution to the field of identity formation in AS through the presentation
of case studies that characterise the evidence for different processes of formation of the
concept of self in individuals with AS.
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1.5.5

Teacher professional development and multiple audiences

Over the course of the research, professional development sessions for teachers, parents
and partners, and consultations with individuals with AS and their family members,
were delivered as a means of returning a benefit to the participants and ‘road-testing’
the evolving conceptual framework. The positive reaction to the sessions demonstrated
the significance of the study and showed that wider application beyond mainstream
classrooms—to parents, partners and individuals with Aspergers—is warranted. The
study therefore has multiple audiences: mainstream classroom teachers who find that
their pedagogical framework is inadequate to explain and understand the learning of
students with AS; individuals with AS; and those closely involved with them (family
members such as parents and life partners).
1.5.6

Summary

The thesis makes a significant contribution because: first-person perspectives that focus
directly on the thinking, memory and learning of individuals experiencing Asperger
syndrome are largely absent from the research literature with the exception of a single
case study (Boucher, 2007)—however, it is noted here that there are significant
examples in the mainstream literature, such as Grandin (2013) and Lawson (2011); the
study employs methodology which has rarely been used with this population (but in a
small number of studies it was used successfully); it contributes to the field of memory
in autism through the case studies that elicited first-person responses from individuals
with AS; it furthers teacher professional development with its application to teaching
and learning in the form of a conceptual framework; and, the framework represents
knowledge that is valuable to gifted individuals with autism and their family members.

1.6

Chapter conclusion

Through my personal experience as an ‘Aspie wife’ and my professional experience as
an educator, I became aware that there are other ways of thinking and being beyond my
understanding. By consciously adopting the role of learner in my personal journey, I repositioned myself from ‘victim of circumstance’ to ‘empowered learner’. I found that
there was a need for the application of my learned knowledge to my educational
environment as we, as teachers, lacked a coherent framework for understanding
Asperger cognition and yet we based much of our pedagogical practice on our belief
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that we understand our students’ cognition. In the face of lack of understanding of the
cognition of students with AS, the fall-back position was to focus on students’
behaviour management, development of social cognition and teachers’ classroom
management. In this, I believe we were under-serving our students with AS in that we
did not apply the same level of professional insight into their learning as we did for TD
students.
This doctoral study was undertaken with the aim of addressing the identified
educational problem through the development of a conceptual framework for
understanding the cognition of students with AS. During the course of the study, the
target audience broadened from teachers to include individuals with AS and their family
members, while the research focus shifted from the local school context to theoretical
outcomes.

1.7

Outline of the thesis

This thesis is constructed in three parts. Part A includes Chapters 1 to 3. The literature
that was reviewed as the background to the study is outlined in Chapter 2. This
literature led to the development of the study’s theoretical framework, which is included
in the same chapter. Chapter 3 documents the methodology employed for the study,
interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA), and the methods used to conduct the
study.
Part B presents the five cases of this doctoral research in five chapters, Chapters 4 to 8.
As the case studies were conducted, an iterative literature search was required and the
literature review on memory and memory-in-autism is provided throughout Part B,
particularly within Case 1 in Chapter 4 (Sections 4.3—4.5), when the emergent themes
were becoming clearer. The cases are presented in the chronological order of the
interviews in order to reflect the sequence in which the themes and the conceptual
framework developed.
Part C, Chapters 9 and 10, presents the discussion, findings and conclusion of the thesis.
Chapter 9 discusses the emergent themes separately from the individual case studies,
comparing the thematic material across the cases. The diagrams that are the culmination
of the conceptual framework, the ‘Teaching, Memory and Learning Framework’ (TML),
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are included in Chapter 9: the TML is presented in full in Appendix C. Chapter 10
presents the super-ordinate theme, addresses the research questions, provides
pedagogical insights arising from the findings and poses questions for further research.
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Chapter 2 Theoretical Framework & Background
Literature Review
2.1

Introduction

This chapter addresses the background literature utilised for the study. It includes
definitions of important concepts and presents the study’s starting-point theoretical
framework. As this study was cross-disciplinary with multiple stakeholder audiences
(educators; individuals with AS; and, family members), working definitions and
explanations using non-technical language were developed. A principle of this study
was that, ‘the study of learning unites education and neuroscience’ (Goswami, 2008, p.
33), therefore, the working definitions of concepts were drawn principally from
neuroscience research and served for explanatory purposes in presentations to the
stakeholder audiences. The review of the relevant cross-disciplinary literature is
addressed thematically within this chapter.

2.2

Cross-disciplinary literature

This doctoral study drew upon the research literature of three disciplines; neuroscience,
education and psychology, in order to investigate the research question; ‘How do gifted
adults with Asperger syndrome think and learn?’

Figure 2.1 The cross-disciplinary literature that informed this study

The confluence of neuroscience and education, known as ‘neuroeducation’ by Gardner
and others (Gardner, 2008a; Pasquinelli, 2012), has provided opportunities to study
thinking and learning in ways not previously possible in educational research. In this
study, the neuroscience evidence on autism and learning was considered alongside
learning theory, set against a background of psychology, which has had historical
influences on understandings of autism, cognition and learning.
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2.2.1

Neuroscience

Newer brain-imaging techniques have provided the means of investigating thinking and
learning that were not previously possible through psychological research, providing
novel insights to the fields of learning and autism.
In particular, the last decade has seen huge advances in in vivo neuroimaging
technologies. Scientists are now able to study the workings of the human mind in healthy
participants as they solve problems and perform other sorts of cognitive and emotional
tasks in real time. … these recent advances in neuroimaging have had a profound effect
on the field of neuroscience and its potential relevance to education. (Immordino-Yang &
Fischer, 2011, p. 10)

Through behavioural and cognitive psychology, the ‘black box’ of the learning brain
was not directly available for study: theories of learning relied heavily on observations
of the inputs and outputs of human behaviour. The affordances of neuroimaging have
opened the ‘black box,’ allowing the human brain to be studied during acts of learning
and providing powerful implications for teaching and learning (Fischer, 2009). At the
same time, autism research has blossomed, also due to the affordances of neuroimaging
(Abu-Akel, 2003; Anagnostou & Taylor, 2011; Jordan & Murphy, 2011).
At the commencement of this doctoral study, as a newcomer to neuroscience research, it
was necessary to learn how to read the research literature, filtering for relevancy, and to
develop a working understanding of the brain and learning. This task was greatly
assisted by attendance at two conferences and a workshop in the Learning and the Brain
series (for example, Focusing the mind: Using brain research to enhance learning,
attention and memory, 2008), staged by a collaboration between researchers and
educators from many major universities in the USA.
In order to determine the relevancy of domains within the literature, an attempt was
made to ‘map the landscape’ of concepts and relationships within the neuroscience
literature. The map of the landscape that follows in Figure 2.2 is by no means definitive,
but indicates the areas of reading that provided the background to the current study. The
areas shaded in grey are those that were early exclusions as the focus of this study
narrowed.
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Figure 2.2 Mapping the landscape: cross-disciplinary literature relevant to Asperger syndrome and cognition
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The concept map of the literature in Figure 2.2 demonstrates the breadth of, and crossdisciplinary relationships within, the neuroscience and autism literature that informed
this study.
2.2.2

Education

The learning theory that informed this study is located as the foundation to the
theoretical framework (see Figure 2.6). This is a Vygotskian socio-cultural approach to
learning (Brown, J. S., Collins & Duguid, 1989; Collins & Greeno, 2011; Säljö, 2011;
Wertsch, 2011) that operates within a constructivist view of education (Brown, G.,
2009; Dennen, 2004; Duffy & Cunningham, 1996; Jonassen, Peck & Wilson, 1999).
The foundational constructs of ‘learning’ and ‘the researcher as situated learner’ are
understood within the context of the socio-cultural approach. Educational literature
relevant to the theoretical framework sets the stage for the study by providing
background concepts such as ‘giftedness’, ‘learning disorder’ and ‘twice exceptionality’
(Gardner, 2000, 2006; Norris & Dixon, 2011).
2.2.3

Behavioural and cognitive psychology

The significance of behavioural and cognitive psychology as providing a backdrop for
this study is acknowledged for the following reasons. First, behavioural and cognitive
studies, prior to recent neuroimaging advances, have provided much of the evidence
upon which theories of autism and learning are based. Indeed, psychological views of
situated cognition (see, for example, Hobson, 2008) align with active, constructivist
views of situated learning in education and both fields, education and psychology, owe
much to Vygotskian psychology for the development of their respective theoretical
understandings (Wertsch, 2011; Yasnitsky & Ferrari, 2008). This is understandable,
given that Vygotsky was both a psychologist and an educator. Hobson, a
psychotherapist, applied a Vygotskian perspective to the study of autism in his
discussion of thinking as situated cognition (Hobson, 2008, 2010). The study of
thinking in children with autism also serves to illuminate the thinking of TD children.
The following quotation provides an example of the contribution of psychological
research to the study of both thinking and autism.
In the present context, a special focus is how intimately or otherwise thinking is
intertwined with interpersonal relations. Here, there is much to be gained from the study
of children with autism who have profound difficulties in their emotional engagement

23

with other people. Research on autism may do more than give us new facts about typical
as well as atypical development – it may also prompt us to reconfigure the concepts in
terms of which those facts are framed. (Hobson, 2008, pp. 378-379) [emphasis added]

Phenomenology is claimed as a field within psychology and is appropriate to a
qualitative investigation of thought. Constructs such as ‘embodied, active, situated,
cognition’ and the ‘foundational concept of a situated, meaning-making person’ (Larkin,
Eatough & Osborn, 2011, p. 319) are drawn from phenomenological psychology and
have shaped this study: these particular constructs are intended, in this study, to refer to
the subjective positions of both the researcher and the participants. The use of IPA
resonates with a constructivist, Vygotskian approach to active, situated learning.
Secondly, the language used by neuroscientists is heavily influenced by psychology.
Influential neuroscientists, such as Minshew and her colleagues (Minshew, Meyer &
Goldstein, 2002; Minshew & Williams, 2007; Williams, D. L., Minshew & Goldstein,
2008), continue to employ the language of information-processing theory that pre-dates
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and the other newer forms of brain
imaging. Thirdly, four of the explanatory theories of autism (Section 2.7) were in
development prior to the neuroimaging resources now available and owe much to
behavioural and cognitive psychology (see, for example, Happé, 1994). Fourthly,
behavioural diagnostic criteria are employed to diagnose AS, and this has been the case
since the third edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(DSM) (APA, 1994; Witwer & Lecavalier, 2008). Fifthly, many treatment approaches to
autism are based on psychological research and practice and are administered by
psychologists, even though the intervention itself may be carried out by an allied health
professional, such as a speech pathologist, or a volunteer (see, for example,
interventions discussed by Darrou, et al., 2010; Davis, Rosswurm & Zane, 2008;
Francis, 2005). Sixthly, psychological experimental methodology has been widely used
for autism research (see, for example, Williams, D., Happé & Jarrold, 2008). The use of
psychometric instruments in autism research studies, such as Baron-Cohen and
Wheelwright’s (2004) study, has generated a large body of research findings. Seventhly,
psychology has been pivotal for education and the development of theories of learning
through the use of psychology experimental methodology and the use of psychometric
instruments in educational research (see, for example, studies by Barton & Starnes,
1989; Mayer & Chandler, 2001).
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The foundational role of relevant psychological research for this educational study is
recognised. However, as Gardiner (2008) asserts, behavioural and cognitive theories
that do not accord with new evidence from neuroscience must be weeded out:
neuromyths are examples of psychological theories that have been discounted by
neuroscience (Lindell & Kidd, 2011; Pasquinelli, 2012). On the other hand, theoretical
understanding arising from the research on memory led by Tulving (for example,
Tulving, 1985) is an example of psychological theory that has been strengthened over
time as a result of supporting evidence from neuroscience.

2.3

Defining autism

Autism, a term independently adopted by Leo Kanner and Hans Asperger (Meyer &
Minshew, 2002), has become known as ‘autism spectrum disorder’ (ASD) (APA, 2013).
As it is a complex, heterogeneous condition (Frith, U., 2004; Szatmari, 2011), within
the research literature it has been variously recognised as: having subtypes (Noterdaeme,
Wriedt & Hohne, 2009; Witwer & Lecavalier, 2008), including autism, Asperger
syndrome and ‘Pervasive Developmental Disorders Not Otherwise Specified’; as a
spectrum disorder (Golan, Baron-Cohen & Golan, 2008; Happé, Booth, Charlton &
Hughes, 2006); or, even as ‘many autisms’ (Amaral, Schumann & Nordahl, 2008;
Dawson, 2008a). The difficulty of description, conceptualisation and diagnosis is
testament to the complexity and heterogeneity of the phenomenon of autism.
2.3.1

DSM-IV and DSM-5: Subtypes or spectrum?

In the researcher’s experience, the term ‘Asperger syndrome’ has entered the
mainstream vocabulary in Australia in the time since the researcher’s husband’s
diagnosis in 2005. In this period of time, AS has become commonly understood as
associated with autism, although there is confusion about whether AS is autism or a
separate condition: this debate is reflected in the research literature (Ghaziuddin &
Mountain-Kimchi, 2004; Yu, Cheung, Chua & McAlonan, 2011). The reclassification
of autistic spectrum disorders from DSM-IV (APA, 2000) to DSM-5 (APA, 2013) was
prompted by the need for greater ‘diagnostic sensitivity and specificity’ (Huerta,
Bishop, Duncan, Hus & Lord, 2012, p. 1056). Under the influence of the DSM-IV, the
construct of ‘Pervasive Developmental Disorders’, of which AS was a subtype, was
employed (Szatmari, 2011). However, prior to the publication of DSM-5, it was
foreshadowed that AS would no longer be seen as a separate subtype but would be
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merged into ‘autism spectrum disorder’. For those with a diagnosis of ‘Asperger’s
Disorder’ (APA, 2000) and their family members, the impending reconceptualising of
AS in the DSM-5 was the cause of considerable anxiety.
The prospect of losing the ‘Asperger’s syndrome’ label has also caused widespread
anxiety among parents and among affected individuals. (Skuse, 2012, p. 345)

This anxiety should be alleviated by the following acknowledgement in the DSM-5,
which: (a) indicates the change from subtypes to spectrum; and, (b) provides for the
continued use of the term ‘Asperger syndrome’ by the use of ‘encompassing’ rather
than ‘replacing’.
Autism spectrum disorder is a new DSM-5 disorder encompassing the previous DSM-IV
autistic disorder (autism), Asperger’s disorder, childhood integration disorder, Rett’s
disorder, and pervasive developmental disorder not otherwise specified. (APA, 2013, p.
809) [emphasis added]

From a clinical perspective, the change from subtypes to spectrum may ‘increase the
specificity of diagnosis, thus clarifying the distinction of ASD from other nonautistic
disorders,’ but be ‘at the expense of sensitivity’ (Skuse, 2012, p. 344). The classification
debate continues (Giles, 2014; Kite, Gullifer & Tyson, 2013; Wing, Gould & Gillberg,
2011).
2.3.2

Use of the term ‘Asperger syndrome’ in this study

Changes to autism diagnostic classifications and criteria in the editions of the DSM to
date reflect evolutionary development of understanding rather than a definitive set of
definitions and diagnostic criteria. While the primary audience for the various editions
of the DSM is diagnosing clinicians, the influence of the DSM on cultural conceptions
of disability is significant: for example, DSM diagnostic criteria are used by Centrelink,
the Australian government department responsible for social security payments, to
determine eligibility for support payments. However, it needs to be acknowledged that
the DSM-5 terminology is not binding on the stakeholders in this research study. The
lay audience is undoubtedly influenced by, and dependent upon, influential diagnostic
manuals such as the DSM, but it is not bound by them. The term ‘Asperger syndrome’
in Australia was, in early 2013, significant for the provision of support funding in
schools, and remains significant for those with a family member diagnosed with AS,
and for diagnosed individuals themselves. For these reasons, in this doctoral study, the
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use of the term ‘Asperger syndrome’ was maintained and it is accepted that: AS is an
autism spectrum disorder; that people with AS are ‘on the spectrum’; and, that research
findings on the construct of ‘autism’ are applicable (taking into account differentiating
features between subtypes or across the spectrum).
2.3.3

What is ‘the spectrum’?

‘Classic autism’ or ‘Kanner’s autism’ is the expression of autism accompanied by
moderate to severe intellectual delay, and was first described by Leo Kanner (1943).
Cognitive capacity (IQ) continued to be the distinguishing feature between subtypes of
autism, or across the spectrum (see, for example, Witwer & Lecavalier, 2008), until the
publication of the DSM-5. Differentiation of severity across the spectrum, previously
determined by IQ, is now determined by ‘adaptive functioning’.
Diagnostic criteria emphasize the need for an assessment of both cognitive capacity (IQ)
and adaptive functioning. Severity is determined by adaptive functioning rather than IQ
score. (APA, 2013, p. 809)

Under the DSM-5, ‘the spectrum’ has evolved from a spectrum of intelligence to a
spectrum of adaptive function.
2.3.4

High(er)-functioning autism versus Asperger syndrome

This doctoral study followed Baron-Cohen (2004) and Howlin (2003), who did not
distinguish between high-functioning autism (HFA) and Asperger syndrome for the
purposes of their research. However, the research effort to distinguish between HFA
and AS has been extensive (for example, Noterdaeme, et al., 2009; Yu, et al., 2011).
For the purposes of the current study, which began in 2008, starting-point definitions of
the terms ‘autism,’ high-functioning autism,’ and ‘Asperger syndrome’ followed BaronCohen and Wheelwright.
Autism is diagnosed when an individual shows abnormalities in social and
communication development in the presence of marked repetitive behavior and limited
imagination (American Psychiatric Association, 1994). The term HFA is given when an
individual meets the criteria for autism in the presence of normal IQ. AS is defined in
terms of the individual meeting the same criteria for autism but with no history of
cognitive or language delay (World Health Organization, 1994). (Baron-Cohen &
Wheelwright, 2004, p. 166)
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Not mentioned in this definition is the group of those diagnosed with autism, whose IQ
is above-average to superior. As the term ‘Asperger syndrome’ indicates average to
superior IQ (Ozonoff, Dawson & McPartland, 2002), it is inclusive of HFA (see, for
example, Howlin, 2003) and the terms are sometimes used interchangeably within the
literature (Yu, et al., 2011), although developmental language delay and verbal ability
have been employed as differentiating criteria (Bradshaw, 2013; Ghaziuddin &
Mountain-Kimchi, 2004; Noterdaeme, et al., 2009). A further point of confusion with
the term HFA is that it has sometimes been used in a relative sense, ‘higher functioning
autism,’ where its meaning is defined explicitly or by context (see, for example, Estes,
Rivera, Bryan, Cali & Dawson, 2011; Klin & Jones, 2006; Tsatsanis, 2004).
Furthermore, Boucher (2007) used the phrase ‘very high functioning autism’ to indicate
an individual with superior IQ and Asperger syndrome.
2.3.5

Locating the current study on the autism spectrum

In this doctoral study, phrases such as ‘gifted individuals with Asperger syndrome’ have
been purposefully utilised to highlight the region of the autistic spectrum of interest and
to indicate individuals with higher-than-average to superior cognitive ability. As
qualitative research, this study was not concerned with measures of cognitive capacity
(IQ). Instead, the Multiple Intelligences framework (Gardner, 2006), which has wide
acceptance in education, was employed. Evidence of giftedness in at least one domain
of the Multiple Intelligences framework was accepted as placing the participant within
the area of interest. This approach is particularly appropriate in ASD, given the narrow
strengths and uneven cognitive profile of gifted individuals with AS (Barnhill,
Hagiwara, Myles & Simpson, 2000; Cash, 1999). Figure 2.3 illustrates the
conceptualisation of the spectrum for this study and shows the region of interest in blue.

Figure 2.3 Conceptual map of the autism spectrum
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2.3.6

‘Typically developing’ and ‘neurotypical’

Difficulty with descriptive terms follows from diagnostic confusion. The importance of
non-discriminatory language is a core value of this research. The preferred phrase
‘gifted adults/individuals with AS’ (or similar) is used throughout the thesis. To
distinguish individuals without AS, the term ‘typically developing’ (TD) is used for
children who are experiencing a neurotypical developmental path (Kjelgaard & TagerFlusberg, 2013). Some authors refer to adults using the term ‘neurotypical’ (NT)
(Lombardo, et al., 2009; Pelphrey, Morris & McCarthy, 2005). Both of these terms,
‘typically developing’ and ‘neurotypical’, have wide acceptance throughout the
literature. However, it is acknowledged here that the use of words such as ‘typical’ to
indicate someone without AS and ‘compensatory’ (Section 2.7.5.3) to indicate features
of AS cognition compared to NT cognition is inherently discriminatory: such usage
positions NT individuals as ‘normal’ and individuals with AS as other-than-normal.
Mottron, Dawson and Souliéres (2008) have discussed the use of ‘normocentric’
language in autism spectrum disorders. It is entirely contrary to the intention of this
study to promote such discrimination and the necessary usage is offered with an
apology.
2.3.7

Wing’s Triad

No discussion defining autism would be complete without mentioning the significance
of ‘Wing’s Triad.’ The autistic triad of features of socialisation, communication and
imagination became known as ‘Wing’s Triad’ (Cashin & Barker, 2009) after Lorna
Wing (1981), who first described Hans Asperger’s work (1944) for the Englishspeaking world. However, Wing later gave joint credit to Gould for suggesting that
there was a triad of basic impairments in autism (Wing, et al., 2011). According to Yu,
et al., (2011), Wing disagreed with Asperger, ‘who had regarded Asperger syndrome as
distinct from Kanner’s autism’ (p. 412), thereby foregrounding the relevance of the two
bodies of literature on autism and AS to each other, and locating AS as a variant of
autism.
Wing’s Triad has been influential in defining, describing and diagnosing autism and AS
for professional and lay audiences. The three behavioural categories of ‘impairment of
social interaction,’ ‘impairment of social communication’ and ‘impairment of social
imagination’ (Wing, et al., 2011, pp. 768-769) provided the structure for the
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behavioural diagnostic criteria in the DSM-IV and DSM-IV(TR) (APA, 1994, 2000),
with the exception that ‘imagination’ was re-classified as ‘repetitive behaviour patterns’
in the DSM-IV (Wing, et al., 2011). Wing’s Triad according to Happé (1994) is
illustrated in Figure 2.4.

Figure 2.4 Wing's Triad of Impairments

In the DSM-5, the three behavioural categories of Wing’s Triad were collapsed to two,
merging communication and socialisation into a category called ‘social communication’.
The second behavioural category is ‘restricted, repetitive behaviours’ (APA, 2013, p.
52). Even though the DSM no longer follows Wing’s Triad, the DSM-5 category of
‘social

communication’

descriptively

aligns

with

the

‘socialisation’

and

‘communication’ categories in Wing’s Triad. Wing’s Triad continues to be historically
significant in the evolving understanding of autism.

2.4

Defining Asperger syndrome

The question ‘What is Asperger syndrome?’ is a simple question with a very complex
answer. This study aimed to provide an elaborative answer to this question by building
conceptual understanding using non-technical language and explanations, drawing upon
the literature, and illustrated by the case studies. Following the course of historical
developments in the field, the four major explanatory theories, shown in Figure 2.6, are
an important way of elaborating on Wing’s Triad and interrogating the neuroscience
and autism literature to gain insights into the nature of AS. To provide a brief answer to
the question ‘What is Asperger syndrome?’ as a background for this thesis, some
guiding statements based on the neuroscience, educational and autism literature follow.
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(a) AS is a complex neurological condition that involves different (from typically
developing) functional connectivity between brain regions and different levels of
activity within brain regions. Therefore, metaphorically speaking, the brain can be
said to be ‘wired’ differently (Anagnostou & Taylor, 2011; Baron-Cohen &
Belmonte, 2005; Baron-Cohen, et al., 2000; Frith, U., 2004; Gotts, et al., 2012;
Jordan & Murphy, 2011; Minshew & Hobson, 2008; Mottron, Dawson, Souliéres,
Hubert & Burack, 2006; Müller, R-A., et al., 2011).
(b) There is strong evidence for structural differences between the brains of individuals
with AS and neurotypical individuals in, for example: the volume and distribution of
grey and white matter (Beacher, et al., 2012; Cauda, et al., 2011; Ecker, et al., 2012;
Zilbovicius, et al., 2006); the reduced size of the corpus callosum (Casanova, et al.,
2011); the size difference of the cerebellum and reduced numbers of Purkinje cells
within the cerebellum (Amaral, et al., 2008; Hodge, et al., 2010); the structure and
connectivity of the amygdala and limbic system that is fundamental to the
development of social cognition (Abu-Akel, 2003; Ashwin, Chapman, Colle &
Baron-Cohen, 2006; Pelphrey, et al., 2005); and, enlargement of the hippocampus
(Ben Shalom, 2003; Schumann, et al., 2004).
(c) There is emerging evidence for neurobiochemical differences, such as ‘altered
metabolite levels in the amygdala [being] associated with a more severe early
developmental course in ASD’ (Kleinhans, et al., 2009, p. 1079) and decreased
levels of the neuropeptide oxytocin (Schulkin, 2007).
(d) AS is neurodevelopmentally distinct from typical development, meaning that brain
growth follows a different developmental trajectory, for example: early overgrowth
is followed by abnormally slowed growth (Carper, Moses, Tigue & Courchesne,
2002; Courchesne, et al., 2001); the size of the amygdala and hippocampus differs
from typical development through developmental stages (Groen, Teluij, Buitelaar &
Tendolkar, 2010; Nordahl, et al., 2012; Schumann, et al., 2004); and, there is
decreased synaptic pruning (Dawson, 2008a; Hill & Frith, 2003).
(e) The complexity of autism is such that a number of authors conclude that AS is a
symptomatically and cognitively heterogeneous condition (Amaral, et al., 2008;
Ashwin, Chapman, et al., 2006; Chen, Rodgers & McConachie, 2008; Frith, U.,
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2004; Klin & Jones, 2006; Szatmari, 2011; Williams, D. L. , Goldstein & Minshew,
2006), a complication that contributes to the difficulty of conceptual understanding
and diagnosis.
(f) Cognition (encompassing thinking and learning) in AS is distinct from TD cognition,
as first noted by Hans Asperger.
The idea that people with autism miss out on socially transmitted skills and information,
despite apparently intact information processing potential, fits well with Asperger’s
(1944; trans. Frith, 1991) original insights into the puzzle of autistic intelligence: [T]here
is an inability to learn from adults in conventional ways. (Scheuffgen, Happé, Anderson
& Frith, 2000, p. 89)

The differences in cognition are noted in all three bodies of literature that informed
the current study: neuroscience findings (for example, Schipul, Williams, Keller,
Minshew & Just, 2012); educational research (for example, Cash, 1999); and
psychological research (for example, Kilincaslan, Mukaddes, Kucukyazici & Gurvit,
2011).
(g) AS can be viewed as producing strengths as well as impairments (Assouline, FoleyNicpon & Doobay, 2009; Baron-Cohen, 2002; Baron-Cohen & Belmonte, 2005;
Rutherford, Richards, Moldes & Sekuler, 2007). The capacity to be completely
immersed in detail without consideration of context appears to be at the cost of
holistic (top-down) and social processing, as summarised in the theory of central
coherence (Section 2.7.6). Rather than focusing on impairments, this doctoral
research followed the values, espoused by Baron-Cohen and others, of considering
strengths alongside impairments. Within the wider literature, focus on strengths has
principally been applied to issues of employment for individuals with highfunctioning autism or AS, however, this is outside the scope of the current study
(Mottron, 2011; Parr & Hunter, 2013). Within the current study, the application of
the Multiple Intelligences framework to the phenomenon of AS in education
facilitates the consideration of strengths alongside weaknesses.

2.5

Qualitative Studies

Autism research has traditionally been conducted on rather than with individuals with
AS (Humphrey & Lewis, 2008). A small body of seven qualitative studies drew upon
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the perceptions and experiences of people with AS with a focus on social life and school
experience. None directly addressed learning or thinking, with the exception of a single
case study that examined memory (Boucher, 2007). Collectively, these seven studies,
which employed IPA (except Boucher’s, which employed a traditional case study
approach), served as models for this doctoral study. The studies are reviewed here
because of their foundational role in this doctoral study. They are discussed again in
Section 3.2 for their methodological contribution.
2.5.1

School studies

Two phenomenological studies by Carrington and her colleagues were conducted with
school students in Australia (Carrington & Graham, 2001; Carrington, et al., 2003). One
was a case study that collected data from two 13-year-old males with AS, while the
other collected data from five secondary school students, four male and one female,
focusing on the difficulties of socially navigating aspects of schooling. Humphrey and
Lewis (2008) interviewed 20 students with AS or HFA from mainstream secondary
schools in England and identified barriers to successful educational experiences: their
study produced similar findings to the Australian studies. Humphrey and Lewis’s study
confirmed the paucity of literature that illuminates the perspective of pupils in special
education, while calling for more research studies of this kind. These three studies
provided valuable insights into the experience and world of students with AS but did
not investigate thinking or learning.
2.5.2

Adult studies

Four studies drew directly on adult perspectives. Hurlbutt and Chalmers (2002)
conducted a 9-month qualitative study in the USA with three adults with HFA. The
findings of their study related to the participants’ views about their experience of having
autism: they concluded that ‘High-functioning adults with autism want to be considered
experts on, have opinions on and be consulted on issues related to autism’ (Hurlbutt &
Chalmers, 2002, p. 109). In the second study, Müller, E., et al., (2008), used interviews
to ask adults with AS to describe their ‘social worlds’ and to recommend social
strategies. One finding of this US study was the desire of adults to develop selfawareness. The third study, ‘I just don’t fit anywhere: Support experiences and future
support needs of individuals with Asperger syndrome in middle adulthood’ (Griffith, et
al., 2011), examined adults’ experiences of accessing support services in the community.
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Along with several of the other qualitative studies, this study reported explicitly on the
use of IPA to analyse and interpret the data. Collectively, these studies demonstrated a
consistent approach to the use of phenomenological methodology in AS research. The
only article to directly address cognition (in this case, memory) from an experiential
perspective was the single case study by Boucher (2007). The participant is a person
with AS, who, himself, has considerable expertise in the area of memory. The use of a
single case is a limitation, particularly in the light of the heterogeneity of AS, however,
it demonstrated: (a) the possibility of metacognitive self-reflection on the part of a
gifted adult with AS; and, (b) the use of case study methodology and personal
perspectives by a respected researcher in the field of memory in autism (see Boucher &
Bowler, 2008). Therefore, these studies demonstrated: the need for further research; that
participants with AS have the capacity to participate in research that contributes to a
greater understanding of AS; that, despite challenges (Newman, Cashin & Waters,
2010; Russo, et al., 2007), participants with AS are able to reflect upon their own
thinking; and, that a phenomenological case study approach is appropriate to a
qualitative educational research study of thinking and learning.

2.6

Learning, thinking and cognition

The term ‘cognition’ is used in a broad sense in the autism and neuroscience literature
to encompass neurocognitive activity, including ‘thinking’, ‘memory’ and ‘learning,’ as
these terms are generally understood within education. The term ‘social cognition,’ for
example, is so widely used as being synonymous with ‘social thinking,’ ‘social
understanding’ or ‘social intelligence,’ that there is rarely a need to define the term
(see, for instance, David, et al., 2008; O'Connor & Kirk, 2008). Garfield, et al., (2001),
citing Baron-Cohen (1991), stated: ‘… we use the term “social intelligence”
synonymously with “social cognition” to refer to “those aspects of the cognitive system
that are used in understanding the social world”’ (p. 507). ‘Cognition’ is a term widely
employed in the research literature to embrace thinking and mental activity (implicit
and explicit) and to distinguish between mental activity (visible on functional brain
scans) and the physical brain that does the processing. In autism research, both
cognition and the physical brain, together and separately, are the objects of study. As
can be seen in the following quotation, the distinction is drawn between the physical
brain (by the use of the words ‘neural’ and ‘brain’), and the mental processes of the
brain (by the use of the words ‘cognitive’ and ‘cognition’).
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If individuals with HFA [high-functioning autism] have difficulty with processing
complex information, this difficulty must result from a neurobiologic difference. …there
is a fundamental problem with functional underconnectivity of the neural systems of the
brain in HFA. …result[ing] in reduced integration of information at the neural and
cognitive level. Clearly, whatever is going on with cognition and the brain in autism
extends considerably outside the social, language and range of activities domains
constituting the DSM diagnostic triad of autism. (Williams, D. L., Minshew, et al., 2008,
p. 139) [emphasis added]

By contrast, practising teachers are more likely to speak in terms of ‘thinking’ and
‘learning’ than ‘cognition.’ Since the researcher is a teacher and not a psychologist or
neuroscientist, and as this study was initiated within a particular school context by the
identification of an educational problem, the preferred terms for the research question
were ‘thinking’ and ‘learning’ as teachers were more likely to speak in those terms.
The working definition of cognition for this study was simply ‘brain processes and
mental activity, both implicit and explicit, associated with thinking and learning’. This
definition incorporates ‘information processing’, a phrase inherited from information
processing theory (Section 2.7.3), as referenced in the quotation above through use of
the terms ‘processing’ and ‘reduced integration of information’. ‘Thinking’, for the
purposes of this study, was used to mean explicit, intentional mental activity. ‘Learning’
(in the cognitive domain) was used to mean mental activity that leads to increasing
understanding and skills, understanding being the goal of learning (Ritchhart, et al.,
2011). Thinking may, or may not, result in learning. Learning may result from explicit,
intentional cognition (thinking) and/or implicit, unintentional cognition. Figure 2.5
shows the relationship of the working definitions to each other.

Figure 2.5 Learning and thinking as subsets of cognition

As shown in Figure 2.5, cognition subsumes both thinking and learning: cognition is
defined as referring to all mental activity; thinking refers to explicit, effortful mental
activity; and, learning refers to implicit and explicit mental activity that leads to
increased understanding and skills. While these are shallow, working definitions, they
were a required starting point for the phenomena under investigation.
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2.6.1

Cross-disciplinary perspectives on learning

For this study, the educational perspective on learning was based on a constructivist
view: ‘… the student … construct[ing] his or her own reality or knowledge, and this
construction [is] based on the learner’s prior experiences, mental structures, and beliefs’
(Mory, 2004, p.770). However, from a neuroscience perspective, learning is understood
in terms of ‘neuroplasticity’, which is ‘the brain’s capacity to adapt continually to
changing circumstances’ (Blakemore & Frith, 2005, p. 205) or ‘changes in neural
connectivity’ (Wolfe, 2001, p. 195). In the past, the brain was theorised by behavioural
psychologists as a metaphorical ‘black box’ (Fischer, 2009) with learning processes
being unknowable, however, brain imaging studies provide evidence of neural
connectivity and activity that are the neurobiologic correlates to learning (Blakemore &
Frith, 2005; Wolfe, 2001). Within a neuroscience perspective then, learning is ‘the act
of making (and strengthening) connections between thousands of neurons forming
neural networks or maps’ (Wolfe, 2008, p. 17). Within education, learning is
demonstrated in terms of changed behaviour and outputs that are indicative of increased
understanding and skills. While a neuroscientist is interested in the changes in the brain
that are the physical correlates of the changed behaviour and outputs, an educator is
focused on assessable outputs that demonstrate learning. The neuroscience view of
learning is important to this study as so much evidence has accrued to show that the
neural processes affecting learning are disrupted in autism in ways not definable using
psychological methods. Therefore, throughout this thesis, evidence from neuroscience
research is used to illuminate the thinking and learning processes under investigation,
for educational purposes. The term ‘neuroeducation’ has been coined to describe such a
use of neuroscience in education (Battro, 2010; Pasquinelli, 2012).
2.6.2

Relationship between metacognition and theory of mind

Metacognition and ‘theory of mind’ are constructs within the educational and autism
literatures that share a close association. ‘Metacognition’ is a more familiar term in
education (Hannah & Shore, 1995; Shore, 2000; Sodian & Frith, 2008) and is
significant in this study for its relatedness to the notion of ‘theory of mind’ in the autism
literature (Neihart, 2000). Theory of mind is a phenomenon in human cognitive
development and Theory of Mind Theory is a major explanatory theory of autism
(Section 2.7.5).
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2.6.3

Twice exceptionality

Individuals with AS have ‘uneven cognitive profiles,’ a mixture of academic strengths
and weaknesses (Attwood, 2007; Lind & Bowler, 2010; Lovecky, 2004). They can be
both gifted and have learning difficulties and therefore are recognised as ‘twice
exceptional’ (Cash, 1999; Foley-Nicpon, Allmon, Sieck & Stinson, 2011; Foley-Nicpon,
Assouline & Colangelo, 2013; Norris & Dixon, 2011). Twice exceptionality, also
known as ‘dual exceptionality’ or ‘gifted with a learning disorder’ (Assouline, FoleyNicpon & Dockery, 2012; Kennedy, 2004; Wormald & Vialle, 2010), has its own
challenges in addition to the challenges of giftedness or a learning disorder alone
(Amend, Schuler, Beaver-Gavin & Beights, 2009; Bianco, Carothers & Smiley, 2009;
Jensen, 2008). For this doctoral study, Howard Gardner’s (2006) Theory of Multiple
Intelligences provides the framework that accommodates an understanding of giftedness,
disability and the complexities of twice exceptionality in relationship to AS. A number
of authors have proposed that twice-exceptional students’ strengths are the key to
successful learning, whereas many reports imply that the focus in schools tends to be on
weaknesses (Foley-Nicpon, et al., 2011; Foley-Nicpon, et al., 2013; Lovecky, 2004;
Willard-Holt, Weber, Morrison & Horgan, 2013). The participants in this doctoral study
are twice exceptional and their stories offer important insights. The core values of this
study include first recognising and valuing the strengths of individuals with AS, and
acknowledging weaknesses second.

2.7

Theoretical framework

This section elaborates the philosophical position and working theories that informed
this study: a socio-cultural approach to learning within a constructivist philosophy;
information processing theory; theory of mind; central coherence; executive function;
amygdala theory; and the Theory of Multiple Intelligences. The theoretical framework
is illustrated in Figure 2.6, which how shows the theories were conceptualised in
relationship to each other.
2.7.1

Constructivist philosophy

The theoretical framework is located within a constructivist worldview with the
researcher as ‘situated learner’ with membership of a particular socio-cultural group:
life partners of individuals with AS. A socio-cultural (Vygotskian) approach provides
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the basis of understanding learning and learners as culturally situated. Phenomenology
was employed to elicit the experience of participants, in order to investigate their
learning. The grey shaded area of Figure 2.6 represents the foundation of constructivist
philosophy upon which the study is based, and encompasses situated learning. This
philosophy is central to the study’s conception, methodology, role of the researcher and
the application of the findings.
2.7.2

Working theories

Information processing theory (IPT) was the starting-point for the working theories (see
the cyan-coloured sections in Figure 2.6, reading from left to right) because of the
wealth of evidence from brain-imaging studies of autism that contributed to the
development of the four major explanatory theories of autism—Theory of Mind,
Central Coherence, Executive Function and Amygdala Theory—and these provided the
starting-point framework for the development of a conceptual understanding of
Asperger thinking and learning. Intelligence, giftedness and cognitive profiles are at the
heart of this research study so the Theory of Multiple Intelligences (Gardner, 2006)
completes the theoretical framework as Gardner’s framework accounts for the twiceexceptional nature of Asperger syndrome and is strengths-focused. The relationship
between the theories is illustrated in Figure 2.6.

Figure 2.6 Theoretical framework
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The following discussion of each of the working theories illustrated in Figure 2.6
demonstrates their significance to education and to this study of thinking and learning in
gifted adults with AS.
2.7.3

Information Processing Theory

Information Processing Theory (IPT) historically underpins models of learning, such as
Gagné’s work in the 1970s, with recent breakthroughs in imaging technologies greatly
contributing to the development of our understanding of cognition and learning (Wolfe,
2001). Gagné (1974) identified his work on learning as based on information-processing
and his learning model (Fournier, 1996), although decades old, continues to stand well
in the light of current findings from neuroscience. Information-processing models of
cognition are foundational to the four major explanatory theories of autism and IPT
underpins many authors’ discussions of cognition in people with autism: for instance,
Scheuffgen et al., (2000) concluded that information-processing capacity in autistic
children with low IQ is preserved. Weak central coherence in AS is described in
information-processing terms (Happé, 1994) with strong central coherence equated with
‘global’ or ‘top-down’ processing and weak central coherence with ‘local’ or ‘bottomup’ processing (Jacobsen, 2005), indicating contrasting cognitive-processing styles.
Kanner, the researcher who originally described classic autism, used the term
‘fragmentary processing’ (Kanner, 1943, cited in Happé, 1994, p. 127). IPT allows the
processes of cognition and learning to be conceptualised from a neuroscience,
psychology and education viewpoint and is commonly held across all three bodies of
literature.
2.7.4

Explanatory theories of autism

The explanatory theories of autism are summarised here as Theory of Mind, Central
Coherence, Executive Function and Amygdala theory. Following Wing’s (1981)
proposition of AS as a form of autism to describe ‘those very able autistic people who
do not fit the Kanner stereotype of being silent and aloof’ (Happé, 1994, p. 83), there
was a concerted research effort to achieve theoretical understanding of AS as a subtype
of autism. Competing theories of autism emerged. Decades later, each of these four
working theories is still the organising theme for a body of research. None has become a
grand theory and all make novel contributions to theoretical understanding of autism.
The literature reveals unsuccessful attempts to unite two or more of the theories, for
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example, Happé and Frith’s (2006) defence against the proposition that central
coherence is a ‘mere side-effect of executive dysfunction, and may be independent of
theory of mind deficits’ (p. 5), or that ‘pure’ theory of mind ‘involves no executive
function component (no attention switching, inhibition, planning, etc., …) and no
central coherence component’ (Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe, Mortimore & Robertson, 1997, p.
816). Therefore, all four explanatory theories were needed to encompass the breadth of
literature and to provide conceptual keys to understanding autistic cognition for this
study. A brief description of each follows.
2.7.5

Theory of Mind

Theory of Mind (ToM) is the ability, which begins to develop in infancy, to represent
and attribute mental states—beliefs, emotions, thoughts and bodily sensations—to
oneself, and other people (Baron-Cohen, 1995; Frith, U., 2001). Also known as
‘empathy’, ‘mentalising’ and ‘mindreading’, ToM is the basis of social cognition
(Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004). ToM allows an individual to predict the likely
meaning and purpose of others’ behaviours and words and provides social cues that may
be overlooked by a person with poor ToM (Perner, Frith, Leslie & Leekam, 1989).
People with AS have impaired ToM (Boucher, 2012; David, et al., 2008). The notion of
ToM, as noted earlier, is closely associated with the educational literature on
metacognition, which is the ability to mentally represent one’s own thoughts and
feelings (Sodian & Frith, 2008). Developmentally, ToM begins early in infancy and is
usually developed by 9-11 years (Frith, U., Morton & Leslie, 1991), although advanced
ToM tasks may require further maturity. The neural networks that confer ToM capacity
have been the subject of much research (Abu-Akel, 2003; Frith, C. D. & Frith, 2008;
Frith, U., 2001; Gilbert & Burgess, 2008).
2.7.5.1

False belief tests

Theory of mind capacity is clinically tested with children through ‘false belief tests’:
simple scenarios (such as through the use of puppets) that allow the observer to predict
another person’s behaviour based on knowledge of the other person’s beliefs (BaronCohen, Leslie & Frith, 1985). An example of a false belief test in comic-strip form is
shown in Figure 2.7.
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Figure 2.7 The ‘Sally-Ann’ False Belief Task (Happé, 1994, p. 41)

Tests such as the ‘Sally-Ann’ task are used to assess a child’s theory of mind capacity.
In this task, a scenario using two dolls is acted out by the assessor, with the child
observing. The first doll, ‘Sally’, has a basket with a marble in it. The second doll,
‘Ann’, has an empty box. While Sally is out of the room, Ann moves the marble from
Sally’s basket to her box and closes the lid. When Sally returns, the assessor asks the
child, ‘Where will Sally look for the marble?’ (In other words, ‘Where does Sally
believe the marble is?’) Sally’s belief about the location of the marble is an example of
a mental state. Most TD children by about four years of age are able to distinguish
between their own belief about the location of the marble, having observed the scene
being played out, and the ‘false belief’ of Sally, who believes the marble is still in her
basket: they will therefore answer the question, ‘Where will Sally look for the marble?’
with, ‘In the basket.’ However, most children with autism are not able to distinguish
between their own knowledge of the marble’s current location and Sally’s false belief,
so will most likely answer the question, ‘Where will Sally look for the marble?’ by
saying, ‘In the box’ (Boucher, 2012; Happé, 1994).
The capacity to pass false belief tests demonstrates an appreciation of the
representational nature of mental states, that is: an individual’s mental representation of
a state of mind (for example, happiness) is distinct from the actual state of mind itself;
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and, the representation may represent or misrepresent the reality. Understanding the
nature

of

mental

representation

of

mental

states

has

been

described

as

‘metarepresentational ability’ (Leekam & Perner, 1991, p. 204) and has been proposed
as the underlying mechanism in the development of theory of mind that is responsible
for ToM deficits in autism (Baron-Cohen, et al., 1985).
2.7.5.2

Development of ToM in AS

ToM development in individuals with AS may be delayed or it may not develop into the
advanced theory of mind capacity anticipated in maturity (Baron-Cohen, et al., 1997;
Meyer & Minshew, 2002). ToM underlies social cognition by providing the capacity to
predict, to a fair degree of accuracy, what another person is thinking or feeling, even if
the other person has a mistaken belief, as a way of making sense of the behaviour of
others (Baron-Cohen, 1989). ‘Theory of own mind’, being aware of one’s own mental
states and the emotions that accompany those mental states (Frith, U. & Happé, 1999),
has been posited as diminished, similar to social ToM capacity in individuals with AS
and suggests a different experience of the self (Williams, D., 2010). Some individuals
with AS may learn compensatory social ToM skills through memorising social scripts
or rules for social behaviour (Boucher, 2012). However, mature social cognition in
natural settings relies on advanced, spontaneous ToM and in this context individuals
with AS display impairment (Senju, 2012). Intuitive understanding of other people’s
perspectives, taken into account together with one’s own, are likely to be beyond the
meta-representational capacities of most individuals with AS, however, compensatory
mechanisms may develop that allow them to factor the perspectives of others into their
thinking (Senju, Southgate, White & Frith, 2009).
2.7.5.3

Compensatory ToM mechanisms

High-functioning individuals on the autistic spectrum may develop compensatory
mechanisms for ToM to overcome the social problems raised by lack of ToM (Frith, U.,
2001): for example, memorising a list of ‘rules’ for social interactions to compensate for
lack of intrinsic ToM (Williams, E., 2004). Lack of intrinsic ToM results in social
awkwardness: where spontaneous reactions are required in response to others’
behaviours, compensatory mechanisms for ToM may not serve the individual well
(Bowler, 1992). Compensatory learning of social rules (or memorisation of social
scenarios, events, or scripts), in lieu of typically developing ToM, may be useful for
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situations involving basic ToM tasks (Hill, Berthoz & Frith, 2004; Minshew, et al.,
2002), but lack of ToM will be socially restrictive in tasks requiring spontaneous,
advanced ToM (Meyer & Minshew, 2002; Senju, 2012).
2.7.5.4

ToM and identity

Theory of mind is associated with the development of identity (Lind & Bowler, 2009),
although the mechanism for this is debated (Ben Shalom, 2003; Hobson, 1990; Hobson
& Meyer, 2005). Identity formation is related to episodic memory and autonoetic
consciousness (Perner, 2000) and is progressively addressed throughout the case studies
(for example, Sections 4.9.4 and 5.6.2).
2.7.5.5

Summary

Individuals with AS will, most likely, master basic ToM tasks later in development than
TD individuals, probably, in part, through compensatory learning. In natural social
situations where advanced spontaneous mentalising is required, lack of ToM capacity
contributes to the well-documented social disadvantage that is a feature of AS.
2.7.6

Central coherence

The term ‘central coherence’ refers to an information-processing style, described as a
‘perceptual-cognitive style’ (Burnette, et al., 2005, p. 63), and is weak in autism. Klin
and Jones propose that it leads to social impairment (2006). As with theory of mind and
executive function, central coherence is not a single cohesive construct (Lopez, Leekam
& Arts, 2008). Weak central coherence is sometimes referred to as ‘local’ or ‘bottom-up
processing’ and is contrasted to strong central coherence, ‘global’ or ‘top-down
processing’ (Neumann, Spezio, Piven & Adolphs, 2006). Individuals with weak central
coherence tend to focus on one detail in an event, picture or experience, not seeing the
bigger picture, context or gestalt (Blakemore, et al., 2006).
2.7.7

Executive function

Executive Function (EF) is the umbrella term that encompasses mental functions that
are reliant upon the prefrontal cortex (Adams, N. & Jarrold, 2012; Hill & Frith, 2003).
The prefrontal cortex in AS does not appear structurally abnormal. Instead, impaired
functional connectivity with other parts of the brain leads to decreased prefrontal cortex
activity, as demonstrated by blood flow rates (Kleinhans, et al., 2008), so AS is
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sometimes described as a disorder of integration of brain functions or brain connectivity
(Steyaert & De La Marche, 2008). Examples of EF mental activities are inhibition,
flexibility, planning, working memory, problem solving, multi-tasking, task switching,
control of attention (such as divided, joint, and so on), inner speech and decisionmaking (Hill, 2004a, 2004b; Williams, D., Happé, et al., 2008). A review of definitions
given in the literature for executive functions was provided by Kalbfleisch and Loughan,
and is substantially reproduced in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1 Definitions of executive function (Kalbfleisch & Loughan, 2012, p. 391)

Skills related to planning, monitoring, and regulating behaviour.
Ability to maintain adequate problem solving set over time for the purpose of attaining future goals.
Planning, inhibition, mental representation of the tasks.
Multiple component processes that include planning, decision-making, judgment, self-perception. It is the
most supra-ordinate level of cognitive processes.
Executive function resembles metacognition, a construct that includes monitoring, planning, organization,
coordinating knowledge and resources, and self-regulation.
Control processes involving inhibition and delay of responses.
Skills that are requisite for goal-directed and purposeful activity: volition, planning, purposeful action,
effective performance.
Goal-directed behavior.
A special case of attention including nonverbal working memory, verbal working memory, internalization
and self regulation, reconstitution.
Problem representation, planning, execution, evaluation of the complete process—skills making reference
to, but not equated with, goal-directed problem solving.
Executive function viewed in the context of metacognition, knowledge and process(es) that monitor and
control cognition.
A set of higher-order functions and behaviours that are responsible for purposeful, goal-orientated,
problem-solving activities.
Anticipation, goal selection, planning, initiation of activity, self-regulation, mental flexibility, deployment
of attention, utilization of feedback.
Skills aligned with reasoning and perceptual speed performance in adults.

Baron-Cohen and Belmonte (2005) proposed ToM as the basic construct and that EF
impairments and weak central coherence processing style in autism are consequences of
impaired ToM. Booth et al., (2004) maintain that executive function and central
coherence are distinct cognitive phenomena. Although there is debate about the
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relationship between the three explanatory theories, whether one subsumes the others,
there is agreement that EF impairments are a feature of AS (Hala, Rasmussen &
Henderson, 2005; Happé, et al., 2006; Landa & Goldberg, 2005).
2.7.8

Amygdala theory

Unlike the previous three explanatory theories, which are conceptual, amygdala theory
is based on research into an organic brain structure. The amygdala, a pair of almondshaped organs (amygdalae) in the midbrain, is centrally involved in the processing of
emotions and emotional regulation (Bechara, Damasio & Damasio, 2000). The
amygdala is an important part of the neural network underlying social cognition (BaronCohen, et al., 2000) and in autism is abnormal in size, poorly connected to the
prefrontal cortex and shows abnormal activity. People with damage to the amygdala
may acquire autistic qualities (Ashwin, Chapman, et al., 2006). Work by Damasio and
Immordino-Yang (2007) has suggested a crucial link between emotion processing and
learning: this is an emerging connection of potentially key importance to educators
(Immordino-Yang, 2008). When there is a greater body of research explicating the
relevant mechanism, amygdala theory may contribute substantially to educators’
understanding of thinking and learning in autism as it occupies an important place in
autism research (Ben Shalom, 2003; Munson, Dawson & Abbott, 2006; Schulkin, 2007;
Schumann, et al., 2004) and is therefore included in the theoretical framework of this
doctoral study. The role of the amygdala and its profound influence on thinking is
acknowledged, however, it did not play a direct role in the findings of this doctoral
study as the theoretical relationship between learning and the amygdala did not appear
to develop significantly within the research literature over the study’s timeframe.
2.7.9

Purpose of theories that form the theoretical framework

The purpose of each theory for this study, with indicative references, is summarised in
Table 2.2.
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Table 2.2 Theories and their rationale for inclusion in the theoretical framework

Theory

Indicative references

Reason for inclusion

Socio-cultural
approach to learning,
situated cognition
(Vygotsky)

(Brown, J. S., et al., 1989)
•
(Larkin, et al., 2011)
•
(Vialle, Lysaght & Verenikina, 2005b)
(Wertsch, 2011)
•

•
Information Processing (Williams, D. L., Minshew, et al., •
Theory (IPT)
2008)

Core learning theory for this study
Elaborates what is understood by
the word ‘learning’ and the nature
of learning processes
The data suggest that AS thinking
and learning can be understood in
cultural terms and the education of
students with AS as a crosscultural transaction requiring
different cultural understanding
The role of the researcher is
understood as ‘situated learner’
Neuroscience research relies upon
IPT

•

Neuroscience is contributing
greatly towards new understanding
of autism and learning

•

IPT is foundational to the
explanatory theories of autism

Theory of Mind
Central Coherence
Executive Function
Amygdala Theory

(Baron-Cohen, 1995)
(Happé & Frith, 2006)
(Happé, et al., 2006)
(Immordino-Yang & Damasio, 2007)

•

Four major explanatory theories of
autism provide a starting-point
conceptual framework for
understanding thinking and
learning in Asperger syndrome.

Theory of Multiple
Intelligences

(Gardner, 2006)

•

Provides the basis for
reconceptualising learning in
gifted individuals with AS

•

Accounts for giftedness,
intelligences, disability, cognitive
profiles, twice-exceptionality

•

Supports development of a
conceptual framework of Asperger
thinking and learning

The theories selected for the theoretical framework of this study provided the
philosophical foundation and the scaffold for understanding autism and AS based on
research across the disciplinary areas of neuroscience, education and psychology.
2.7.10

Implications of explanatory theories for this research

The implications of each of the explanatory theories for this research are summarised in
Table 2.3 below.
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Table 2.3 Implications of theory for research

Theory

Implications for this research

Theory of Mind

•

Theory of Mind is impaired with people with AS. (Frith, U., 2001)

•

Participants with AS may have found it challenging to reflect on their own
mental states in order to be able to describe their thinking processes to the
researcher. (Frith, U. & Happé, 1999)

•

Theory of mind conceptually aligns with ‘metacognition’ in the educational
literature. (Neihart, 2000; Sodian & Frith, 2008)

•

Metacognitive capacity is viewed as a characteristic of successful learners.
(Hannah & Shore, 1995; Schneider, W., 2008; Shore, 2000)

•

Central coherence in autism is said to be ‘weak’ indicating a detail-focused
information-processing bias. (Blakemore, et al., 2006; Jarrold, Butler,
Cottington & Jimenez, 2000)

•

Data collected from participants with AS may contain detail without
reference to context. (Hill & Frith, 2003)

•

The strategy of using key informants and artefacts will be employed to
account for likely weak central coherence by providing contextual
information.

•

Executive function is impaired in AS and is associated with underconnectivity of the prefrontal cortex and other brain regions serving
executive control. (Hill & Frith, 2003; Kalbfleisch & Loughan, 2012)

•

Essential cognitive components of learning being impaired (Battro, 2010;
Davis-Unger & Carlson, 2008; Meltzer, 2010) posed the key research
question, ‘How do gifted adults with AS think and learn?’

•

Participation in the study required executive skills such as keeping
appointments, focused attention, and so on. This posed challenges to data
collection and influenced the research design. Flexibility to contribute using
asynchronous methods such as email, and contribution of artefacts catered
for this challenge.

•

The amygdalae show structural differences in people with autism, including
different developmental growth trajectories. (Amaral, et al., 2008; BaronCohen, et al., 2000; Kleinhans, et al., 2009)

•

As a key component of the limbic system (emotion-processing), the
amygdala is involved in executive function. (Bechara, Damasio & Damasio,
2003)

•

Building a comfortable relationship with participants was an important
feature of this study to overcome anxiety associated with encountering new
situations and people. (Burnette, et al., 2005)

•

The limbic system is implicated in social anxiety and sensory sensitivities.
The setting of interviews and meetings had to account for these. (JennesCoussens, Magill-Evans & Koning, 2006)

•

Amygdala theory may have particular relevance to how people learn with
regard to affective aspects of learning. (Immordino-Yang & Damasio, 2007)

Central Coherence

Executive Function

Amygdala Theory
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2.7.11

Reconceptualising Asperger learning within the framework of
Multiple Intelligences

Gardner’s Theory of Multiple Intelligences (1993) provides the framework that
accounts for twice-exceptionality. Gardner has wrestled with the issues of intelligence
in autism and giftedness (2006) and the Multiple Intelligences framework is therefore
suitable for an exploration of Asperger thinking. Theories of intelligence where a single,
rankable IQ is thought to exist are unhelpful and lead to lack of recognition of
intelligence in people who do not fit the learner profile being captured by the IQ testing
employed (Gould, 1981). Such a view of intelligence is, according to Gardner,
impoverished (2000). Many people with AS, including the participants of this study (see,
for example, Section 4.9.5), report that they have been told they are ‘stupid’ and that
their intelligence is not recognised (Attwood, 2007; Carrington & Graham, 2001;
Carrington, et al., 2003). Gardner’s framework has fostered a new discussion of
intelligence and learning, one in which a learning disorder does not disqualify one from
being intelligent (Gardner, 2008b).

2.8

Chapter conclusion

This chapter has provided a discussion of the cross-disciplinary nature of this doctoral
study, which draws upon the fields of neuroscience, education and psychology.
Contributions from the literature in each of these disciplines was foundational to the
development of this study’s research question and design. From the literature review of
the three bodies of research, definitions were provided and theoretical propositions were
drawn together into a theoretical framework. The theoretical framework informed the
study itself and provided the starting point for the development of the conceptual
framework of understanding that was the output of this study.
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Chapter 3 Methodology & Method
3.1

Introduction

This study was conceived within a constructivist theoretical paradigm (Lincoln & Guba,
2013), which was formerly designated as ‘naturalistic inquiry’ (Lincoln & Guba, 1985).
Within this paradigm, Lincoln and Guba described the appropriate methodology as
‘hermeneutic/dialectic’ (Lincoln & Guba, 2013, p. 65), terms that are compatible with
the phenomenological methodology employed in this doctoral study. The research
strategy utilised was a phenomenological case study approach using interpretative
phenomenological analysis (IPA).
Table 3.1 Paradigm, methodology and method, according to Lincoln and Guba’s (2013) taxonomy

Taxonomy
Paradigm
Methodology
Method

3.2

This study
Constructivist (Naturalistic)
Phenomenology
Case studies employing interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA)

Methodological influences

As discussed briefly in Chapter 1, Gardiner, in the introductory chapter to Memory in
Autism: Theory and Evidence (2008), raised the need for converging sources of
evidence where previously the research community relied on behaviourist and cognitive
theories of autism. He argued that functional brain-imaging techniques have provided
empirical evidence requiring theoretical assumptions to be consistent with
neuroanatomical function. Gardiner proposed that a third source of evidence, which he
called ‘Mind’, is now required alongside behavioural and brain studies. This category
refers to the reports of people experiencing the phenomenon of autism, and he asserts
that ‘there is an increasing willingness amongst memory theorists to take on board
mental life as experienced, and reported verbally, by participants in memory research’
(p. 15). Gardiner’s illustration of the three converging sources of evidence in the field of
memory in autism is reproduced below in Figure 3.1 (see also Figure 1.4).
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Figure 3.1 Three kinds of converging evidence (Gardiner, 2008, p. 16)

Gardiner’s call for first-hand reports contributed to the rationale for the choice of
phenomenological methodology here and this doctoral study augments the autism
research by providing case studies that focus directly on cognition and learning, where
previous case studies—listed in Table 3.2—examined social and educational issues. The
six phenomenological studies cited in Table 3.2 supplied the model for this current
study through the use of a similar research design that involved analysis and
interpretation of first-hand reports by participants with autism and AS.
Table 3.2 Six phenomenological studies of relevance

Author and Year

Title of Journal Article

Carrington & Graham (2001)

Perceptions of school by two teenage boys with
Asperger syndrome and their mothers: A qualitative
study.

Hurlbutt & Chalmers (2002)

Adults with autism speak out: Perceptions of their life
experience.

Carrington, Papinczak, & Templeton (2003)

A phenomenological study: The social world of five
adolescents who have Asperger's Syndrome.

Humphrey & Lewis (2008)

'Make me normal': The views and experiences of pupils
on the autistic spectrum in mainstream secondary
schools.

Müller, E., Schuler, & Yates (2008)

Social challenges and supports from the perspective of
individuals with Asperger syndrome and other autism
spectrum disabilities.

Griffith, Totsika, Nash & Hastings (2011)

'I just don't fit anywhere': Support experiences and future
support needs of individuals with Asperger syndrome in
middle adulthood.

Each of the studies in Table 3.2 utilised some form of what Humphrey and Lewis
(2008) called ‘interpretive phenomenological analysis’ (IPA) (p. 23). It is noted here
that most sources used the longer form of the word interpretive—interpretative—when
referring to IPA. In this current study, and drawing on the six studies cited above, an
interpretative phenomenological approach provided the framework that guided data
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collection, analysis and interpretation: generalisable themes were distilled that were
consistent with the literature within the boundaries defined by this study’s theoretical
framework. The six studies cited above employed different terms to describe their
methodology, however, they clearly followed a similar research process. Carrington and
Graham (2001) labelled their study a ‘case study approach … through the use of semistructured interviews … An inductive approach to data analysis [that] identified four
themes’ (p. 37). Carrington, et al., (2003) described theirs as a ‘phenomenological
approach, within an interpretative sociological framework, [which] facilitates an
understanding of the participants’ experience’ (p. 16). Humphrey and Lewis (2008)
described the IPA approach they used as semi-structured interviews and ‘descriptive
coding of data leading to the eventual organization of analytical themes’ (p. 28). Müller,
E., et al., (2008) conducted interviews where participants articulated their experience,
the outcome being the themes that emerged. Griffith, et al., (2011) used the phrase,
‘interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA)’ (p. 1).
The six phenomenological studies cited above together represent an evolving
methodology: a phenomenological case study approach using IPA, successfully applied
to autism and AS research; that results in the development of themes, which are
assessed for generalisability. The increasing validation of IPA as a distinct methodology
situated within a recognised research paradigm was confirmed for this doctoral research
with the publication of the reference book by Smith, Flowers and Larkin (2009). Indeed,
further reports have since been uncovered that indicate increasing recognition and
appreciation for the productive findings available through IPA (Huws & Jones, 2008,
2013; Larkin, et al., 2011; Newman, et al., 2010; Williams, E., 2004). Although none of
the reports listed in Table 3.2 focused directly on thinking and learning, one report was
discovered that did and that study also exerted a major influence upon the methodology
of this doctoral study. Boucher’s (2007) single case study report is significant in that it
directly addressed memory in very high-functioning autism using a qualitative approach,
demonstrating that a cognitive phenomenon can be investigated using a case study
approach which is both descriptive and interpretive, and is an example of the first-hand
reports called for by Gardiner (2008).
The choice to utilise an inductive, qualitative study based on a broad research
question—‘How do gifted adults with Asperger syndrome think and learn?’—using
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semi-structured interviews, artefacts, and an IPA framework to arrive at emergent and
super-ordinate themes was modelled on these seven studies. Taken together, the studies
provide the precedent for using a phenomenological case study research design with
gifted people with AS and confer face validity on this doctoral study.

3.3

Research design and methods

This study employed a case study design in line with the studies discussed in the
previous section. A case study design allowed for the heterogeneity of AS (Szatmari,
2011) while examining the phenomenon of Asperger thinking and learning across
multiple cases, allowing for theory formation which can be assessed for generalisability
(Punch, 1998). Working within an interpretative phenomenological framework (IPA) as
a situated learner (Brown, J. S., et al., 1989; Larkin, et al., 2011), triangulation of data
with multiple sources across five cases of gifted adults with AS was employed. Data
were collected through: semi-structured, audio-recorded interviews of primary
participants (gifted adults with AS) and secondary participants or key informants
(without AS); and, artefacts, such as emails, photographs, and documentary evidence.
Analysis was conducted through iterative reflection, frequent comparison with
neuroscience and autism research literature, data coding and categorisation, leading to
emergent and super-ordinate themes and the development of a conceptual framework.

3.4

Research question and sub-questions

The starting-point research question:
How do gifted adults with Asperger syndrome think and learn?
The sub-questions:
(a) Can gifted individuals with AS describe how they think and learn? Given the ToM
issues noted in the autism research literature, what means will they use to describe
their thinking and learning?
(b) Is there a distinct cognitive profile (information-processing style, memory, and
learning) that emerges from the case studies of gifted individuals with AS?
(c) What pedagogical insights emerge from the case studies?
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(d) Do neuroscience, autism and memory research inform educational theory
development with respect to learning as it is understood by teachers? Can
understandings of thinking, memory and learning from neuroscience and
psychology be mapped to a framework that has meaning for teachers seeking to
understand differences between the thinking, memory and learning of their typically
developing students and their students with AS?

3.5

Aim

The aim of the study was to investigate the thinking and learning of gifted adults with
AS and, with the benefit of current neuroscience research, to utilise the perspectives of
gifted people with AS and their key informants to develop a conceptual framework of
thinking and learning in AS, for the understanding of individuals with AS, teachers,
parents and partners. Furthermore, the purpose was to support the stakeholders’ move
beyond deficit views of AS and to facilitate bi-directional acceptance and understanding
of the differences between cognition in AS and typical development.
The intellectual functioning of gifted people with AS can appear mysterious to others,
exposing cultural differences (in the broadest sense of ‘culture’). This scenario was
being played out in the researcher’s former school setting (Section 1.4) by the teachers
who forthrightly professed themselves to be mystified by the behaviours of their
students with AS and what those behaviours indicated about the students’ learning. This
observation does not reflect harshly on those teachers: on the contrary, they were
expressing an authentic need for professional knowledge that was not available to them
in their pursuit of what was best for their students. The lack of conceptual
understanding made it difficult for the teachers to ‘problem-solve’ in their efforts to
facilitate their students’ learning. Wertsch, writing from a Vygotskian perspective,
recently stated:
Some dyads and larger groups…seem to function differently and perhaps at more
advanced levels than others. ... This raises questions requiring conceptual frameworks
that will be quite different from those we currently employ. (Wertsch, 2011, p. 43)

While the teachers’ current frameworks for understanding the thinking and learning of
their students were recognised as inappropriate for students with AS, the conceptual
framework that could facilitate their understanding was not available to them. The aim
of developing a conceptual framework of the thinking and learning of students with AS
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was born out of this need, expressed by teachers. It may be appropriate, within a
Vygotskian perspective, to conceptualise Asperger and neurotypical cognition as
indicative of different intellectual or mental cultures. If so, then the conceptual
framework that is the theoretical outcome of this doctoral study—the ‘Thinking,
Memory and Learning Framework’ (TML)—potentially contributes to improved
relationships between those cultures on a micro (in individual teacher-student dyads)
and macro level (teacher professional development, pre-service teacher training). It is
also anticipated that teacher professional development using the framework will
contribute to a culture shift within schools and education more broadly, away from a
deficit view and towards a view of the twice-exceptional student with AS as a gifted
learner.

3.6

Sampling strategy

IPA employs ‘purposive sampling’, which ‘resembles theoretical sampling’ (Smith, et
al., 2009, p. 252). Theoretical sampling is a sampling technique employed in grounded
theory, a methodology that may be viewed as ‘the main alternative method for someone
considering IPA for a research study’ (p. 201). Mertens (2005) refers to Guba and
Lincoln (1989) to outline this notion of sampling:
… respondents who will enter into the hermeneutic process must be selected.
But such sampling is not carried out for the sake of drawing a group that is
representative of some population to which the findings are to be generalized.
Nor is the sample selected in ways that satisfy statistical requirements of
randomness. The sample is selected to serve a different purpose, hence the term
‘purposive sampling’ … (pp. 177-178)
They go on to describe a sampling process that is not preordained but allowed to evolve
with the emergence of issues in the research. (Mertens, 2005, p. 324)

The principle of theoretical sampling is ‘the idea that subsequent data collection should
be guided by theoretical developments that emerge in the analysis’ (Punch, 2009, p.
133). Therefore, the final selection of cases may not occur until late in the process (see
Figure 3.2).
Small sample sizes are appropriate in IPA research: ‘IPA utilizes small, purposivelyselected and carefully-situated samples, and may often make very effective use of single
case analyses’ (Smith, et al., 2009, p. 29). The researcher’s own position and personal
contacts may be a key element in the recruitment of participants and selection of cases.
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…samples are selected purposively (rather than through probability methods) because
they can offer a research project insight into a particular experience. Most frequently,
potential participants are contacted via: referral, from various kinds of gatekeepers;
opportunities, as a result of one’s own contacts; or snowballing (which amounts to
referral by participants). Participants are selected on the basis that they can grant us
access to a particular perspective on the phenomena under study. That is, they ‘represent’
a perspective, rather than a population. (Smith, et al., 2009, pp. 48-49) [emphasis added]

Purposive sampling in IPA is not intended to be representative of a population and is
not suitable for the purposes of measurement, comparison or statistical manipulation.
Participant selection, instead, aims to represent perspectives on human lived experience
and the cases in this doctoral study were selected with this purpose: that is, for their
capacity to provide information-rich perspectives on the phenomenon of interest.
IPA facilitates the study of invisible or elusive phenomena. Smith, Jarman, and Osborn
(1999) made this point with regard to cognition, while contrasting IPA with discourse
analysis.
While IPA shares with discourse analysis (DA) a commitment to the importance of
language and qualitative analysis, where IPA researchers would typically differ from
discourse analysts is in the perception of the status of cognition. DA, as generally
conceived of in contemporary social psychology, is sceptical of the possibility of
mapping verbal reports on to underlying cognitions … IPA by contrast is concerned with
cognitions, that is, with understanding what the particular respondent thinks or believes
about the topic under discussion. Thus, IPA, while recognizing that a person's thoughts
are not transparently available from, for example, interview transcripts, engages in the
analytical processing in order, hopefully, to be able to say something about that thinking.
(Smith, et al., 1999, p. 219)

The choice of IPA as the research design for this study is appropriate for a study of
cognition as the IPA framework confers acceptance of the perspectives of the
participants on their thinking as valid data for analysis.
Operating, like ethnography, within a naturalistic paradigm, IPA recruits participants
from a particular community or group of people who are experiencing a phenomenon in
common: the phenomenon in the case of this doctoral study being the intellectual or
‘mental culture’ of gifted individuals with Asperger syndrome (AS) (Section 3.5). The
phenomenological methods focus on the participants’ lived experience, as described by
themselves. Bogdan and Biklen (1998) state that:
Researchers in the phenomenological mode attempt to understand the meaning of events
and interactions to ordinary people in particular situations. … Phenomenologists …
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attempt to gain entry into the conceptual world of their subjects (Geertz, 1973) in order to
understand how and what meaning they construct around events in their daily lives.
Phenomenologists believe that multiple ways of interpreting experiences are available to
each of us …. (Bogdan & Biklen, 1998, p. 23)

However, IPA moves beyond ‘classic’ phenomenological research by self-consciously
adopting a hermeneutical approach to the data analysis: that is, undertaking an
interpretive analysis and situating that analysis within a context that makes the position
of the researcher and the theoretical developments undertaken transparent to the reader.
It can be said that the IPA researcher is engaged in a double hermeneutic because the
researcher is trying to make sense of the participant trying to make sense of what is
happening to them. (Smith, et al., 2009, p. 3)

This doctoral researcher is also a member of the ‘community’ impacted by the
phenomenon of thinking and learning in gifted individuals experiencing AS, by means
of her own lived experience (documented in Section 1.3), and, therefore, she selected a
methodology and methods that leveraged her position as being most appropriate to
answer the research questions. As the life partner of a person experiencing AS, she
provided an ‘insider’s view’ to the case selection, analysis and interpretation of the
research.
… the researcher as an individual, complete with values, opinions, biases, and feelings,
brings an experiential world to the research process that influences the phenomena studies.
Rather than adopt a position of ‘omniscient observer’ that may be apparent in varieties of
quantitative research, the qualitative researcher instead seeks to interpret, understand, and
describe in a reflexive process. Because qualitative research rests on such ontologic and
epistemic foundations, it enables the acknowledgement of complexity, ambiguity, and
dynamism in human phenomena. It centralizes individuals’ experiences and the meanings
they ascribe to them. It also places the participant as the ‘experiencer’ in the position of
expert, and the investigator in the position of learner. (Wilding & Whiteford, 2005, pp.
98-99)

The ‘community’ from which this study drew were people in the researcher’s local
context of Sydney, NSW, Australia, who identified themselves as experiencing AS, and
where there was significant supporting evidence, such as: a formal diagnosis by a
qualified professional; AS traits exhibited during interview; or, educational
accommodations offered during the participant’s schooling. This approach is supported
by Jones, Quigney and Huws (2003), who reported the use of the criterion of selfidentification as a basis for participant selection in their study.
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Although the diagnosis of these persons was not independently confirmed, all of these
individuals described themselves as high-functioning autistic individuals. (p. 113)

Evidence of giftedness was also required for inclusion. This was established simply in
the light of: personal histories of learning; career achievements: and, artefacts; for Kahla
(a successful artist), Rhoda (a graphic design teacher), Colin (a long successful career in
publishing, broadcasting and photography), and Riley (numerous academic publications
in his field). To characterise the individual participants’ giftedness in multiple
intelligences terms would be interesting but was not the purpose of the study. Gifted in
one domain (for example, the visual-spatial domain in Rhoda’s case, where she is able
to accurately render detailed 3D drawings of buildings from 2D blueprints despite never
having seen the building) satisfies Gardner’s description of giftedness.
Giftedness is a sign of early or precocious biopsychological potential in the domains of a
culture (Winner, 1996). A person who advances quickly, who is ‘at promise’ in an
available task area or domain, earns the epithet ‘gifted’. Individuals can be gifted in any
area recognized as involving intelligence. (Gardner, 2000, pp. 78-79)

Rhoda recounted in her interview that she exhibited this superior artistic capacity in
childhood. In 18-year-old Nadia’s case, giftedness was established through: samples of
her schoolwork (a stage play written for her HSC major work, photographs of fashions
she designed and made modelled on the catwalk); and, her and her key informant’s
(mother) verbal recounts of teachers’ reports and comments regarding her giftedness.
The interpretive analysis was conducted with extensive reference to the research
literature from neuroscience and psychology as the findings of these disciplines clearly
contribute enormously to the understanding of the mental phenomenon of ‘learning’,
formerly said to be unknowable, inside a ‘black box’.
… we can begin to use research tools, such as brain imaging, analysis of cognitive
processing and learning, and genetics assessment to illuminate the “black box” and
uncover underlying learning mechanisms and causal relations (Hinton & Fischer, 2008).
(Fischer, 2009, p. 3)

Further literature reviews were called for throughout the interpretive process as the need
for new conceptual understandings was realised: the researcher viewed herself as a
learner moving beyond previous knowledge domains, thus needing to build accurate
conceptual understanding from primary sources to undergird her analysis and
interpretation.
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A number of interviews took place that were ultimately excluded from the final case
selection, including some where the transcriptions had been completed. These
interviews did not represent the phenomena under investigation richly enough in a form
amenable to analysis and interpretation: for example, a shy 15-year-old male school
student with a formal diagnosis and a highly articulate key informant (father), where the
primary participant’s interview and artefacts provided insufficient evidence of
giftedness. His non-selection as a case was not a judgement on his giftedness, rather that
the data collection process had failed to provide solid triangulated evidence of
giftedness in one or other multiple intelligence domains.
The sampling strategy of this doctoral study was to allow the criteria for the final
selection of cases to evolve over the course of data collection (see Figure 3.2). The
emergence of early themes (for example, memory in autism, and the role of memory in
learning) facilitated a greater focus on eliciting rich information in these areas in the
later interviews and contributed to the selection and exclusion of cases at the conclusion
of the data collection phase.

3.7

Generalisability

Generalisability of the output of this doctoral research is claimed on the basis of its
theory development activity: that is, the development of a conceptual framework based
on the iterative literature search conducted throughout the study; not on the selection of
the case studies as being representative of a population. The question of generalisability
from a single or small number of case studies has been discussed by Punch (2009) and
Smith, Flowers and Larkin (2009) and, it is argued, validity is maintained if the case
studies are utilised in two ways: ‘The first is by conceptualizing, the second is by
developing propositions’ (Punch, 2009, p. 121). The development of a conceptual
framework is a means of conceptualising the themes emerging from the cases,
interpreted in the light of relevant research literature.
A conceptual framework is a representation, either graphically or in narrative form, of the
main concepts or variables, and their presumed relationship with each other. (Punch,
2009, p. 83)

The issues surrounding case selection in IPA have been discussed in Section 3.6. The
case studies of this doctoral research are viewed within a naturalistic paradigm as
information-rich, phenomenological ‘units’, capturing instances of the phenomenon of
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thinking and learning in gifted individuals experiencing AS from the participants’ own
perspectives, thus making those data available and amenable to interpretation. In order
for the interpretation of the data that is offered throughout this thesis to hold validity, it
must be judged as being a creditable interpretation against the literature upon which the
interpretation relies.
The early interviews and artefact collection served to focus the field of investigation,
and indicated the need for an iterative literature search throughout the study. The
conceptual understanding of interest to this study contained within the literature was
documented (Appendix B is an example) and mapped into diagrams that ultimately
formed the conceptual framework, ‘The Thinking, Memory and Learning Framework
(TML)’ (Appendix C). The need for an iterative approach to the research literature
became obvious soon after the analysis of Case 1 commenced and, therefore, the
unusual step was taken to include another substantial literature review within Case 1
(Sections 4.3 to 4.6). Following the development of the TML framework, in
presentations to stakeholders the case studies then served a different purpose. Figure 3.2
illustrates the evolving nature of the study and its impact upon case selection and claims
of generalisability.
Figure 3.2 maps case selection, the iterative literature review and generalisability for
this doctoral study within an IPA framework. After initial contact by potential
participants with the researcher, if the enquirer met the criteria for the study, an
information package was mailed to them. When the signed consent form was received,
the date, time and venue for the interview were arranged. Interview and artefact
collection was based on semi-structured interview schedules (see Appendix 1). After the
first interview, which was with ‘Kahla’ (Case 1), the issues raised that were not already
well-understood from the background literature review, necessitated further ongoing
literature searches (shown in Figure 3.2 in green). The need for clarification and
ongoing refinement of the researcher’s conceptual understanding from the literature also
emerged from other interviews. The literature search, therefore, became a central pillar
of the study and continued throughout as: (a) new research reports significantly
impacting upon an understanding of the phenomena described by the participants were
published month by month; and, (b) the need became apparent for deep and broad
‘mining’ of the literature as the lens through which the interpretation was conducted. As
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the data collection and analysis continued, conceptual mapping of important notions
within the literature was undertaken (shown in blue to the right of the iterative literature
search), initially as a way of summarising and clarifying the literature, but eventually
this was recognised as a central strategy for each stage of the analysis, and finally it was
apparent that the conceptual mapping (shown in pink) was, itself, an important product
of the study and represented the study’s theoretical output. As discussed within Section
3.6, the final case study selection (shown in beige to the left of the iterative literature
search) was not possible until the data collection was finalised and the major themes
across the data that were reflected in the literature became apparent. It was only then
that the most information-rich cases could be selected. As the case studies are not
representative of a population, but rather a perspective, generalisability is not claimed
for the case studies. However, the conceptual mapping of the literature that was
prompted by issues arising from the data collection is generalisable. Once the data
collection was completed and the emergent themes recognised, the case studies then
served a further, different purpose (shown in beige on the right), that of illustrating the
conceptual framework.

Figure 3.2 Case selection and generalisability

As shown in Figure 3.2, final selection of case studies was late in the research process,
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after the emergence of themes and with concurrent literature searches. Generalisability
is not claimed on the basis of case study selection or sampling techniques; instead it is
claimed for the conceptual framework that was developed as the theoretical output of
the study. Following the completion of the study, the case studies then served the
further purpose of illustrating and providing examples for the framework to be utilised
for professional development.

3.8

Participants

The primary participants were gifted adults who had received a diagnosis of AS or were
of the view that they had AS, where there were significant supporting indicators. Key
informants (KI), such as life partners or parents, were also participants for each case,
where available. Priority was given to participants where there were significant
indicators of giftedness, as defined within the Multiple Intelligences framework
(Section 2.7.11), demonstrated throughout a participant’s personal history by: career
achievements and artefacts such as publications; a formal diagnosis by a psychologist or
psychiatrist; and, availability of a key informant and artefacts. An accessible location
facilitating face-to-face interviews was important to the study. In one case, the
interviews were conducted at the participants’ request via Facetime (Apple software
similar to Skype).

3.9

Recruitment

Participants were drawn from people who made contact by phone, email or in person
after limited advertising through word of mouth, the ASPIA (Asperger Syndrome
Partner Information Australia) and ‘Aspect’ (Autism Spectrum Australia) newsletters,
and through submissions to the newsletters of four local schools. A total of 39 people
made contact. From the initial contact, people who did not meet the criteria for the study,
or who did not fall within the boundaries set by the ethics approval, were screened out.

3.10

Case selection

Sixteen interviews were conducted. Five cases, consisting of nine interviews, were
selected as the focus for this study because of the quality of the data and the fulfilment
of Punch’s (2009) ‘four characteristics of case studies’ (p. 120) in the data collected.
Young people with AS, aged 14 to 17 years, were initially included as participants and
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several interviews took place, however, the most ‘information-rich cases’ (Speirs
Neumeister, Yssel & Burney, 2013, p. 265) all had adult primary participants so the
focus of the study shifted onto the reflections of adults on their schooling and learning.
The primary participant in one of the selected cases was aged 18 at the time of the
interview and was still at school so this case, Case 4, offered a perspective on recent
experiences of schooling. The other interviews that were not selected did not fulfil
Punch’s criteria for various reasons, such as where triangulation of data was not
available due to divorce, or because of non-disclosure of participation to the partner.

3.11

Case descriptions

The cases were bounded by the focus on the thinking and learning of a gifted individual
experiencing AS. In four cases, the person with AS had received a formal diagnosis by a
psychologist or psychiatrist. Case 5 involved a person represented by his wife, with his
agreement, as having AS without a formal diagnosis: the wife is a teacher of children
with special needs, including autism spectrum disorders, and, within her professional
capacity, recognised her husband as meeting the criteria for AS. The traits presented and
discussed during both interviews and a requested follow-up interview affirmed the view
that a working diagnosis of AS was justified. Case 1 had no key-informant interview as
all of her immediate family members were also diagnosed with AS. The decision to
include the case was made due to the richness of the data provided, the presence of
similar themes to the other cases, and the provision of artefacts. Table 3.3 provides a
summary of the cases.
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Table 3.3 Cases, participants and artefacts

Case
1

Participant
Kahla

Description
48 yo female

Key Informant1
No key informant

2

Rhoda

Female in her 60s

Partner (Steve)

3

Colin

Male in his 50s

Partner (Wendy)

4

Nadia

18 yo female

Mother (Lydia)

5

Riley

Male in his 60s

Wife (Renae)

3.12

Artefacts
Emails
Artworks
Artwork
Digital publication
Emails
Photographs
Magazine publication
HSC major work
Photographs of fashion
creations
Newspaper articles
Publication list
Résumé
Awards

Data collection

Triangulation of data, represented graphically in Figure 3.3, was achieved through
audio-recorded, semi-structured interviews, artefacts and continual reading of the
research literature in neuroscience and autism.

Figure 3.3 Triangulation of data

3.12.1

Literature

As shown in the theoretical framework (Section 2.7), the neuroscience and autism
literature were foregrounded in this study. Because the phenomena under
investigation—thinking and learning—are not themselves observable, and this study
directly investigated these phenomena (not their behavioural outcomes), this was
possible only in the light of recent advances in neuroimaging that provided evidence of

1

Nomenclature employed aligns with participants’ usage
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neural differences between the thinking of individuals with AS and those experiencing
typical development. The literature was foundational to decision-making in regard to:
research design; data collection; analysis; the development of categories and codes;
thematic development; and, trustworthiness; and it played a key role in the interpretive
process.
3.12.2

Interviews

The semi-structured interview format allowed participants to determine the direction of
their interview. Participants were given a copy of the interview schedule (Appendix A)
prior to the interview. If a lull in the conversation occurred, the interview schedule was
referred to. Where possible, the participants’ recollection and reflections were given
free rein within the topic area. The interviewer’s focus was on: the comfort and ease of
participants with AS to reduce the stress of being in a new situation with a stranger;
clarifying meaning and ensuring audio clarity for the recording; probing for greater
depth; verbally validating contributions; sharing information in response to questions as
a means of returning a benefit to participants; and. taking limited notes. The interviews
were conducted over the course of 12 months in 2011 and 2012 and included several
interviews with young people or their family members. During that time, the focus
sharpened onto gifted adults and their memory processes. More talk on memory
processes was therefore elicited in the later interviews than in the early ones. All
interviews, with the exception of Case 2, were conducted face-to-face at a time and
location of mutual convenience, with priority placed on ensuring the least stress
possible to the participants and on achieving a good-quality audio recording. In Case 2,
the interviews were conducted via Facetime (software similar to Skype) at the
participants’ request. The computer screen was recorded using software called iShowU
and the audio track was stripped out for transcription. Key informant (KI) interviews
were conducted for corroboration, elaboration, assistance with meaning, and to give
different perspectives and independent interpretations. KI interviews were an important
member-checking strategy for establishing truth value and credibility (Section 3.14).
3.12.3

Artefacts

Artefacts were collected as evidence of gifted achievement, as well as for corroboration
and elaboration. Examples are the academic publication list of Riley and photographs
by Colin. A number of participants maintained contact after the interview via email and,
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with their permission, their emails were treated as artefacts to complement the interview
data. In each case, data collection procedures were negotiated with participants to align
with their ability and willingness to contribute.

3.13

Data analysis

This section describes the process of data handling and analysis, including the
categorisation and coding structure developed for the study.
3.13.1

Transcription

Audio recordings of the semi-structured interviews were transcribed. The transcripts
were subjected to at least two passes of accuracy checks, line by line, by the researcher
and an associate. The challenge was to be faithful in meaning to the utterance while
transcribing mid-sentence changes of direction, unfinished utterances, and repetitious
verbal habits: which were, in some interviews, excessive. Where participants displayed
perseverative use of phrases, words or sounds that did not convey verbal meaning (such
as ‘sort of’, ‘you know’, ‘um…um…um’), these were edited out in the later accuracy
checks. An excerpt of a transcript before and after redrafting is provided here to
demonstrate the type of editing that was employed to move from a literal transcription
to formatted quotes for this thesis.
Table 3.4 Transcript excerpt before and after editing

Original literal transcription
I’m, you know, I’m I’m actually on sick leave
because of all the stress and all the stuff that’s been
going on. It’s you know. And I think part of it is
Asperger’s and part of it is people who want power
and a whole lot of things. It’s complicated.

3.13.2

After redrafting
I’m on sick leave because of all the stress and all
the stuff that’s been going on. I think part of it is
Asperger’s and part of it is people who want power
and a whole lot of things. It’s complicated.

The analysis process

Müller, E., et al., (2008), described their process of analysis as ‘qualitative analyses of
the interview transcripts [that] revealed a number of common experiences’ (p. 173), a
process very similar to those described in less detail in the other IPA studies cited in
Table 3.2. Müller’s team coded the transcripts with a ‘preliminary coding structure’ (p.
176) in mind, while other studies allowed categories and themes to emerge through
repeated readings, coding and interpretation. Hurlbutt and Chalmers (2002) described
the purpose of their study as being to ‘investigate and describe [participants’]
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perceptions of their life experiences’ and the process as ‘asking them about their
experiences’ (p. 103). They used interviews and artefact examination to form themes:
As we read the data, we documented recurring ideas and thoughts and identified
emerging patterns. We made comparisons and analyzed data using an open coding
procedure. To understand the phenomenon of the perceptions of the lives of adults with
autism, we inductively formed categories. … Thoughts believed to be important or
significant were identified. … coding was done by paragraph and/or main idea … the
next step involved identifying concepts … the codes were collapsed into seven categories
… eventually four patterns emerged … (Hurlbutt & Chalmers, 2002, p. 104)

In Hurlbutt and Chalmers’ terms, the significant elements for this doctoral study were:
(a) documenting ‘recurring ideas and thoughts’ as the data from the current study were
read and re-read, feedback from presentations to stakeholders was received, and further
reading of the literature was undertaken; and, (b) employing an ‘open coding procedure’
of inductively formed categories, which was understood to be an organic process of
category development, where ‘organic’ indicates that the codes and categories are
suggested by the data rather than imposing a pre-existing structure upon the data. For
example, when primary participants in three of the five cases talked about memories
from infancy, a literature search was conducted on ‘infantile amnesia’: the literature
search revealed diminished childhood amnesia as a recognised phenomenon in autism.
‘Childhood amnesia’ was then used as the name of a code (NVivo ‘node’) that was
grouped under the category of ‘Memory’. Other references to diminished childhood
amnesia were then coded using this node. Further information on coding and category
development is given in Section 3.13.3.
While the team approach adopted by Müller, E., et al., (2008) facilitated discussion as
part of the analysis and interpretation process, being a sole researcher mandated internal
reflection, which was based on these guiding questions: (a) What does this mean? (to
the participant; to the researcher; to stakeholder audiences); (b) How are the data
illuminated by the autism and neuroscience literature?; (c) What are the common
themes across cases?; and, (d) What are the issues that arise in one case and not others?
Feedback from presentations given to stakeholder audiences and further reading of
relevant research literature was also used to reflect on the data.
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3.13.3

Coding, categories and the development of themes

Using the qualitative analysis software NVivo, the evolutionary development of
categories and codes was a critical process throughout the analysis and is, according to
Guba and Lincoln (1981), a key to the trustworthiness of a study. Codes, and the folders
they were stored in (representing categories), were developed from the research
literature and from the data, as shown in Figure 3.4.

Figure 3.4 Category and code development

Initially, codes were created to reflect ideas or topics raised in the relevant research
literature in neuroscience and autism. As an open-ended, cross-disciplinary
investigation, the number of codes required to reflect all the notions raised was too large
to be meaningful, hence the need to create a structure for the codes. Organisation was
achieved through the creation of category folders and the codes were allocated to the
categories. The naming and definitions of categories and codes were drawn from the
literature, which then informed the development of categories and codes used for
transcripts and artefacts. Throughout the study, categories and codes were reorganised
to align with clarified understanding and insight, in order to reveal the emerging themes.
As a naturalistic study, the study design mandated triangulation to establish
trustworthiness. The interpretive process of category and code development could not
be member-checked by participants (the reasons for this are discussed in Section 3.14)
so must be judged against the literature by which it was informed. The process that
Carrington, et al., (2003) described reflects the strong reliance on the research literature
that was also a feature of this doctoral study.
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Meanings and words that emerged from the data were organized into categories, however,
the categories of data were also influenced by the literature that informed the research…
(Carrington, et al., 2003, p. 16)

The coding structure was developed organically. As passages were read and re-read for
meaning, codes (nodes) were created and allocated to folders that represented categories,
until redundancy was achieved. Nodes were keywords and phrases, such as ‘episodic
memory’, ‘concept formation’ and ‘amnesia’. The categorising of these three nodes into
the folder ‘Memory’ was guided conceptually by the literature (for example, Ben
Shalom, 2003; Boucher & Bowler, 2008; Klinger & Dawson, 2001; Markowitsch &
Staniloiu, 2011; Minshew, et al., 2002).
Transcripts and artefacts were, at first, coded with a separate node structure to the
research literature. Part-way through the analysis, transcript nodes were rolled over into
the same folders as literature nodes and then combined, resulting in a single coding
structure. This became possible once confidence in definitions and concepts was
achieved. Ongoing refinement of the node structure took place as more was learned
from the research literature about the subject areas raised in the transcripts. For example,
at first there were separate nodes for ‘Autobiographical memory’ and ‘Episodic memory’
but after further reading it was realised, for the purposes of this study, the passages
coded to ‘Autobiographical memory’ could be rolled over into ‘Episodic memory’ as,
conceptually, episodic memory subsumes autobiographical memory. This is true with
the exception of certain fine distinctions: for example, see Crane and Goddard (2008).
The end result was, in the ‘Memory’ folder for example, a single node called ‘Episodic
memory.’ Every ‘source’ (journal article, transcript or artefact) with an excerpt coded to
the ‘Episodic memory’ node was then accessible by opening the node (double-clicking
on the node name), which opened a new window showing all source excerpts coded to
that node.
As an idea or a popular culture reference was noted in a transcript—for instance, The
Cabinet of Dr Caligari (Wiene, 1920), in Case 2—time was spent researching the idea
until confidence was achieved that the speaker’s intended reference was understood by
the researcher. In the example just given, it was important to the analysis to understand
both the reference itself and the speaker’s purpose for raising the reference. The
reference to Dr Caligari was coded as ‘Metaphor’ in the category ‘Cognition’ as the
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speaker was using the reference to describe her horror of certain objects, thus providing
a clue to her visual processing. Excerpts were most often coded to multiple nodes,
facilitating extensive cross-referencing: hence, the reference to Dr Caligari was also
coded to ‘Emotion processing’ in the ‘Emotion’ category and ‘Bullying’ in the ‘School’
category as the speaker was using the reference to explain why she repeatedly ran away
from school. Refinement of the coding structure involved the combining of nodes where
different nodes contained similar data (through a process of clarifying definitions and
meaning over time), prioritisation of significant nodes, and grouping into a smaller
number of categories. In this way, definition of terms, where different phrases had been
used, were reconciled and conceptual categories became clearer, allowing themes to
emerge.

3.14

Trustworthiness

To address aspects of trustworthiness in this study, the structure provided by Guba and
Lincoln (1981, p. 104), reproduced below in Table 3.5, was employed.
Table 3.5 Scientific and naturalistic terms appropriate to various aspects of rigor

Aspect
Truth value
Applicability
Consistency
Neutrality

Scientific Term
Internal validity
External validity/generalizability
Reliability
Objectivity

Naturalistic Term
Credibility
Fittingness
Auditability
Confirmability

Since this is a naturalistic—later described as ‘constructivist’ (Lincoln & Guba, 2013, p.
23)—study, it utilises what Guba and Lincoln (1981) described as credibility,
fittingness, auditability and confirmability. Truth value in this doctoral study is asserted
through credibility with the stakeholder audiences of the research, along with prolonged,
substantial

engagement,

member

checks

and

triangulation

(Mertens,

2005).

Applicability, equated with external validity, was formatively and summatively
evaluated by the ‘fittingness’ of the research findings based on feedback from
stakeholder audiences and by generalisable or transferable findings in the form of
theory development (Punch, 1998, 2009). The theory development activity of this
doctoral study resulted in the conceptual framework for understanding thinking,
memory and learning in AS: the TML (Appendix C). Transferability was achieved by
thick description and multiple cases. Consistency, equating to reliability in the positivist
paradigm and also described as ‘dependability’, is demonstrable through the auditability
of the research process and documentation, providing a ‘chain of evidence’ (Mertens,
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2005, p. 253). Consistency is founded on the audit trail so that ‘a competent judge’
could ‘[attest] that [the study] was carried out in a competent manner’ (Guba & Lincoln,
1981, pp. 122, 123). Neutrality, replacing objectivity and replicability, which are not
claimed in phenomenology, can be ascertained by a competent judge who, using the
audit trail, would examine the methods and outcomes of this study based on accurate
documentation, rich description, sustained engagement of the researcher, feedback from
stakeholder audiences and triangulation of data.
… one would be more inclined to accept the reports of one magician standing in the
wings during another magician’s performance … (Guba & Lincoln, 1981, p. 125)

As in the analogy of the ‘magician standing in the wings’, a competent judge, in this
instance, is necessarily not a research participant but, rather, someone well-versed in the
relevant research design and literature.
3.14.1

Credibility and fittingness

Claims of credibility and fittingness for this doctoral study are based on the following
criteria: prolonged engagement, persistent observation, triangulation and member
checking (Lincoln & Guba, 1985).
3.14.1.1

Prolonged engagement

Since the diagnosis of the researcher’s husband in 2005, a period of three years was
spent ‘learning the culture’ (Lincoln & Guba, 1985, p. 301) as a situated learner prior to
commencing the study part-time in 2008. Personal and professional associations
established through this time were maintained throughout the study. This represents a
nine-year engagement with the audiences and culture of the investigation and
contributes to the claim of credibility of this study.
3.14.1.2

Persistent observation

Persistent observation helps distil the ‘things that really count’ (Lincoln & Guba, 1985,
p. 304) in the inquiry and sort out irrelevancies. This is accomplished by:
… continuously engag[ing] in tentative labelling of what are taken as salient factors and
then exploring them in detail, to the point where either the initial assessment is seen to be
erroneous, or the factors are understood in a nonsuperficial way. To satisfy this criterion
of trustworthiness, the naturalist must be able to describe in detail just how this process of
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tentative identification and detailed exploration was carried out. (Lincoln & Guba, 1985,
p. 304)

In this doctoral study, persistent observation was employed to engage with the
phenomena of potential interest until the salience of each phenomenon to the inquiry
was ascertained. That persistent observation has been a feature of this inquiry is
demonstrated by: (a) the evidence of wide reading through recorded Endnote references
and notes; (b) the NVivo coding structure, whose evolution can be traced through
frequently archived backups; and, (c) engagement with stakeholder audiences through
meetings and presentations. Some of the phenomena that were examined were
ultimately deemed to have no salience for the research questions of the study, for
example: causation, including genetic studies; educational, behavioural and social
interventions; the role of the cerebellum in autism; mirror neurons; oxytocin; and,
pharmacological research. These were excluded as the emergent themes came into focus.
3.14.1.3

Triangulation

The term ‘triangulation’ is used here to mean ‘contextual validation’: both, (a) to
compare similar evidence from different sources about the same phenomenon; and, (b)
to validate the sources (Lincoln & Guba, 1985, pp. 305-306). Examining the
phenomena in the research literature and across multiple cases is an example of the first
form of contextual validation. Use of artefacts and key informants is an example of the
second. As previously noted, triangulation of data sources was required by the research
design in order to investigate the cognitive phenomena of thinking and learning.
Interview data were collected from two sources, primary participants and key
informants, along with artefacts from the primary participants. These were analysed in
the light of the relevant research literature in neuroscience and autism. The studies listed
in Table 3.2 examined human experience relating to observable, behavioural
phenomena. On the other hand, the current study investigated mental phenomena and a
study of this nature was not possible prior to the recent advances in neuroimaging
techniques and the theoretical developments in autism that followed; the research
literature has therefore been pivotal to each stage of this study.
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3.14.1.4

Member checking and multiple audiences

Lincoln and Guba (1985) assert that in naturalistic inquiry, truth value or credibility, is
established through exposing the process and outcomes to the various audiences from
which the data were drawn.
In order to demonstrate ‘truth value,’ the naturalist must show that he or she has
represented those multiple constructions adequately, that is, that the reconstructions (for
the findings and interpretations are also constructions, it should never be forgotten) that
have been arrived at via the inquiry are credible to the constructors of the original
multiple realities. (Lincoln & Guba, 1985, pp. 295-296) [italics in original]

As the naturalistic inquirer is dealing with multiple realities, it is for the audiences to
determine whether the description and interpretation of the data is credible and
applicable to them. Therefore, the multiple audiences for this inquiry were central to
establishing credibility and fittingness. The audiences were teachers, individuals with
AS, life partners and family members. Exposing audiences to the progress and
outcomes of the study (‘road-testing’) was the core strategy for establishing truth value
(credibility) and applicability (fittingness). The audiences provided an intrinsic
member-checking process through their responses to presentations given throughout the
study. Feedback received from all presentations was evaluated. Well-attended sessions
running overtime by demand, email correspondence, absence of negative feedback, and
follow-up invitations, were testament to the positive reception of the presentations.
Questions from audience members were sometimes influential in determining an aspect
of the study when the incompleteness of the explanatory framework at that time was
exposed by the questions. Tables 3.6 to 3.10 list the audiences, presentations and
documentary evidence.
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Table 3.6 Member checking: Teachers

Presentations Given
In-service and post-graduate teachers, ‘Autism
Certificate’. Lectures given: January 2008, January
2009, January 2010, June 2010, January 2011,
January 2013, January 2014.

Evidence Stored files in italics
Verbal feedback from January 2013 session:
students gave session high rating.
Presentation handout
Email
Feedback.pdf

Professional development, K-12 school teachers:
May 2008, October 2009.

Email

Professional development, K-12 school teachers: 3
sessions in April-May 2011

Email

‘Learning & the Brain’

Recipient of research Scholarship Award, $5,000
study tour to USA.

www.learningandthebrain.com

Conference Poster
Boston, MA, USA: November 2011
Professional development, K-12 school teachers:
May 2012
Teacher’s Guild of NSW, Annual Poster
Presentation Lecture Evening: July 2012. Brief
presentation and poster. Selected for award.
Higher Degree Research Conference: October 2012

MAS Email to teachers.pdf
MAS feedback 1.pdf
MAS feedback 2.pdf
Teacher consultations.pdf
MAS Leadership Support.pdf
Hope PD 1.pdf
Hope PD 2.pdf

Award Letter Cert.pdf
Feedback.pdf

Runner-up Research Award 2012
Guild Research Award.jpg
Guild Research Poster.pdf
HDR Conference 2012.pdf
Feedback HDR Conf.pdf

Table 3.7 Member checking: Individuals with Asperger syndrome

Presentations Given
Support group for people with Asperger syndrome:
March 2013

Evidence
Presentation handout
Copies of email with arrangements
ArrangementsEG.pdf

Feedback and correspondence with a participant
Feedback1.pdf

Report to supervisors
Report for supervisors.pdf

Table 3.8 Member checking: Life partners of people with Asperger syndrome

Presentations Given
Support organisation for life partners of individuals
with AS, 3 hour workshops: July 2010, April 2011,
October 2011, May 2012, February 2013, March
2014.

Evidence
Presentation handout
Feedback.pdf
120512 Notes on presentations.docx

Table 3.9 Member checking: Parents

Presentations Given
K-12 school Asperger syndrome parent support
group: May 2012

Evidence
Feedback.pdf
120512 Notes on presentations.docx

Table 3.10 Member checking: Personal consultations

Formal Consultations
MT: regarding adult brother
Case 5: follow-up consultation
MO: regarding partner

Evidence
August 2011, diary entry
July 2012, diary entry
Meeting May 2012
Extensive email correspondence
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Member checking usually involves the submission of data that has been gathered and
interpreted back to the participant. In this doctoral study, stakeholder audiences
provided the member-checking process. This elicited more than accuracy of the data,
instead, stakeholders responded with questions and commentary that offered nothing
but positive ‘fit’ for the listeners’ context.
3.14.1.5

Member-checking by study participants

Key informant (KI) interviews were designed as a member-checking strategy for the
data provided by primary participants (gifted adults with AS) and were conducted, in all
but one case (Case 5, where the delay was due to the participant’s health), soon after the
primary participant interviews. Notions raised by the primary participants that called for
elaboration were discussed with KIs to check and enhance the researcher’s observations
and interpretations. Artefacts also played a member-checking role as: they were
considered alongside interview data; they supported claims made by the participants;
and, they influenced the researcher’s interpretations.
There were two obstacles to be navigated regarding post-interview member-checking of
the researcher’s interpretations by the nine study participants. First, participants in four
cases specified that either they didn’t want to see their own, or both, they didn’t want
their partner or family member to see their transcript or hear the interview recording. In
Case 5, copies of the transcripts were given to the primary participant and key informant
during the requested follow-up consultation, where they reviewed the transcripts and
asked follow-up questions to advance their understanding, so this was the only case
where direct member-checking was possible. Secondly, it was not appropriate to
undertake member-checking by participants of the category and coding structure as it
was based on the research literature and, without knowledge of the literature and the
theoretical framework of the study, participants were not in a position to verify that the
codes, categories and thematic interpretation were credible and applicable. Furthermore,
the literal, concrete, cognitive style of participants with AS mandated against direct
member-checking as this study involved theory development. Therefore, the literature
was relied upon to guide and authenticate the category and coding structure. NVivo
project backup files demonstrate the development of the evolving coding structure for
the study and are available for audit.
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3.14.2

Auditability and confirmability

The auditability and confirmability of the study was addressed by: the researcher
keeping a reflective journal and a diary from the beginning of the study; the storage of
all documentation and digital evidence, such as email correspondence; double-checking
by a colleague of interview transcripts with the audio recordings for accuracy; and, a
comprehensive backup archive that provides evidence of originality and the
developmental course of the study. The files shown in Tables 3.6 to 3.10 (filenames are
italicised) contain evidence that the presentations and consultations took place, and give
examples of feedback from audience members. This evidence has not been included in
the thesis because it necessarily identifies individuals and the inclusion of the
identifying information would be a breach of privacy. The complete information, files
with names and contact details, will be stored for five years after the conclusion of the
inquiry and is available for auditing and confirmation by a competent judge (Guba &
Lincoln, 1981).

3.15

Limitations

The limitations of this research will be outlined under the headings ‘Generalisability
and the heterogeneity of AS’, ‘Number of cases’, and ‘Metacognition’.
3.15.1

Generalisability and the heterogeneity of AS

Limitations of this doctoral study related to generalisability are: (a) the findings are
based on gifted individuals who have particular cognitive features not shared with
individuals with other autism spectrum disorders; (b) the perspectives of adults
reflecting on past experience may not relate to current school practices or the views of
school-aged children and adolescents; and, (c) the inherent heterogeneity of AS presents
challenges to the generalisability of findings.
Heterogeneity in autism, and within AS itself (Frith, U., 2004), signifies that the
manifestation of autism varies from person to person (Williams, E., 2004), leading some
researchers to prefer the term ‘many autisms’ rather than speaking of a spectrum
(Amaral, et al., 2008). Focus on gifted people with AS overcame this limitation to an
extent by defining the region of the autism spectrum from which participants have been
drawn (see Figure 2.3), but, as it is a complex disorder, to differentiate between the
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heterogeneity of the condition and personal individuality is an ongoing challenge that
must be met by a thorough grounding in the research literature. The underlying
mechanisms of autism allow generalisations to be made, as evidenced by the vast
literature based on the common features of a diagnosis of autism or AS. There is an
implicit acknowledgement of both the commonalities and heterogeneity of AS in
Humphrey and Lewis’ (2008) discussion citing Norwich and Lewis (2005), who
proposed a conceptually layered approach to this problem to facilitate educational
problem-solving:
‘[Norwich and Lewis] argue that we can address pedagogic needs in three ways: first, by
thinking about those needs that are common to all; second, by thinking about those needs
that are specific to group (e.g. pupils with AS); and third, by thinking about those needs
that are unique to individuals.’ (Humphrey & Lewis, 2008, p. 41) [italics in original]

The heterogeneity of AS and autism is well established (Mottron, et al., 2006) and is, in
itself, acknowledgement of the commonality between ‘autisms’ as heterogeneity is a
feature of all autism spectrum disorders. It is, therefore, a reality for any research study
of autism. While care must be taken during data analysis to avoid over-generalising at a
low-level (between individual cases), distilling themes to inform conceptual
understanding with applicability across multiple cases of AS is a legitimate form of
theory development (Punch, 1998, 2009) with the precedent having been set by the
studies listed in Table 3.2.
3.15.2

Number of cases

While the number of cases in this study is small, the design is appropriate for a
qualitative research study that focuses on the perceptions, experiences and
interpretations of people with AS, while gathering rich, in-depth data. Punch (1998)
argued that such case studies can produce generalisable findings if the case is used to
conceptualise or develop propositions that can be ‘assessed for their applicability and
transferability to other situations’ (p. 154). Punch later stated that:
When generalizability is a goal, and we are focusing on the potential common elements in
a case, it is necessary for the analysis of the case study data to be conducted at a sufficient
level of abstraction. The more abstract the concept, the more generalizable it is.
Developing abstract concepts and propositions raises the analysis above simple
description, and in this way a case study can contribute potentially generalizable findings.
(Punch, 2009, p. 122)
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The aim of this doctoral study was to develop a conceptual framework of understanding
of the thinking and learning of gifted people with AS and so a small-scale collective
case study approach was suitable for this purpose within the chosen research paradigm.
3.15.3

Metacognition

The third area of limitation is the well-documented problem with metacognition, closely
related to theory of mind, for those with AS (Neihart, 2000; Sodian & Frith, 2008;
Williams, D., 2010); therefore, the challenge was to locate participants who were able to
articulate their thinking processes. There were concerns early-on that recruitment was
going to be a particular challenge, however, as the literature later confirmed, many of
the individuals who made contact with a view to participating in this research were able
to narrate eloquent accounts of their thinking and learning, although the different
qualitative characteristics of those accounts became apparent.
Frith and Happé (1999) suggest that those high-functioning individuals who do develop
some introspective awareness (many individuals produce elaborate autobiographical
accounts) have done so is through a ‘slow and painstaking learning process’ (Frith &
Happé, 1999, p. 2), developing a qualitatively different kind of self-consciousness. …
Specifically, participants with Asperger syndrome reported thoughts that were concrete
and factually based comprising mainly visual images. Most intriguingly, they did not
report any form of inner speech and tended not to report emotions or bodily sensations.
This suggests that private self-awareness, like conceptual self-awareness, is qualitatively
different in individuals with ASDs. (Lind & Bowler, 2008, p. 178)

The anticipated limitation was not encountered in this doctoral study as participants
who volunteered made successful contributions in line with the research design
employed. The corroboration of key informants assisted in catering for this potential
limitation by providing another perspective on the contribution of participants with AS.
However, the findings of this research are limited by the participation of people who are
articulate and therefore this study does not present the perspectives of individuals who
are unable to articulate their thoughts.
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3.16

Ethical considerations

Ethics approval was granted by the University of Wollongong Human Research Ethics
Committee to conduct research with adults and young people (14 years and older)
according to the research protocol described in this chapter. The Ethics Approval and
Renewals are attached in Appendix A.
3.16.1

Treatment of participants

Potential participants were provided with an information sheet and a consent form. The
wording of the information sheet and consent form was based on templates provided by
the University. Participants were free to withdraw from the project, including
withdrawal of data collected from them, at any time up to publication. Participants were
assigned pseudonyms so they would not be identifiable in any publication resulting
from the study. Participants under 18 years of age required parental or guardian consent.
Location of interviews was negotiated individually with each participant, the choice of
location and timing being in the individual participant’s full control to facilitate their
ease.
3.16.2

Risks and benefits

There were no anticipated risks to participants. A benefit to participants was offered in
the sharing of information about AS in response to questions within the context of a
framework that affirms and values the Asperger attributes of intelligence and giftedness.
Pro bono presentations at schools, support groups and personal consultations were
provided as a means of returning a benefit to stakeholders.
3.16.3

Treatment of data

Pseudonyms were allocated to each participant to protect identity. Transcripts will be
held in a locked filing cabinet for five years from the conclusion of the study. The
researcher’s laptops were password-protected to secure digital data. Some interviews
were transcribed by a transcription service and the files were password-protected when
they were transported. Data were backed up to external hard drives and DVDs which
are kept in the researcher’s office. Printouts and notes taken on paper will be held in a
locked filing cabinet for the required time to protect the identity of participants.
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3.16.4

Publication

Publication of findings from the research will preserve the confidentiality of the
participants and will be by thesis, submission of articles to scholarly journals and by
conference presentations.

3.17

Chapter conclusion

Working within a constructivist paradigm, a qualitative, case-study approach using an
interpretative phenomenological analysis framework was chosen as the most
appropriate design to investigate the thinking and learning of gifted adults with AS. The
research design was modelled on six phenomenological case study reports that used
similar designs to investigate social and educational issues in the experience of people
with AS. The current study provided first-hand accounts as called for by Gardiner
(2008) with the aim of developing a conceptual framework for understanding the
thinking and learning of gifted people with AS. Trustworthiness was established
through: prolonged engagement with the phenomena under investigation; persistent
observation; triangulation of data; member-checks by stakeholder audiences; and,
compilation of comprehensive documentation and files to provide an auditable chain of
evidence, enabling confirmability by a competent judge.
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Part	
  B 	
  
Part B includes Chapters 4 to 8, which contain the descriptions and interpretations of
the five phenomenological case studies. As this doctoral study utilises an emergent
design, the metaphor of a jigsaw puzzle is apt: through the act of analysis and
interpretation, the pieces of the puzzle gradually come together to form a coherent
picture. Unlike a traditional thesis, the review of the substantive body of literature is
included within the case studies in line with emergent design, while the primary
literature that provided the background to this doctoral study was reviewed in Chapter 2.
Five case studies were selected from the sixteen semi-structured interviews that were
conducted. The selection of these five as cases was based on: the quality and richness of
the data provided by the interviewees; the ability of participants to reflect on their own
thinking and learning experiences; the provision of a key informant (in four cases); and,
the availability of artefacts.
Table B.1 Case studies

Case Number
Case 1
Case 2
Case 3
Case 4
Case 5

Pseudonym
Kahla – 48 yo female
Rhoda – female in her 60s
Colin – male in his 50s
Nadia – 18 yo female
Riley – male in his 60s

Notes2
No key informant
Steve – partner
Wendy – partner
Lydia – mother
Renae – wife

The cases are sorted by the chronological order of the interviews. One of the issues that
became apparent was a sharpening focus on emergent themes of memory and identity,
so that the later interviews were more directed towards these themes than the earlier
ones. Interviews took place over a year from May 2011 to April 2012. This length of
time facilitated the development of ideas across the five cases.
The iterative literature review was conducted in order to develop the framework for
understanding the issues raised in the interviews: for example, references to memory
within the data required an understanding of memory-and-autism research so that the
cases could be interpreted in the light of the existing body of knowledge. The
interpretation of data was based on the conceptual understanding embodied in the

2

Nomenclature employed aligns with participants’ usage
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framework, which acted as a summary representation of the literature. The interpretive
framework developed over the course of this doctoral study into the conceptual
framework that was the theoretical output of the study.

83

Chapter 4 Case 1 ‘Kahla’
4.1

Introduction

Kahla is a 48 year old married woman. Her husband is the step-father of her two
children. Kahla reported that her children’s biological father had received a diagnosis of
Asperger syndrome, along with herself, her current husband and her two sons, who
were 11 and 13 years at the time of her participation in the research. Both sons were in
the same class at the local public school, the oldest having repeated a year of school,
and had been placed together in a mainstream class, along with a small group of
children with learning difficulties. There was no key informant for Case 1 as key
informants were neurotypical adults, usually close family members, who were able to
give corroborative and elaborative data for the case. Kahla’s interview was selected as a
case despite the lack of a key informant because of the richness of the descriptions of
her own and her sons’ thinking, and because she supplied artefacts in the form of an
extensive email correspondence that included interpretations of her own, and her sons’,
thinking. Kahla’s case illuminates many issues that appear in the research literature, so
the literature provides a corroborative perspective.
The broader phenotype of autism, where a genetic connection is expressed through a
higher incidence of autistic traits (De la Marche, et al., 2012; Hill & Frith, 2003), even
where too mild to merit a diagnosis, is evident in Kahla’s extended biological family.
Kahla’s family reveals a pattern of diagnoses of AS and evidence of giftedness. Her two
sons have both been assessed using psychological testing procedures that resulted in IQ
scores at the high end of the average range. The results were accompanied by the
disclaimer that the boys did not fully cooperate with the testing process, meaning that
the IQ scores were likely to underestimate the scores that would be obtained through
full cooperation. Kahla reported that a number of her immediate family members, her
brother, sister, father and nephew, have IQ scores in the superior range, and that her
mother is high in autistic traits, moderately expressed. This family appears to typify the
broader autistic phenotype.
Kahla is a very verbally fluent and intelligent woman. Through an extended interview
and correspondence she gave a credible and detailed account of her cognition and her
reflections on the thinking and learning of her sons. She is an accomplished visual artist
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and held a solo exhibition in a major regional city in New South Wales in 2013. The
themes of her art exhibition were fantasy and imagination. Her artworks display
immense richness of colour and texture, as can be seen in the following example (Figure
4.1; see also Figures 4.2 and 4.13).

Figure 4.1 ‘Garden of Dreams’ Photomedia on Harnemuhle cotton rag, A3 size.
Reproduced by kind permission of ‘Kahla’

Discrete issues arising from Case 1 are addressed first under the heading of ‘school
experience’. Shortly after beginning the analysis of Case 1, it became necessary to
acquire a working knowledge of memory in AS: after introducing the analysis of Case 1
in Section 4.2, the memory literature is reviewed in Sections 4.3 – 4.5 and an
organisational framework for the literature is proposed (Section 4.6) before returning to
the analysis and interpretation of the more complex, interrelated issues of Case 1 in
Section 4.7 and following.

4.2

School experience

Kahla is active in advocating for her sons’ educational needs but recounts many
communication and social difficulties generally and in her relationships with her sons’
schools. At the time of the interview, her boys were still in primary school (prior to
entering secondary school at the usual age of 12 years in NSW) even though the older
boy was 13. They had been to a succession of schools, with a breakdown of
relationships (between Kahla, the sons’ teachers, and the school leadership) being the
trigger for the move to the next school.
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In Kahla’s experience, the heterogeneity of Asperger syndrome and its expression in
individuals with AS is not well understood, with teachers and school leaders imposing
their understanding, based on knowledge of typically developing (TD) learners, in lieu
of treating each child on the basis of their individual strengths and weaknesses.
K: There is the danger with assuming how Asperger’s people learn because, within that
diagnosis, there is a variety. And one of the problems is that often we [individuals with
AS] do present as being really intelligent … but, along with that, people make these huge
assumptions that it means we can learn equally, and possibly more easily, than other
people … I’ve had teachers go, ‘All Asperger’s people are good at maths.’ (Interview)

At another point in her interview, Kahla noted that ‘on [the autistic] spectrum there’s
huge individual learning differences’ and she made a plea for individual treatment of
each learner with AS, set against a background of accurate understanding.
K: And so I would like people to understand in general terms what Asperger’s is and then
realise that every single person is an individual. So you can’t just think, ‘Oh, … children
with Asperger’s do this,’ because we have as much variety as neurotypical people have in
a circumstance. But the saddest thing … is that we usually look quite normal and so
people expect things from you and from children … that are completely unreasonable
because there’s not an obvious deficit there. (Interview)

The individuality of people with AS, as noted in the research literature, and the injustice
of characterising people using stereotyped expectations, is confirmed by Kahla’s
account. In addition, there is the danger of judgements being made based on knowledge
of TD learners alone, inappropriately generalised to learners with AS.
K: A lot of people could just ask the child why they thought that, or why they’re doing
that, but they don’t. They either judge it on their own narrow perception or they judge it
basing what they expect of neurotypical children and not children with Asperger’s.
(Interview)

Kahla’s recent experience of her sons’ schooling reinforces the needs for teacher
professional development in the thinking and learning of gifted students with AS. The
following sections (4.2.1 – 4.2.4) are concerned with issues that arose within the context
of Kahla’s own school experience as well as that of her young sons.
4.2.1

Bullying

Along with the primary participants in the other four cases of this study, bullying is a
major feature of Kahla’s experience. Kahla left high school before completing her final
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year, despite being an ‘A grade student’, as a result of her ‘social incompetence and the
resulting bullying’.
K: By the time I went to high school I was heavily ridiculed and people used to call me
‘witch’ … I became quite depressed and anorexic … and I had no idea why I was so
bullied. I was pushed down stairs and I was constantly tricked [by] people. I believed
really ridiculous lies, which everyone thought was just hilarious. (Interview)

Kahla’s sons have experienced bullying from peers and teachers and she seems to
accept bullying as inevitable, although she moved her sons to another school when the
bullying was severe.
K: [At one school my sons attended, there were] 800 children there. They could not
control the bullying, which was severe. I did not blame the school at all because the
grounds were huge and there were too many children involved. (Interview)

It is also important to acknowledge within Kahla’s narrative there are signs, while
growing up, that her lack of social cognition and subsequent behaviours were construed
by others as bullying.
K: And at school, I was called ‘Hammer’ because I would nail the point home. … this
girl, who kind of liked me, said, ‘Oh, why did you say that, you hammer?! … You’re
always doing that, tapping the nail in, if someone bullies you or confronts you. You make
it worse. They just come back to give you more’. (Interview)

In line with other first-hand accounts and reports (Attwood, 2000; Humphrey & Lewis,
2008; Huws & Jones, 2008; Jackson, 2002; Monger & Johnson, 2010; Osler & Osler,
2002; Sciutto, Richwine, Mentrikoski & Niedzwiecki, 2012), bullying is a reality within
Kahla’s experience. Cappadocia, Weiss and Pepler (2012) suggest that bullying is twice
as prevalent among individuals with AS compared to the wider population. Kahla has
experienced prejudice, based on other people’s lack of conceptual knowledge of AS,
while interacting with teachers and school leaders, including being treated as mentally
ill or retarded once she disclosed her own diagnosis of AS.
K: The school … treated me as if I had a mental illness. They could not comprehend that
you could have Asperger’s and be intelligent. To them, Asperger’s meant retarded. …
they spoke to me -- like -- this. ‘Ah -- you -- need -- to -- come -- this -- way – please’,
which was very humiliating and embarrassing. They told other parents that I was retarded
… so no wonder a lot of people not only keep their child’s diagnosis private, to their
detriment, but their own. (Interview)
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Bullying and the prejudicial views of others have had a formative impact upon Kahla
and her sons and continually contribute to their problematic social experiences. One of
Kahla’s expressed aims in participating in this research study was to support the
education of others in order to facilitate accurate understanding of AS cognition.
4.2.2

Learning disorder: A first-hand account of dyscalculia

Kahla’s narrative gives important first-person insights into the nature of her cognitive
experience of having a learning disorder in relation to the use of numbers (dyscalculia).
This is of great interest for the window it provides into the experience of having a
learning disorder.
K: As soon as I get a small bit of maths, it is almost as if it would slide off. It's almost as
if I just get a little bit of the information and it slides across [gestures across front of
body] so I can't see it. (Interview)
K: Yeah, so I can't [see it], or the information just moves out of my sphere of vision so I
can't get it. I have no idea why, and it’s frustrated me a lot. (Interview)

Of interest is Kahla’s description of the visual experience of seeing and processing
information in a numeric symbolic system: the visual symbols appear to be animated
and move so as to evade her vision. In contrast, language symbols are visually stable for
her: easily read and remembered. This is interpreted as a visual perception and
processing problem specific to mathematical symbols. Further, Kahla seems to be
describing an inability to develop abstract understanding where number concepts are
concerned: she was distracted by non-salient visual features in the learning
demonstrations given by her teachers using concrete mathematical materials.
K: In primary school we had Cuisenaire rods. I failed utterly to grasp the concept. I had a
great love and flair for colour and was totally confused to discover for some
unfathomable reason that two pinks equalled a blue, and a yellow and white equalled a
green etc. I had no idea that the rods had any numerical value. I was further confused by
the teacher introducing fruit and slicing it in order to demonstrate fractions. I believed
there was something mysterious and important about cutting fruit but I failed utterly to
grasp what it was! (Email)

In the first example she gave, Kahla perceived each Cuisenaire rod as a single item with
its own intrinsic features. She was unable to conceptualise the rods as having any
relationship to each other and, as she possesses extraordinary colour perception (Section
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4.7.7.2), the colours of the rods were a distraction from the teacher’s purpose in using
them.
4.2.3

Twice exceptionality

Twice-exceptionality issues are clearly exposed within Kahla’s account. At one school,
her sons were excluded from smaller-sized special needs classes, where the learning
environment was more appropriate for them, because they were judged as having an IQ
too high to qualify. Yet, within mainstream classes, they were treated as learning
disabled (which Kahla accepts) and were recognised for their deficits. Their strengths
were under-recognised within the busyness of multi-age, mixed ability, mainstream
classrooms taught by teachers without special-needs expertise. Anxiety and school
refusal have resulted from Kahla’s sons’ keen awareness of teachers’ attitudes towards
them, experienced via teaching methods that have included shaming. Kahla gave the
following example and concluded with the poignant statement, ‘… there’s no real place
for them. They’re not really catered for.’
K: …the teacher had a shame-and-name and humiliation method that she openly termed
‘The Humiliation Method for Making Children Learn’, which made my sons absolutely
collapse and [my older son], in particular, just couldn’t even get out of bed in the morning.
He just refused to go to school and the school didn’t have any understanding of him at all.
For instance, he was told to draw the school grounds and [he] drew these incredible blue
exploding circles over and over again. The school called me down and said, ‘We’re
seriously concerned about your son’s mental health. He can’t even draw.’ And he could
draw. And so I said, ‘Well, that’s very unusual. I don’t know why he’s done those blue
circles. Have you asked him?’ And they said, ‘No. We have not asked him.’ … So they
got [my son] and I said, ‘Why did you draw these blue circles when you were asked to
draw the school grounds?’ And he said, ‘Because I find architecture boring and I decided
that I would draw the beginning of the cosmos instead.’ (Interview)

The recognition of twice-exceptional children for their weaknesses alone runs counter to
recommendations in the literature on twice exceptionality, which advises that children’s
strengths be utilised as leverage for their learning (Section 2.6.3). Kahla’s account
highlights the need for teacher professional development in this area.
4.2.4

Uneven cognitive profile

The Multiple Intelligences framework (Gardner, 2006) facilitates an explanation of
twice exceptionality in educational terms, where Kahla’s cognitive profile (her strengths
and weaknesses) could be mapped, relatively, across the eight domains: linguistic,
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logical-mathematical, musical, spatial, bodily-kinaesthetic, naturalistic, interpersonal,
and intrapersonal. Such a mapping would show unevenness with logical-mathematical
being extremely low while visual-spatial and verbal ability would be very high. Kahla’s
verbal ability throughout her participation, spoken and written (excluding spelling and
punctuation), was superior. Visual ability is evident as, at the time of writing, she had
recently held a solo exhibition of her artwork, which display very rich visual imagery,
colour and texture. A further example of Kahla’s artwork is reproduced here as
evidence for her giftedness in this domain.

Figure 4.2 'The Last Wish' Photomedia on Harnemuhle cotton rag, A3 size.
Reproduced by kind permission of ‘Kahla’

A number of researchers have documented the unevenness of the cognitive profile of
individuals with AS (Barnhill, et al., 2000; Cash, 1999; Foley-Nicpon, Assouline &
Stinson, 2012; Minshew, Goldstein & Siegel, 1997). Uneven cognitive profiles in gifted
individuals with AS, such as Kahla, are well recognised, whether measured through
psychological testing or evaluated in educational settings by teachers using an MI
framework.

4.3

Memory systems: Literature review

During the interview with Kahla, it became apparent that she has profound differences
in her qualitative experience of memory and the meanings she derives from memory.
For example, descriptions of her memory that pointed to her heightened perceptual
powers led to Kahla wondering if I (the researcher) have a disability (colourblindness)
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because, while I could imagine the phenomena she described, she was surprised I could
not directly perceive them for myself (Section 4.7.7.2). At this point in the current
study, it became necessary to read deeply in the memory and autism literature to explore
the differences between the memory of TD individuals and individuals with AS. The
literature is essential to an understanding of the nature of memory as described in
Kahla’s narrative and provided the background for the analysis of Kahla’s data that
follows, as well as for the other four cases. Therefore, before considering Kahla’s data,
some further background is necessary: this will take the form of a literature review of
the memory, and memory-in-autism, research that is founded upon Schacter and
Tulving’s (1994) model of human learning and memory. This thesis builds upon the
notion that the phenomenon of atypical memory in autism reported by the literature and
reflected in Kahla’s case, has corresponding associations with the human learning and
memory systems of Schacter and Tulving (1994), a conceptual framework of memory
that is widely supported by many researchers in the field of memory and autism
(Boucher & Bowler, 2008; Bowler, Gardiner & Grice, 2000; Lind, 2010; Magnussen &
Brennen, 2011; Markowitsch & Staniloiu, 2011; Tulving & Markowitsch, 1998;
Wheeler, Stuss & Tulving, 1997). In addition, sensory sensitivities and enhanced
perceptual functioning are a significant cognitive feature of Kahla’s account of her
thinking, memory and learning, and can best be understood within Tulving’s approach.
4.3.1

Tulving’s memory systems framework

Table 4.1 reproduces the memory framework provided by Schacter and Tulving that
was translated into the diagram in Figure 4.3.
Table 4.1 Major systems of human learning and memory (Schacter & Tulving, 1994, p. 26)

System
Procedural

Other terms
Nondeclarative

Perceptual
representation (PRS)

Nondeclarative

Semantic

Generic
Factual
Knowledge
Working

Primary
Episodic

Personal
Autobiographical
Event memory

Subsystems
Motor skills
Cognitive skills
Simple conditioning
Simple associative
learning
Visual word form
Auditory word form
Structural description
Spatial
Relational

Retrieval
Implicit

Visual
Auditory

Explicit

Implicit
Implicit

Explicit
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Although semantic memory is described in this table as ‘implicit’ and ‘relational’, more
recent memory literature supports the notion of semantic memory as explicit,
declarative and ‘single-item’: that is, under conscious control; its processes and content
can be verbalised; and, non-relational. The term ‘implicit’ in this context refers to the
operation of the memory system as being outside conscious, effortful, mental control.
However, implicit memory systems are still learning systems, meaning that they
respond to training. Since the publication of the table above in 1994, not all writers have
agreed upon the precise definition of the terms. Part of the process of interpretation of
this doctoral study was the clarification, after wide reading, of the meaning of terms for
the purposes of the study. The memory systems approach, with each memory system
being served by discrete neural networks, is supported by brain imaging studies from
neuroscience, particularly studies of amnesia (Ben Shalom, 2003; Tulving &
Markowitsch, 1998). While there is debate about some of the details, for example,
‘relational memory’ is later used to describe a function of episodic memory (Boucher,
2007; Gaigg, Gardiner & Bowler, 2008), and ‘priming’ and ‘conditioning’ are thought
by some to be separate memory systems rather than subsumed under procedural or
perceptual memory (Magnussen & Brennen, 2011; Markowitsch & Staniloiu, 2011), the
model of memory associated with Tulving has been widely adopted in autism research
(Gardiner, 2008) and serves as the framework for understanding memory in this thesis.
For the purposes of the current study, the memory framework is illustrated by Figure
4.3. The Perceptual Representation System (PRS) is sometimes referred to as
‘perceptual memory’ (Ben Shalom, 2003).

Figure 4.3 Major systems of human learning and memory
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In Tulving’s approach, there are five memory systems, three of which are of particular
interest because of the accrued body of evidence relating to memory enhancements and
impairments in autism (Ben Shalom, 2003; Faran & Ben Shalom, 2008), relevant to the
research questions of this study. These three, perceptual, semantic and episodic, are also
of interest because of the type of memories native to each system, and the related states
of human self-consciousness associated with them (anoetic, noetic and autonoetic – see
Section 4.4.8). Each of the five memory systems will be described and reviewed next.
4.3.2

Working memory

Working memory, where items are held short-term for processing, is the interface
through which implicit and explicit long-term memories are encoded and retrieved.
Working memory has its own qualitative and neural characteristics (Baddeley, 1994;
Boucher, 2007), thus qualifying it as a separate memory system.
...working memory refers to working with memory - this involves not only time-limited
online holding of new information, but also retrieving portions of old, already stored
information. (Markowitsch & Staniloiu, 2011, p. 18)

Baddeley (1994) defines working memory as ‘the system for the temporary
maintenance and manipulation of information, necessary for the performance of such
complex cognitive activities as comprehension, learning and reasoning’ (p. 351). Figure
4.4 depicts working memory as the location of ‘online’ information processing: it is the
interface between embodied thought and long-term memory storage.

Figure 4.4 Working Memory: the information-processing interface with long-term memory systems
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‘Reasoning’ and ‘processing’ are words used in the literature to describe the type of
explicit thinking that takes place in working memory, which, if committed to long-term
memory, are encoded into, and retrieved from, one or both of the explicit long-term
memory systems. Thus, where researchers use terms such as ‘abstract reasoning’
(Minshew & Goldstein, 2001; Minshew, et al., 2002) or ‘relational processing’
(Boucher, 2012), they are describing the type of thinking that takes place in working
memory that is native to one of the memory systems; episodic memory in the case of
abstract reasoning and relational processing. The relationship between working-memory
processing and the corresponding memory systems is detailed by Baddeley (1994), who
used terms such as ‘episodic-learning mechanism’ (p. 353) to encapsulate both the
processing and memory elements of conscious thinking and learning. Thus, it is asserted
that each memory system has a corresponding type of information processing—for
example, ‘perceptual and semantic processing’ (Lopez, et al., 2008, p. 165)—that is
enacted in working memory (although, importance was placed on avoiding confusion
from uses of ‘semantic processing’ to refer to language processing rather than with a
focus on the semantic memory system itself, as clarified by context). Within the
executive functions framework, working memory is said to be an executive function and
shows some impairment in autism. Working memory limitations in autism may be
natively impaired, or they may be a consequence of cognitive load or poor executive
function (Poirier & Martin, 2008).
4.3.3

Episodic memory

Episodic memory is memory for personally experienced events. It is the most complex
and late-maturing form of human memory and involves a sense of personal involvement,
of ‘warmth and intimacy’ (Vandekerckhove, 2008, p. 16).
The episodic memory systems enables individuals to remember happenings they have
witnessed in their own personal past, that is, to consciously recollect experienced events
as embedded in a matrix of other happenings in subjective time. Episodic memory is
assumed to be the most recently evolved system that has grown out of semantic memory
through working memory. (Schacter & Tulving, 1994, p. 28)

Episodic memory is associated with a unique form of retrieval called ‘mental time
travel’: one imagines oneself back in the remembered event and re-experiences it (Lind
& Bowler, 2010; Perner, Kloo & Stöttinger, 2007; Wheeler, et al., 1997). This memory
system is ‘episodic’ in that episodic memories are incomplete (that is, not a complete
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recording of an event) and subject to change as they are retrieved and re-experienced
based on salience and personal meaning: ‘human beings construct and reconstruct their
personal memories’ (Markowitsch & Staniloiu, 2011, p. 19). That which is salient and
meaningful to a person within their own experience changes over time and is dependent
upon factors such as how they feel at the time of retrieval, their purpose in retrieving the
memory, and so on.
Temporality is a feature of episodic memory: that is, a personal, subjective sense of
one’s place in and over time including a sense of ‘past self’, ‘present self’ and ‘future
self’. The ability to realistically imagine oneself in the future is described as ‘episodic
future thinking’ (Lind & Bowler, 2010; Lind, Williams, Bowler & Peel, 2014).
[Episodic memory] is the kind of memory that renders possible conscious recollection of
personal happenings and events from one’s personal past and mental projection of
anticipated events into one’s subjective future. As such, it is the memory system that
mediates mental time travel. (Wheeler, et al., 1997, p. 332)

There are consistent findings that episodic memory is impaired in autism, demonstrated
through impaired: temporality; source memory (Section 4.4.2); and, ability to retrieve
memories through mental time travel (Section 4.4.8) (Boucher & Mayes, 2012; Bowler,
Gardiner & Berthollier, 2004; Bowler, et al., 2000; Williams, D., 2010). Memory in
autism is described as being ‘selectively impaired’ (Ben Shalom, 2003; Gardiner, 2001;
Zahavi, 2010) because, while episodic memory is impaired,

the perceptual and

semantic memory systems are spared (or even enhanced), giving rise to a different
cognitive profile when compared to TD individuals.
4.3.4

Semantic memory

Semantic memory is memory for facts and general knowledge about the world (Tulving
& Markowitsch, 1998). It is ‘oriented to the present and represents general context-free
facts’ and ‘awareness of symbolic representations of the world’ (Markowitsch &
Staniloiu, 2011, p. 18); the symbolic representation may be language, numerical or
visual. Semantic processing involves mental representation (of, for example, objects or
concepts), apart from, or separate to, the physical perception or experience of those
things (Tulving, 1985) but without the personal involvement of first-hand experience:
for example, knowledge about Paris gained from a book is represented in semantic
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memory (Baddeley, 1994); knowledge about Paris gained through visiting is
represented in episodic memory.
Semantic memory makes possible the acquisition and retention of factual information
about the world in the broadest sense. The knowledge and beliefs about the world that
people gain, possess, and use … is critically dependent upon semantic systems. (Schacter
& Tulving, 1994, p. 28)

Semantic memories are ‘context-free’ or decontextualised, that is, the semantic memory
of a fact stands alone without reference to location, time or affect (emotion) (Lind,
2010).
Semantic memory refers to generic knowledge that is context-free (e.g., the name and
color of a banana) … Episodic memory, on the other hand, refers to information that is
unique to an individual, is tied to a specific context (e.g., I ate a banana at lunch
yesterday), and requires conscious recollection to be retrieved. (Wiggs, Weisberg &
Martin, 1998, p. 103)

Language-learning and the use of symbolic representation to mentally represent
perceived objects or ideas is a function of semantic memory (Markowitsch & Staniloiu,
2011; Vandekerckhove, 2008). Simple labelling, sorting, matching, classifying and
categorisation of objects using a semantic label (for example, ‘green objects’) is a
function of semantic memory as these functions involve detail-focused processing of
single items, regardless of context. However, complex categorisation requiring
relational processing is handled by episodic memory (see Section 4.3.3).
The serial association of words and ideas (‘associative thinking’) without an
overarching organisational structure as described by Dr Temple Grandin, a world expert
on autism, and Kahla (see Section 4.7.2), is, it is reasoned, a function of semantic
memory processing. It is noted that, in the literature, the term ‘associative learning’ is
used by some authors to refer to an episodic memory process akin to memory binding
(Baddeley, 1994; Johnson & Chalfonte, 1994; Schacter & Tulving, 1994), which is part
of the process of concept formation. This is not the linear word/idea association that
Temple Grandin and Kahla described. Neither is it ‘associative learning’ in the sense of
Pavlovian conditioning (Esteves, Parra, Dimberg & Öhman, 1994) or the ‘simple
associative learning’ in Table 4.1 Major systems of human learning and memory
(Schacter & Tulving, 1994, p. 26), both of which refer to procedural, non-declarative
memory. Grandin’s use of the term ‘associative thinking’ is, however, in line with
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Tsatsanis (2004), who described explicit ‘associative learning (e.g., stimulus-response
learning, paired learning)’ as a relative strength in children and adolescents with highfunctioning autism and, it is reasoned, this serial (or linear) phenomenon relies on
semantic memory, due to the absence of personal experience and contextual detail
involved in the processing and memorisation, while still being an explicit act. Boucher
(2007) also uses the term ‘associative learning’ in this sense in the case study of ‘JS’.
Clearly, caution must be exercised with the use of the term ‘associative’ as it is used to
refer to a number of different memory phenomena. However, the declarative, linear
connection between words and ideas, described by Grandin and Kahla, is an instance of
semantic processing.
Semantic memory is: (a) unimpaired, or possibly superior, in gifted individuals with
autism (Ben Shalom, 2003; Boucher, 2007; Salmond, Adlam, Gadian & VarghaKhadem, 2008); (b) associated with rote learning, which is intact, or superior, in
individuals with autism (Ben Shalom, 2003; Bowler, et al., 2004; Chen, et al., 2008;
Crane & Goddard, 2008; DeLong, 2008; Gardiner, 2001; Toichi & Kamio, 2002); and,
(c) along with perceptual memory, functionally aligned with detail-focused, bottom-up
information processing tasks, which do not require complex mental organisation or use
of abstraction strategies for encoding, for example, learning rules and rote memorisation
(Minshew, et al., 2002).
4.3.5

Perceptual Representation System

The Perceptual Representation System (PRS) is also known as perceptual memory. It is
implicit (Baddeley, 1994), that is, it does not require effortful thought, and is
operational at birth. Therefore, newborn babies have the capacity to process sensory
experience and to register those experiences: for example, in the early recognition of the
mother’s face or the sensations associated with breast feeding. The baby is a sentient,
‘experiencing being’ who registers his or her experience via the PRS even though he or
she has not yet developed semantic or episodic memory systems that confer the capacity
to explicitly reason and represent thoughts within memory. Perceptual memory is the
most primitive and early developing of the three memory systems under consideration.
Of these three memory systems, the perceptual representation system is clearly the most
basic – a limbic (probably rhinal cortex) representation of ‘raw’, nondeclarative,
perceptual and cognitive information. (Ben Shalom, 2003, p. 1130)
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Adults with dementia that spares the PRS retain implicit cognitive capacities relating to
recognition and familiarity, even though the semantic-memory representation through
language (of an item, notion, concept, person or relationship), or the episodic-memory
representation from previous encounters with the item (or notion, concept, person or
relationship), is no longer available to them.
Patients with semantic dementia, who lose the capabilities for language and semantic
memory, may still be able to distinguish, for example, an apple from a peach or pear
without the need to access semantic information, by accessing perceptual representations
of information via the perceptual memory system. (Markowitsch & Staniloiu, 2011, pp.
18-19)

Even when the more complex memory (and processing) systems are impaired through
injury or disease, a person continues to be a sentient, experiencing being, although they
are limited in the type of self-consciousness they experience (Section 4.4.8). Perceptual
memory may be associated with judgements of familiarity: that is, an item is recognised
as either being familiar or not, without being named or recalled from previous
experience (Markowitsch & Staniloiu, 2011). It is consistently reported within the
reviewed literature that perception is intact or enhanced in autism (see, for example,
Blakemore, et al., 2006; Boucher, 2007; Crane, Goddard & Pring, 2010) (see also
Section 4.5).
4.3.6

Procedural memory

Procedural memory is memory for encoded automatic motor routines and skills
(Markowitsch & Staniloiu, 2011) and was not a significant feature arising from the data
of this doctoral research. It is not one of the three long-term memory systems of interest
and will not be reviewed in detail.

4.4

Crucial conceptual characteristics of memory:
Literature review

There are other kinds of memory, described in the literature using terms such as ‘source
memory’ or ‘single-item memory’, that are not memory systems. Instead, they represent
characteristics of one of the memory systems that are essential to an understanding of
the selective impairment of memory in autism.

98

4.4.1

Single-item memory

Semantic memory is described by some writers as ‘single-item’ or ‘item-specific’ and
correlates with low-level, bottom-up or detail processing (Boucher, 2007; Lind, 2010).
Low-level processing is characterised by lack of organisational strategies or contextual
information to assist or enhance memory encoding and retrieval. Other writers contrast
single-item or item-specific memory with relational memory or memory binding (Gaigg,
et al., 2008; Johnson & Chalfonte, 1994), which is a function of the episodic memory
system. Single-item memory is a notion that helps distinguish the lower-level
processing of semantic memory from the complex information processing of episodic
memory and is an important point of difference between semantic memory and episodic
memory.
4.4.2

Source memory

Episodic memories are rich with encoded contextual information, which is described as
‘source memory’: spatial (location), temporal (subjective time), affect (emotion)
(Markowitsch & Staniloiu, 2011; Vandekerckhove, 2008), as illustrated in Figure 4.5.
Source memory is ‘memory for the particular situation in which a fact was learned’
(Ben Shalom, 2003, p. 1133).

Figure 4.5 Source memory: memory for the spatial, temporal, affective context of events

Source monitoring is the mental processing of information about the source of the
memory, which is encoded, along with the event, in episodic memory. Source
monitoring confers attribution capacity to episodic memories.
Source monitoring refers to the set of cognitive processes involved in recalling the origins
of memories, knowledge and beliefs … discriminating between memories of internally
generated information vs. memories of externally generated information (e.g., ‘Did I say
that or did Jack say that?’) … discriminating between memories of at least two externally
derived sources (e.g., ‘Did Jack say that or did Jill say that?’) … ability to discriminate
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between at least two types of internal or self generated memories (‘Did I say that or only
think that?’). (Hala, et al., 2005, p. 75)

Source memory and monitoring is impaired in individuals with autism and AS (Bowler,
et al., 2000; Hala, et al., 2005; Lind, 2010). A close relationship between autonoetic
consciousness and source memory has been reported (Bowler, et al., 2004) and source
memory is a function of the episodic memory system (Ben Shalom, 2003; Lind &
Bowler, 2010; Wheeler, et al., 1997).
4.4.3

Temporality and temporal processing

Temporality is defined as a personal sense of subjective time that is foundational to a
sense of self: past self, present self and future self. Elements of temporality in relation
to AS are noted within the literature and have an impact upon thinking and memory
(Lind & Bowler, 2010; Tulving, 2002; Vandekerckhove, 2008; Zukauskas, Silton &
Assumpcao Jr., 2009). The impact of temporal processing deficits upon thinking and
language has been described (Perkins, Dobbinson, Boucher, Bol & Bloom, 2006). In
writing about the subjective stance and use of third person terms when referring to self,
Perkins et al., stated:
… deficits of temporal processing would cause problems in the acquisition of those
temporal concepts which cannot be rote learned (e.g. soon, before, first—as opposed to
Wednesday, 4 o’clock, 2004). This would in turn cause impaired acquisition of concepts
with shifting referents, especially deictic temporal terms such as ‘now’, ‘today’,
‘tomorrow’ etc. (Perkins, et al., 2006, p. 796) [italics in original]

Problems with relative temporal terms in speech also indicate an issue with the temporal
processing necessary for the theory of mind mechanism. Shifting between different
mental states requires the capacity to concurrently represent mental states from different
moments in time, as well as the perspectives of another person. The temporal aspect of
ToM is illustrated by the false photograph theory-of-mind task, shown in Figure 4.6.
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Figure 4.6 The false photograph task (Happé, 1994, p. 47)

In Figure 4.6, a child with poorly developed ToM and temporal processing is unlikely to
be able to discriminate between their own current knowledge of the cat’s present
location (‘on the bed’) and the previous location (‘on the chair’), represented in the
polaroid photograph being held out of sight by the researcher. This task demonstrates
that the capacity to flexibly shift between two perspectives, known as ‘set-shifting’
(Van Eylen, et al., 2011), is affected even when those two perspectives, which may be
only minutes apart, are different knowledge states in the same person.
Reduced temporal processing capacity and subjective stance have an impact upon
mindset shifting and are components of the ToM capacity. Wheeler, Stuss and Tulving
(1997) drew upon the literature to show that the temporal processing of episodic
memory negatively impacts upon executive functions (planning, sequencing, goal
selection, anticipation, behaviour monitoring, and so on) when there are episodic
memory deficits as these are mental processes with temporal elements. Beyond episodic
memory functions, other temporal processing issues are noted in the literature.
‘Temporal binding’ refers to the timely integration of incoming signals to the brain
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from the different sensory modalities. A number of authors (Brock, Brown, Boucher &
Rippon, 2002; Stevenson, et al., 2014) assert that temporal binding difficulties in autism
operate at multiple levels: across neural networks; within neural networks; and,
multimodal sensory integration; with a cascading effect on the higher-order processes of
language productive and central coherence. Therefore, the neurobiological aspects of
temporal processing and the phenomenon of ‘temporality’ (Zukauskas, et al., 2009) are
both likely to be adversely affected in gifted individuals with AS.
4.4.4

Relational memory

Relational memory is a distinguishing feature of episodic memory (Markowitsch &
Staniloiu, 2011; Sluzenski, Newcombe & Kovacs, 2006). Relational memory is the
capacity to draw relationships between items or ideas and to ‘bind’ them together ‘to
form new memories’ (DeLong, 2008, p. 108).
Remembering an episode … involves bringing together information that has been
registered in different modalities, in different parts of the brain, some of which is new (a
first sight of the Eiffel Tower) but some of which is not new (knowing from pictures what
the Eiffel Tower looks like). Because it involves bringing together diverse information,
episodic memory is sometimes referred to as ‘relational’ memory. (Boucher, 2007, p.
261)

Memory binding is a ‘constructive process’ (Lind & Bowler, 2010, p. 897). It is
reasoned for the purposes of this thesis that relational memory is central to abstract
thinking and it is noted that a relationship to executive function in the autism literature
is observed. It is further reasoned that relational memory relies on ‘simultaneous
processing’ (DeLong, 2008; Goldstein, 2009): being able to hold two or more ideas in
working memory and to switch attention between them in order to dynamically process
relationships. Executive control of attention is said to be impaired in AS (Nyden,
Gillberg, Hjelmquist & Heiman, 1999; Van Eylen, et al., 2011). Attentional control is
said to be an executive function, leading to the proposition that executive functions are
themselves examples of complex or top-down processing (Hill & Frith, 2003).
Relational memory can therefore be associated with: complex reasoning, abstract
thinking and top-down processing (Meyer & Minshew, 2002); meaning making (Crane,
et al., 2010); and, concept development and central coherence (Minshew, et al., 2002).
Relational processing is contrasted with item-specific processing (Gaigg, et al., 2008).
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Given that episodic memories involve multiple features, the features comprising an
episode must be linked together at encoding to form a coherent or ‘bound’ representation
(Chalfonte & Johnson, 1996). Thus, featural or relational binding plays a key role in
episodic encoding. Correspondingly, episodic retrieval involves bringing multiple
features together in order to re-construct a coherent event representation (Baddeley,
2000). (Lind, 2010, p. 433) [emphasis added]

Through the construct of relational memory, a connection with the executive function
and weak central coherence accounts of autism (note the use of the word ‘coherent’
above in the sense of ‘central coherence’) becomes apparent that facilitates a mapping
of these features of autism onto Tulving’s learning and memory systems (Section 4.6).
4.4.5

Autobiographical memory: Refining the concept

Autobiographical memory was originally associated with the episodic memory system.
However, the semantic memory system has a role to play in autobiographical memory
and this assists in understanding the interplay between the semantic and episodic
memory systems in memory and learning. While episodic memories are memories of
personal experience, facts about oneself are an important facet of autobiographical
memory. An example is one’s name (a stand-alone fact stored in semantic memory)
contrasted with a memory of being called by name (context-rich event stored in episodic
memory). Markowitsch and Staniloiu use the term ‘Episodic-autobiographical memory’
(EAM) to distinguish episodic remembering from autobiographical factual knowledge.
Nowadays episodic memory is defined as the conjunction of subjective time, autonoetic
consciousness and the experiencing self and subsequently the episodic memory system is
currently viewed as being equivalent to the episodic-autobiographical memory system
(EAM). Though the term autobiographical is still at times used interchangeably with the
term episodic, not all the components of autobiographical memory, however, have an
episodic quality. (Markowitsch & Staniloiu, 2011, p. 19)

Lind (2010) has proposed the existence of non-autobiographical episodic memory, for
example, remembering what was in the newspaper you read this morning, but this finer
point of how the facts were committed to memory has not been widely taken up in the
literature. However, she has successfully highlighted the complex nature of
autobiographical memory and the involvement of semantic memory, even for personal
memories.
Autobiographical memory refers to memory for information pertaining to the self and is
often considered to be synonymous with episodic memory (Gilboa, 2004). However, the
term ‘episodic’ refers to a distinct type of memory system, whereas the term
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‘autobiographical’ refers to a particular type of memory content. Indeed, both the
episodic and semantic systems are capable of processing autobiographical content. (Lind,
2010, p. 431) [italics in original]

Lind’s distinction between autobiographical and non-autobiographical memory and the
interplay of episodic and semantic memory in coding and retrieval of explicit memories
is illustrated in Figure 4.7 and provides good examples of ‘remember’ and ‘know’
responses (see Section 4.4.8 for a description of the ‘remember’ responses of autonoetic
consciousness and the ‘know’ responses of noetic consciousness).

Figure 4.7 Autobiographical memory according to Lind (2010, p. 431)

However, Markowitsch and Staniloiu (2011) dispute the category of (b) Nonautobiographical episodic memory. This researcher concurs with them that a separate
category for (b) is confusing as, in the example given, it depends upon how the content
of ‘the newspaper you read this morning’ was encoded: if it is remembered by an act of
mental time travel, then it is episodic ‘remembering’; if it is remembered by rote
memory or eidetic memory, then it is semantic ‘knowing’; or, it may possibly be
recalled by a combination of both types of memory processing, reinforcing each other.
Therefore, along with Markowitsch and Staniloiu, this doctoral study accepts that
autobiographical memory is a function of episodic memory and semantic memory as
represented by (a) and (c) in Figure 4.7, without subscribing to the notion of (b) nonautobiographical episodic memory.
4.4.6

Interplay between explicit memory systems during learning

In the current educational climate in Australia, high value is placed on the role of firsthand, authentic experience, which is contrasted with rote memorisation. Rote
memorisation is a function of semantic memory, while memory for first-hand

104

experience is a function of episodic memory. The interplay between memory systems
for retrieval of first-hand memories is well described by Cabeza and St Jacques.
Episodic memory refers to remembering unique past events together with their associated
contextual details and involves autonoetic consciousness, the capacity for mental time
travel. By contrast, semantic memory refers to knowing facts about the world and about
our life that is associated with noetic consciousness. Autobiographical memories (AMs)
are an integration of episodic and semantic contents. For example, the AM of a birthday
party might include a vivid image of the cake and the people singing around the table
(episodic memory) intermixed with knowledge about the date of the birthday and the
standard sequence of events (script) of a birthday party (semantic memory) … Episodic
and semantic contents in AM dynamically interact during memory construction.
(Cabeza & St Jacques, 2007, p. 222) [emphasis added]

The dynamic interaction of memory systems during thinking, memory and learning in
the way described is a key understanding for educators in the light of selective
impairment of those systems in autism. It is proposed that Kahla and the other cases in
this doctoral research are using their considerable intellectual resources to compensate
for diminished aspects of episodic memory, relying on superior perception and semantic
memory and that this constitutes authentic learning when their cognitive profile is taken
into account.
4.4.7

Self-referential processing

Autobiographical memory plays a key role in the development of a sense of identity
(Wilson & Ross, 2003), with ‘self-referential processing’ understood to be a factor that
accounts for differences in identity formation between individuals with AS and TD
individuals: self-referential processing is impaired in individuals with autism. The ‘selfreferencing effect’ is described as ‘typical individuals show[ing] enhanced memory for
information that is self-relevant or encoded in relation to the self’ (Lind, 2010, p. 441).
Self-referential processing is not only foundational to a sense of self but is also integral
to the way individuals process information about the world: that is, incoming perceptual
information is processed in relationship to oneself and one’s own perspective. Selfreferential processing is advantageous for memorisation compared to no selfreferencing (material that is meaningless to the memoriser). Perner (2000) ventures the
notion that episodic memory is a ‘self-referential mental state’ (p. 300). For educators,
the broader implications of this finding are self-evident: personal engagement and active
meaning-making have long been recognised as contributing to deeper learning.
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A number of authors have concluded that the self-referential processing effect is
diminished in autism (Crane & Goddard, 2008; Crane, et al., 2010; Tanweer, Rathbone
& Souchay, 2010; Toichi, 2008) due to the different patterns of activity and underconnectivity of the neural networks that serve this type of processing (Lombardo,
Barnes, Wheelwright & Baron-Cohen, 2007; Mundy, Gwaltney & Henderson, 2010;
Northoff, et al., 2006). In memory terms, self-referential processing translates to ‘selfreferenced memory’ (Mundy, et al., 2010, p. 420). Autobiographical memory is
dependent on self-referential processing: ‘Self-referential processing is an integral,
defining component of AM [autobiographical memory]’ (Cabeza & St Jacques, 2007, p.
220). A study reviewed by Cabeza and St Jacques found that autobiographical memory
tasks involved more self-referential processing compared to a semantic memory task.
According to Northoff, et al., (2006), self-referential processing affects every aspect of
identity and their list of ‘domains of the self’ (pp. 446-447) ties together many of the
seemingly disparate features of Asperger cognition: verbal, spatial (the physical body),
memory, emotional, facial, social, and a sense of personal agency.
Most authors emphasise the particular role of the self-referential effect in episodic
autobiographical memory, as in the following:
On the brain level these EAM [episodic autobiographical memory] developmental
changes in humans (from infancy to early adulthood) are reflected in the extensive
structural and functional reorganization of different components of the neural networks
supporting EAM, autonoetic consciousness and self-referential processing, ToM [theory
of mind] capacities and ability for emotional regulation (Shing et al., 2010).
(Markowitsch & Staniloiu, 2011, p. 17).

Northoff and colleagues offer a hierarchical model showing the mediating role of selfreferential processing between perceptual input and ‘higher-order processing’ (Northoff,
et al., 2006, p. 450). The purpose of their study was to locate the neural networks that
serve self-referential processing, however, the main interest of that study for the current
study is: (a) the significant role that self-referential processing plays in higher-order
cognitive processes; (b) the processing hierarchy of lower (sensory) to higher, which
correlates with the theory of central coherence (see also Plaisted, Saksida, Alcantara &
Weisblatt, 2003); and, (c) the association of top-down modulation and bottom-up
modulation with that processing hierarchy. Insights from Northoff’s paper clarified
many references in the memory literature and assisted with the task of mapping the
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explanatory theories of autism to Tulving’s memory systems as a step along the path of
developing a coherent framework for teacher professional development (Section 4.6).
Self-referential processing is a key aspect of episodic memory, affecting the encoding
and retrieval of memories for personal, autobiographical experiences and events. There
is wide agreement in the literature that self-referential processing is related to identity
formation and is affected in autism: individuals with autism do not benefit from the
memory advantage of self-referencing to the same extent as TD individuals. This
thesis proposes that impaired self-referential processing in AS is the ‘other side of the
coin’ to the externally oriented focus of cognition in AS (Section 4.8.5).
4.4.8

Memory, consciousness and identity

As noted in Section 4.3.1, each memory system is hallmarked by a corresponding form
of human consciousness. The form of consciousness ascribed to the perceptual memory
system is ‘anoetic awareness’, semantic memory is described as having ‘noetic
awareness’, and episodic remembering is described as having ‘autonoetic awareness’
(Tulving, 1985).
In line with Tulving’s (2002, 2004) conceptualization, we use anoetic consciousness for
almost always implicit experiential and procedural memory, noetic consciousness for
semantic memory—context-free facts of the world—and autonoetic consciousness for
consciousness related to episodic memories, context-rich events that are often of an
emotional and time-related character. However, in addition to this present theorizing, we
also point to the importance of a first sort of ‘‘self-experience’’ or self-consciousness
apparent at an anoetic level. Children, we suggest, already very early in development,
develop an implicit awareness of their own organism and of its influence on the
surrounding world. Even though they are still not capable of reflecting on the perceptual
origin of their own knowledge, they possess already very early, implicit experiential
information about themselves (as we call it: ‘anoetic self-consciousness’) or a sense of
self and identity. (Vandekerckhove, 2008, p. 5)

Anoetic consciousness is ‘non-knowing’, that is, it is ‘implicit’. In earlier psychology,
terms such as ‘sub-conscious’ or ‘unconscious’ were used but, in recent memory
research, anoetic consciousness is viewed as a form of awareness, rather than the
absence of awareness that is implied by ‘unconscious’.
Anoetic consciousness is a kind of procedural, sensory, and primary affective level
consciousness along the continuum of consciousness. It is based on information that one
can act upon without bringing this information into explicit awareness … a continuous
stream of affective sensory input … As a neurophysiological state it is only accessible in
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awareness as the simplest non-reflective ‘stream of experience,’ determined by the
immediate and continuous flow of events in the here and now. (Vandekerckhove, 2008,
pp. 13-14)

Noetic consciousness is the form of consciousness associated with semantic memory
(Gardiner, 2008). Autonoetic consciousness is the highest form of human selfconsciousness and is associated with episodic memory (Markowitsch & Staniloiu,
2011). Additionally, ‘knowing’ and ‘remembering’ are technical terms that indicate the
qualitative characteristics of explicit memory retrieval from, respectively, semantic
memory and episodic memory. For instance, one can ‘know’ one had a birthday party
for one’s tenth birthday: this would involve remembering facts about the party such as
the names of the guests who attended; or, one can ‘remember’ one’s tenth birthday
party: this would involve the type of self-consciousness (autonoetic) that experiences a
reconstruction of the event in imagination, known as ‘mental time travel’. In an oftquoted scenario (Baddeley, 1994; Boucher, 2007; Gardiner, 2001), one can ‘know’ that
Paris is the capital city of France without having been there (for example, through a
documentary or book), but, for the person who has been to Paris, they both ‘know’ and
‘remember’ Paris: episodic re-experiencing is context-laden with emotion and
subjectivity in a way that semantic memory retrieval is not. Memories are ‘native’ to
their respective memory system as the act of memory retrieval requires the form of
consciousness (anoetic, noetic or autonoetic) that is specific to that system.
Relying on the memory systems framework of Schacter and Tulving (1994), researchers
have supported the notion of a hierarchy, both developmentally and of complexity,
within the long-term memory systems (Gardiner, 2001, 2008; Lind & Bowler, 2008;
Markowitsch & Staniloiu, 2011; Tulving, 2001; Vandekerckhove, 2008; Wheeler, et al.,
1997). Perceptual memory is a more primitive memory system than the semantic
memory system, and is functioning at birth (Vandekerckhove, 2008). The semantic
memory system relies on perceptual memory, emerges in the second year of life
(Vandekerckhove, 2008) and is a prerequisite for development of the episodic memory
system. The episodic memory system is later maturing, becoming evident around four
years of age (Lind & Bowler, 2010), and is the most complex form of human memory
(Gardiner, 2008). The hierarchy of memory systems and consciousness, with indicative
references, is illustrated in Figure 4.8.
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Figure 4.8 Hierarchy of learning and memory systems and their associated forms of consciousness

With theoretical understanding of the relationship between information processing, the
operation of memory, and the associated forms of self-consciousness, the issue of
personal identity comes into focus. Identity emerged as a major theme in Case 1, as
predicted for many IPA studies (Brocki & Wearden, 2006; Smith, 2004). Figure 4.9
shows two of the five memory systems with some elaboration to show the relationship
of memory to identity: autonoetic (‘self-knowing’) consciousness is the experience of
explicit self-awareness. Source memory is a feature of episodic memory that is related
to autonoetic consciousness: it confers attribution of personally experienced memories;
and, it embeds contextual information (spatial, temporal and affective) as characteristics
of those memories. The temporal aspect of episodic memories is evident in the notion of
mental time travel, which is the capacity that enables a sense of the self ‘in time’: past,
present and future self. In the memory systems, autonoetic consciousness is contrasted
with noetic consciousness, which is the type of explicit consciousness associated with
semantic memory.

Figure 4.9 Identity as a component of autonoetic consciousness
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As shown by the relationships in Figure 4.9, episodic autobiographical memory and
autonoetic consciousness play ‘an important role in the construction of personal identity’
(Wilson & Ross, 2003, p. 137). An investigation into autonoetic consciousness in
Asperger syndrome found that participants relied more on semantic memory ‘knowing’
recall of events in their lives, and less on episodic ‘remembering’ of personal events
(Tanweer, et al., 2010). Similar findings have been reported by other researchers (Crane,
Goddard & Pring, 2009b; Hare, Mellor & Azmi, 2007; Lind & Bowler, 2010; Williams,
D., 2010). In the face of atypical episodic memory and diminished autonoetic
consciousness, there is increased reliance by individuals with AS on semantic memory
for memory of personal experiences, supported by intact or superior perceptual
representation, impacting upon identity formation.

4.5

Enhanced perceptual functioning: Literature review

Within education, there is a tendency to negatively ascribe the label of ‘sensory
sensitivities’ to the same phenomenon that is elsewhere positively characterised as
‘enhanced

perceptual

functioning’.

Therefore,

if

an

individual

experiences

overwhelming sensory input that disrupts their social function, it may be described as
‘sensory sensitivities’; if an individual exhibits capacities or gifts based on the same
perceptual processes, it may be attributed to ‘enhanced perceptual functioning’. In
support of this statement, see Mottron (2011), who proposed the theory of enhanced
perceptual functioning in autism, for a discussion of bias in the way autistic sensitivities
are reported. For the purposes of the current study, it was concluded that sensory
sensitivities and enhanced perceptual functioning in autism are closely related, although
these two themes appear separately in the literature. It is accepted that sensory
sensitivities are the experiential outworking of brain activity and connectivity that also
confer enhanced perceptual functioning. In this way, sensory sensitivities, which were
not previously accounted for in the theoretical framework (although each of the four
major theories contributes to an understanding of sensory sensitivities), is satisfactorily
accounted for via enhanced perceptual functioning, allowing it to be mapped to the
memory systems theory of Tulving.
4.5.1

Sensory integration and sensory sensitivities

The impact of sensory sensitivities on the thinking and learning of gifted students with
AS is widely reported (Betts, Betts & Gerber-Eckard, 2007; Gere, Capps, Mitchell,
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Grubbs & Dunn, 2008; Jacobsen, 2003). Sensory issues in autism may take the form of
hypersensitivity or hyposensitivity (Blakemore, et al., 2006; Crane, Goddard & Pring,
2009a; Jennes-Coussens, et al., 2006; Mottron, et al., 2006). Problems with the
integration of sensory inputs is understood to be the basis of sensory sensitivities
(Minshew & Hobson, 2008; Minshew & Williams, 2007; Paton, Hohwy & Enticott,
2012). Sensory issues are reported as being the cause of many problems for individuals
with autism (Attwood, 2007; Kunce, 2003; Lovecky, 2004; Prior, 2003; Tantam, 2003)
and this is certainly supported by Kahla’s account. Accounts of well-known individuals
with AS, such as Glenn Gould and Temple Grandin, include descriptions of sensory
sensitivities (Arsenault, 2000; Attwood, 2007; Boso, et al., 2010; Minshew & Hobson,
2008). Gifted children, including those without autism and ADHD, are reported to have
heightened sensory sensitivities (Gere, et al., 2008; Lovecky, 2004). Keane (2004)
reported ‘early-arising and pervasive impairments in sensory processing’ (p. 8) from
first-hand accounts of individuals with autism. Sensory issues can disrupt social
interaction and are considered a contributing factor to impaired development of social
cognition (O'Connor & Kirk, 2008). Sensory sensitivities in autism indicate altered
perceptive processes, as noted in this commentary on first-hand accounts.
Most writers comment on the disruptive effect their sensory problems have on sustaining
social engagement. Not only do they report that they are hyper- or hypo-sensitive to
everyday sounds, smells, tastes, lights and textures … they also comment that they
actually perceive things … differently… (Williams, E., 2004, pp. 712-713)

Sensory integration issues experienced by individuals with high-functioning autism
pertain to ‘both basic perceptual functions and … higher-order processes’ (Brandwein,
et al., 2013, p. 1329), pointing to the broad impact of sensory integration problems for
different memory systems, not just perception. Sensory issues, while being a
disadvantage in some environments, may result from functional neural connectivity that
simultaneously contributes to the giftedness of the individual (Boso, et al., 2010).
4.5.2

Enhanced perceptual functioning in autism

Perceptual processing differences, impairments and enhancements, have been a feature
of autism since the earliest descriptions: ‘perception plays a different and superior role
in autistic cognition’ (Mottron, et al., 2006, p. 39).
Dating from the earliest clinical observations (Kanner, 1943), atypical perceptual
processing has been documented widely in autism spectrum disorder (ASD; Ben-Sasson
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et al., 2009). Perceptual differences likely play an important role in complex behavioral,
social, and cognitive deficits that define ASD (Zwaigenbaum et al., 2005; Mottron et al.,
2006; Samson et al., 2011). … Both visual impairments, such as face perception deficits
(Simmons et al., 2009), and enhancements, such as superior perception of local visual
features (Dakin and Frith, 2005) and enhanced visual search (Plaisted et al., 1998; Joseph
et al., 2009), have been observed. (Foss-Feig, Tadin, Schauder & Cascio, 2013, p. 8243)

Sensory sensitivities and enhanced perception were not part of the diagnostic criteria for
autism until the publication of the DSM-5 (APA, 2013) and did not find a theoretical
‘home’ among theories of autism until 2006, when Mottron and his colleagues
proposed the ‘enhanced perceptual functioning’ theory of autism (Gastgeb, Dundas,
Minshew & Strauss, 2012; Gastgeb, Wilkinson, Minshew & Strauss, 2011). Both the
social disadvantages and the advantages of enhanced perception were noted.
As a part of superior perceptual functioning, a superior perceptual trace was believed to
be responsible for enhanced memory of the surface properties of visual and auditory
patterns. Some positive symptoms, such as the apparent hypersensitivity to noise,
represented the detrimental effect of discrepancies between autistic and non-autistic
processing of perceptual information. (Mottron, et al., 2006, p. 28)

Elsewhere in the same report, Mottron et al. related enhanced perceptual functioning to
the theory of weak central coherence (WCC) in autism, thereby suggesting a
relationship between Tulving’s memory system approach and the WCC account.
Wallace and Happé (2008) also related perceptual abnormalities in ASD to the central
coherence account of autism and, along with Mottron and others (see also, for example,
Baron-Cohen & Belmonte, 2005), shifted the focus to the potential strengths of this
cognitive profile.
A number of theoretical accounts now focus on superior processing of
elements (Mottron, Dawson, Souliéres, Hubert, & Burack, 2006),
discrimination (Plaisted, 2001) and imbalance between local and global
(Happé & Frith, 2006), which may play a part in superior performance
perceptual tasks by ASD groups, and the high rates of savant skills in ASD
Wallace, 2004). (Wallace & Happé, 2008, p. 448)

perceptual
increased
processing
on certain
(Heaton &

The research literature on enhanced perceptual functioning provides a comprehensive
theoretical understanding of the role of sensory sensitivities in autism and was therefore
included as a fifth explanatory theory for this research, alongside theory of mind,
executive function, central coherence and amygdala theory. The theoretical framework
was updated accordingly and is shown in Figure 4.10.
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Figure 4.10 Theoretical framework updated

The updated theoretical framework is the starting point of the TML professional
development package (Appendix C).

4.6

Mapping autism theories to Tulving’s memory systems

The theory of central coherence theory states that ‘lower-level’ (also known as ‘weak
central coherence’, detail-focused, or bottom-up) information processing is enhanced in
autism, at the expense of ‘higher-level’ (also known as global-focused, top-down, or
Gestalt) information processing (Blakemore, et al., 2006). One aspect of ‘strong’ central
coherence is the capacity to form prototypes and concepts: moving beyond literal, or
concrete, detailed-style processing towards the abstract. This is a capacity that shows
impairment in AS (Gastgeb, 2010; Gastgeb, et al., 2011; Klinger & Dawson, 2001).
Concept formation is an act of abstract reasoning, which is a function of episodic
memory, and abstraction ability shows impairment in AS (DeLong, 1992; Minshew, et
al., 2002; Newman, et al., 2010). Abstract reasoning is also said by some to be an
executive function (Solomon, Buaminger & Rogers, 2011). Therefore, there is a
relationship between enhanced perceptual functioning in autism, the weak central
coherence and executive function accounts of autism. However, the relationships are
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conceptually vague in the literature: in order to resolve the vagaries, for the purposes of
this thesis, the following ‘mapping’ was devised.
Mapping the explanatory theories of autism, showing relationships between theories,
memory systems and corresponding mental activity, allows diverse elements within the
literature to be viewed in relationship to each other for educational purposes. This
process facilitates an interpretation of Kahla’s case and the other cases of this doctoral
study and contributes a key component to the conceptual framework that is the theory
development activity of this study. It brings insights from the memory and neuroscience
fields more readily into the sphere of educators. The mapping process was undertaken
through careful reading of the research literature over a long period of time, drawing
upon existing literature and newly published studies. Comparisons between the memory
literature and the information-processing literature revealed that ‘strong’ central
coherence involves greater reliance on episodic thinking for: abstract, conceptual
understanding; context-laden memories; and, construction of personal meaning. Weak
central coherence indicates reduced reliance on abstract or episodic thinking and greater
reliance on perceptual or sensory input (perceptual processing) and knowledge without
context (semantic processing). The explicit act of thinking and reasoning episodically,
or semantically, takes place in working memory and leaves, or fails to leave, a ‘memory
trace’ (Tulving, 2002, p. 19). Different types of encoding and retrieval memory
processes (see Section 4.3.2), such as those listed by Gardiner (2008), shown in Table
4.2, provided further keys to the mapping process.
Table 4.2 Encoding and retrieval processes (Gardiner, 2008, p. 9)

Deep vs shallow level
Item-specific vs relational
Explicit vs implicit
Conceptual vs perceptual
Effortful vs automatic
Recollection vs familiarity

Through this mapping process, novel pedagogical insights into the thinking and learning
of all students, not just gifted students with AS, were revealed. The resulting ‘map’ is
presented in Table 4.3.
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Table 4.3 Mapping autism theories to Tulving's memory systems

Episodic memory

Semantic memory

Perceptual memory

Type of consciousness
Autonoetic consciousness

Noetic consciousness

Anoetic consciousness

Explanatory theories associated with this memory system
(Strong) Central coherence
Executive function

Weak central coherence

Enhanced perceptual functioning

Mental construct functions
Prototype formation
Concept formation
Meaning-making

Naming, labelling, classifying
Simple category formation
Critical features

Source memory
Temporal memory
Prospective memory
Relational memory
Autobiographical memory
Greater role of self-referential
processing

Single-item memory
Item-specific memory
Symbolic systems e.g. language,
mathematics, visual symbols
Rote memory
Associative thinking

Sensory processing
Experiential

Processes and descriptions associated with this memory system

Mental representation
Top-down, global processing
High-level processing
Complex information processing
Memory for personal experience
Subjective
Contextual (spatial, temporal,
affective)
Memory binding
Abstract reasoning
Organising strategies
Interpretative, constructive
Metacognitive

Mental representation
Bottom-up, local, detail-focused
or low-level processing
Not contextual
No memory binding
Not interpretative
Literal, concrete
Object-focused

No mental representation
Direct perception
Low-level processing
Raw experience
Being ‘in the moment’
Registration of sensory input
Sensory sensitivities in ASD

Table 4.3 is intended as a broad summary of concepts drawn from the literature
reviewed in Sections 4.3 to 4.5, allowing theoretical relationships to be revealed. For the
purposes of this conceptual mapping process, the Theory of Mind theory is accounted
for under the umbrella of the Executive Function theory. The Amygdala theory is
omitted from the table as the research findings about the amygdala are largely
neurobiological in nature, rather than conceptual, with the exception of Immordino-
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Yang and Damasio’s theory of emotion ‘tagging’ for learning (Immordino-Yang, 2008;
Immordino-Yang & Damasio, 2007). The process of mapping autism theories with
conceptual terms from the memory research laid the foundation for the Thinking,
Memory and Learning Framework, which is discussed in Chapter 9 and shown in full in
Appendix C. The references utilised are listed in full in Appendix B.

4.7

Qualitative characteristics of memory in Case 1

Having established the theoretical foundation to support interpretation of the issues of
memory that arose from Kahla’s account, the analysis of Kahla’s data is resumed.
4.7.1

Eidetic imagery

Kahla described her memories as being an unvarying ‘experience’ of the original event,
including all the emotions and perceptions experienced at the time.
K: I totally relive it. I relive every emotion that I felt at the time. Everything that I thought,
or saw, or felt, or smelled at the time is still trapped in that memory. (Interview)

Memories are indexed and filed, available for retrieval at any moment, and are ‘enjoyed’
through being replayed.
K: I can’t ever be bored … I know people experience boredom because I’ve seen it, read
about it, seen how people react to it, seen how they don’t like it, but I can’t actually
experience [boredom] because I can always have a look at something in my head.
(Interview)

Kahla spoke of looking at her autobiographical memories to relive them. The term
‘eidetic memory’ for the phenomenon Kahla described was suggested by another person
with AS in a personal communication. While that communication did not translate to
the person’s participation in this research study, it was valuable for the imparting of this
concept, which was new to the researcher. The early research interest in ‘eidetic
imagery’ appears to have been a field that had its day last century (Allport, 1924),
however, after a break of decades, the term ‘eidetic’ has been revived in the literature
and associated with individuals with autism. Eidetic memory is defined as ‘a rare form
of visual memory … distinguished from ordinary visual imagery by its vividness and by
the fact that it is “seen” projected in front of the viewer as opposed to being merely
remembered’ (Furst, et al., 1974, p. 603). Eidetic imagery (EI) is associated with
unusually high patterns of occipital alpha-wave activity in contrast to the usual case,
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where ‘visual stimulation tends to block alpha-wave production in the visual cortex’ (p.
605). Furst, et al, further suggested that ‘EI is produced by an entirely different memory
mechanism than that responsible for the more usual kind’ (p. 605).
A discussion of eidetic imagery was advanced by Haber (1979), who disputed a
prevailing hypothesis that EI is ‘a developmentally less mature memorial representation,
which is gradually replaced by more abstract representations as the child acquires
abstract thought, reading, and more advanced cognitive abilities’ (p. 583). Hurlburt,
Happé, & Frith (1994), without using the term ‘eidetic’, noted the centrality of visual
imagery in relation to three case studies of adults with AS, when the participants
described their inner experiences.
Sometimes, the visual images served useful or problem-solving functions, e.g. visualizing
the result of some action. In many cases, visual images were accompanied by emotions.
(Hurlburt, et al., 1994, p. 386)

Cash described 27 year-old Jim, who has high-functioning autism, as ‘having an
exceptional, perhaps eidetic memory’ (1999, p. 25). Wallace and Happé described
‘eidetic-type imagery’ as ‘a pure recording of a stimulus’ (2008, p. 447). Eidetic
memory may sometimes be associated with synaesthesia, where, for example, superhuman recall of numbers is associated with ‘seeing’ a colour that represents the next
number (Brang & Ramachandran, 2010). This capacity is manifest in Daniel Tammet, a
young man with high-functioning autism who recited pi to 22,514 places (Attwood &
Garnett, 2012; Gooder, 2005). Brang and Ramachandran (2010) postulate brain overconnectivity (‘defective pruning’) as a possible factor in explaining ‘enhanced visual
(eidetic) imagery’ (p. 173) and this explanation of the possible role of neuronal pruning
in heightened perception is supported by Hill and Frith (2003). Newman, et al., (2010)
noted that eidetic memory encoding, being visual, does not rely on language.
For persons with autism, information is processed visually, as opposed to linguistically.
Thoughts about the world, or about experiences, are stored chronologically as discrete
chunks of visually coded information, as opposed to linguistically coded and stored with
similar concepts or experiences. (Newman, et al., 2010, p. 268)

The characterisation of individuals with autism as ‘thinking in pictures’ (Grandin, 2006;
Sacks, 2011) is relevant within this discussion.
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Eidetic memory is contrasted with abstraction: ‘Without abstraction, a more eidetic or
documentary style of memory and thinking formation occurs’ (Cashin, Gallagher,
Newman & Hughes, 2012, p. 143). Memories are encoded without interpretation, as
they were literally perceived (although, errors are possible).
Sacks (1986) highlighted this interpretation-free recall of memory in his description of
how his patients with autism recalled memories. As he noted: One is dealing with
memories that seem of a ‘documentary’ kind, in which there is no personal reference, no
personal relation, no living center whatever. …It might be said that personal involvement,
emotion, has been edited out of these memories (p. 198). (Newman, et al., 2010, p. 269;
citing Sacks, 1986)

Precise agreement on what is meant by ‘eidetic’ is lacking, however, the notion of
eidetic-style memory in association with individuals with autism is well documented in
the literature.
The absence of encoded interpretation of an eidetic-style memory is noticeable in the
following comment by Kahla about reviewing memories at different ages, where the
eidetic-style memory is encoded as raw material that can be viewed through the eyes of
a 4 year-old or a 48 year-old and interpreted for meaning from the perspective of being
that age.
K: It’s really interesting because, as you get older, you can look at the same memories
and learn something different from [them]. Because the memory’s intact, so you can see
it. But seeing it through the eyes of a 4 year-old to a 12 year-old, up to 48, … I suddenly
think, ‘Oh, look! That was happening!’ or, ‘When that person said this, this was
happening.’ (Interview)

Episodic memories in TD individuals are encoded on the basis of salience for the self
(Lind, 2010) and have therefore already been subjected to an interpretive process at the
point of encoding, whereas Kahla described having complete, verbatim recordings,
without the forgetting that is characteristic of episodic memory.
The modern study of the accuracy of episodic memory has convincingly disproved
another popular metaphor, the idea of memory as a video recorder taping and replaying
the original events. Episodic memory does not reproduce, it constructs, and the
reconstruction of previous episodes is based on information from many sources with the
assistance of many neural system (Rubin, 2006). As some of the sources of information
used in the construction of episodic memories are external to the original event, memory
accuracy suffers. (Magnussen & Brennen, 2011, p. 87)
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In contrast to Magnussen and Brennen’s account, Kahla, along with Grandin (2006) and
the other cases of this research, used terms indicative of autobiographical memory that
indeed functions like a video recording, pointing to a reliance on the semantic memory
system for memories of personal experience. Figures 4.11 and 4.12 depict the explicit
(declarative) memory systems based on the memory systems model of Schacter and
Tulving (1994). Figure 4.11 represents typically developing autobiographical memory.

Figure 4.11 Explicit memory systems

In contrast, the representation of autobiographical memory based on Kahla’s narrative is
shown in Figure 4.12. Kahla’s account of autobiographical memory displays a reliance
on semantic memory, even for autobiographical memories that are typically the domain
of episodic memory.

Figure 4.12 Autobiographical memory from the narrative of Case 1
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Kahla is describing a qualitative experience of memory that accords with the literature
references to eidetic-style memory in autism. Even though she used the word ‘reliving’
at one point, at other times she, instead, used terms such as ‘playing’ or ‘looking’ at her
memories. Kahla’s articulation of her autobiographical memories is qualitatively
different to the ‘remembering’ or ‘mental time travel’ of typical episodic memory (Lind
& Bowler, 2010). The distinction between typical episodic autobiographical memory
and the phenomenon of autobiographical memory expressed in Kahla’s narrative is
further discussed in Section 4.7.3.
4.7.2

Memory as ‘filing system’

Kahla described an encoding process with her memory continuously working to index
and cross-reference features of remembered events and objects. She used the metaphors
of a library and a filing system: her memory is a vast storehouse of information that is
available for her to review, when she chooses.
K: The other thing I love about my mind is my filing system. All memories and thoughts
are stored in sections with related links. … My mind is constantly sorting out these files,
adding to them and creating more links. … The other useful thing is that my mind
operates these files by itself. (Interview)

Memory is described as if it is external, rather than being an integral part of herself.
However, memory has an internal, active role to play in Kahla’s thinking.
K: I can’t ever actually feel alone because there’s so much in [my memory] that I can
have a look at and relive. And it’s interesting. It’s like visiting an enormous library.
There’s all kinds of things in there. There’s everything that I’ve seen that I’ve liked.
Because it’s all catalogued, I can find an interesting leaf and then if I want to, I can enjoy
all the other different leaves that I’ve seen … it’s all cross-referenced, so that I could
retrieve a memory about a balloon and then go into balloons, or I can go into circles,
things that are circular shaped. I collect tones of voice, sets of words, the way things look.
(Interview)

There is no room for a socially constructed view of knowledge in this ‘library’.
Knowledge is viewed as a ‘collection’, perfectly tailored to the self. However, the
library contains knowledge that assists with social learning.
K: I like scenes, so things that I saw, people interacting that I liked, I can put in there and
then take out and have a look again. (Interview)
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Remembered social scenes that were effective provide event scripts and are used as
templates for future social interaction. The indexing and cross-referencing process
happens without conscious effort and leads her to think of her memory as being a
separate entity.
K: What I like is my brain cross-references by itself, so it does work that I’m not aware of.
Sometimes when I bring up a memory and I’m interested to see the other ones that are
associated, there might be a new one there and I’ll think, ‘Oh, good.’ It’s one that I’ve
actually had before, it just hasn’t been cross-referenced to that one. … It’s as if my
brain’s always doing it itself. So the more memories that I accumulate, the more my brain
does that. …
Res (Researcher): So does this require conscious effort on your part for that to happen?
K: It can, if I want it and, but not always. (Interview)

‘Associative thinking’ is the term used by Temple Grandin for this phenomenon: the
indexing, cross-referencing and cataloguing of memories, where one thought leads to
another thought by categorical association in a linear (or serial) progression. Grandin
stated:
Not long ago I was walking through the United Airlines terminal in Chicago, which has a
glass roof. I looked up, and in my mind I saw pictures of the greenhouse at my university,
the Crystal Palace from the 1851 World’s Fair in London, a botanical garden and the
Biosphere in Arizona. These structures weren’t the same shape as the airline terminal, but
they were all in my glass-roof file. Then when I saw the Biosphere in my mind, I noticed
the turrets in the structure. They reminded me of the turrets on the Hoover Dam. So I
started seeing pictures of turrets: on a castle in Germany, on the Disney Fantasyland
castle, on a military tank. At that point, I could have gone either way. I could have
continued to root around in my glass-roof file. Or I could have stayed in the turret file. To
an outsider, my thoughts might appear random, but to me, I’m simply selecting which file
folder I want to explore. I’ve often said that my brain works like a search engine.
(Grandin & Panek, 2013, p. 125)

To take a short detour from the qualitative nature of memory in Case 1: with personal
memories being captured by continuous multiple associations, the issue of executive
control of attention, also referred to a ‘set switching’ or ‘cognitive flexibility’, is raised.
Said to be faulty in autism (Happé, et al., 2006; Van Eylen, et al., 2011), the accounts of
Grandin and Kahla suggest that, rather than attentional capacity itself being diminished,
attention may be so overloaded with internal associations that there is little capacity left
for attending to external, social stimuli. This accords with the cognitive load

121

explanation of executive function deficits proposed by Schneider, Lam, Bayliss, and
Dux (2012).
Returning to Kahla’s account of autobiographical memory, Kahla’s memory filing
system includes metadata or ‘tags’ that allow her to make a decision whether to retrieve
the memory or not. The ‘tag’ contains information about the memory but is not the
memory itself.
K: For instance, I was wondering the other day why I didn’t enjoy painting as much as I
did, and why I had reduced it. I said that out loud because that’s [an] important part of the
process, hoping that my brain would do its own work and then give me the answer. When
I woke up in the morning … my brain just delivered a block of memory to me … I can
[choose] not to open it. I can still see it, recognise it, the way you file and there’s a little
tag on it to show you what’s in the file. I can do that or I can retrieve more of it.
(Interview)

Kahla’s characterises her autobiographical memory as a filing system of print, video
and audio recordings, a virtual library for one, continuously updated with links (crossreferences) between memories, in the phenomenon described by Temple Grandin as
‘associative thinking’. Metaphors of a library and a filing system containing ‘recorded’
material were employed consistently throughout Kahla’s account.
4.7.3

Autobiographical memory

Autobiographical memory in TD individuals functions very differently to the
autobiographical memory in Kahla’s account. Typical autobiographical memory is
‘episodic’ in nature, that is, more is forgotten than is remembered: that which is
remembered, is remembered for personal salience and meaning. Episodic memory
typically involves: ‘self-referential processing’, also known as the ‘self-referencing
effect’ (Cabeza & St Jacques, 2007; Lind, 2010); ‘autonoetic awareness’, selfconsciousness, within which a sense of self, or identity, is formed and maintained
(Markowitsch

&

Staniloiu,

2011;

Tanweer, et al.,

2010;

Tulving,

1985;

Vandekerckhove, 2008); and, ‘mental time travel,’ the means of retrieving
autobiographical memories through stepping back into the memory to re-experience it
within one’s imagination (Perner, et al., 2007; Tulving & Markowitsch, 1998; Wheeler,
et al., 1997). Episodic memories change over time, through decay, lack of rehearsal and
re-interpretation (Cabeza & St Jacques, 2007), however, semantic memories, being
factual in nature, are ‘interpretation-free’ (Newman, et al., 2010, p. 269) and do not
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change their nature over time. One either remembers or forgets a fact (2 + 2 = 4); unlike
episodic memories, a fact doesn’t change depending on, for example, why the person
remembers it or how they feel when they are recalling it. In autism, compared to typical
development, memory is not processed self-referentially to the same extent (Cashin, et
al., 2012; Crane & Goddard, 2008; Mundy, et al., 2010); ‘autonoetic awareness’ is
reduced (Bowler, et al., 2004); and, there is a greater reliance on the semantic memory
system, even for autobiographical memories (Goddard, Howlin, Dritschel & Patel,
2007).
The semantic memory system contains factual knowledge that, in Kahla’s case, includes
data about personal memories, which she described as ‘tags’. It has been suggested that
the semantic memory system may be superior in gifted individuals with autism
(Boucher, 2007; Gaigg, et al., 2008) as evidenced, for example, by superior rote
memory (Bowler, et al., 2004; Crane & Goddard, 2008).
In fact, there is substantial evidence to indicate a selective diminution in episodic
remembering and increased reliance on semantic knowing among individuals with autism,
including high-functioning adults. (Williams, D., 2010, p. 482)

Against the background of the autism and memory literature, it can be seen that Kahla’s
firsthand descriptions of her memory exhibit the qualitative characteristics attributable
to less reliance on episodic memory and a greater reliance on semantic memory, even
for autobiographical memories. Thus, according to Kahla’s account, eidetic-style
memory recordings are stored in a memory repository that is viewed as operating both
like a library and a filing system: it operates in place of typical episodic re-experiencing
(mental time travel), which is the hallmark of episodic autobiographical memory
(Bowler, et al., 2000). Furthermore, Kahla’s account aligns with Lind and Bowler’s
(2010) findings that the autobiographical memory retrieval stance of individuals with
autism is ‘observational’, rather than displaying a sense of personal involvement: ‘of
“being there” (autonoetic awareness)’ (Boucher, 2007, p. 261).
Participants with ASD demonstrated impaired episodic memory and episodic future
thinking. In line with this finding, participants were less likely than comparison
participants to report taking a field (first-person) perspective and were more likely to
report taking an observer (third-person) perspective during retrieval of past events …
highlighting that they were less likely to mentally re-experience past events from their
own point of view. (Lind & Bowler, 2010, p. 896)
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According to these reports, the individual with ASD tends to ‘observe’ his or her own
memories, rather than re-experience them. Kahla used terms such as ‘looking’ and
‘replaying’ her memories, reinforcing the notion of an observational stance. Although
she also used the terms ‘reliving’ and ‘experiencing’, this is likely to be a different
phenomenon to the re-experiencing of episodic mental time travel, with its sense of
personal involvement. Indeed, from Kahla, one gained the sense that her reviewing of
memories had functional purposes of enjoyment and meaningful learning that are not
usually intrinsic to typical episodic remembering.
4.7.4

Memory as a separate entity

Kahla personified her memory (see also the transcript excerpts in Section 4.7.2) and
referred to it as though it was a separate entity.
K: My memory is very interesting and I love my memory. I am attached to it as if it’s an
object that you could actually have. Like the way someone has a special necklace that
they could take out and look and admire and enjoy just having. I’ve noticed people enjoy
expensive objects. I enjoy my memory the same way. So I’m constantly kind of looking
at it and patting it almost, and enjoying it as if it’s a separate thing to myself. It’s part of
me but it’s also a very separate thing and I absolutely love it. It’s almost so big that it’s
almost got its own identity so that it’s another entity. (Interview)
K: … I actually thank my brain. I go, ‘Oh, thank you for that information’, as if it is
another identity to [me] and it’s working on a completely different level. … As if there is
another one of you, almost, in there, living on a slightly separate level but working (in)
conjunction … it’s almost like it’s a twin. (Interview)

The external characterisation of memory appears to have the function of bringing the
abstract notion of memory into the literal domain, where Kahla may feel she has a
measure of cognitive control. This is consistent with the externally oriented thinking
that is a feature of cognition in individuals with autism (Section 4.8.5).
4.7.5

Language: ‘You don’t have to say everything you think’

The reification of thought and memory in Kahla’s case is further evident in her
encoding and retrieval process, which is via spoken language. By speaking aloud, Kahla
is able to ‘record’ her experiences in the complete way implied by eidetic memory.
Kahla is hyperlexic, having had a precocious facility with words, both written and
spoken. Unfortunately, the need to speak her thoughts aloud has greatly contributed to
her social challenges as a teenager and adult. In the previous two years, Kahla had
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received social skills coaching from a psychologist in order to understand the role of
voice modulation and the separation between spoken language and verbal thinking,
something she was not previously aware of.
K: This is [an] amazing thing for me, that you don’t have to say everything that you think.
Oh! I had absolutely no idea. … [The psychologist] … told me to think it, wait, and then
think about what might happen if I actually said that, and what I could say instead. If I put
the two together—the voice modulation and the not saying everything I think—I have
noticed an absolutely amazing difference. …
Res: So there was a direct connection between your thought processes and your
verbalising?
K: Yes. It’s really important to me to talk to myself and I sometimes wonder how many
people might have been burnt as witches for doing it. (Interview)

Kahla proceeded to explain that verbalising her thoughts aloud allows them to be
committed to memory verbatim.
K: Once I’ve spoken it, it becomes extremely etched in my mind so that … it’s always
there for my retrieval, like always. I can adjust it, I can add to it, I can bring up that block
of speech and I can think, ‘Okay, I thought that, then. Now I’m just going to add to it,
rewrite to it.’ So then I have a different block that I can also retrieve, as long as I say it
out loud. Then I can hold up the two conversations side-by-side and weigh them, see
what they sound like. I can recall conversations from my earliest childhood because I’ve
said it out loud. As long as I say it out loud, it’s always there for me to retrieve. … I can
actually see the conversations … as well as hear [them]. (Interview)

In place of typical episodic memory for personally experienced events (Ben Shalom,
2003; Boucher, 2007; Goddard, et al., 2007; Williams, D., 2010), Kahla uses eidetically
recorded event memories as templates for social interaction and conducts mental
rehearsal.
K: So I can shift [a conversation] into a space and hear it and see it and then think, ‘Hmm,
if I say that, that sounds really good.’ Because a lot of it’s planning what I’ll do, if I meet
this person, what I should say in that situation. … A lot of my talking to myself is
actually replaying an event out loud and then adjusting it so that it might have worked, or
had a different outcome and then I can refer to it if a similar situation comes up again.
(Interview)

Boucher reports a comparable account by ‘JS’, a highly gifted individual with autism,
who employed a modified form of event memory with a similar purpose to Kahla.
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[JS] has learned to compensate by memorizing events involving other people in terms of
remembered conversations. Many or even most sentences in a conversation are
memorized verbatim. (Boucher, 2007, p. 256)

For Kahla, memory retrieval, as well as encoding, is mediated through speech. Voice
modulation (volume, pitch and tone) and non-verbal language have a direct, literal
relationship with words and thoughts for her. Kahla’s association between thought
language and spoken language was so fixed that her volume and tone reflected the
strength of her thoughts. If the thought was very important to her, she would shout the
words. The problems with her manner of speaking became apparent to her during a
series of court hearings, where she was reprimanded when she shouted and did not
understand why. Working over an extended period of time with a specialist psychology
practice gave Kahla opportunities to learn compensatory strategies to overcome the
mismatch between her speech and situations requiring higher-level social understanding.
K: I didn’t realise that a loud voice was interpreted as aggressive or unfriendly. The
stronger the thoughts came to me, the more emphasis I would put on them. Particularly if
I liked the thought. … Because when a thought appears in your mind, it’s got a weight. If
you like it, or you think it gets across what you want to say, it becomes heavier or more
visible … and so I give that weight the sound-weight. … If I was more uncertain, my
voice would become smaller. …
Res: Does the weight of your thoughts equate to importance, or passion?
K: Both. … when I was in court, if someone had lied and I had the correct piece of
information, I would shout it because it was true. … I knew something was going
drastically wrong … And so, as I talked to [the psychologists], they finally said, ‘Well,
one thing you need to do is stop standing up and down, stop waving your arms around,
stop shouting.’ (Interview)

Through compensatory learning, she has been able to learn appropriate voice
modulation and the beauty and precision of her use of voice during the research
interview was noted. She has also gained a measure of awareness that her use of verbal
and non-verbal language (for instance, standing up and down to reinforce the ‘soundweight’ of a thought) has a potentially negative effect on other people, and, knowing
this, has been motivated to change her behaviour in order to communicate more
effectively.
Spoken language for Kahla represents a ‘memory stream’ or flow, both in and out, for
encoding and retrieval. She thinks by speaking aloud and hearing herself speak. She
encodes to, and retrieves from, memory by speaking aloud. Rather than having
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implicit knowledge of her thoughts, she knows what she thinks by listening to
herself speak. Voice modulation and body language have, for her, a direct association
with the meaning of the words, rather than functioning for social purposes. Thoughtful
reflection is an active, externalised process. Through explicit learning, Kahla has been
successful in achieving more effective strategies for communicating in various social
situations.
4.7.6

Childhood amnesia

A feature of Kahla’s account of memory was her unsolicited references to early
memories, which seemed to indicate clear, eidetically recorded, autobiographical
memories at age one.
K: …my long-term memory is superior and I can provide any details from my past you
require right back to age one. (Email)

At the time, the researcher was dismissive of this early memory account but began to
pay closer attention when the same phenomenon arose, also unsolicited, in two other
cases. A literature search on childhood amnesia in autism revealed reports of this
phenomenon. Crane and Goddard (2008) described typical ‘childhood amnesia’ as the
case where ‘people tend to recall few memories from the first few years of their life’,
and stated that this is a ‘robust temporal characteristic’ of autobiographical memory (p.
503). In contrast, spontaneous reports from individuals with autism of autobiographical
memories going back to birth were reported by Lee and Hobson.
It was also remarkable (and rather mysterious) that no fewer than nine autistic
participants but no nonautistic participants talked about experiences of babyhood. (Lee &
Hobson, 1998, p. 1140)

Williams (2010) proposed that diminished childhood amnesia in autism might be
attributable to the increased reliance on semantic memory and this explanation aligns
with Kahla’s description of eidetic recordings of autobiographical memories. In
response to Lee and Hobson’s report, Williams reported the ensuing debate over
whether the memories were confabulated.
Lee and Hobson found that a substantial proportion of the participants with autism, but no
comparison child, spontaneously described ‘recollections’ of their own birth. Importantly,
Hobson (personal communication) reports that these recollections were as vivid and
descriptive as their other personal recollections. The phenomenon of childhood amnesia,
which concerns the fact that the vast majority of typical adults do not recall events which
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happened prior their fourth birthday, suggests that any memory of one’s birth (or of early
life, per se) is most likely the result of confabulation. On the other hand, Lyons and
Fitzgerald (2005) argue that early autobiographical episodic memories reported by some
people with autism are accurate and this apparently exceptional ability to report events
from early in life should be considered a savant talent. (Williams, D., 2010, p. 482)

While noting the debate, which is conducted in the context of a discussion about
individuals with autism and their knowledge of their own mental states over time
(including in early childhood), Williams issued his own ad hoc ‘credibility test’ based
on whether the memories involve skills that have not been developmentally achieved at
the time.
The most important thing to note from all of this is that we should be cautious about any
individual’s memories that include details of skills or capacities that the individual
probably would not have possessed at the time of the original event, even if they possess
those skills at the time of ‘remembering’/reporting. (Williams, D., 2010, pp. 483-484)

Lending authenticity to Kahla’s report is that the nature of her memories changed when
she acquired language (keeping in mind that she had precocious language
development). Applying William’s test of caution, Kahla’s report acquires credibility.
The following lengthy excerpt from Kahla’s account, describing the difference in her
memories before and after language acquisition, is reported here so that the credibility
of her account can be judged on its merits.
Res: How far back do your memories go?
K: My memories go back to before speech and they’re catalogued differently … because
you don’t have words … so it’s a sensation. … I wouldn’t know how old I am but
logically you can apply it because … my obsession with the sky and what it looks like,
comes directly from this memory. I like things around my neck, like that (gesture: tucks
scarf around neck and smiles) so I’m clearly tucked into my pram. … I did not know it
was my pram then because I didn’t know what a pram was. It’s only with distance that I
can see that it’s a pram. And my mother must be moving the pram up when it goes to a
curb. But I can remember all the lifts and downs and the way the sky looked when you’re
moving. So I must be very young because I have no memories other than sensation. It’s
sensation. And visual. I can recall the exact intense ‘ah!’ (gasps with delight) of seeing
the sky. [I’d] no idea what it was but, the moving past and the clouds, I absolutely love it.
Another memory that I have is seeing a red marble in the grass and I’ve got blue soft
pants on over a nappy, and then over that is the plastic. And I didn’t like the feeling of the
plastic at all or the elastic that goes around your leg. I did not like that feeling and I’m in
the grass and I did not like the way the grass dug into my knees. You know how mothers
always put babies on grass? I didn’t like it. So I used to go like that (hand gesture
indicating rocking) rather then crawl across the grass. But I saw this bright, orange round
thing. I didn’t know it was round. When I go back into my memory, I only see the round
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thing (makes round shape with hands), and it’s from a child’s perspective. When I noticed
it, everything else shifts out of focus in my memory. It’s this thing that I want and I want
to put it in my mouth. I want to feel it in my mouth (puts fingers inside mouth) but I had
one second of enjoyment, of feeling it in my mouth, before I felt this huge blow on the
back of my head (hits self on back of head), and this scream, which was my mother. I still
remember the exact feeling, and the wail and the shock and of it, without any language at
all.
I spoke quite early, at 10 months. I still remember my first word. I remember being in the
high chair and having a damp cloth. I’d eaten apple sauce with bits of what I now know is
pork. I wasn’t keen on those because my mum used to leave this bit of fat on and I used
to get this texture in the roof of my mouth. So I remember going round trying not to get
those pork bits in but Mum used to cut them really small. And then I used to try and get
them out of my mouth so she had a blue cloth that was wet that she would keep wiping
my fingers with. And then I lifted it on my face and pulled it down and said, ‘Peek-a-boo’.
Whereupon my mother shrieked and left the room, which really scared me. But Mum said
later, when I brought back the memory with her, that she rushed off to tell everyone I’d
said my first word. I know from my mother that two months after that I was speaking
quite well, in strings of sentences. So memories with feelings must come before 12
months. Some of them are not very detailed the way my older [more recent] memories are.
Once I got language, the memories are concreted in a completely different way. They’re
retrievable in a different way. … like when you hop into a bath and you’re just immersed
in the warm water, hopping into one of those memories is very much like that. It’s being,
it’s bathed in sensation. You don’t get words like, ‘I’m looking at the sky,’ it’s you just
instantly go back into a state of being. … that’s why I’ve been so obsessed with language
all my life and I’ve liked words because it’s like a key to creating your world. (Interview)

It is interesting to note Kahla’s switch between past and present tense, her gestures
throughout this passage that were essential to the narrative, and her use of metaphor to
describe the switch between two mental states (‘like when you hop into a bath’). While
it is unexpected that infants would have colour representation at the age Kahla describes,
given the proof of her heightened colour perception (as evidenced by her artwork),
caution was applied before dismissing that aspect of her account. It may be that the
description of the cloth as blue and the marble as red and orange is a recent application
of language to the remembered sensation that does not necessarily undermine the
credibility of the account. Although she used the phrase ‘you just instantly go back into
a state of being’, the extensive use of language throughout her account indicating
documentary-style, eidetic recordings of memory preclude the interpretation that she is
describing an act of mental time travel but rather is recalling the vividness of childhood
memories that have not been subject to typical decay. This interpretation is supported
by Kahla’s explanation for the difference between her own early childhood memories
and the childhood amnesia of TD individuals.
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K: I have observed that neurotypical [individuals] seem to experience time and their life
events in a linear fashion, a line extending from their earliest memory to the present day. I
have also observed that many of these memories, unless significant or traumatic, fade
with time so that the earlier memories are not as distinct as the current ones. However, I
and my sons experience time and our life events in a circle, as if we are in the middle,
with events being equally significant and clear and within equal distance of each other,
like beads on a necklace, and, in our case, infancy is within easy grasp. So events that
occurred when we were 1 or 2 are just as vivid as if we were 10 or 20 and so on. This
causes certain problems and difficulties. For example the distress I felt at losing a toy
when I was 3 is just as painful now as it was all those years ago if I choose to select that
memory. (Email)

Once again, Kahla eloquently employs metaphor to illustrate her conception of her
memory and to contrast her experience with TD individuals. Her description of the
decay of episodic memory accurately reflects the research literature.
The phenomenon of spontaneous reports indicating lack of typical childhood amnesia
by individuals with autism is not widely reported but certainly has a presence within the
research literature and was a surprise finding of this doctoral study. Against the
background of the extensive research literature on episodic memory and semantic
memory, both typically developing and in autism, a reasonable explanation for the
phenomenon of Kahla’s detailed descriptions of incidents from her infancy is that the
‘forgetting’ function of episodic memory has not been activated due to the memories
being eidetically recorded (a function of the semantic memory system). This is an
interpretation supported by Vandekerckhove, speaking about the phenomenon of
childhood amnesia itself: ‘The lack of remembering in an episodic way is related with
the phenomenon of infantile amnesia before the age of 3 or 4’ (Vandekerckhove, 2008,
pp. 10; citing Perner & Ruffmann, 1995). Vandekerckhove associated episodic
forgetting (childhood amnesia) with brain maturation in an inverse relationship: as the
prefrontal cortex matures, episodic memory develops and typically assumes the primary
role in autobiographical memory from semantic memory, which is an earlier developing
system. Childhood amnesia, therefore, allows greater organisation of personal
autobiographical memories and abstraction of meaning from experience, beyond the
recording of the memories, and suggests a role in the heightened reliance on semantic
memory that Kahla exhibits. Although the origin of the reduced incidence of childhood
amnesia in autism is not well-understood, the research literature certainly supports
Kahla’s claims to having such early memories: as a visual ‘recording’ of sensation, with
the addition of language as it developed and, in Kahla’s case, it is suspected that
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enhanced visual perception and precocious language facility may have contributed to
the vividness of the memories.
4.7.7

Enhanced perceptual functioning in Case 1

Enhanced perceptual functioning in Case 1 was demonstrated through evidence of
sensory sensitivities and visual-spatial giftedness.
4.7.7.1

Sensory sensitivities

Sensory sensitivities may be an advantage, with regard to heightened perception and
giftedness, or a disadvantage. Kahla gave instances where her own and her son’s
sensitivities had been both an advantage and a disadvantage. While at school, Kahla
described the difficulty of having super-acute hearing combined with attentional control
issues.
K: When teachers talked in the class room, I was distracted by the myriad of sounds both
near and distant. My hearing is in the top 7% so I could hear very well. The problem is
that my brain loves to categorise things so, instead of listening to the teacher with my full
attention, I would be busy identifying the bird species based on the sounds I heard
(magpie, magpie-lark, wattle bird, willy wagtail …), labelling the various insect sounds
(fly, wasp, bee, cricket, cicada) and identifying dog barks (sad, lonely, frustrated,
greeting, warning, excited, puzzled) as well as papers rustling, children fidgeting,
teachers in other rooms, etc., etc. In addition I would fantasize about the sounds. For
example if I heard the distressed bark of a Labrador I would imagining rescuing it and
giving it a walk. (Email)

Sensory sensitivities may be viewed, in some contexts, in a very positive light, as super
powers (Huws & Jones, 2013). Two such examples were given by Kahla.
K: My dearest friend once asked me to bring [my son] to her home as her son had lost his
[School] Captain’s badge and although they had turned the house upside down it was
nowhere to be found. My son ran through the front door, raced down the hall and swerved
suddenly into the lounge with a joyful ‘WHOOP’ as he swiftly knelt beside the sofa and
extracted the badge from beneath it to the amazement of all present! When asked how he
found it [my son] tapped his eye and solemnly declared he had seen a ‘glimmer where
there had never been a glimmer before.’ On taking him to a park recently he suddenly set
off at a sprint and was soon nearly lost to sight. In a panic, I and several others chased
him … Finally he stopped after covering an incredible distance and shouted, ‘Look up
there...a baby kookaburra!’ A man who had assisted said, ‘Good God! How did he see
that without binoculars? It’s almost impossible to see now!’ [My son] replied, ‘I made
everything into a green grid divided by red lines. In one of the squares, I could see
something different.’ (Email)
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In agreement with Kahla’s account, Mottron (2011) stated that the altered brain function
of autism confers advantages as well as disadvantages: ‘redistribution of brain function
may nonetheless be associated with superior performance’ (p. 34), thereby drawing a
relationship between a perceived weakness and a corresponding strength. Enhanced
perception may impart a disadvantage in social settings when sensory stimulation levels
are outside one’s control, but the perceptual advantage may be nonetheless treasured by
the individual themselves.
4.7.7.2

Visual-spatial giftedness

Kahla’s heightened visual perception is apparent in her artwork, which is rich in visual
texture and colour. This characteristic was expressed in concern for the researcher’s
‘colourblindness’ as she became aware that the researcher does not see as she sees.
Res: What you write [about seeing colour] is really fascinating. … my experience with
seeing colour is very different. I have trouble even seeing the colours that make up other
colours on physical objects and still find it hard to distinguish between a 'warm red' and a
'cold red', as artists refer to paint colours. They all look 'red' to me and I've been taught
that red is 'warm' so how can you have a 'cool red'...? (Email)
K: I was VERY interested in your email. Are you colourblind? I was fascinated by your
difficulty with red because it is my favourite colour and what I love about it is its extreme
diversity of hue from hot to warm to cool to cold. Different reds have various amounts of
yellow or blue in them to push them to the extreme ends of the red spectrum, vermilion
has more yellow and so is warm but cadmium has blue in it and so it becomes cooler.
(Email)

The researcher is not colourblind in the medical sense but, to Kahla, she does have a
kind of blindness, as she cannot perceive colour in Kahla’s rich way. Kahla’s perception
of the researcher’s ‘disadvantage’ accords with the findings of a recent IPA study.
When comparisons were made to people without autism, everyone except Joshua and
Darren talked about themselves as being more fortunate in some respects because of their
heightened abilities in some modalities. (Huws & Jones, 2013, p. 4)

Kahla’s heightened perception as an infant is reflected in her accounts of experiences
from babyhood (Section 4.7.6). Perceptual experiences have been retained verbatim
(eidetically) and are available for ‘replay’: for instance, the account of being a baby in
the pram looking at the sky and having a changing view as the pram was wheeled up
and down over the roadside kerb. Where, typically, childhood amnesia mitigates against
the permanency of these memories, their retention is suggestive of heightened
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perception. In an email, Kahla wrote extensively about ‘dots’, and this account would
appear to be an example of enhanced perceptual functioning as described in the
literature. The following six excerpts are a continuous passage (from an email), which
has been segmented to allow for analysis and commentary.
K: This email is about ‘dots’...it’s how I and [my two sons] see. I've often wondered if
more autistic people see these dots and if they are so overwhelming on a sensory level
that they can't see beyond them and are locked into this very visually isolating process.

Kahla reflected on the sensory sensitivities of her autistic experience and how these
create social isolation. She then provided an explanation of the experience of her
enhanced visual perception.
K: … The most fascinating thing about the ‘dots’ and possibly the most difficult thing to
explain is that they are so small that, even if I made the smallest pinprick with my pencil
on a piece of paper, that would be way too big, so the quandary is: how do I and [my
sons] see them? The word ‘pixelated’ is the closest word to describe the effect and yet
even that word falls short. When [my son] asked me if he was seeing molecules or atoms,
I had to wonder.

She further described how the ‘dots’ are animated, which began to convey a sense of the
sensory and mental load she was describing.
K: The other interesting and amazing thing about the ‘dots’ is not only do they pulse or
vibrate but they also whiz around in all directions at incredible speed. As a young child, I
used to think the dots were deliberately making patterns … Because there are billions
whizzing about in all directions, your brain can literally join the dots as it pleases.
Thankfully, as an adult, I no longer have this problem. I use the word ‘problem’ because
it was so distracting when I was a child …

At this point, it became clear why she thinks the researcher is colourblind: she was
describing visual perception of colour that is beyond the researcher’s experience.
K: For example, although I see a purple cushion as overwhelmingly purple, I also
simultaneously see the other colours in the purple (mostly red and a range of blues).
There are always black dots in everything, even the lightest colours. When I was younger,
my mind used to jump between the two effects but now the process is seamless.

Along with the liabilities of this visual perception, Kahla recognises that the same
mechanism may contribute to her giftedness.
K: I also used to find the rapid movement of the dots highly distracting and, at times,
disturbing but that process has also become integrated. There are usually red dots in
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greater or lesser degrees in most colours. I have wondered if seeing these ‘dots’, whatever
they are, has helped with my fantastic night vision. …

It is apparent that trying to make sense from these visual experiences of the world must
impact upon the individual’s developing view of the world: particularly where it has
been assumed that all people see in the same way, followed by the realisation, from
negative or absent feedback, that this is an experience singular to oneself. Assigning an
entity to the ‘dots’ is reminiscent of Kahla’s view of her memory (Section 4.7.4): that is,
she exhibits a tendency to externalise mental processes by speaking of her perception as
though it were external to herself, or concrete.
K: Like [my sons] I went through various stages as a child of trying to understand what I
was seeing. At first I believed the dots were sentient and alive. At times, like [my sons], I
was not certain if they were friendly or not. I then went through a stage of wondering if
they were microbes or bacteria and, just like [my sons], came to wonder if I was
somehow seeing on a molecular level. What I did learn relatively early was that other
people did NOT see them. … When I was a child, I tended to over-focus on the dots. This
was not just distracting but also intensely fatiguing. Following the rapid motion can be
tiring and stressful. It can create a state of hyper-alertness. As an adult, I have retrained
my brain to find the same motion soothing and I am also able to blur the effect (or turn
down the volume). (Email)

The effect of this experience of the world has had an impact on every level of Kahla’s
development and world view: social (‘isolating’), emotional (‘stressful’), physical
(‘fatiguing’), perceptual, intellectual (theorising about whether she is seeing molecules),
and lends weight to the notion that attention and working memory are so overloaded
processing internal perceptual experience that there is little available to ‘spend’ on the
external social world. Kahla’s description in this email communication and at other
points in her narrative suggests an association between sensory sensitivities, enhanced
perceptual functioning and her artistic giftedness. However, it is evident that the
enhanced function comes at a cost: social, physical, emotional, intellectual.
4.7.8

Summary

Kahla’s memory account indicates profound differences from memory in TD
individuals. The notion of eidetic memory, where verbatim, visual and documentarystyle autobiographical memories are ‘recorded’ and ‘filed’, aligns with Kahla’s
descriptions. She described her memory as independently conducting its own ‘indexing,
cross-referencing and cataloguing’ and her explanation of this process is very similar in
nature to Temple Grandin’s account of ‘associative thinking’. Both women used

134

metaphoric language relating to a filing system to describe the functioning of their
memory. Kahla’s descriptions of her memory indicate a strong reliance on semantic
memory and reduced reliance on episodic memory, in line with the autism and memory
literature. She conceives of her memory almost as if it is a separate, twin-like entity.
Through difficult social experiences and the intervention of a specialist group of
psychologists, Kahla’s underlying beliefs about memory and language have been
exposed—‘you don’t have to say everything you think’—and she has been successful in
learning compensatory social strategies. Those beliefs provide insight into the nature of
her memory, where spoken language plays a particular role in her encoding and
retrieval thinking processes. Reduced childhood amnesia, which is evident in Kahla’s
account, is an indication, supported by the literature, that she has a greater reliance on
semantic and perceptual memory and a reduced reliance on episodic remembering, for
autobiographical memories. Aspects of Kahla’s narrative indicate enhanced perceptual
function, particularly in relationship to visual acuity.
Against the background of the memory systems approach, mapped with executive
function, weak central coherence and enhanced perceptual functioning theories of
autism,

Kahla’s

case

demonstrates

an

instance

of

superior

perceptual

processing/memory and superior semantic processing/memory. Her superior perception
and visual representation abilities confer artistic giftedness that has resulted in a prolific
output of visually rich, imaginative artworks. Episodic memory is evidently diminished
as her first-hand autobiographical memories are documentary, eidetic-style, memories
that can be mentally viewed as a ‘pure recording of a stimulus’ (Wallace & Happé,
2008, p. 447): sometimes for enjoyment (as if a spectator); or, for purposes of learning,
evaluation and social problem-solving. Kahla did not recount autobiographical
memories that appeared to be the result of mental time travel. Many of her memories
have apparently been resistant to the effects of childhood amnesia. Reliance upon
superior semantic and perceptual processing/memory, with diminished reliance upon
episodic processing and memory, accounts for the characteristics of Kahla’s memories.

4.8

Learning

The analysis now turns to themes that are not directly about memory but have a bearing
upon learning.
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4.8.1

Compensatory learning

Many individuals with AS employ their intellect to learn compensatory strategies in
order to manage their social cognition deficits (Frith, U., 2001; Hill & Frith, 2003;
Williams, E., 2004) and there are references to compensatory learning, or strategies, in
relation to other domains as well.
Uta Frith has written, in her book Autism: Explaining the Enigma, ‘Autism … does not
go away. … Nevertheless, autistic people can, and often do, compensate for their
handicap to a remarkable degree. [But] there remains a persistent deficit … something
that cannot be corrected or substituted.’ (Sacks, 1995, p. 241)

Compensatory learning is described as a ‘slow and painstaking learning process’ (Frith
& Happé, 1999, cited in Lind & Bowler, 2008, p. 178) and contributes to a different
form of self-consciousness, founded on cognition that relies on external referents in
place of self-referential processing. This style of thinking is described in this thesis by
the use of the term ‘externally oriented thinking’. The phenomenological nature of these
compensatory learning techniques has not yet been subjected to close scrutiny and is of
particular relevance to the research question of this doctoral study.
Kahla’s compensatory learning certainly fits the description of ‘slow and painstaking’.
She typified compensatory development of awareness and ability to articulate inner
experiences and she employed externally oriented ways of thinking to achieve this.
Kahla’s account indicates the ways she has developed ‘work-around’ solutions to
compensate for: deficits in eye gaze and face recognition (Section 4.8.2);
communication (Section 4.8.3); and, social skills, through the study of people, to
develop social understanding of human behaviour (Section 4.8.4).
4.8.2

Eye gaze and face recognition

Eye gaze, for experimental purposes, is usually treated independently of face
recognition (see, for example, Davies, Bishop, Manstead & Tantam, 1994; Grynszpan,
et al., 2012; Kliemann, Dziobek, Hatri, Baudewig & Heekeren, 2012; Langdell, 1978;
Parvizi, et al., 2012; Pelphrey, et al., 2005). However, phenomenologically, and for the
purposes of this study, there is a clear relationship between the individual’s use of eye
gaze to garner social information and the ability to decipher identity and social meaning
conveyed through looking at faces, so these elements are treated as interrelated. This
approach is supported by a recent study that proposes an association between: eye gaze;
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face recognition; amygdala activation; and, social and emotion processing (Kana,
Libero, Hu, Deshpande & Colburn, 2014).
Individuals with AS have different patterns of eye gaze and find it difficult to make
appropriate eye contact during social interactions (Brenner, Turner & Müller, 2007;
Neumann, et al., 2006). Kahla described how she deliberately worked on mastering eye
contact as she was motivated by the realisation that her social interactions and other
people’s impressions of her were hampered by lack of eye contact.
K: I’ve been practising eye contact for about seven years. … I changed my eye contact
seven years ago myself because I realised people didn’t like it at all. [They] kept saying
to me, ‘Look at me!’ Even adults would get really annoyed. I had this reputation for not
looking at people and I got quite desperate. I thought, ‘Gosh, not only do people think
I’m rude, but they are so hostile if I don’t look at them.’ The other thing that really
concerned me was how it’s interpreted by so many people as being dishonest, or lying. I
could hardly sleep at night, understanding that that was the perception that people had,
because I’m rigidly honest. So I wanted to do it. I have to say I don’t like it, but I am
quite good at it, I think. (Interview)

There is a limited capacity to recognise faces and process facial information in
individuals with AS (Faja, et al., 2012; Meyer & Minshew, 2002; Schultz, et al., 2000).
Many authors have documented atypical face processing in ASD, with the fusiform
gyrus—a small ‘valley’ in the temporal cortex dedicated to face processing—implicated
as underactive and under-connected with the neural network responsible for face
processing (Ashwin, Wheelwright & Baron-Cohen, 2006; Dawson, 2008b; van Kooten,
et al., 2008). Attwood described this phenomenon as ‘prosopagnosia’ or ‘face blindness’
(2007, p. 130)—see also Sacks (2011). Individuals with ASD tend to focus on less
salient elements, such as the mouth or clothing, avoiding the eyes (Davies, et al., 1994;
Grynszpan, et al., 2012).
Face blindness poses a major social problem for individuals with autism. For people
with poor face recognition, contextual cues, such as being in the family home or
wearing a particular style of clothing, may provide the clue to a person’s identity, rather
than implicit face-recognition ability. Grandin described how she manages her face
blindness by using external objects to identify people.
I myself didn’t know that people have subtle eye signals until I was fifty. I have so much
trouble remembering faces that in a business meeting, for instance, I’ll force myself to
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recognize physical details: Okay, she’s wearing big glasses with black rims. He’s the one
with the goatee. (Grandin & Panek, 2013, pp. 121-122) [italics in original]

There is another report of an individual with autism using contextual cues to recognise
people: associating a preference for striped shirts with a person, or silver jewellery, or
the sound of their voice, in order to identify them (Dawson, 2008a). This is a successful
strategy only as far as the context remains stable. If location is one of the contextual
cues used, then the same person may not be recognised in a different location, posing
the social problem experienced by Kahla.
K: The reason I taught myself [to recognise faces] was because people thought that I was
really rude and hostile for just walking straight past them. This lady got really angry with
me in the street because she said, ‘You know, it’s all very well when you walk past my
house, you say hello, but if I see you out here, you don’t.’ I was like, ‘Goodness! Who
are you?’ She said, ‘Don’t be ridiculous! I live across the road,’ and she was quite
agitated. Then I said, ‘Look, this might sound strange but I’ve got this problem with
recognising people’s faces,’ and she thought that was really weird. And my children have
huge trouble, absolutely dreadful. They didn’t even recognised their stepfather properly
for about two years. Even though they loved him and they knew, if he was in the home, it
was him, once we got out[side the house], any bald man was J- if he was tall and thin.
(Interview)

Even when the person is as well-known as a new stepfather, recognition of faces out of
context may still pose problems. Kahla’s children required repetition and practice over a
long period of time before being able to recognise their stepfather independently of
context. Kahla gave the following account of how she achieved a measure of ability to
recognise faces out of context, using a visual memory strategy, via compensatory
learning. She was clearly already employing contextual cues but needed a technique that
would enable her to identify a person when the context changed.
K: The other … disability I have is faces but I taught myself how to recognise those last
year. … I noticed that, when I’d seen a two-dimensional photograph of a person, I was
more likely to remember them. When I’d seen a picture of a movie star in a magazine, I
could recognise them if I saw them in in a movie. So I thought about those two things:
about what it was if I’d seen a photograph of a person, why I could remember them more
easily. But, the thing is, there’s a lot of people out there that you don’t get a chance to
have a photograph of. You don’t go to school with your children and see all the mothers,
take a photograph and go home and study it. So I thought, ‘OK, let me create a twodimensional image in my head when I look at somebody, as if it is a photo,’ would that
help? Well, it certainly did. It was incredible and within three months I was recognising
everyone. (Interview)
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Although facial recognition via matching a magazine photo to a face in a movie is not
the same thing as recognising faces in natural social interactions, Kahla nevertheless
reported that she has achieved a level of mastery she did not previously have. Kahla’s
technique is an explicit strategy to memorise a ‘mental photo’ of the person’s face, a
strategy which employs her superior visual processing and semantic memory to roteremember images. In contrast, typical face recognition employs a strategy of forming
prototypes (summary representations) of faces (for example, male or female, older or
younger): this strategy allows a speedy, intrinsic matching process to take place,
providing almost instantaneous, implicit recognition. The capacity to form prototypes
for faces is impaired in individuals with autism (Gastgeb, et al., 2011).
4.8.3

Communication

Explicit teaching and learning is required for a motivated individual, such as Kahla, to
learn social skills through compensatory learning. The following section of Kahla’s
transcript is an example of her hard-won social learning and gives insight into her
thought processes.
Res: Your voice modulation is really beautiful.
K: Yes, I worked a lot on that though over the last two years. How it happened was in my
dealings with [a government department], I realised that I was not getting my message
across somehow. … But one of the problems I had, and it became huge when I was [a
plaintiff] in [court], the judge just hated the way I spoke. …
Res: So what would be your natural way of speaking?
K: (very loud volume with equal emphasis on most words) ‘Well, the thing is my child
needs a lot of help in this area.’ That loud and really full-on. I would stand and wave my
arms around and stand up and down and up and down and up and down, like a yo-yo. I
might even walk around the table while people were sitting and I might bang the desk
(thumps the table several times) to make my point. I didn’t realise that a loud voice was
interpreted as aggressive or unfriendly. (Interview)

Prosody, or voice modulation (for example, pitch, volume, tone), is defined as ‘the use
of acoustic features of speech to complement, highlight, or modify the meaning of what
is said’ (Van Santen, Prud'Hommeaux, Black & Mitchell, 2010, p. 215). Prosody in
individuals with AS may be poor (Klin & Volkmar, 1995) and require specific tutelage,
as in Kahla’s case.
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K: [Learning] voice modulation … changed my life remarkably. Just in the last year, I
would say I really noticed an astounding impact. I wish I’d known all about it before.
(Interview)

In the experience shared by Kahla above, the socially inappropriate use of her voice was
determined by her mistaken belief in a simple direct relationship between thought and
speech (Section 4.7.5). Through experience of failure, she became highly motivated to
change her behaviour but this could only be done through explicit teaching that
challenged the underlying belief. That explicit teaching was provided by a specialist
psychology practice and, from this tutoring, Kahla learnt socially appropriate alternate
event ‘scripts’, or ways of behaving. While she did not learn the solution to the problem
from her own experience, she did acquire the motivation to learn. Hans Asperger noted
that:
[T]here is an inability to learn from adults in conventional ways. Instead, the autistic
individual needs to create everything out of his own thought and experience. More often
than not this results in defective performance, even in the more able autistic individuals
(p. 56). (Asperger, 1944, trans. Frith, 1991, cited in Scheuffgen, et al., 2000, p. 89)

This provides a pedagogical insight into teaching students with AS: although perhaps
not learning directly through experience itself, individuals with AS may instead find the
motivation to learn. Teachers may be able to recognise and capitalise on that motivation
to explore a compensatory means of learning with a student with AS.
Kahla’s experience in the modulated use of voice and language shows, on one level, the
tortuous learning path she has followed, having not been able to learn from prior
experience. On another level, it reveals her shocked surprise at discovering that
thoughts and words operate independently, with contingent outcomes for establishing
trustworthiness and truth of verbal utterances. Kahla’s reaction of shock points to the
ontological problem that gifted individuals with AS may have, which can be
summarised in the question ‘What is real and true?’
4.8.4

Study of people

The study of people as a special interest is a theme that draws on several others:
fixations and special interests; externally oriented thinking; and, compensatory learning.
Studying people to see how they ‘tick’ (in the words of Case 5, where ‘tick’ is used as a
clockwork metaphor meaning ‘function’ or ‘operate’) is a special interest which leads to
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compensatory learning. The interest in people is akin to a scientific study for the
purposes of social problem-solving. Observations are made, evidence gathered, analysis
conducted and conclusions drawn. Social decision-making is based on the findings and
helps address the felt need of poor social cognition. Kahla is highly motivated in her
study of people as evidenced by her increasing awareness, over time, of the extent of
her social deficits.
K: Now I’ve got the type of brain that likes analysing things. I like looking at ‘Why?’ I
particularly like behaviour. I like watching people and thinking, ‘Why are they doing
that? What does that mean?’ I like the psychology of it. I think I’m lucky in that I can
look at it and pull it apart in such fine detail, about myself and other people. (Interview)
K: It is a special interest and it came from two things. It came from my inability, or my
mismanagement of my world when I was a child, [so I became] interested in what other
people were doing and thinking and feeling. (Interview)

In this portion of Kahla’s account, she is also expressing a compensatory theory of mind
(Frith, U., 2001; Hill, et al., 2004; Meyer & Minshew, 2002; Williams, D., 2010;
Williams, E., 2004): an explicit, learned theory of mind to account for her own and
others’ behaviours and mental states, based on a study of people.
K: You are right in thinking that I think a lot about how I and my sons think. I constantly
evaluate and assess and pull apart our minds and events. At about age 4, I realised
something was wrong, and by age 5 I was certain. It was then I began to study human
behaviour intently. Unfortunately, I also decided to study animal behaviour by reasoning
that we are animals, and, for many years, applied what I had learned about cats, dogs and
birds, to people, with dismal results. (Email)

Kahla compared her study of people to her special interest in animals, both subjects for
her detached, scientific-like study. She later recognised, through trial and error, that this
was an unsuitable comparison for the purposes of compensatory learning of social skills.
This theme contributes to the super-ordinate theme of identity and the formation of selfconcept, which is addressed in Section 4.9.4.
Kahla’s scientific-like study of people extends to an analysis of the observation of tiny
muscle movements in faces for the purpose of emotion recognition and trustworthiness
judgements: a clear example of detail-focused processing of faces, and expressive of her
weak central coherence information-processing style and externally oriented thinking.
The effectiveness of this technique may be open to question, however, one can applaud
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the high level of motivation, detailed observations, analysis and work that Kahla invests
to develop compensatory strategies.
K: Because I found faces so difficult to remember and because facial expressions were so
confusing, I taught myself to focus on the muscles of the face—they have their own
language. Nervous people flex and unflex certain muscles in their necks, as do angry
people (but then the flex extends into the jaw). People who are lying often tense the little
bunch of muscles where the cheek bones hinge. It has taken years of excruciating
observation to define and correlate these signals. But the downside is that becoming so
lost or absorbed in these details can cause you to miss other important information.
(Email)

Kahla has made extensive observations of family members and gives a well-reasoned
argument for their placement on the autistic spectrum. She compares herself with her
sister, with herself having superior skills in the study of human social behaviour and her
sister excelling in mathematics, while being disinterested and ‘more coldly scientific’.
K: In regards to my superior memory, it is flawed by my poor memory for numbers
(although I am better with dates). My sister can state, with utter confidence, a page
number from a book years after reading it and refer you to a bit of information. That said,
I have superior ability to record ‘human and social’ details than her. She has a more
coldly scientific personality, devoid of strong emotions, and she is far less interested in
people than I am. (Email)

Kahla’s study of people is a special interest that provides a compensatory path to
improved social functioning.
4.8.5

Externally oriented thinking

Kahla’s description of being able to remember a photographic image of a face, while
not being able to remember the face in vivo, accords with the research on face
perception and processing in ASD: less activation of the brain networks responsible for
face processing and greater activation of brain networks that process objects (Kleinhans,
et al., 2008; Klin, Jones, Schultz, Volkmar & Cohen, 2002). Of interest to the current
study is that individuals with AS rely more on object-processing neural networks to
process objects and faces, perhaps even processing faces as if they are objects: as
evidenced, for example, by focusing more on the mouth and less on the eyes (Kliemann,
et al., 2012). This explanation would clarify why Kahla’s compensatory learning is
successful in the absence of implicit face perception: her strategy of taking a mental
photograph of a face treats the face as an object (a photo), which can be roteremembered visually, and provides her with an alternate strategy when context clues to
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a person’s identity are not available. Kahla’s compensatory learning is in harmony with
a cognitive profile of externally-oriented—or concrete—thinking (Hill, et al., 2004;
Lind & Bowler, 2008; Newman, et al., 2010).
Other features of Kahla’s narrative display a reliance on externally oriented thinking:
memory as an external entity; speaking aloud to encode to and retrieve from memory;
compensatory learning using external referents; and, study of people. Within the
research literature, the preference for externally oriented thinking is also described as
‘concrete’ thinking (Lind & Bowler, 2008; Newman, et al., 2010), literal thinking
(Cashin, et al., 2012) or ‘black and white thinking’ (Meyer & Minshew, 2002) and is
contrasted with abstraction and the ability to form mental representations (such as
prototypes for faces). Concrete thinking is defined by Minshew, Meyer and Goldstein
(2002) as ‘the inability to form concepts based on experience’ (p. 327). The phrase
‘externally oriented thinking’ was adopted by Hill, et al., (2004), from the Toronto
Alexithymia Scale and defined as ‘a tendency to focus on external events rather than
inner experiences (concrete thought)’ (p. 229). Thus, Kahla’s compensatory learning
strategy of utilising visual mental representations of external objects to solve the
problem of lack of implicit face-recognition is well recognised within the literature as
being characteristic of autistic thinking.

4.9

Philosophical questions

Many features of Kahla’s case suggested existential problems with reality, truth and
identity. Lincoln and Guba’s framework of philosophical questions was employed as
the framework within which to examine these issues (Lincoln & Guba, 2013). Their
‘four fundamental questions’ of philosophy—ontology, epistemology, methodology,
axiology—are apparent within Kahla’s experience and these questions are used to frame
this aspect of the thesis. The ontological questions—‘What is there that can be known?’
and ‘What is the nature of reality?’—can be summed up in the word ‘reality’. The
epistemological question—‘What is the nature of the relationship between the knower
and the knowable?’—can be summed up in the words ‘knowledge’ and ‘identity’. The
methodological question—‘How does one go about acquiring knowledge?’—is summed
up as ‘methodology’. The axiological question—‘Of all the knowledge available to me,
which is the most valuable, which is the most truthful, which is the most beautiful,
which is the most life-enhancing?’—is summed up as ‘values’ (Lincoln & Guba, 2013,
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p. 37). These four notions, Reality, Knowledge/Identity, Methodology and Values, were
adopted as the framework for the existential themes emerging from Kahla’s account.
Furthermore, there is a question of culture. Kahla articulated one of the most important,
and indisputable, principles of education: the centrality of the learner and their response
to the learning environment.
K: When you see a child with Asperger’s who has a reasonable IQ or a high IQ and
they’re failing to learn, it’s really important for teachers to think, ‘What can I do then to
make sure that child learns?’’ (Interview)

Building on Kahla’s statement, this thesis reasons that gifted individuals with AS
operate within a particular cognitive cultural milieu that may not be perceived or
understood by their neurotypical teachers: restated, this means that teachers may be
blind to the different intellectual culture of their student. Fundamental issues of
educational philosophy such as ‘What is learning?’, ‘What is knowledge?’ and, ‘What is
trustworthy?’ may have different meanings within the culture of AS cognition. Kahla’s
descriptions are a window into what it means to be experiencing Asperger syndrome in
an education system intended for typically developing learners, where the individual’s
ontological and epistemological worldviews differ substantially from those of the
dominant educational system, thus posing life-defining problems: ontological,
epistemological, methodological and axiological.
4.9.1

Life-defining problems

Kahla’s narrative reveals that much of her thinking is occupied with questions of reality,
the trustworthiness of knowledge, identity and value. These questions touch not only the
core of what it means to be human, but also the heart of learning. The chain of
reasoning for this proposition is: learning is not authentic unless it is based in reality; if
Kahla’s perception of reality disagrees with other people’s (in particular, her teachers),
and her means of learning differs from theirs (or from how she is being taught), how
can she know what is real and true? (note the association of knowledge and identity
along with method); and, given conflicting information, is she valuable or not? This is a
personal and social problem-solving situation for Kahla on a massive scale and her
account reflects the many attempts, over time, to come up with definitive answers.
These attempts also help to understand many of her self-named eccentric behaviours.
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4.9.2

Mindblind schools: Knowledge of AS is a key to scaffolding
learning

Kahla described experiences of schooling that displayed ignorance of the possibility of
her non-neurotypical mental and physical states. Keeping in mind that Kahla was 48
years old at the time of her contribution and that knowledge of AS is now widespread
through the education profession, relatively recent reports by students with AS suggest
that schools, enacted through individual teachers and leadership teams, may persist in a
mindblind attitude towards the thinking and mental states of their students with AS
(Carrington & Graham, 2001; Humphrey & Lewis, 2008). Indeed, this is the
educational problem that prompted this doctoral research.
Kahla reflected on what she would have liked to have known, and what she would have
liked her teachers to know, while she was at school.
K: I would have liked the teachers and parents just to know what Asperger’s is so I could
have been accommodated a bit more. For instance, I broke a lot of school rules because
they didn’t make any sense to me … but I would have liked them to appreciate things that
I found very, very stressful and to be more understanding instead of angry. When I
resisted going into the really crowded [school assembly] hall, they would have known
why, that there was a big sensory overload and it was too overwhelming, rather than
thinking I was being deliberately disobedient… And I would have liked to have known
just for my own understanding. Because knowing has actually enabled me to put a lot of
strategies into place like looking in eyes, modulating my voice, understanding what some
people find eccentric and annoying, and modifying it, while still being true to yourself but
just being able to adapt enough so that you fit more comfortably in. (Interview)

Kahla has clearly come to place high value on the compensatory social learning she has
acquired late in life through explicit teaching. While it is impossible to say whether she
would have benefited or had the same motivation to learn as a teenager, she pointed to
the lack of understanding that she experienced in a school system designed for TD
learners. Ironically, it could be said that schools need to develop a ‘theory of mind’
towards their students with AS as, in Kahla’s case, her school was ‘mindblind’ to her
mental states (see Baron-Cohen, 1995). This issue is captured by Jacobsen from the
perspective of a psychotherapist but can be applied to education; educational terms have
been substituted.
Those with AS are often described as having difficulty understanding and accepting the
perspective of others or even recognizing that others have a perspective. Yet the key to
psychotherapeutic work [teaching] and case management with AS, and the challenge for
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the therapist [teacher], is our understanding of their perspective. (Jacobsen, 2004, p. 571)
[italics in original: strikeout added]

Therefore, one aspect of the philosophical problems Kahla has is that, rather than
helping to build her knowledge construction, the education system she experienced was
blind to her authentic experience and ways of knowing.
4.9.3

What is true?: Lying and a sense of justice

The well-documented sense of justice (Attwood, 2007; Bogdashina, 2013; Williams, E.,
2004) and insistence on adherence to rules, whether dogmatic adherence is socially
appropriate or not, is, this thesis contends, indicative of the philosophical problems
experienced by individuals with AS, like Kahla. The problem can be elaborated like
this: if one’s sensory input gives information that does not reconcile with the observed
behaviours of others (as in the example of Kahla not wanting to enter the crowded
school hall while the other students did not object); and, with diminished theory of mind
and capacity to construct abstract frameworks of understanding to guide her behaviour;
then Kahla has no choice but to fall back on the memorised rules and patterns of
behaviour (her own and others’) she has experienced. Perseverative and dogmatic
adherence, and the urge to have others also conform to the expected behaviours, could
be the expected result of this method of understanding the world. It follows that the
expression of this worldview would be inflexibility, insistence on sameness, routines,
predictability, and a strong sense of the ‘right and wrong’ ways of doing things.
The combination of: (a) compromised capacity to intuitively understand whether other
people are telling the truth (as well-developed theory of mind is needed in order to do
this with a reasonable degree of reliability); and, (b) a strong sense of justice;
contributes to the inexplicability, from Kahla’s point of view, of processing what other
people say when it does not match her mentally constructed view of the world.
K: I know some Asperger’s people have been recorded as being able to lie to a small
degree, but in my experience it’s unlikely. My son [name] could not do it even if it was a
choice of ‘death or say it’. It’s so foreign to me that I will be continually shocked until I
die when I come across the fact that some people do it. So I think there are really valuable
assets to being Asperger’s: the sense of social justice, the right and wrong, the fairness.
(Interview)

Kahla is reliant on people telling the truth in lieu of her absent, socially constructed
knowledge. She is missing a body of knowledge that other people have and is literally
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reliant on other people telling her. When they lie, even the knowledge that people do lie,
it is a profound shock. It points to the questions ‘What is real?’ and ‘How can I know
what is real?’: that is, the critical issue of the trustworthiness of knowledge.
K: See, for me, lying is the most shocking thing human being can do, because the word is
a truth on its own. Words were our keys to escaping from being an animal and without
them, we couldn’t be as human as we are. Words make the solid foundations of things
because only with words can you understand clearly. Once you start saying something
that isn’t true, to me that’s like building a house on a big hole, it’s shaky, it’s not reliable.
To me, words are almost sacred… (Interview)

However, with regard to deception and lying, it needs to be noted here that, due to a
compromised episodic memory system, particularly source monitoring and temporality
problems, the attribution of what oneself or others have said or done in the past (unless
accurately remembered verbatim in semantic memory) is open to question. Anecdotally,
and in the researcher’s own experience, it has been reported by many life partners of
people with AS that their partner has said or done something that they have contradicted
at a later time, denying they said or did it, which, from the life partner’s perspective, is
an act of deception or deliberate lying on the part of an individual with AS. With an
understanding of source monitoring problems and the role of temporality in cognition,
these conflicting phenomena (strong sense of justice and adherence to the truth
contrasted with life partners’ reported experiences of acts of deception and denial of
previous words or actions) become amenable to explanation.
Against this background, the complexity of the problem of establishing truth and
trustworthiness as a basis for learning about the world (and learning in general)
becomes apparent in Kahla’s account. Kahla has to live with the unresolvable
inconsistencies of life (such as the mismatch between what she hears some people say
and what she believes to be true from her own experience and learning), and the
emotional turmoil that must result: she must do this without the benefit of the cognitive
flexibility or emotional processing capacity to resolve and integrate such mismatches
into higher-order understanding, such as that possessed by mature TD individuals of
equivalent intellectual capacity to Kahla.
4.9.4

Identity formation

As discussed earlier, autobiographical memory, self-referential processing and
autonoetic consciousness are atypical in autism. The development of a sense of self, or
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identity, is typically achieved through these mechanisms, however, these processes
operate differently in autism. ‘The autobiographical memory difficulties in ASD may …
be related to the development of self-identity in this group’ (Crane & Goddard, 2008, p.
504). It was therefore expected that the participants’ expression of identity would take a
different form. Despite the challenges, the development of ‘introspective awareness’ in
gifted individuals with AS is clearly possible, as demonstrated by the eloquent selfnarratives in the five case studies of this doctoral research, published accounts (Grandin,
2006; Williams, E., 2004), and other phenomenological studies (Carrington, et al.,
2003; Hurlbutt & Chalmers, 2002), although the evidence on memory and
consciousness points to compensatory pathways to achieve this.
Lind and Bowler (2008) reported that the characteristics of thinking will take the
following form: concrete, fact-based, employing visual imagery, lacking inner speech;
and ‘this suggests that private self-awareness, like conceptual self-awareness, is
qualitatively different in individuals with ASDs’ (Lind & Bowler, 2008, p. 178). Further
to the life questions that are in the subtext of Kahla’s narrative, the search for identity
through external referents—to answer the question, ‘Who am I?’—can be seen. Kahla
described her attempt to answer this question throughout her childhood, through her
own observations and actions, and through the feedback (hostile or otherwise) of others.
The sub-textual question, ‘What is real?’, is coupled with the search for identity. Kahla
described a period of her childhood when she decided she had more in common with
dogs than people, so she would be a dog. She found success for some time in being
Pollyanna, after reading one of the Pollyanna books (Porter, 1913), through a period of
recuperation after a car accident when she was ten. This was a persona that served her
well during her later primary school years but broke down during adolescence. She felt
for some time that she was a changeling, a ‘strange fairy child’, who had been
substituted for a human child. As an adolescent, because of her eccentricities, she was
hostilely cast as a witch. She speaks of alienation, complicated by the fact that she
believed things she read in books, such as seeing unicorns by looking in a mirror, or
communicating with the ancient Norse gods.
K: I loved fairy tales and mythology and no one had ever suggested to me that they
weren’t real. The written word has such a huge power for me, I assumed that it was true. I
had no doubt in my mind. I was very fond and familiar with all the Norse gods who I
spoke to, thinking, imagining that they would hear me. I constantly thought I could see
glimpses of magical and mystical beings because I knew they were there, the books

148

described them so realistically. So I really entertained the idea that perhaps I was a
changeling, that I’d been swapped at birth and the real me was being looked after by
fairies and I was really some kind of strange fairy child that had been left for my parents
to raise and I certainly hoped that they would come and get me soon. (Interview)

The naïve inability to distinguish between reality and fantasy, based on what she read in
books, left her at the mercy of others’ taunts and with a clear problem of identity
formation. As noted in the four philosophical questions, the answer to the
epistemological question, which includes knowledge of the self, is contingent upon the
ontology question, ‘What is real and true?’ (Lincoln & Guba, 2013, p. 37). Hence,
Kahla has feelings of alienation where she is not with her ‘tribe’: born out of place or
out of the time where she belongs. As an adult, she continues to come to terms with the
sense of being an alien within her social context, but has a strong identification with
other people with AS, seeing TD individuals as outsiders, even disadvantaged, as in the
case of the discussion of the researcher’s so-called ‘colourblindness’. Kahla is
ambivalent with regard to identity: she feels sorry for people who do not have her
perceptive capacities and has a sense of TD individuals as lacking a special set of
capabilities. At the same time, she is aware of her own alienation and disadvantages.
4.9.5

Am I smart, or am I dumb?

In addition to the questions of reality, knowledge, identity and methods, Kahla’s
comments revealed that she and her sons have an axiological problem: that is, the value
of the self gained through participation in schooling, as reflected by teachers and peers.
This is summarised by the propositional question, ‘Am I smart, or am I dumb?’ and is a
common theme through all five cases. Inevitably, Kahla herself is grounded in her own
cognitive cultural milieu and her interpretations of good teaching and learning also
follow from her ontological and epistemological beliefs. Throughout her interview and
her correspondence, she expressed confusion and personal angst about the value of her
intelligence and gifts.
K: The one thing all Aspergers people are good at learning is a sense of failure. Once
instilled it is very difficult to shift and I personally have struggled with overwhelming
onsets of a sense of failure all my life—particularly on a social level but some times
academically. There were situations when I was actually excelling at a subject but the
teacher for whatever reason chose to ridicule me or mark down my work. (Email)

Kahla has the problem of maintaining a belief in the value of her own intelligence while
being exposed to day-to-day challenges to this belief. This issue played out in her
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experience of school, highlighting the ambivalence of being gifted and learning disabled,
along with other issues of being autistic.
K: I feel I must warn you that maths is my deepest failing and I am VERY ashamed of
this flaw, as most people in my family are genius and are fluent in astro- and quantum
physics … Most teachers were furious, believing in error that, as I was so advanced in
other areas, I was deliberately withholding my maths ability in a strange bid for attention.
I was regularly punished by being left alone in the class room at lunch with a pile of
maths books. The teachers left no instructions. I had no idea I was supposed to do
anything with the books and sat there in silent misery amusing myself by listening to the
sounds outside. I only learnt to tell the time at the half [hour] two years ago and mastered
the art of navigating calendars last year. This issue caused tremendous shame. (Email)

The confusion between building a sense of self as a gifted person while building a sense
of self as a person with a learning disability is also expressed in the lived experience of
her sons.
K: My older son, who is 13, is very intelligent but utterly failing in the school system.
Nobody understand the incredible achievements he has made! He is perceived by teachers
as an idiot when he is in fact truly remarkable! He did not talk until he was five and a
half. … I devised my own program and saturated my son with language. I wove words
like a tapestry and wrapped him in them. Now he writes poetry. Now his eloquence is
capable of inducing tears! (Email)

Kahla’s younger son is a quiet, emotionally sensitive child who wants to please his
teachers. However, he has been the recipient of negative feedback from teachers about
his efforts that has affected his developing sense of self.
K: Despite being known fondly in our family circle as ‘the little professor or
philosopher,’ the teacher said to me one day, ‘You should be really worried. He is so
stupid, I simply can't imagine a job he could have when he grows up.’ This about a child
at age 3 who stated that he doubted the ability of ghosts to see anything due to the fact
they would not have functional optical nerves!!! And who regularly wondered at the same
age who he would be after death if all the things that made him ‘[child’s name]’, … and
defined him; in what identity or form would he exist? (Email)

Even allowing for the subjectivity of Kahla’s comments about her children’s negative
experiences at the hands of their teachers, it is clear that mainstream classroom teachers
are working at a disadvantage in understanding the learning needs of their students with
AS.
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4.10

Being a member of a minority ‘cognitive cultural group’

Vygotsky’s sociocultural theory is an appropriate ‘fit’ for Case 1: reality, knowledge
and values are constructed and maintained within a cultural context (Brown, J. S., et al.,
1989). Kahla has a strong grasp of the values attached to ‘being Asperger’ as culturally
constructed and recognises that her personal values are at odds with the social culture in
which she lives.
K: I’ve thought about the traits that make up what somebody with Asperger’s is and I like
it. I think there’s a lot more value in it. A lot of people think ‘Asperger’s’ and they put it
over here (gestures to one side), and you read these big labels like ‘socially impaired’ and
you get these almost cartoon-like Asperger’s representations. When, in actual fact, a lot
of what we are is highly valuable. (Interview)

Kahla is also keenly aware of the tension between her own values and the values being
imposed upon her within her own culture. However, she has travelled widely and
explored primitive cultures: Amish and Indian tribal culture.
K: I find primitive cultures incredibly civilised and interesting. I think that we use that
concept of ‘primitive’ as meaning ‘uneducated’ because they haven’t been through our
school system. Their learning is so intense. It’s so complicated. (Interview)

The rote memory and pedantic interests of AS would be viewed as strengths, according
to Kahla, in the primitive cultures she has experienced.
K: … I’ve travelled the world and in other settings I think Asperger’s would be incredibly
useful. I think it would be very useful in an Amish community because it’s very ordered
and structured, a bit like the insect world, and the work is very ordered.
Res: So it wouldn’t be seen as a disability?
K: No. They’re very task-orientated. … they care a lot about patterns and the way things
look. … I really liked how they don’t just chop fruit up and bottle it. They actually
arrange it aesthetically in patterns and then group the yellow fruits with the orange fruits
with the red fruits. I noticed in tribal cultures and when I crossed from [the Maneri region
of India] onto the other side, where you get … tribal people who are … hunting-gathering.
… skills like cataloguing and recognising insect life and what you can eat and what [you
can’t]. Specialised interests are really, really important and valued. A really big auditory
and visual memory is essential for those tribal communities and the ability to relay long
stories and oral histories, which I see as a skill. All the skills that I saw were highly
valued in those types of communities were things that I had and that I recognise other
people with Asperger’s as having. They were also incredibly tolerant to eccentric
behaviours and those people were quite revered. … I can’t think of anything more
wonderful than having a place to use that mind, like Celtic tradition, that big oral history,
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I would have been perfect. I’ve got a lot of Celtic blood anyway but I could have relayed
the stories back to the beginning of time and been a bard. (Interview)

Within a sociocultural view, individuals’ personal strengths and weaknesses are
culturally determined. Kahla laments that the westernised culture she operates within
does not place the same value on the type of learning and memory she excels in and
proposes that, had she been born into primitive Celtic culture, she may have been a
celebrated bard whose learning, memory and skills were of critical value to that culture.
She noted that social aspects of the tribal life she experienced were highly structured,
with rules for interacting, ceremonies and rituals, while the hunter-gatherer lifestyle
facilitated silence and solitude. In these situations, Kahla did not have the sense of
alienation that is her usual experience.
One might be tempted to label Kahla’s views as escapist or a defensive mechanism,
however, her cultural understanding aligns with a sociocultural approach to learning and
deserves serious consideration for the insight it offers into cognition. For this reason, a
proposition of this thesis is that gifted individuals with AS may be understood as
operating within a different internal ‘culture of the mind’, or ‘cognitive culture’, and
that application of a socio-cultural view of cognition in AS provides new possibilities
for insights relevant to education. The need for cross-cultural understanding between
teachers and learners with AS, in relation to language, thinking and learning within
educational settings, will be considered further in this thesis. A cultural approach is
supported by Jacobsen (2004) who was looking for a frame of reference within which to
relate her psychotherapy practice.
I developed a frame of reference to help in my role with these children. Though not a true
analogy to the Asperger experience, the analogy that worked for me was one in which I
might find myself in the ‘alien’ role. If I were to live in a very different culture, as I tried
to learn what is appropriate, I might constantly commit faux pas. I would undoubtedly be
misunderstood, behave in ways that seemed inappropriate or even offensive, and I would
misunderstand others. I would need to learn new rules, the meaning of my behavior to
others, and I would probably have to do that cognitively translating, rather than
emotionally ‘getting it’. (Jacobsen, 2004, p. 571) [emphasis added]

The experience of being an ‘alien’ appears in the autobiographical and biographical
accounts of individuals with AS (Hedgcock, 2010; Sacks, 1995; Williams, E., 2004).
The different ‘mental culture’ that is suggested supports the proposition of ‘translation’,
described by Jacobsen as ‘cognitively translating’. Kahla’s narrative exposed the issues
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of identity and cognitive culture that became evident throughout the case studies of this
doctoral research.

4.11

Conclusion

The life problems faced by Kahla are complex in nature and ultimately need to be
addressed at a philosophical level: pertaining to the nature of reality, knowledge,
identity and value. Learning for Kahla is a matter of adapting to ways of being in her
social context that will facilitate better functioning, social integration and problem
solving. Kahla appears to need very little support to learn per se as her mind is very
active: observing; making associations; filing memories; and, seeking out information
related to her special interests or needs. Kahla demonstrates a methodological need for
access to trustworthy knowledge that will result in her learning being accurate and
appropriate. She needs access to teaching methods that will assist her to analyse and
make the adaptions to behaviour that will help her be more successful socially. She
deserves the same unconditional acceptance and respect that others deserve, while she
undergoes this compensatory learning process, which is counterintuitive to her native
intelligence and ways of learning. From an examination of Kahla’s data, a philosophical
scenario of unresolved ‘life questions’ and a quest for epistemic certainty emerged.
Clearly, Kahla has wrestled with existential issues that have impacted her thinking and
learning and her account seems to show that she has fewer pathways to resolution than
might be expected for someone of her intelligence and giftedness. If resolution of
existential questions is a matter of learning from experience, then Kahla has overcome
great challenges to achieve her present level of resolution and social competence.
Learning from one’s prior experience has been noted as highly problematic for
individuals with AS (Crane, et al., 2010; Klinger & Dawson, 2001; Williams, E., 2004).
However, through compensatory learning strategies, employing externally oriented
thinking, Kahla has achieved a measure of personal success and a place within the
artistic community as a valued contributor. Her reflections on thinking, memory and
learning point to a cross-cultural approach as an effective means to understanding the
thinking and learning of students with Asperger syndrome.
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Figure 4.13 'Contemplation with Fish and Lilies' is a mixed media work
comprising digital media, hand drawn elements and photography. Reproduced by kind permission of ‘Kahla’
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Chapter 5 Case 2 ‘Rhoda’
Rhoda is a woman in her sixties, who, at the time of the interview, was investigating
retirement. She was on stress leave from her teaching job in the tertiary training sector
in New South Wales. Rhoda was born in London but grew up in South Africa and has
lived in a number of countries, finally settling in Australia and meeting her life partner,
‘Steve’, through shared interests. She married very young and moved with her thenhusband from England to Morocco but the marriage ended and she was left traumatised
and alone. Rhoda is an accomplished musician, who plays many instruments and
specialises in early music, particularly polyphonic music and music for lute, recorder
and voice. She was an architectural draftsperson with a particular gift for hand drawing
three-dimensional (3D) realisations from architectural plans. In more recent times, she
has specialised in graphic design and multimedia, eventually becoming a teacher. She
has published a multimedia (print and software) work involving the 3D mapping of
imagined landscapes based on the use of fractals.
Rhoda’s partner, Steve, is also a musician and teacher. He has had a long career as a
professional musician playing the French horn, but also plays many other instruments.
Rhoda and Steve met in 1986 at a workshop on early music, discovered a common
interest in playing and performing lute music, and had been together for 25 years at the
time of their interviews. Rhoda gave a coherent narrative of her personal struggles and
past history. Steve delivered a premeditated, structured treatise of his interpretations of
Rhoda’s cognition and behaviours based on his observations and interactions with her
over the years they had been together.
Rhoda and Steve made contact with this research study through a word-of-mouth
recommendation and requested that their participation be conducted via Facetime,
Apple video-calling software. The ethics approval for this study was amended to cater
for this request. The researcher did not meet with Rhoda and Steve in person. Both were
present in the room while the other gave his or her interview and there were numerous
discussions between them during the course of the interviews but only the person in
front of the computer was audible. This meant that there was frequent cross-checking
for meaning between them but it resulted in a less fluent transcript.
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Rhoda, being a high-level Apple Macintosh user, suggested the method for conducting
and recording the interview: while the interviews were in progress via Facetime, screenrecording software called iShowU was used to record the Facetime window. After the
interviews, the audio track was stripped out of the resulting video file and transcribed.
Due to the unreliability of the internet connection during the Facetime calls, Rhoda’s
interview was conducted in two parts, on separate days. There was some delay in the
transmission so sometimes speakers’ utterances overlapped or were hesitant.
Transcription attempted to preserve meaning for the reader rather than provide a
verbatim record of the delays and overlaps. Despite the challenges of an intermittently
reliable internet connection, this proved to be an expedient means of conducting the
interviews as it allowed the participants to maintain their privacy and reduced the social
demands of the interview process.
Rhoda’s biological family, like Kahla’s, displayed the broader autism phenotype. Her
brother was mute until he was five or six years old and she, herself, had delayed onset
of expressive language. Rhoda described her brother as ‘semi-autistic’ and other family
members as ‘eccentric’.
R: My grandmother apparently was [eccentric], on my father’s side. I’d say my mother
was a bit eccentric. My brother was almost semi-autistic as a kid. He [went] like this
(rocks back and forward on her chair) so it’s interesting. … He was very non-verbal. He
couldn’t express himself … he became a hardware engineer, electronics, in America,
surgical instruments. (Interview)

From this and other similar references, it appears that Rhoda comes from a family with
a genetic inheritance of autism traits and high intelligence, aligning with the broader
family phenotype of autism (Baron-Cohen & Hammer, 1997).

5.1

A sense of difference, alienation and isolation

One of the overarching impressions from Rhoda’s narrative was her sense of sadness at
the losses and alienation she has experienced: awareness of what her life could have
been with a measure of understanding and tolerance, contrasted with sadness over the
difficulties she has experienced. When asked to explain her understanding of Asperger
syndrome, her answer was imbued with that sense of difference.
R: [AS is] … an abundance of nerves or intelligence in certain areas and a lack of it in
others. And for different people, it’s different. So it’s like an imbalance in the nervous
system. For me, it involves difficulty as far as socialisation, because I can’t get into that, I
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can’t see what other people like. I used to be in a drawing office and the girls used to talk
about TV and Brevilles and that, I just could not get into that. So that’s where it affects
me. And also the fashion thing, I couldn’t get into all that preening and primping, that
stuff. (Interview)

Rhoda’s sense of isolation was exacerbated during her developmental years through
mental health (mis)treatments and she reported she was, at one time, at risk of being
lobotomised.
R: I was misdiagnosed around the age of 13 [in South Africa] because I found becoming
a teenager was really hard to cope with. I had special interests and I’m afraid the special
interests got me into a lot of trouble because I had this fascination for Arabs and that just
wasn’t appreciated. … I ended up being misdiagnosed, getting shock treatment … and the
psychiatrist who diagnosed me called me obsessive-compulsive. I wasn’t schizophrenic. I
didn’t hear voices but I talked to things and I was very anti-social, I just used to sit in my
room. As I grew up, I got more withdrawn because of everything that was going on. So
it’s been a sad time and I wish people had known about [Asperger syndrome] then, but
they didn’t. Remember that the 50s and the 60s … was a time they were giving people
lobotomies … and I’m lucky it didn’t happen to me. … It’s scary because it was touch
and go. They could have done it to me as well. So it’s just been a case of survival. … [My
diagnosis of AS was] a big relief because it explains everything. It explains my aloneness.
If anything characterises an Aspie person, I mean, for me, it’s a feeling of disconnection
or aloneness from the rest of the world. (Interview)

Depression is a feature of Rhoda’s experience and this exposes a dilemma for gifted
individuals with AS: without intelligent awareness of the possibilities for oneself in the
world, it is unlikely one would be so profoundly sad at the lack of realisation of those
possibilities. Based on Rhoda’s narrative, reactive depression at perceived lost
opportunities is assumed to be, at least, a component of her depression.
Rhoda embraces isolation as a necessity and as a lover of solitude but, at the same time,
she is aware of a sense of missing out. She gave examples from her workplace.
R: … things were really getting bad at work. … I had been diagnosed with depression a
number of times … When I started at this [current] job, which is teaching … multimedia
and graphic design, … there were just two others and myself, and because the other
people had been there for a year, they marginalised me. Some people think I’m arrogant
and I don’t know why. But anyway, the other chap wanted power so of course he
marginalised [me], he made sure I was out of the running for anything even though I was
the most experienced and the most qualified person in the place, because before that I was
a graphic designer and I was an architectural drafter. (Interview)

Rhoda appears to manage her sadness and find meaning in her life through her special
interests, which are extensive. She is a prolific photographer and photo-blogger and she
and Steve share an interest in ‘narrow boats’. Since Rhoda retired the year after the
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interviews, they have purchased their own narrow boat and divide their time between
Australia and the United Kingdom, spending many months each year motoring through
the canal systems of the UK.

5.2

School experience

Rhoda experienced major problems in her schooling, which took place in South Africa.
She was ‘persecuted’ for poor handwriting and seems to have encountered very few
teachers who extended understanding and tolerance for her unusual behaviours. She
said that she did not suffer much bullying from her peers because she was known to
have a temper, so was left alone. However, school peers did exploit one of her phobias
and, as Rhoda tells it, they seem to have enjoyed scaring her.
R: When I was about eight, I wanted to know what [a leaf damaged by a leaf miner] was
but it still gave me the horrors and somehow it came out that I was scared of them
because I told one person and … it spread about the girls and these girls started chasing
me with the leaves and I was cowering under a bench. That was horrible. I think I ended
up with an asthma attack soon after that. I know that I wasn’t at school for a long time
and it didn’t happen after that. So either they forgot or they were told, ‘Don’t do that’.
(Interview)

Experiencing horror at the sight of certain shapes is discussed further in Section 5.4.1.
Rhoda’s sense of sadness and regret is apparent in the following summary of what her
schooling meant to her. Like Kahla (who didn’t attend school for a long time after a car
accident, aged 10), she had long periods of absenteeism, in this case, due to sickness.
These long absences at home seem to have been productive times of self-learning
without the interference of the social restrictions of formal schooling.
R: … I was able to get through school without much help. Perhaps my mother teaching
me [to read] when I was three … I was too way ahead. What would have helped and
perhaps I would have had a better life, I would have gone to academia or something that
really interests me, would have been to have encouraged me to get ahead, rather than hold
me back. … To not have persecuted me because I had bad handwriting and made
disparaging remarks about my untidy work. To have encouraged me with the things that I
enjoyed doing and not forced me to do things that I was no good at. (Interview)

Rhoda’s and Kahla’s cases indicate that, as gifted children with strong special interests,
their learning thrived in the solitary home environment, but was very disrupted and
stressful in the formal school environment. Rather than being disruptive to their
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education, long periods of absenteeism had the opposite effect: a redemptive effect of
allowing them to learn in their own time and pursue their own interests.
R: When I was at school, I had these IQ tests and I just did them like this (gestures that
she did IQ tests easily), this is primary school … and after that the teachers started to treat
me differently, in a way that they expected me to achieve more than I did … but there
[was] some kind of dichotomy between what I achieved on the IQ tests and my
performance at school, which isn’t surprising, considering. I’m amazed I got [good
results], when you think about how often I was away with asthma and bronchitis, I’d be
away about two thirds of the year … and what would I be doing at home? Jigsaw puzzles
and listening to the radio, which I loved, and it was good because Meena [her nanny]
would bring me breakfast in bed. I’d be sick, I wouldn’t have to go to school. I read Enid
Blyton books, I liked comics …
Res: So that was really your own home-schooling, your own home curriculum, selfcontrolled.
R: Oh yes, yes, yes. And I used to read the dictionary and Arthur Mee’s Encyclopaedia, I
liked that. … number 10 was my favourite encyclopaedia because it had pages of
illustrations and it was from the Victorian era … they had architectural details and then
they’d have heraldic details … and all the different parts of armour. I used to love that …
Res: So it sounds like you learnt more by staying away from school than by going.
R: Oh, absolutely! And I’d come back to school and they’d be doing something just [too
easy] and I’d think, ‘Arrrg’. (Interview)

Rhoda and Kahla’s narratives lend weight to the idea that, as gifted children with autism,
they enjoyed and took responsibility for their own learning in a way that was
disconnected from their school experiences.

5.3

Learning

A number of issues arising from Rhoda’s case that relate to her thinking and learning
processes are discussed in this section.
5.3.1

Language: verbal vs. visual processing

The findings of several reports (Harris, et al., 2006; Kana, Keller, Cherkassky, Minshew
& Just, 2006; Koshino, et al., 2005), a review (Williams, D. L. & Minshew, 2010) and a
firsthand account (Grandin, 2006) suggest that language and visual processing have a
unique relationship in learning for individuals with AS. In typical verbal processing, the
concept of an object is symbolically represented by the noun or pronoun that describes
it. However, in the findings of a key study with individuals with autism, the difference
in visual processing of verbal and linguistic content was described in terms of
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neurological connectivity, which correlated with the way language was processed, using
visual imagery instead of typical language processing.
Our interpretation of the pattern of results is that the autism group used a more nonverbal
and visually oriented processing style and that they retained the stimuli as visualgraphical codes. … On the other hand, the control group relied on a verbally oriented
style in which they converted the letter stimuli into verbal-phonological codes. (Koshino,
et al., 2005, p. 819)

Williams and Minshew (2010) interpreted these findings by stating ‘… when adults
with ASD viewed a letter, they processed the information in the right-hemisphere visuographic brain regions, failing to recode the information linguistically’ (Williams, D.
L. & Minshew, 2010, p. 10) [emphasis added]. Similar findings were related to
Grandin’s account of ‘thinking in pictures’.
Participants with autism showed more activation in parietal and occipital regions,
suggesting that they were using visual imagery more widely than control subjects to
support understanding of sentences. In Temple Grandin’s terms, they were probably
‘thinking in pictures’ much of the time (Grandin, 1995). … The result suggests that the
autism group might routinely recruit visual imagery for comprehending sentences rather
than comprehending them on a purely linguistic basis. (Kana, et al., 2006, p. 2491)

Rhoda’s data, considered in the light of the references cited above, suggest the idea that,
in autistic thinking, an object may be represented symbolically as a visual image of
itself, rather than a word: and, if so, the word does not represent the object but instead it
is the other way around; the visual image of the object would be required to
remember how to decode the word. For example, it’s possible that the word for
‘guitar’ is memorised for decoding purposes by picturing the object it is mentally
attached to, as shown in Figure 5.1.
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Figure 5.1 Symbolic representation in verbal thinker vs. ‘picture thinker’

For ‘picture-thinkers’ such as Rhoda, it may be that they are using a language-learning
technique, such as that shown in Figure 5.1, for remembering how to decode letters and
words that imparts a heavier cognitive load when reading and writing. Building on the
research by Perkins, et al., (2006), further investigation into the nature of word-object
processing is required to illuminate the mechanism and load resulting from this
cognitive feature. This would, among other things, provide evidence for the need to free
up timing constraints in learning for gifted learners with AS, which is one of the
proposals emerging from this study. In the meantime, anecdotal reports are suggestive.
Grandin describes the way she remembers a word as picturing it as a label on the object
it describes (although it is unclear whether she is actually decoding the word or seeing it
as a graphical representation). For her, the process of working with words is similar to
translating into, and from, a second language and she uses terms that indicate a reliance
on eidetic-style semantic memory.
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When I read, I translate written words into color movies or I simply store a photo of the
written page to be read later. When I retrieve the material, I see a photocopy of the page
in my imagination. (Grandin, 2006, p. 15)

Rhoda’s description of the way she sees, and represents what she sees, suggests that she
is seeing words and objects in a similar way. This may be an advantage for accurate
representation in drawing but a disadvantage in the additional process of working with
language. For Rhoda, working with language appears to require an extra, effortful
dimension of cognitive processing, suggesting that verbal thinking, for her, is not a
native way of thinking but a learned compensatory skill that continues to demand
practice and effort.
5.3.2

Processing verbal instructions

Processing complex verbal instructions is another point of difficulty that has arisen in
Rhoda and Steve’s life together.
R: There are certain [things] that I find difficult. … if somebody interferes with me while
I’m trying to absorb information, or too many verbal instructions at once. (Interview)

Rhoda and Steve described a self-devised scenario that illustrated differences in the way
they think. The scenario was a route, known to both of them, that was described to her,
verbally, by Steve. The test was to see whether Rhoda could mentally construct the
route. They concluded that, as long as she mentally navigated by roads and landmarks
she had previously experienced in real life, she was able to mentally construct the route
and follow directions. However, if Steve gave verbal instructions using landmarks, as
soon as she moved off the previously experienced route, she was unable to mentally
navigate, and experienced a sense of ‘being lost’. In this case, she required the concrete
support of a map.
R: …if somebody says, ‘Oh, you go left. You go right and then you…’ I say, ‘Don’t. Just
give me a map. Tell me where it is on the map and I’ll find it.’ (Interview)

This account is in accord with the research on cued and uncued recall (free recall) that
found ‘contrasts between intact cued recall and impaired free recall and recognition in
autism’ (Ben Shalom, 2003, p. 1129). Rhoda’s previous experience possibly acts as an
internal cueing system, but when it comes to mentalising novel material from verbal
instructions, she is unable to do this.
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The timeframe required to process instructions is a critical factor for Rhoda’s thinking
processes. For example, she enjoys knitting and chooses complex knitting projects. In
the case of complex knitting instructions, they are written, not spoken, which allows
Rhoda to process them in her own time, whereas performing a task within a timeframe
according to another person’s expectations, under the processing time-pressure of
speech, is very difficult.
Res: So, from the map, or whether it’s a knitting book, or watching someone else, in your
own time you are able to go through the steps and process it but in somebody else’s
timeframe, you can’t. Would that be right?
R: I think that’s an excellent way of putting it. Someone else’s timeframe, what they
expect. (Interview)

5.3.3

Dyslexia

Rhoda has eye-tracking problems suggestive of dyslexia, which is grouped with
dyscalculia under ‘Specific learning Disorder’ in the DSM-V (APA, 2013), a possibility
she and Steve had not considered in the context of the issues they raised in their
interviews, even though she was diagnosed with dyslexia as a child.
R: … my eyes, I have trouble, now this is another learning difficulty, tracking along a
line. … I did have a good arithmetic teacher in school. I was very good at algebra and
geometry but in arithmetic I’d get every answer wrong. Why? I was dyslexic. I always
got my methods 100% right, so I’d get 95% for an arithmetic test. [The teacher] was very
kind because, had she just gone on the correct answer, I would have failed it every time.
… the numerical answer was wrong.
Res: Because you were reading the numbers in the wrong order?
R: Yes, because sometimes I’d say the numbers back to myself and I’d reverse them. I
tend to reverse things. I tend to say left when I mean right. Even though I know left is left,
and it drives my partner mad because, when we’re driving, [I’ll] say, ‘Go left. No, sorry, I
mean right.’ (Interview)

While Rhoda spoke about her dyslexia as though it was in the past, the current problems
with sight-singing highlighted by Steve suggested that she continues to have difficulty
with eye tracking and discrimination of musical notation on paper (that is, not being
able to distinguish between a note on a line and a note in a space).
S: So notation, unfortunately, there’s no escape. Rhoda deals with it in a sort of flexible
pictorial way of watching the rise and fall of those little black blobs … if there is a
mistake, I have to say, ‘that was note 2 in the scale’ and Rhoda has to somehow at that
stage look at that blob and … that blob has to be recognised somehow as the pitch of the
2nd degree in the scale. (Interview)
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R: … it’s a problem in that I never learnt music officially until I was 14 and I learnt guitar,
which is a completely different thing [to sight-singing] because that was kinetic and, if I
saw the notes, my fingers would go to them automatically. Plus, I could also hear what
was coming next so I’m good at pitching within a harmonic framework and I can
anticipate, I can improvise and I can even compose. But the thing is that, if I’m reading
something from scratch, it’s very easy for me to make a mistake because sometimes it
will be a very quick guess and be correct within the harmonic structure but won’t be the
right note … because sometimes my eyes skitter, especially if I go on to a new line.
(Interview)

The term ‘skitter’ was employed extensively by both Steve and Rhoda as a pseudotechnical term: their explanation for her cognitive processing differences being that
Rhoda’s brain ‘skitters’. Steve likened a ‘brain skitter’ to a petite mal epileptic seizure
and hypothesised that skitters are a ‘lag’, where there’s a mismatch in integration of
information processing in the brain between the left and right hemispheres. Apart from
attributing the brain skitters to the left-brained/right-brained neuromyth (Pasquinelli,
2012), Steve’s processing integration explanation is supported by the literature
(Brandwein, et al., 2013). Rhoda reported being diagnosed with dyslexia as a child: it is
possible that sensory integration problems continue to affect her visual processing and
are most noticeable when sight-singing from musical notation on paper under the
pressure of performance timing and rhythm constraints.
5.3.4

Handwriting vs. drawing

The contrast between Rhoda’s handwriting skill at school, which was poor, and her
drawing skill, which was excellent, poses a conundrum: she expressed bewilderment
about her apparently conflicting abilities. Being left-handed and moving her hand across
the wet ink during handwriting was a problem.
R: I had awful trouble [especially with handwriting]. First of all I was left-handed. We
used ink pens in those days, so oh! my book was covered with blots and then I’d tear
pages out … I was just so dissatisfied, and yet I could draw. Now, that’s the weird thing
and I could print well … I could draw people and I used to look at the other kids [at
school] and think, ‘Why are they doing stick figures? Can’t they see what they seeing?’
Res: That is a big conundrum isn’t it? The fact that handwriting is almost universally a
problem, translating the language into figures, into letters and numbers is a problem but
many [people with] Aspergers … draw so beautifully and so well and with such control.
…
R: … I’ve been to art school so I know about drawing and I was drawing since I was
about three or four, but the way that I draw, I don’t need to block out things. I’ll start in
the corner and if somebody says, ‘Can you draw a picture of me?’ I’ll start off and, you
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know, I’ll just go da-da-da, and just gradually do it. Whereas other people need to block
out the shapes … and I’ll think, ‘Why?’ (Interview)

The theory of weak central coherence in autism suggests that, when she is drawing,
enhanced perceptual functioning and reduced top-down modulation of perception allow
Rhoda to accurately represent what she literally perceives, as a drawing, without
labelling or categorising. She is most likely not interpreting the elements in the drawing
as objects in relationship to each other (an example of top-down modulation) so there is
no need to block out those elements before filling in the detail; she is simply
representing what she perceives. Stephen Wiltshire, an artist with autism
(www.stephenwiltshire.co.uk), is renowned for the same capacity to draw without
significant blocking; in his case, immense city landscapes drawn from memory.
The act of handwriting, in contrast, requires representational mental manipulation of
symbols (letters, words) if the words are to be written as language, rather than as a
verbatim representation of the way the letters and words appear and are perceived at
that moment. A useful metaphor to describe this distinction is the digitisation of text
through scanning: a page of text can either be scanned as a graphic or it can be
interpreted as text. If recognised as text (Optical Character Recognition—OCR) then the
text characters can be edited (manipulated as independent symbols); if recognised as a
graphic, the entire block of text is a single item and the text represented by the graphic
cannot be edited, being, in fact, a picture of text. During handwriting, the mental
manipulation of letters and words for meaning, rather than reproduction, adds a layer of
cognitive processing requiring top-down modulation. Alternately, if handwriting at
school was, for Rhoda, the literal reproduction of letters and words without
interpretation, as if they were a drawing, this could be understood as problematic due to
hand position and left-handedness, while attempting to conform to the handwriting
techniques being taught. In this case, her attempts to faithfully reproduce the text (style,
font, line weight) in a school exercise book using ink resulted in frustration.
Motor skills, which are frequently poorly developed in ASD (Meyer & Minshew, 2002),
present an obstacle in handwriting but appear to present no problem when the
artistically gifted individual with AS is drawing. Layered over the constraints of
conforming to the physical handwriting techniques being taught, in cognitive terms,
when the person is drawing from life or a visual memory, they are representing what
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they literally see, but when they are engaged in handwriting, they are representing
language. For ‘picture thinkers’ such as Rhoda, the symbolic representation of language
arguably requires translation from a visual mode of thought, increasing cognitive load
and interfering with handwriting ability.
5.3.5

The use of scaffolds: Top-down modulation

Rhoda’s partner, Steve, gave a detailed explanation of the differences in cognitive
function between themselves that he has observed during their years of working
together on music performance.
S: We conjectured that Rhoda’s left and right brain were working in a different phase …
she thought differently and she learnt differently and she saw things differently. … Rhoda
picked up other instruments with me and we learnt them and performed them. But there
were always discontinuities and I could tell that things were different from an average
able student, and Rhoda is … an intuitive, very natural musician. [But] I was seeing and
hearing these problems in getting some of the basics of music into [her] head and as a
language. There were problems in picking it up. It wasn’t ‘til Rhoda said, ‘I can’t see the
lines,’ and ‘Stop calling [the notes of the scale by] numbers. It’s one more thing to learn.
… Don’t try to put another process in the path to block getting to something, which is
unnecessary and confusing.’ (Interview)

The sol-fa notation system is a scaffolding technique used in music teaching. Each note
in the scale is sung using a syllable (doh, ray, me, fah, soh, lah, te, doh). The strength of
the sol-fa system is that it facilitates the teaching, on any instrument, of pitch, intervals,
and transposition into different key signatures, using the voice. Steve’s attempts to use
an adaptation of sol-fa by singing numbers instead of sounds (doh = 1, ray = 2), while
he and Rhoda practised sight-singing (singing from the musical notation of music not
previously learnt), highlighted the differences in their cognitive processing style. Even
naming the notes of the scale (A, B, C, D, E, F, G) was a distraction for Rhoda. She
stated that she needed to hear the raw data of the musical sound (simulated through
singing nonsense sounds) in order to learn a piece.
S: The sound is, to Rhoda, the final result. ‘Why learn numbers when I go, ‘La-da-dumda-dum’?’ (sings) ‘Why learn letters? I can see the blobs.’ ‘Dum-ba-bum-ba-bum.’
(sings) ‘Why go 3 levels away?’ (Interview)

For Rhoda, the scaffold itself becomes a barrier, not a facilitator, of learning. Scaffolds
allow generalisability but Rhoda is unable to utilise the scaffold and needs to learn each
instance separately.
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5.3.6

Learning via rote memory

Prior to engaging in sight-reading activities with Steve, Rhoda performed music entirely
from memory.
S: … previously all Rhoda’s music was 100% memory. She has a very, very good
memory.
Res: So we’re talking rote memory here …
S: Yes, yes. There would not be any notation anywhere. It’s learnt from sounds, goes into
[her] head and, 30 verses of the folksong, watertight memory, all [the] verses and the tune
and, when it locks on, it lasts for multi-decades.
Res: It’s the perfect skill set for a street troubadour.
S: Exactly. And that’s why we have done this very same thing. (Interview)

Working from strong rote memory (a function of the semantic memory system) as a
musician, having learnt a piece of music through auditory and tactile processing, Rhoda
avoided the effects of her ‘brain skitters’ until she was challenged by Steve to sight-sing
polyphonic music (multiple melodic parts that work against each other rather than a
single melody with a harmonic structure), where predictability of the melody line was
low and reading musical notation was required. This task exposed her processing
weaknesses.

5.4

Cognitive profile: Processing style

Aspects of Rhoda’s mental processing style and memory that illuminate her cognitive
profile are examined here.
5.4.1

Sensory sensitivities and phobias

Rhoda described phobias triggered by the way certain objects appear to her: for example,
a leaf damaged by a leaf miner (Figure 5.2).
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Figure 5.2 Leaf damaged by leaf miners (the larvae of insects)3

Other triggers were: the shape of a monkey’s skull; old-fashioned cage-type elevators,
where the chains and pulleys are visible; and, salt shakers. Rhoda and Steve shared their
attempts to make sense of the phobias.
R: I [had] a lot of phobias and sensitivities. Very strange phobias, like things I didn’t like
the look of, shapes. … for instance, a monkey’s skull. … the shape of it, … it had to be
from the side-on, would absolutely terrify me. I only got over it when I was about 33 and
even [now] I still don’t like it very much. … apparently one day I didn’t like the look of
the salt cellars and I’d hide my … face so I didn’t look at it and my parents would say,
‘Oh yeah, another one of your madnesses’ … (Interview)

Steve’s explanation for Rhoda’s sensitivities implied that Rhoda has a ‘normal’ visual
representation of an object and that deviance from that picture causes horror.
S: Certain items, skulls and things, … are related to some shape of something which is
normal but they upset her because of their deformation, turning the expected, and
something which can be seen with ease, into something which is objectionable, … a
bastardisation, a horrific mutation … The deformation of the human form into a mindless,
sightless, ghost form, a sort of variation on the human … the medical aberrations cabinet
at the hospital, at the museum. (Rhoda speaks in background.) As Rhoda said, ‘The
Cabinet of Dr Caligari’. (Interview)

The Cabinet of Dr Caligari (Wiene, 1920) is a silent horror film about a sideshow
carnival act with a murderous ‘somnambulist’ who predicts the future. The character of
Dr Caligari is a carnival showman, who displays the sleeping fortune-teller in a coffinlike cabinet to paying visitors. The visitors respond in horror at the body in the cabinet,
which is apparently neither alive nor dead.
Whereas Temple Grandin described extreme sensitivity to the way things feel on her
skin, Rhoda described sensitivity to the way certain shapes appear to her vision, which

3

Photo reproduced under GNU Free Documentation License. Description: Leaf mining in the Lonicera
periclymenum leaf (Diptera). Author: Krzysztof Ziarnek. accessed 15/10/2013.
URL: http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Lonicera_leaf_miner_kz.jpg.
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evokes feelings of horror, as illustrated in the film. Steve’s explanation of deviance
from a remembered ‘norm’ implies that Rhoda has a ‘prototype’, an abstracted
summary representation of an object (Klinger & Dawson, 2001), that she uses to
identify objects, whereas it is more likely that, as a bottom-up processor, she has not
abstracted prototypes of objects but recalls objects by remembering each instance of an
object she has seen.
… it has been reported that in ASD the categorization of objects is in particular
compromised when it has to be done on the basis of abstract object prototypes (Klinger
and Dawson, 2001; Minshew et al., 2002). This is in line with an anecdotal account by
Temple Grandin (who has ASD), who described her tendency to remember all specific
exemplars of a category rather than rely on a more generalized concept of those
exemplars (Grandin, 1995). (Burnett & Jellema, 2013, p. 213)

Other reports have confirmed that individuals with autism have difficulty with
prototype formation (Gastgeb, 2010; Gastgeb, et al., 2012; Meyer & Minshew, 2002;
Williams, D. L. & Minshew, 2010). Rhoda stated that the monkey skull evokes horror
only if it is viewed from the side, not because it is a monkey skull. This phobic
phenomenon is more likely to be a low-level perceptual processing problem, similar to
Temple Grandin’s aversive response to the light touch of certain fabrics on her skin. In
the absence of well-developed emotional regulation, which is a top-down process,
unregulated emotional states are triggered by certain perceptual stimuli. Why some
shapes and not others? Why the monkey skull from the side and not from the front or
back? Further research on enhanced perceptual functioning would be indicated to
identify, if possible, the mechanism behind triggers and responses for individuals such
as Rhoda.
An interpretation of the phobic phenomenon in Rhoda’s case is that, accompanied by
poorly regulated emotion: (a) she can only conceptualise single items as she is a detailfocused processor relying on semantic and perceptual memory to make sense of the
world; (b) therefore, like a page of text scanned as a single graphic instead of OCR text,
she cannot mentally represent concepts into their component parts for problem-solving;
and (c) working with single-item memory (Section 4.4.1) for objects only leaves a
binary choice, good or bad, right or wrong (for example, a leaf with leaf miner damage
has lost its ‘leaf-ness’; the essence of its identity as belonging to the leaf category).
Further research would be of interest as to whether Rhoda is able to accept new
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categories, such as ‘leaves damaged by leaf miners’, through compensatory learning,
and whether this would assist with regulation of her sense of horror.
Certain sounds, also, are, or have been, a trigger for Rhoda’s fear response: sirens;
sound effects on radio plays in the 1950s; and, the sound of a Jew’s harp being played
by the maid next door in her childhood home in South Africa.
R: … I’d never heard that sound [of a Jew’s harp] before and it absolutely terrified me. I
went under the bed, I blocked my ears, I couldn’t stand it and you know I’d even hear it
from the bedroom and that was about five rooms away. She was in a flat next door, I
would still hear it and my hearing’s extremely good … (Interview)

Rhoda’s auditory sensitivity has contributed to her phobias. Phobias have impacted
upon her choice of career as she planned to study anthropology but found looking at
skulls too frightening. Her comments about sensory sensitivities and their contribution
to her phobias illuminate the process of ‘meltdowns’ in children with AS that find
aspects of the school environment very frightening.
5.4.2

Executive control of attention and ‘filtering’ sound

Despite the fact that Rhoda said she has a very analytical mind, her concept of ‘analysis’
appears to match the notion of single-item memory rather than the ability to:
deconstruct a phenomenon into its component parts; consider the parts and their
relationship to the whole; and, reassemble the whole, while maintaining the integrity of
the phenomenon. With reference to this, it was of interest to know whether Rhoda, as a
musician, has the capacity to move her attention between the different elements of
massed sound, for example, the performance of a symphony, or whether she processes
the sound as a single item, a whole. The ability to filter sound would commonly be
considered a necessary skill for a musician. The research literature on executive control
of attention in autism (an executive function), which includes the ability to filter sound
in order to attend to salient sounds, suggests that Rhoda would have difficulty with this
task and be more likely to perceive the massed sound of an orchestra as a single
stimulus. Filtering sensory input requires executive control of attention, akin to ‘set
shifting’ or ‘cognitive flexibility’, and demonstrates impairment in ASD (Tsatsanis,
2004; Van Eylen, et al., 2011). The capacity to filter sensory input is a point of
difference between giftedness and twice-exceptionality, according to Jensen’s
description of gifted individuals.
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Generally, the gifted has the ability to acquire new and complex information more rapidly
than their average-ability peers in situations involving simple acquisition. Multiple
studies have shown a stronger focus ability in those with higher IQ, suggesting an ability
to filter out distractions. Higher-ability people's effectiveness in controlling attention and
gating sensory information seems to be a critical factor. It differentiates and identifies
those individuals with complex cognitive abilities. (Jensen, 2008, p. 391)

‘Gating sensory information’ is a characteristic of giftedness that does not apply in
Rhoda’s case, Gifted individuals with AS may present an exception to Jensen’s
proposition.
Steve confirmed that Rhoda does indeed have difficulty filtering the sound of music
performances and noted that she is entirely unable to do it with recorded sound, due to
insufficient fidelity. Even for live performances, Rhoda’s natural way of processing the
sound is as a whole: as a single unit of sound.
S: So you could trace the trumpet in the top, you could hear the clarinet in the middle and
the trombone … but … Rhoda assembles the unified whole. It will be like a big organ
which goes ‘Blah’ (makes sound) like that. And the whole sound is chords and harmonics
in a big whole, but the strands, even though they might be a bit visible, they’re not
wondrously clear. … So it’s a different way of perceiving music. It’s more holistic …
(Interview)

By contrast, in a live performance, Rhoda later stated that she has acquired limited
ability to move her attention from instrument to instrument through effortful control.
However, when conversational language is involved, she experiences sensory overload
and has to reduce sensory input by putting her hands over her ears. (Steve used the
phrase ‘acoustic masking’ to describe the situation where multiple sounds require
filtering in order to attend to salient information.)
S: Acoustic masking is devastating for Rhoda. This means that a conversation of two
people is okay. Three people in a room conversing starts to get a worry. Three, four,
there’s problems. A party with all these conversations going, it’s the delineation and the
focus on one thread within that mess. Remember I talked about the orchestra, which is a
whole? It’s the same thing. [She] can’t pick up the line. So acoustic masking within
multi[ple] conversations simultaneously is very, very, very difficult. (Interview)

When language is an element of the environment, such as in a room where
conversations are taking place, sensory issues quickly become overwhelming for Rhoda
and she does not have the capacity to control her attention in order to attend to one
conversation, while screening out others.
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5.4.3

Serial processing

Rhoda and Steve both expressed their passion for simpler styles of music. (Early music
is much simpler in form than the music of later historical periods, such as the Classical
and Romantic periods, when increasingly larger ensembles produced ‘fatter’ sounds.)
This preference suggests that the historically more recent styles of music may present a
challenge to Rhoda’s auditory processing. In particular, Rhoda and Steve love
polyphonic music, where two or more melodies ‘compete’ against each other, in
contrast to musical styles that employ harmonic structures. It is suggested by Rhoda’s
narrative that her love of polyphonic music plays to her cognitive strengths in serial
processing (thinking in a linear fashion rather than ‘simultaneous processing’—see
Section 4.4.4) and, indeed, polyphony, with each performer’s focus on a single melody
line, provides a wonderful metaphor for the serial-processing cognitive style of gifted
individuals with AS.
5.4.4

Auditory processing

Rhoda’s auditory processing shows distinctive characteristics in line with the research
on information processing in AS. She has a prodigious auditory memory and performs
long pieces from memory. Her principal means of learning new music is by hearing and
memorising. She mostly processes ensemble music (for example, chamber group or
orchestral music) as though it were a single sensory input but has learnt, with effort, to
move her attention from the whole to a single instrument in a live performance: for
example, with visual support and auditory memory of the sound of an oboe, in a live
performance Rhoda can pick out the oboe part, overcoming the limitations of singleitem processing. She is unable to filter sounds in the same way when watching
television or listening to a recording on sound equipment, as she apparently needs the
richer visual and auditory cues of live music performance. When spoken language is
involved, cognitive load is much greater and Rhoda finds conversation hard when more
than one person is speaking: she lacks the cognitive capacity to spontaneously narrow
her focus to the speaker of interest.
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5.4.5

Visual processing

Like Kahla, Rhoda described her thinking in visual, eidetic terms: using the terms
‘movie’, ‘recording’ and ‘playback’. A difference in visual processing was the first clue
that led Rhoda and Steve to investigate, and ultimately receive, Rhoda’s diagnosis of
AS.
S: … as we got to know each other in the early days and we were working on music
together, it wasn’t ‘til she … said, ‘I think very differently from other people. … I see
things in pictures, or in movies’, and then dear Temple Grandin’s similar statement,
which happened in a documentary and I picked it up and that was the beginning of …
denouement’. (Interview)

In fact, Rhoda gave the impression that she has a very similar visual cognitive style to
Temple Grandin, as portrayed in the movie Temple (Monger & Johnson, 2010), with the
slight exception that she appears to be the kind of visual thinker who is, in Grandin’s
terms, a visual-spatial or ‘pattern thinker’ (Grandin & Panek, 2013, p. 140).
As in Kahla’s case, Rhoda described her autobiographical memories as ‘recordings’ that
are played back.
R: …the kind of memory which I have … is very good, because it’s a little bit like reeling
back information, almost like a tape recorder. So that really gave me good advantage … I
used to remember 24 verses of a folk song after singing it twice, things like that. I don’t
think I could do that now because my mind is cluttered and full of rubbish but when I was
15, yes, I could do that kind of thing.
Res: So you’re saying that your memory records things that you’re interested in as though
it was a video camera?
R: Yes, yes, that’s right, and also if … something really bad has happened, I’ll relive it.
I’ll go over it again and again. [My psychologist] says I’m like a person with post
traumatic stress syndrome. It’s an advantage to have a memory like this but it’s also a
disadvantage. (Interview)

As with Kahla’s case, caution needs to be exercised in regard to her use of the term
‘reliving’. Rhoda stated elsewhere, ‘to remember it, I have to [play the recording]’,
indicating a noetic, rather than autonoetic, state of consciousness.
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5.5

Cognitive profile: Memory

During their interviews, Rhoda and Steve remarked that ‘kinetic’ or ‘tactile’ memory
plays a major role in the expert performance of instrumental music. Tulving’s human
learning and memory systems framework (Figure 4.3) facilitates an explanation of
Rhoda’s success and giftedness as a musician, artist and draftsperson. Tactile or kinetic
memory is a reference to procedural memory, where automaticity is achieved through
practice and repetition, just as a touch-typist types words automatically without
requiring conscious effort to select each letter correctly.
Rhoda’s learning requirement for music to be learnt through bottom-up processing,
rather than through the use of scaffolding systems like sol-fa (top-down processing), is
indicative of enhanced perceptual functioning operating in conjunction with prodigious
rote memory. Rhoda’s narrative is suggestive of superior semantic, perceptual and
procedural

processing

coupled

with

diminished

episodic

thinking.

Rhoda’s

autobiographical memories were not as extensive or descriptive as Kahla’s so it is
difficult to further evaluate her reliance upon episodic thinking. Her personal history
was told from a first-person perspective but this aspect of her account was not explored
during the interview as Rhoda and Steve had a set agenda for the topics they wanted to
talk about. Indicators of first-person stance for autobiographical events, in some
instances, may be the product of mental and verbal rehearsal, rather than evidence of
episodic functioning.
Within the framework of Tulving’s human learning and memory systems, Rhoda’s case
displays: increased reliance on procedural memory for music learning; enhanced
perceptual processing demonstrated by artistic representations (drawing, musical
performance); difficulties with language processing; and, likely superior visual
symbolic representation. It is also possible that Rhoda has an extensive mental capacity
for word memory, although this may function in a compensatory way, as suggested by
Grandin (2006; 2013), Koshino et al., (2005) and Williams and Minshew (2010), which
allows her to enjoy reading. Dyslexia affects her eye tracking from left to right and from
line to line when reading musical notation. Her challenges are exposed during sight
reading, which is a complex function requiring sensory integration of stimuli under time
pressure in multiple modalities: visual, auditory and tactile.
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5.6

Philosophical questions

As for the other cases in this thesis, higher-order issues emerging from the case will be
addressed using Lincoln and Guba’s (2013) framework of the four philosophical
questions, which are interpreted as issues of reality, knowledge, methodology, identity
and value.
5.6.1

What does Rhoda mean by ‘logic’?

The methodological question, ‘How does one go about acquiring knowledge?’, arose in
Rhoda’s case through her references to the notion of ‘logic’. Anecdotally, most
individuals with AS will claim to be logical in their thinking, where logic and emotion
are held to be mutually exclusive, and have difficulty understanding the complexities of
other people’s behaviours and thinking. The characters of Mr Spock and Data from the
television series Star Trek are commonly held heroes, of, for example, Temple Grandin
(Sacks, 1995), for their logical thought and lack of emotion. Rhoda described herself as
logical in the way she learns new skills and information, and she reported frustration
with her students’ failure to employ logic in their learning. Her claim to be a logical,
analytical thinker raised the question of what she meant by ‘logical’, contrasted with her
perception of her students’ as ‘illogical’.
It is reasoned that rule-based categorisation (Perkins, et al., 2006) is an example of the
phenomenon Rhoda referred to as ‘logic’ in learning. Rhoda’s superior semantic
processing with minimal top-down modulation means that her thinking can be described
as ‘black and white’ or ‘concrete’ thinking (DeLong, 1992; Meyer & Minshew, 2002;
Newman, et al., 2010). A characteristic of this cognitive style is superiority at labelling,
sorting, classification and rule-based categorisation with reduced reliance on abstract
schemas (top-down processing). In the researcher’s experience, it is often accompanied
by poor understanding of other people’s lack of ‘logic’ in failing to adhere to the same
rules and categories.
Rhoda’s definition of Asperger thinking is centred on the notion of logic.
Res: What would you say the essence of the Asperger mind is?
R: I would say very logical and not tolerating a lot of extra information. (Interview)
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‘Not tolerating a lot of extra information’ appears to indicate the requirement of a
clearly defined, narrow frame of reference for the logic to operate effectively. To use
Grandin’s example of the categorisation of ‘dogs’ via a series of rules (Gastgeb, 2010;
Grandin, 2006; Klinger & Dawson, 2001): dogs have four legs; fur; they bark; they are
bigger than cats. The implied frame of reference in Grandin’s account is every instance
of dogs she has known, stored in memory as a series of images or movies. Broader
thinking and experience, including other people’s ways of thinking about dogs, would,
therefore, present challenges to the learned, rule-based logic. If the rule is, for example,
that dogs are bigger than cats, based on every remembered instance of dogs and cats
previously encountered (rather than abstract prototypes), seeing an adult chihuahua for
the first time is likely to result in an incorrect categorisation: ‘that’s not a dog’.
Rhoda reported that she had great difficulty in tolerating some of the learning
behaviours of her adult students that, to her, are illogical; for instance, her students’
failure to rigorously apply the rules she taught them for naming computer files for use
in websites, where the application of rules is a requirement. Following the step-by-step
instructions of a knitting pattern was the example she gave of her own use of logic in
learning.
Res: So when you say [as a child] you were good at teaching yourself, how do you think
you did that?
R: Oh, it would be pictures in a book or something like that. It would be instructions and
pictures. If it came to something like crocheting and learning a new stitch, it would be
lots of visuals and verbal things in point form. Everything would have to be succinct
and logical, not verbal, as in sentences. Long sentences and unnecessary words [don’t]
work for me. (Interview) [Emphasis added]

Individuals with AS have difficulty comprehending complex verbal instructions
(Saalasti, et al., 2008). Where there are complex instructions in a task (as previously
noted in Section 5.3.2), the application of simple rule-based principles of labelling and
categorising breaks down, hence Rhoda’s preference for simple, dot-point instructions.
In addition, except for the most basic tasks (for example, labelling an object), in
semantic processing there is a process of mental manipulation, once a single-item
concept or rule-based category is established. Boucher described how ‘JS’ builds factual
knowledge by using ‘logical’ formulaic processes based on concepts that have been
established by rule-based categorisation.
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However, JS’s factual knowledge is acquired in ways that differ, at least in part, from
more typical processes of knowledge acquisition. JS points out that, in the absence of
episodic and event memory, he must derive factual knowledge in one of two ways. The
first way in which JS establishes factual knowledge in semantic memory is to derive it
from percepts and single-item concepts by linking together arguments and predicates
(JS’s terms): e.g. ‘cats’ + ‘eat’ + ‘fish’; ‘chillis’ + ‘are’ + ‘hot’; ‘global warming’ +
‘results from’ + ‘CO2 emissions’. These propositional facts are then reinforced and
stabilized in semantic memory via internalized verbal rehearsal. JS reports that he has
good perceptual memory for single items. However, these may be complex: he describes
‘single items’ in terms of a snapshot, rather than in terms of isolated items. (Boucher,
2007, p. 258) [Italics added]

Boucher notes that JS’s cognitive strategies are a means of compensating for underfunctioning episodic memory processes, where typically developing individuals are
more likely to learn equivalent knowledge spontaneously through personal experience.
… ordinary people … extract a great deal of information and knowledge effortlessly and
unconsciously from events and episodes. If, for example, the ordinary person drives into
an unfamiliar shopping centre on successive Friday nights and on each occasion find the
car park full, they are likely to register unconsciously that ‘the car park is usually full on
Friday nights’. … Although registered without conscious effort, such information is
subsequently available as factual declarative knowledge derived from episodic memory,
even long after the actual episodes from which the information was derived have been
forgotten. JS cannot derive factual knowledge from events in this effortless way. Instead,
if he wants to learn from personally experienced events, he has either to memorize
conversations that occurred (or, for example, the content of a lecture he heard at a
conference); or formulate a verbal account of the event and rehearse it … (Boucher, 2007,
p. 258)

Interpreting Boucher’s explanation within the framework of Tulving’s memory systems,
in the cases of JS and Rhoda, it is reasoned that observations of the way other people
derive knowledge from experience would be considered ‘illogical’ because: (a) the
observed learning would not conform to rule-based categorising and the formulaic
processing of semantic memory; and, (b) the operation of episodic memory and
personal experience in that act of learning would be opaque to the individuals with AS.
Therefore, it could be the case that what Rhoda means by ‘logic’ is that the task or
material to be learnt is already inherently structured in a way the individual with AS
can understand: it conforms to known rules and categories so that a concrete, externallyoriented thinking style is accommodated. However, for learners who are abstract
thinkers and are factoring a broader frame of reference into their thinking (for example,
their personal experience), the application of simple rules and categories may be
unsatisfactory for their approach to a learning task. From the perspective of the
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individual with AS, the abstract thinker would likely appear to be illogical, due to what
is not perceived by the individual with AS.
In summary, it is reasoned that rule-based categorising and formulaic manipulation,
which are characteristics of semantic processing unmodulated by personal experience,
are perceived as ‘logical thinking’ by Rhoda. A pedagogical insight that emerges from
this discussion of logic in AS is that the desirable ‘logic’ needed to facilitate learning in
a student with AS is most likely to be simply the inherent, concrete structures and
concepts that accommodate concrete thinking, in contrast to the detailed, conceptual
explanations intended to help students build their own complex knowledge
constructions.
5.6.2

Identity

Unlike Kahla’s narrative, Rhoda’s narrative is mostly neutral in its indications of firstperson vs. third-person observational stance. However, she made an explicit selfreflective identity statement, so there is, at least, slight evidence for self-referential
processing.
R: I don't think I'm a teacher. I might know things but it's not really me. (Interview)

One of the few other identity statements Rhoda made was couched in terms of her
perception, rather than in self-referencing terms, seemingly indicating a greater reliance
on perceptual memory for identity, rather than semantic and episodic memories.
Res: … what do you understand by your ‘mind’?
R: Oh, it’s, mostly it’s me, as I am. Um yeah, I think that’s, I mean it’s a whole
conglomeration of things but it’s me, basically, as I perceive things. (Interview)

Like Kahla, Rhoda likens her memory to a recording that requires time to playback to
the appropriate place, in contrast to the spontaneous nature of episodic memory retrieval
via mental time travel. However, Rhoda’s narrative doesn’t overtly display the
characteristics of a third-person observational stance as did Kahla’s. This may be due to
memories being rehearsed and retold in the style of episodic memories in a
compensatory way, as noted in JS’s case (Boucher, 2007).
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5.7

Pedagogical insights

From Rhoda’s case, the following observations can be made regarding the complexity
of Rhoda’s cognitive style.
(a) Despite her high levels of giftedness in the creative arts, when the element of
language is a layered component of a task, Rhoda operates at a disadvantage.
(b) Rhoda has high levels of skill in drawing and artistic representation but poor
handwriting. Motor control issues are recognised as playing a part but it is proposed
that this is not a sufficient explanation for the conundrum of excellent drawing skills
alongside poor handwriting: instead, the processing load induced by language is a
significant factor (see previous item).
(c) Rhoda has excellent auditory processing for memorising and performing certain
styles of music (early music and polyphony; linear melody lines; long folksongs
requiring strong rote memory) but distinguishing the sounds of individual
instruments from the whole in an ensemble is difficult, and is only possible from a
live performance, otherwise she interprets the sound of an ensemble as a single
stimulus. She has problems with a basic musical skill but excels in some types of
complex musical performance.
(d) Rhoda’s perception is affected by dyslexia when reading from paper, however,
visual processing and memorisation of scenes, pictures, patterns, puzzles, and word
recognition (possibly with each word as a single item rather than decoded) is
excellent.
Insights for teachers reflecting upon the implications of Rhoda’s case for teaching and
learning include: (a) the need for teachers to be mindful of the potential interference of a
learning disorder; (b) the need to modify expectations of the timeframe required for a
task, due to increased cognitive processing demands; (c) the high-levels of ‘selflearning’ that may occur when obstacles to learning are removed, as when Rhoda was
absent from school due to illness; (d) the notion that teacher-provided scaffolds may be
a distraction that increase load and decrease learning; and, (e) the importance of positive
feedback and recognition of strengths for emotional well-being.
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5.8

Conclusion

In both visual and auditory processing, when language comes into the mix, Rhoda’s
cognitive processing load increases dramatically, supporting the notion that she is a
visual thinker translating between visual mental representations and language. Complex
verbal instructions, both written and spoken, are difficult for Rhoda to process,
particularly under time constraints (such as in a classroom learning situation or
practising a piece of music with another musician). Instrumental music and music sung
without words do not present the same challenges. Rhoda is most likely to be the type
of picture thinker that Temple Grandin calls a ‘pattern thinker’ (Grandin & Panek, 2013,
p. 205) or ‘spatial visualizer’ (p. 155). She has a prodigious memory for words and
sounds, however she most likely processes an incoming visual stimulus or incoming
auditory stimulus as a single unit. Through trial and error, she has found a visual
scaffold that assists with overcoming the limitations of reading music notation under
performance pressure (software that scrolls music manuscript and an animated cursor
that points to the place) but has found that traditional language-based, music-teaching
scaffolds, such as sol-fa or counting, interfere with her learning and performance.
Within the Human Learning and Memory Systems framework (Schacter & Tulving,
1994), Rhoda most likely: has enhanced perceptual functioning which is, however,
disrupted under certain circumstances by dyslexia; has superior semantic processing and
memory; is natively a picture thinker rather than a verbal thinker; is reliant on rulebased categorisation for simple concept identification (bottom-up processing); and, has
decreased reliance on episodic memory and abstract reasoning (top-down processing).
Rhoda’s cognitive style of serial processing, allied with enhanced perception and
excellent semantic memory, ideally positions her for her interests in early music, such
as folk songs that would once have been sung by wandering troubadours.
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Chapter 6 Case 3 ‘Colin’
The third case study is centred on a 57 year old male, ‘Colin’, who has a life partner
‘Wendy’. Colin and Wendy had been together for 14 years at the time of the interviews
in 2011. Colin is a professional photographer and writer of considerable reputation.
Colin is also a semi-professional musician and has had extensive involvement in media,
advertising, entertainment and publishing in Australia for several decades. In addition to
photography, Colin creates artistic images through painting. Wendy trained as a teacher
so her insights into Colin’s thinking and learning were of special interest for that reason.
Wendy initiated the contact with the researcher and stated that she and Colin had often
discussed the different ways of thinking of each and were interested in contributing to
research, hoping to gain understanding into those differences. Since the interviews,
there has been prolonged engagement with Colin and Wendy, at their initiative, via
email messages that have been included in the data for Case 3.
The interviews took place at Colin and Wendy’s home. Each elected not to be present
during the other’s interview and asked not to see transcripts of the interviews. Colin’s
interview was conducted over two hours while Wendy left the house and walked their
dog. A phone call to Wendy at the conclusion of the first interview recalled her and,
while waiting for her to return, Colin displayed some of his photographs and artworks.
This part of the dialogue was not captured on the recording as it was unanticipated and
involved moving around their house to see the displayed artworks and photos. During
Wendy’s interview, Colin worked elsewhere in the house but once or twice walked
through the room where the interview was being conducted. Nonetheless, Wendy was
candid in the interview, even sharing references from her private journal. Much of the
data given by Wendy falls outside the research questions of this study, however, her
evidence is significant for corroboration of Colin’s narrative and for insights into his
learning and memory.
Colin was born in India and, like Rhoda, experienced frequent, dislocating moves as a
child, all before the age of twelve: India, the United Kingdom, the Middle East, Eastern
Europe, Europe, Asia and, finally, Australia. He described himself as a loner and much
younger than his older sister and brother. His father, whom he recently discovered
worked in international intelligence, was a distant, critical figure in Colin’s life but
Colin experienced a measure of closeness with his mother. Colin was given his first
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camera at the age of seven and had a photo published from his first reel of twelve
exposures: he had taken a photo of his neighbour working at her desk because the light
was interesting, which she then used as the author photo on the cover of the book that
she was writing.
C: It was a simple yet eloquent image of her sitting at her writing desk lit by a shaft of
warm afternoon sunlight streaming in through her office windows (this was purely by
chance more than good planning – I had spent so much of the day running around with
my camera that by the time I got to her house the light just happened to be in the perfect
spot). Still, it was my first published shot and I’d only had a camera for less than 24
hours; not bad for a 7 year old. But then, I had learnt so much simply by looking at all
those wonderful photos in LIFE magazine for years. (Email)

Colin does not believe that any of his immediate family members have AS, however, he
noted eccentricity and autistic traits within members of his wider family circle. His
father’s brother was the creator of iconic children’s animated television characters in the
UK and his cousin, the same uncle’s son, was said to have ‘a blank spot on the brain’.
C: They used to tie him up by his reins to the radiator so he wouldn’t run around the
house and he’d just sit there rocking, backwards and forwards. I used to get like that
sometimes when I’d get really stressed out and I used to think, ‘I kinda relate to him in a
way.’ Really nice guy, turned out he’s a really chronic Asperger but, without any formal
training, … he works for the [museum name] as an illustrator of birds and his job was to
turn every single bird that they had in their collection into an illustration for a book on
birds. (Interview)

Colin was formally diagnosed with AS as an adult some years prior to the interview,
following a long period of mental health treatment for depression, through the
intervention of a colleague whose son had been diagnosed with AS.

6.1

School experience

Colin’s education was extremely disrupted by his family’s moves from country to
country and he ultimately left school early, aged fifteen. He found school very stressful
and never felt he fitted in.
C: Yeah, never liked school, always had a miserable time at school. A lot of the time I put
it down to bad teachers, but also increasing awareness from about the age of about 6 or 7
that I just was not part of the human race. Just didn’t fit in. I never felt normal, ever.
(Interview)

His narrative of his school experience has several defining features: the mismatch
between his cognitive profile and the learning environment that was provided; bullying;
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his struggle with any learning task that involved written or spoken language; and, his
intuitive grasp of many tasks without being able to articulate his thinking, which
resulted in him being described as ‘lazy’ and ‘a shonk’. Colin was told during school
that his IQ had been tested at 163 and he was selected to attend a school for the gifted.
He reported that his father ‘flatly refused because it was going to cost him money and
my father would much prefer to spend money on a bottle of brandy than sending me to
a private school’ (Interview). His school experience, during which he was regarded as
gifted with behavioural problems, has contributed to his conflict over the value of his
intellect, and impacted upon his identity. Colin’s narrative, along with those of Kahla
and Rhoda, encompasses the sub-textual question; ‘Am I smart, or am I dumb?’
Although very unhappy at school, Colin remembers one teacher as the single example
of a teacher from whom he was able to learn.
C: Except for one teacher in high school, a guy called [name] … and he was the best
teacher I could have ever had, he taught us history, because he was nuts. He’d walk into
the classroom with a sheet wrapped around himself. He’d been down the bottom of the
school playground, he’d got some ivy and made himself a laurel wreath out of it and he’d
storm into the classroom holding his books like the 10 Commandments and he’d say
‘Boys, today we’re gonna learn about Julius Caesar!’ crash [slamming books on desk]
and he’d say, ‘OK, it’s the Vietnam War but … it’s not the Vietnam War, it’s the Civil
War in Rome. What’s the difference here? Oh, one’s got a media and one hasn’t.’ And
suddenly he had us. (Interview)

This teacher’s externally oriented methods included dramatic and visual strategies,
combined with oral story-telling: techniques that reduce the load on abstract reasoning
and top-down information processing. Wendy noted that students like Colin should be
regarded ‘almost like ESL [English as a Second Language] children’ (Interview).
W: … because they can’t handle too many people, too much stimulus, they can’t seem to
block, they can’t seem to stop other sounds and concentrate on what they’re meant to be
doing. They find the teaching methods themselves really boring, he [Colin] found that so
unstimulating just to stand there and listen to a teacher with a blackboard, so they need
lots more interactive things for sure … (Interview)

Colin stated that he found the ‘teacher with a blackboard’ methods employed in art
classes so stressful that he would skip lessons and accept the punishment, indicating not
just boredom, but also significant stress. He described the ‘traditional’ pedagogical style
and the associated explanations, methods and frameworks as ‘crap’.
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It will be argued later in this case, that, although clearly being a gifted individual with
AS like Kahla and Rhoda, Colin has significant cognitive profile differences from them.
While, along with Colin, they displayed enhanced perceptual processing, Kahla and
Rhoda recounted more memories with semantic-memory features than Colin. With
reduced capacity to explicitly process language (a function of semantic memory), the
mismatch between the lockstep, teacher-centred teaching methods that Colin
experienced and his capacity to learn is understandable, since those teaching methods
depend on the student’s capacity in language processing and abstract reasoning.
Abstract thinking is a function of the episodic memory system, which is mediated via
the semantic memory system, according to Tulving’s original description (Schacter &
Tulving, 1994), and Colin’s narrative is consistent with diminished features of both
semantic and episodic thinking (explicit) and increased reliance on perceptual and
procedural processing (implicit). Colin, therefore, appears to be very reliant on visual
imagery, perceptual processing and procedural memory and this will be further
discussed in Sections 6.5 and 6.6.

6.2

A sense of difference, alienation and isolation

A deep sense of alienation from family, peers and society runs throughout Colin’s
narrative. He described trauma, depression and, like Rhoda, prolonged experience of
treatment for mental illness. Prior to his diagnosis of AS, he attributed his sense of
alienation to multiple causes: his unusual family background; a minor head injury as a
child; and, unquestionably significant trauma. In particular, when he was nineteen, he
lived with his girlfriend, who died suddenly and unexpectedly in their bed the morning
after their first Christmas together.
C: I didn’t know that she was bulimic. But when they came to investigate why she died,
they found all these hundreds of empty bottles of Ford Pills under the house. You know
Ford diet pills? Evidently her kidneys had collapsed during the night and she died. I woke
up. It was about half past six, quarter to seven, and the clock radio was on and it was John
Lennon singing ‘So This is Christmas’. There was some guy mowing his lawn. Suddenly,
all this reality around me and yet, she was dead 20 minutes later. The ambulance guys
arrived and, I mean, I can still visualise all of this absolutely, almost down to how high
the length the grass was. … I became quite suicidal and ended up being put into [a
psychiatric clinic] and then I spent six months at [another psychiatric clinic], and that
isolated me for about 19 years … It was like the last straw because, again, I’d always had
this feeling that there was something wrong with me, the sense of isolation. (Interview)
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Further trauma was experienced at the sudden death of a mentor in the entertainment
industry, who was like a ‘substitute father’, and at the abrupt death of a beloved pet dog.
Prolonged emotional upheaval following trauma that reinforces his sense of alienation
is a thread through Colin’s account.
In considering Colin’s sense of being different, it is tempting to conclude that he does
not need or desire validation from others as, in his narrative, he was sometimes
dismissive of others and appeared very self-focused. However, from prolonged
engagement with the researcher, it is evident that he greatly values the example, opinion
and feedback of a significant few, including his partner (corroborated by her), as being
essential for his well-being, and views it as important for him to contribute to their wellbeing.
C: Support. I think that’s why Wendy and I have been together so long. She knows how
to give support – not that I need much as I never have relied on it from others, but what
she does provide is of enormous help to my sense of self-esteem and general well-being. I
also think it’s very important for Aspies to have someone to love. Joseph Campbell said
... ‘it is not important how many people love us, but it is important for us to be able to
love someone back.’ (Email)

The air of self-absorption expressed in Colin’s account, considered separately from
other autistic features, raises the issue of distinguishing between AS and other disorders.
This line of inquiry is addressed briefly here for two reasons: in order to gain insight
into the nature of Colin’s experienced sense of difference; and, because this issue is
consistently raised by life partners attending ASPIA meetings and workshops (Grigg,
2013). The following passage provides an opportunity to consider this issue.
C: I got my call-up paper (Vietnam conscription) and that was the weird thing, cause I
thought, ‘There’s no way I’m going’. The Whitlam Government got in in December and
[girlfriend’s name] died on the Boxing Day and I said, ‘Great, somebody had to die and
it wasn’t me.’ Cause I said, ‘If I go, I’m dying. I know that.’ Cause I’m not smart enough
to be a soldier, you know what I mean. You put me on the front line, I’d do something
stupid because I’d forget where I am and that’s what happens. (Interview) [emphasis
added]

Without specific insight into Asperger cognition, Colin’s attitude to the death of his
girlfriend appears callous in the extreme (see bold text). How can this feature of Colin’s
case best be understood? Is this statement pointing to an anti-social personality disorder
of some kind in which social isolation may be a choice; or does he desire a sense of
belonging and is frustrated by its lack?
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To understand the issues presented here that are representative of Colin’s thinking
processes, it is important to factor in the style and purpose of his utterance. First, the
purpose of the utterance was to make a number of points about the Vietnam war and
mass media following his description of the history teacher who used dramatic
techniques in his teaching. Secondly, this long monologue, of which the above is a
small excerpt, is an instance of ‘associative thinking’, as described in Case 1 (Section
4.7.2). The path of association from one point to another, paraphrased, is: Colin’s
history teacher; dramatic teaching techniques were effective; learning about the civil
war in Rome by comparing it with the Vietnam War; the change to the conduct of war
due to the influence of the media, starting with the Vietnam war; the subsequent
conscription of some of Colin’s peers; Colin receiving his own call-up papers; the death
of his girlfriend at that time; his conviction that he would be killed if he went to
Vietnam because he’d ‘do something stupid’; Bert Stern, an American photographer for
Life Magazine, who wanted to photograph Vietnam but was constrained by the military
due to potential impact of photos depicting Vietnam as a beautiful country; identifying
with Bert Stern in wanting to photograph beauty, not war; not wanting to come home
from Vietnam in a body bag; karma; being born in India; a Buddhist pilgrimage with his
carer at age 5; and so on for several more ideas, finishing with ‘looking at shapes and
things [that] started to have meaning and significance’ (Interview), which was intended
as a description of his visual processing style. The single, linear track of thinking that
moves from idea to idea in Colin’s mind, as he speaks, briefly touches on his
girlfriend’s death but in a way that shows his intention was most likely not callous.
Instead it is an associated idea with the recount of his Vietnam war conscription. That is,
the idea of death provides the association with the next thought and pervades the
following points of war, death and karma.
This utterance illustrates one of the significant social issues faced by individuals with
AS that contributes to social isolation: the message received by another person may not
be in line with the intention of the utterance. The broader issue of intentionality in
autism has been discussed in relationship to theory of mind (Hill & Bird, 2006; Perkins,
et al., 2006) and inter-subjectivity (Hobson & Lee, 1999; Solomon, et al., 2011) and,
even though definitions vary, Williams’ discussion, ‘The development of situated social
understanding’ (Williams, E., 2004, p. 720), shows a likely connection between
intentionality in autism to ‘intentionality’ as characterised within phenomenology
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(Berndtsson, Claesson, Friberg & Öhlén, 2007; Larkin, et al., 2011). The relevance to
this analysis is that Colin’s utterance ‘Great, somebody had to die and it wasn’t me’ (it
was his girlfriend), interpreted in the light of his behaviour in speaking through a long
chain of linearly associated ideas, set against the poor likelihood that he would have any
idea of how his statement might sound to the listener, resulted in a self-focused
statement that could be interpreted by a casual listener to imply a different disorder,
such as narcissistic personality disorder (APA, 2013). Anecdotally, and in the
researcher’s own partner support experience, this is a significant issue for families and
partners of individuals with AS, with the self-focused behaviours of individuals with
AS appearing narcissistic to others (Goulston, 2009; Holmes, 2013; Jacobsen, 2003),
and evocative of the question, ‘Is it Asperger syndrome or is it narcissism?’ However,
Colin’s self-deprecating approach to his considerable achievements; his lack of
ambition and monetary pursuits; his delight at the unconditional acceptance of his dogs;
his positive relationships with his partner and mentors; and, the sense of alienation he
described as his lived experience; seem to indicate a longing for acceptance and support
the expert diagnosis of AS.
As for Kahla and Rhoda, the diagnosis of AS for Colin, when it eventually was given,
provided great relief and the beginning of building a new understanding of self and the
world.
W: …[the] psychologist who he felt comfortable with… finally said, ‘I think he might be
Asperger,’ and Colin said the (snaps fingers) light bulb came on and it made perfect sense
to him [and] that’s [when] all the things that he felt different about all his life from
everybody made sense. It all clicked into place. (Interview)

The diagnosis did not resolve any of the personal or social difficulties experienced by
Colin but provided the means to reinterpret his experience in the light of new
knowledge. Despite his earlier life being characterised by dislocation, trauma and
depression, he has found a measure of self-acceptance facilitated by his diagnosis,
which has provided him with an explanatory framework through which he has been able
to reinterpret his experiences of alienation and isolation. It is evident that Colin has a
deep longing for acceptance, although he may have paradoxical criteria for what
constitutes acceptance, so the measure of acceptance and belonging that he has attained
is hard-won.
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6.3

Language

Like Rhoda, Colin is an artist with superior visual perception and processing, except
where language is concerned. Colin is a semi-professional guitarist who cannot read
music. He learns to play or sing music through auditory processing: he listens between
one and three times to a piece he is learning, and then is able to ‘play from ear’ after one
or two plays-through. He is a professional writer with an extensive publication list but
cannot spell very well.
C: I’ve written over 60 articles for photography magazines. I’ve written two books on
photography. Mark Twain said, ‘I have no respect for a man who can only spell a word
one way,’ (Laughs) cause he was a bad speller. (Interview)
C: I spelt something one day and [my colleague] said, ‘You know, it might actually be
easier if you just fell across the keyboard occasionally. You might hit the right
combination.’ (Laughs) (Interview)

Colin does not seem to have learnt compensatory mental strategies for spelling but
manages by using spellcheck extensively and relying on the assistance of his partner
and editors. Although Colin reads widely, it is difficult to fathom how he elicits
meaning from text. Wendy discussed his reading problems in the following terms.
W: He still asks me to spell words for him … He gets letters around the wrong way, he
cannot look at a word as a whole and know what that word says. He’ll spell things on our
chalkboard … they’re always misspelt for the shopping list, for example. So nothing’s
retained, his brain just doesn’t do what we do … He can read but there’s words that he
might have seen once or twice but he will not recognise them again. He just he cannot get
it and he can’t sound it out. … No sight recognition. His phonetics is shocking. …
Res: So how does he decode a word then if he’s got no phonetics, no sight [recognition]?
W: He doesn’t. … He’ll substitute something, perhaps, which is what you’re meant to do
when you learn to read but he doesn’t quite understand exactly what that word might
mean. He might not get the meaning and that’s the block. (Interview)

Wendy indicated that Colin’s excellent visual processing in relationship to objects does
not apply to language.
W: He has told me that he sees in pictures. … and that’s the problem with the written
word, he doesn’t see that as a picture. It doesn’t have the right meaning. (Interview)

Wendy, utilising her teaching background, had considered compensatory strategies for
word learning.
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W: It’s interesting because he’s so visual, being a photographer, it made perfect sense to
me that he would therefore be able to just photographic[ally] take a photo of the word and
be able to respell, but he can’t. … with letters, he can’t do it. He can do it with the world.
(Interview)

Colin’s dyslexia severely disrupts his visual processing of text. With apparently limited
success in the acquisition of compensatory strategies, it is a matter of surmise as to how
he derives meaning through reading, perhaps ‘intuitively’ garnering meaning from
context clues and relying on his own perception to construct meaning. This obscurity
points to Colin’s interesting stance with regard to knowledge (Section 6.7.5).
Colin’s dyslexia was identified at an early age and profoundly contributed to his
learning and behaviour problems in school. It is interesting to note that, like Rhoda,
Colin is left-handed and is unable to see the words as he writes. As a visual processor,
this would make consolidation of the shape and detail of words for sight recognition
very difficult. Now he is an adult, it seems inappropriate to describe Colin as having
‘left/right confusion’, as might be a typical description in a school report, because, in
fields apart from reading and writing, it could be regarded as a superiority, that is, lack
of encumbrance by mental issues of directionality. The following email communication
illuminates this perspective.
C: I had a bit of an insight into my view of the world the other night, it came about by
accident when I was talking to [Wendy] and flippantly said I was always like something
out of left field and immediately gestured with my right hand to the ‘left field’. [Wendy]
cracked up laughing. At first I didn’t know what she was laughing at. When she told me, I
got this flash that has been bugging me for years. I suddenly worked out I live in a mirror
world in my head. I used to draw pictures when I was a kid that were completely reversed
from the reality I was in. Left was right and right was left. Just like looking in a mirror. I
have never had a problem reading printer’s typeset – all letters reversed and upside down.
Same with when I used to shoot advertising shots on a big format camera with a ground
glass viewing screen and the image was reversed and upside down too. I never had a
problem telling my assistant which way to move a product as I just knew without
thinking how to work in a reversed way. I can even write backwards pretty easily too, like
Da Vinci did. It’s actually easier to spell correctly too as I can see the letters as they
appear and not being covered up when I write normally. (I’m left handed by the way.)
(Email)

He sent the following image, embedded in the last email, to illustrate the way that
certain cameras mirror-reverse images.
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Figure 6.1 Studio camera © Guillaume Piolle / CC-BY-3.0

In Colin’s case, superior ability in visuo-spatial processing can be attributed to
enhanced perceptual functioning without top-down modulation from either semantic or
episodic processing. As a non-verbal processor, or ‘picture thinker’, directional issues in
language processing are problematic but, in other areas, lack of directional constraint
confers unusual accomplishments: his visual processing is not restricted by explicit
notions of left and right, or top and bottom, and this is an advantage in his field of
photography. The theory of central coherence, as described by Happé (1994), is
suggestive of low level processing in Colin’s case with little modulation by either
semantic or episodic processing.

6.4

Learning

Several times, Colin described himself as never having consciously learnt anything.
C: I’m a bit of a freak, I suppose. I can’t think of anything I’ve ever consciously been
taught, at school or anywhere but I play guitar semi-professionally, I played in a band at
school. … I can’t read music, I just play. … Same with painting. I’ve never been given a
formal lesson in painting but I paint and I love to paint but I haven’t got enough room to
do it all. Same with photography. Once I worked out [the] basic things about the shutter
speed and the F stop and the filmstrip. Once I’d worked out those three things, that was it,
I was away. … I can do any of them well enough to make a living out of. (Interview)
[emphasis added]

So the question raised for this study is, ‘How does Colin learn?’ He clearly does learn
and acquire new skills and has achieved high-level mastery in his professional life,
attested to by the wide-spread use of his photographs in publications and the media.
Colin implied that his learning is so quick it is as if there is no requirement to think
effortfully or explicitly. Wendy corroborated the rapidity of his learning, saying; ‘It’s
almost like it’s instantaneous.’
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W: How does he learn? I think he just makes connections without even thinking through
the different parts of it. He seems to go from beginning to end in a nanosecond.
(Interview)
W: It’s almost like a natural gift that he has that he can just work something out straight
[away], and if he needs to make something, he just looks at, or he’ll just design
something, he’ll just sketch what he wants, he knows what he wants. … So he just cuts
straight through ‘all the crap,’ as he calls it, and does a good job. [laughs] (Interview)

Colin has a very quick method of grasping how to achieve a task, apparently without
conscious reflection, so that he seems to feel that learning is obvious and effortless and
therefore achievements are not a matter for pride. He has a tendency to attribute his
personal achievements, such as taking a widely admired photograph, to a supernatural
element: a force beyond himself. His description of his writing process is illustrative of
this.
Res: Tell me what the process is inside your head and your body as you’re sitting at your
computer and you’re typing words … [are words] an obstacle of some kind that you’ve to
get past … or does it just flow out and you worry about it later?
C: No, once I get … that first line, the first paragraph that I want for an article, bang!
That’s it, I’m on to it and I don’t worry about the spelling. …
Res: … is the language just there and flowing or are you seeing pictures of the words?
C: No, it’s just flowing … it’s this stream of eloquence [that] just comes along. It’s like
when I worked on a book … based on a true story about a guy who was adrift on the
icebergs for a few years, and it was almost in places like automatic writing cause I
would write something that I had absolutely no knowledge at all of and I’d think, ‘Shit’,
and this is in the days before the internet, I’d think, ‘Ooh, better go down to the library
and find out if that’s true,’ and I would and it would take me half a day to find out
something I’d written like that was actually true. I’d say, ‘Oh, OK. That is true. Good.’
(Interview) [emphasis added]

The phrase ‘almost … like automatic writing’ is an example of Colin’s tendency to
ascribe his knowledge to the supernatural. To him, he is drawing upon knowledge he is
unaware of and it is as if it comes from outside himself. Because he is not aware of
consciously thinking or learning and, at school, could not describe his learning
processes, he was accused of being lazy and a ‘shonk’.
C: I’m really not aware of thinking, ‘Now, if I get a spirit level and do that to that, that’s
gonna make that.’ … I really cannot explain it but it’s sort of like, ‘Well, if yellow and
red make orange, then those two wires connect into that and that should work.’ That’s
kinda how my brain works …
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Res: So you’re getting the answer without actually having the working out.
C: Yeah! That’s what I always got failed at exams at school on! I could get the answers
but I could never show the working out, so they’d fail me. That’s exactly right.
Res: Accused of cheating?
C: No, never! Accused of being lazy … being a shonk! (Interview)

Colin’s attempt to explain his thinking process, while doing a creative manual task,
employed the metaphor of mixing colours, and is reminiscent of JS’s formulaic
approach to memory (Section 5.6.1). The formulaic utterance above (‘if yellow and red
make orange, then…’) is the closest Colin came to articulating any kind of conscious
awareness of his thinking or learning processes.
It might be argued from the statement, ‘I actually get the feeling that I have never had a
conscious thought in my life’ (Interview), that Colin simply lacks the vocabulary to
describe his thinking or that he is unable to employ metacognitive vocabulary
accurately. However, his ‘stream of eloquence’ demonstrates that he commands
considerable vocabulary and he can, in his writing, frame his own perspective for an
audience (for an example, see Section 6.7.1). The problem appears not to be lack of
vocabulary but one of accurately matching the vocabulary to the mental experience: he
clearly does have conscious thoughts but does not equate them with learning or
creativity. Rather than lacking the vocabulary to articulate his mental experiences, it
may be knowledge of the mental experience that is lacking, which is an instance of a
‘theory of own mind’ problem: therefore, his perception is that he has never had to
consciously learn anything. Not knowing the knowledge that is in his own mind, Colin
looks to external explanations. Attribution is a function of source memory, which is part
of the episodic memory system. If this interpretation is accurate, it lends weight to the
notion of Colin’s greater reliance upon implicit (non-declarative) thinking and memory
processes rather than explicit (declarative).

6.5

Cognitive profile: Processing style

Wendy noted that Colin’s mind is very quick, ‘jam-packed full of facts’ (Interview), and
she used the term ‘self-directed learning’ to describe the only method by which he
learns. She described him as a ‘high-level thinker’ but this appears to refer to the
rapidity of his thought processes combined with minimal reflective thinking rather than
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strong abstract reasoning and a top-down processing approach. Without conscious
reflection on Colin’s part, the cognitive phenomenon being described is a bottom-up
approach, unencumbered by abstract reasoning and mental schemas: of being
completely ‘in the moment’. Indeed, it is postulated that knowledge of mental schemas
constitutes ‘the crap’ of Colin’s narrative. The phenomenon being described by Colin is
therefore most likely to be ‘raw’, enhanced perception and strong procedural memory,
fortified by robust priming (Baddeley, 1994), with minimal top-down modulation from
semantic and episodic processing. If this is the case, Colin is reliant upon implicit
processing and memory systems with very little explicit processing. His learning is
chiefly procedural and perceptual; non-declarative rather than declarative. He doesn’t
use words to process or learn but he is able to construct knowledge through writing and
creation of artistic works. His learning is implicit, therefore his learning processes are
opaque to him.
Colin is a highly verbal person in his output, spoken and written, but is most likely not a
verbal thinker. He thinks in pictures and has been fascinated by shapes, patterns and
light since he was very young. Colin’s enhanced perceptual functioning is accompanied
by sensory sensitivities, particularly visual: for example, the inability to tolerate
fluorescent light at 50 hz. This makes it difficult for him to go to shopping centres
because he ‘can see the flicker like a strobe light’ (Email). He also wrote that he can
‘detect the slightest movement, especially in my peripheral vision’ (Email). The
cognitive profile he presents stands in contrast to Kahla’s and Rhoda’s, who both
described thinking processes characteristic of enhanced perceptual processing with
superior semantic memory. Colin’s cognitive profile has characteristics of enhanced
perceptual processing with possibly diminished semantic characteristics. As a visual
thinker, it is most likely that he is translating from visual representation to and from
language when he speaks and writes. His speech, while being rapid and forceful,
contained many hesitations and repetitions, and shows evidence of deictic shifting
problems, indicated by pronoun reversal or misuse (Mizuno, et al., 2011; Perkins, et al.,
2006). His monologues were marked by associated ideas, moving in a linear fashion,
from one topic to another without reference to the original topic.
Externally oriented thinking characteristics are subtly evident in Colin’s narrative in
contrast to their more obvious presence in the narratives of Kahla and Rhoda. Colin
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explained that meaning for him is associated with passion and ‘being in the moment’,
rather than being invested in objects. However, the artefacts he produces are very
meaningful to him as external representations of the memory of producing them: the
artistic beauty of the artefact, which is so important to an audience, appears to be less
important to Colin than the artefact as a ‘holder’ of the memory of its moment of
creation. This shift of emphasis from Kahla’s and Rhoda’s profile is consistent with
greater reliance on the implicit processes associated with raw experience (perceptual
functioning) and less reliance on semantic-style mental representation.

6.6

Cognitive profile: Memory

A really interesting feature of Colin’s account was the assertion that he has some kind
of ‘psychic thing’, which allows him to know in advance that a photo opportunity is
about to take place: it is to this ‘psychic’ ability that he attributes his success as a
wildlife photographer. Colin described this phenomenon in a number of different ways.
He used the term ‘synchronicity’, which is drawn from a literary reference to the
‘Chapel Perilous’ from Wagner’s opera ‘Parsifal’ based upon the Holy Grail quest:
these references imply supernatural assistance to accomplish an epic quest. The notion
of psychic ability or supernatural intervention extends beyond Colin’s creativity into
other areas of his life.
C: … the psychic thing, I’d just get a feeling sometimes that something’s happened, or
something’s gonna happen, and pretty much it does. But I can’t explain to you what that
is. (Interview)

During a correspondence with the researcher discussing the nature of his visual thinking,
Colin accepted the idea that he is a pattern thinker (in Temple Grandin’s terms) and
used the word ‘serendipity’ in a similar way to ‘synchronicity’ and ‘psychic’.
C: … when I’m photographing, I start to see shapes and patterns that others don’t see
until I show them the photo later. They might only be small things but they add up in a
visual way that lends power or emphasis to a shot. It all makes sense visually to me. I’ll
send you a couple of examples where this has happened and as usual, quite
spontaneously. I think for an Aspie like me my favourite word has to be Serendipity.
(Email)

As a gifted photographer, the art of capturing great images is served by the rapid
evaluation and extraordinary visual acuity of Colin’s quick mind, which he attributes to
being ‘psychic’. Within the Human Learning and Memory Systems framework, this
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‘psychic’ phenomenon could be interpreted as evidence of a deficit in source memory
and theory of mind, thus creating attribution problems. Source memory, a function of
the episodic memory system, encodes emotion, location and subjective time of
personally experienced events. There are indications of deictic shifting problems in
Colin’s narrative and, given the assumption that he is not actually psychic, there may be
temporal shifting problems as well. If this is the case, it would mean that Colin would
have difficulty assigning correct temporal attribution for the knowledge of a
recalled event: that is, does his knowledge of an event become explicit before or after
the event? The ‘psychic’ phenomenon becomes subject to explanation when considered
alongside: high self-efficacy beliefs in his capacity to capture excellent images;
enhanced perceptual and procedural memory, which allow Colin to perceive and
respond to patterns and shapes, without conscious thought, that others cannot; and,
temporal misattribution of the knowledge of an event. This would indicate diminished
source memory coupled with enhanced function of implicit memory systems. However,
mitigating against this explanation is Wendy’s conviction that Colin has genuine
psychic ability.
Wendy confirmed that Colin has excellent rote memory, which is in line with Kahla’s
and Rhoda’s memory profiles. ‘Once you tell him something he remembers everything
… incredible memory’ (Interview), indicating an active semantic memory system with
the concrete-thinking characteristics previously discussed.
W: It is jam-packed full of facts, full of self-taught knowledge, it’s full of a lot of
stereotypes, he’s pretty black and white in his thinking. I can see his mind’s thinking all
the time and he’s very quick with a response … (Interview)

Colin also referred to his memory in terms that indicate strong rote memory.
C: Now what bothers me is how can I learn something as complex as [a complicated
song] and remember it note for note? Once learnt, I never seem to forget a song. I also
know about 230 songs I can play by heart … yet I can’t spell to save my life. (Email)

One recalled memory in Colin’s narrative has episodic characteristics but memories of
this nature are fleeting. The recovery of this memory appears to be an unfamiliar
experience for him and was triggered by smell and touch.
C: … what I can get sometimes, I had it the other day in the garden, I walked out there
and there was just a puff of breeze that was warm … and instead of being a cold wind it
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was this hot wind coming in from the west. There was a certain moment where it brushed
up against me and it took me right back to Christmas Day 1965 in the driveway of my
house in Woodland St B— [suburb name] talking to Mrs G— and it was like everything
suddenly went BOOM! I thought, ‘Where the hell did that come from?’ And it was just
so vivid. I’ve had it other times too when I’ve smelt something. I’ve caught a whiff of
something and it’s taken me right back somewhere completely all-encasing. … it’s really
hard to explain, I might just be like we are in this situation now and suddenly a memory
will go clunk [makes noise] out of left field and I’ll go, ‘Oh shit! I just remembered
something,’ that I thought I’d completely forgotten all about and it’s like something’s
fallen out of one of the folders in my brain and just gone, ‘Oops sorry,’ and before I can
really grab hold of it something comes along and goes whoosh [makes sound like
‘ssvfit!’] and scoops it back up and I go, ‘Hang on! I was trying to remember that.’
(Interview)

There is a sense of discomfort, even alarm, associated with this kind of instantaneous
memory recovery. Colin appears to be describing a rare experience of autonoetic
awareness (mental time travel), which, for him, is very disconcerting.

6.7

Philosophical questions

In Colin’s narrative, the theme of identity dominates. Lincoln and Guba’s (2013)
philosophical questions were applied to the issue of identity to frame the following
associations: ontological—the reality of self, epistemological—knowledge of self,
methodological—‘How do I find or experience my self?’, axiological—the value of the
self; and provided the framework for a deeper-level consideration of Colin’s data. At
this point, the same framework was then applied to the other cases in this research. The
philosophical questions for this case are described and discussed under the following
headings, which were suggested by the data: creativity and giftedness; animals; fictional
characters and fantasy; ‘I have always felt like a fraud’; knowledge and the knower; and,
values.
6.7.1

Creativity and giftedness: The antidote to alienation

With the photographic artefacts he discussed and shared, Colin placed higher value on
the experience of taking a photo than the resulting product, but the photo is most likely
a key to recovering the memory of the experience. He described one of his wildlife
encounters in a magazine article, accompanied by a photo.
C: You’re in a Zen-like zone, focused in more ways than one. That is, until some thing or
someone reminds you you’re about to die a needlessly horrible death. (Draft article, written
and photographed by the participant, in an unidentified wildlife magazine)
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Figure 6.2 Photo accompanying the draft of a wildlife magazine article about a
face-to-face encounter with water buffalo in a remote part of the
Northern Territory of Australia. Reproduced by kind permission of ‘Colin’

For the purposes of this research, Colin’s use of the term ‘zen’ is equated with
Csikszentmihayli’s concept of ‘flow’ (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990; Nakamura &
Csikszentmihalyi, 2005).
A person in flow is completely focused. There is no space in consciousness for distracting
thoughts, irrelevant feelings … Self-consciousness disappears, yet one feels stronger than
usual. The sense of time is distorted; hours seem to pass by in minutes. When a person’s
entire being is stretched in the full functioning of body and mind, whatever one does
becomes worth doing for its own sake. (Csikszentmihalyi, 1996, p. 71, cited in Vialle,
Lysaght & Verenikina, 2005a, p. 217)

The ‘disappearing self-consciousness’ (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990, p. 71) of the state of
flow, while pleasurable for all individuals, echoes Colin’s general lack, or rejection, of
explicit self-conscious awareness, so it is perhaps then that Colin’s sense of his self is
strongest. Colin indicated that this state is at the heart of his creativity: he actively
pursues such experiences in his wildlife photography and understands his giftedness in
its light. A wildlife photographer’s conscious, effortful calculation of lighting
requirements for a photo would be considered ‘crap’ in Colin’s terms, when, for him,
this is a matter of ‘zen’. Other words he utilised to expand on this idea were ‘serendipity’
and ‘synchronicity’, meaning that he doesn’t consciously think about when to press the
camera shutter, his body just seems to know. This photo of a nesting osprey in Western
Australia was the focus of a discussion about ‘being in the moment’.
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Figure 6.3 Nesting osprey. Reproduced by kind permission of ‘Colin’

The researcher queried how he was able to capture the osprey at a moment when its
silhouette, rotated 90° clockwise, was mirrored in the cloud formation above it.
C: When I was in Broome last time I got these great shots of osprey and there’s only two
breeding pair left in England and there’s not many left in Australia. Every time we go
down the South Coast or anywhere on the coast I always see eagles and I always get to
photograph them and the other day there were whales leaping out of the water and I was
getting lots of shots of that. So it’s, I don’t know, it’s this thing.
Res: Is that what you mean by ‘synchronicity’?
C: Yeah. I just happen to be in the right place at the right time. Bang! (snaps fingers)
There they are for me and that is always a great thing … I’ll say to myself, ‘Gee, I hope I
see such and such,’ and within half an hour or so, [I do]. Like, here’s a classic, I was at
Little Garie Beach about a month ago or a little bit longer, and I was taking some great
shots and I suddenly got the feeling I was being watched and I turned around and there
was this gorgeous and rather rare large black swamp wallaby. Never seen one. It looked
like a kangaroo that was wearing a fur coat, they are gorgeous. … And so the two of us
just sat there for about 15 mins and just had this non-verbal interaction which was lovely
and it let me take lots of pictures … I love those moments where they are not scared of
me and I’m not doing anything to make them scared. I’m never [more] at my happiest
than when I’m at that moment. It’s just a wonderful feeling, cause it’s not about who I am
or what I do or what my socio-economic grouping is it’s, ‘OK, I’ll accept you if you
accept me.’ (Interview)

There are clear elements of identity and belonging in Colin’s description of his wildlife
encounters. As with Kahla and her animal encounters, Colin experiences unconditional
acceptance and belonging in such moments, while with people he may be the object of
jealousy for the ease with which he produces such high-in-demand images.
W: … one [of his photographic mates] admitted how jealous he was of him, but Colin
doesn’t have a jealous bone in his body and he could never understand why people were a

199

bit narky towards him. He thought it was because he had Aspergers … but they would
say, ‘No, it was because you were just so amazing, your lighting.’ (Interview)

Professional jealousy aside, Colin’s implicit knowledge ideally equips him to take
photos that require split-second timing. Consciously, he is simply prepared and waiting.
Then, when the moment is right, his finger presses the shutter as though acting by itself.
C: … in motion picture you’ve got 25 frames a second to capture a moment. In
photography you’ve got 125th of a second to capture the moment or less. You’ve got to
sum up an entire emotional attitude, everything there is about that photograph that makes
it work, in a split second, and as I used to say to myself, ‘If I see it, I’ve missed it,’
because that means that the [SLR camera’s] mirror wasn’t up out of the way. … but I’ve
never had to say to myself, ‘Get in the moment,’ I’ve always been in the moment which
is why I think that I’ve never really had a conscious thought. I mean I’ve had conscious
thoughts like, ‘I’m hungry, I’ll make lunch,’ but I’m talking more about [creativity].
(Interview)

Colin’s creative genius appears to be heavily reliant on implicit processing with very
little conscious thought. This cognitive profile gives him a speed and perceptual
advantage that results in world-class wildlife shots. Although he also has done studio
photography, he is extremely passionate about wildlife photography and his encounters
with wild animals, which endow him with a sense of unconditional acceptance and
belonging.
6.7.2

Animals: A path to acceptance and belonging

Colin experiences a sense of peace and self-acceptance through contact with animals
that is otherwise elusive. His encounters with wildlife in the course of his photography
are deeply meaningful to him. Domestic animals also provide a stabilising influence and
play a key role in Colin’s life in providing a sense of unconditional acceptance that
assists with emotion regulation and social anxiety.
C: … [we] went to a friend’s wedding not that long ago, last time we went out anywhere
big and, as soon as we got there, I sat in the car and literally said, ‘I don’t want to go in. I
don’t want to go in. I don’t want to go in. I really don’t want to be here.’ And so we sort
of wandered over and there was a few drinks going on and so forth and I saw a horse in a
field so I immediately made a bee line for the fence and the horse came over and I stood
there with the horse for about 5-10 minutes and the horse just calmed me down, then I
was fine. I just needed something that I could interact with that was going to be nonthreatening and I always find an animal is that ground for me. (Interview)
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The couple has had two pet dogs that have played an important role in Colin’s life,
giving him unconditional acceptance. The death of one of the dogs was an abrupt and
traumatic experience. Wendy recounted the impact of ‘Skye’ upon Colin.
W: He still will cry about beautiful Skye. …she gave him unconditional love so that’s
what he really leans towards. (Interview)

Whereas many individuals love their pets, Colin and Wendy’s dogs seem to play a more
pivotal role in Colin’s life, being a primary means to experience a sense of personal
acceptance and belonging.
6.7.3

Fictional characters and fantasy

During the interview, Colin spoke about a number of fictional characters he identified
with, the first being the film character ‘Walter Mitty’ (McLeod, 1947; Stiller, 2013). He
explained that, in the past, he relied upon fantasy for identity and social cues, and
experienced a blurring of reality and fantasy, in the absence of a securely developing
identity.
C: I thought, ‘Well hang on. All these psychologists I’ve been to see can’t work out
what’s wrong with me so there’s got to be something pretty serious here.’ And I used to
sometimes think, ‘What am I? Am I schizophrenic? What am I?’ My father used to call
me a ‘Walter Mitty’ … [There was] also … a film called ‘Billy Liar’, which is basically
the way I used to deal … with a lot of my internal problems as a kid, the loneliness and
all the problems I had, place myself in fantastic situations. … In a perfect world where
I’m in control. … I’ve been doing that since I was five, going off in my own world.
(Interview)
C: I was, and still am, a Walter Mitty kind of character. It was, is, and will always be, the
perfect antidote to stressful or uncomfortable situations. It’s such a relief to be able to just
nip off down the yellow brick road of my imagination into a fantasy world where I am the
one in control. Being able to escape inside my head without any outward signs to those
around me that I had racked off was one of the best tricks I ever developed. I was the
ultimate day dreamer. Classic dissociative child stuff. I was just protecting myself from
my all-too-often awkward relationship with this odd little world we call Planet Earth.
(Email)

In addition to fictional characters, Colin indicated that he employed radio and films for
social scripts for events, in lieu of role models.
C: … ideal situations that I’ve seen in films … because of the way my life was structured,
I didn’t have role models outside of my mum and dad. My dad wasn’t a particularly good
role model and mum was a nice lady, she was not really that bright but she was good. So
my role models became Saturday at the movies. I could escape into that world … I didn’t
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have television as a kid. I only had radio so I was a great mimic. I could mimic, I can still
do it today, I can mimic all sorts of things that I want. (Interview)

Colin’s account was peppered with references to fictional characters that he used to
illustrate a point about himself: for example, ‘Zaphod Beeblebrox’, a character from
Douglas Adam’s Hitch Hiker’s Guide to the Galaxy (Adams, D., 1979) series.
C: I think that [Douglas Adam’s] definition of Zaphod Beeblebrox, the guy with two
heads (snaps fingers), perfect Asperger, you know, the logical and the irrational. Having
two heads is perfect: pop one up, put one down.
Res: [But] the irresolvable conflicts internally that sets up…
C: Absolutely. (Interview)

‘Marvin, the depressed robot’, was also mentioned, quoting the line, ‘I get a migraine
thinking down to your level’. Colin not only identifies with the characters, but also with
the author, Douglas Adams: his humorous ideas and eccentricities. Writer and comedian
Spike Milligan was also mentioned in this context and there was discussion about the
eccentricities of these men as his ‘heroes’, their lives and creativity. Indeed, a major
strand in Colin’s account was the ‘hero narrative’, particularly through references to:
Parsifal and the Chapel Perilous; and, Joseph Campbell and his book The Hero with a
Thousand Faces (1949), reportedly used by film-maker George Lucas (Lucas, 1977) as
the ‘blueprint for all of Star Wars, classic Greek tragedy’ (Interview). Colin perceives
his life in similar terms as being on a creative quest or epic journey, facing
overwhelming challenges, with the struggle to find meaning and purpose in suffering
without knowing the ultimate end of the journey; whether tragic or triumphant.
6.7.4

‘I have always felt like a fraud’

Shortly after beginning to date Wendy, he announced to her that ‘I’ve got the
characteristics of a serial killer’, and now appreciates that this was not an appropriate
way to describe himself to a new girlfriend. Even into his adulthood, he felt that he was
a ‘fraud’ or a ‘freak’: a fraud because he seemed to be able to effortlessly do that which
took others years to master and a freak because he felt so different to others. The impact
upon his identity can be seen in the following quote, which describes a time in his
thirties when he had a breakdown in the middle of a photographic shoot and abruptly
left for Bali.
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C: When I got back to Sydney, I shut the studio down, sold everything off and put myself
in the care of a psychologist for a few months and tried to rebuild myself as I wanted to
be, not as everyone else wanted me to be. The whole time I was running my studio and
having to sell, sell, sell, I felt I was living a terrible lie – that I was a fraud. I have always
felt like a fraud, simply because I seem to be able to do things effortlessly that most
people say takes years to learn. I never asked to be creative and I sometimes wish I
wasn’t. Life would be so much simpler and perhaps a happier experience if I wasn’t so
driven by this bloody Asp[ie] [AS] demon. (Email)

In later adulthood, Colin appears to have adopted more positive role models that have
aided him in his professional and personal life. He identified himself with Bert Stern,
‘the great America photographer’ and also with a well-known member of the Australian
entertainment industry, who mentored him and whom he described as a ‘substitute
father’.
6.7.5

Knowledge and the knower

Colin stated, ‘I don’t know how to paint … I don’t know how to do it’ (Interview). He
claimed that writing a book was like ‘automatic writing’ as he was writing details he
‘didn’t know’, which turned out to be accurate when he checked the facts in a library.
Colin’s cognitive profile of greater reliance upon procedural and perceptual memory,
with reduced reliance on semantic and episodic memory, assists with understanding his
beliefs regarding supernatural elements being involved in his creativity. He may not be
able to attribute his own semantic knowledge due to reduced awareness of his own
mental states and tends to attribute his accomplishments, at least in part, to a spiritual
dimension external to himself. His use of terms such as ‘psychic’ and ‘synchronicity’,
and allusions to ‘entering the Chapel Perilous’, are the evidence for this interpretation.
This tendency to ascribe inspiration to supernatural intervention aligns with the notion
of externally oriented thinking in autism (Section 4.8.5).
In terms of Tulving’s memory systems approach, Colin appears to be describing strong
reliance on implicit memory systems including the function of priming (Baddeley,
1994; Poirier & Martin, 2008), resulting in knowledge whose origins are opaque to him,
which may also involve temporal misattribution (that is, did the knowledge of an event
come before, or after, the event?). Feedback from others about the genius of his work,
combined with low self-esteem and a distinctive memory profile, may be the
contributing factors that have led him to believe there is some form of supernatural
intervention that confers upon him the fantastic images he produces. Colin’s narrative
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invites speculation as to whether his experience reveals the nature of genius: does the
extraordinary operation of implicit memory-processing constitute genius of a certain
kind, unencumbered by top-down mental processes? There is some research evidence
on savantism that lends weight to the view that it does (Mottron, et al., 2006).
Colin’s view of the nature of knowledge is, inevitably, skewed by his beliefs based on
his own experience. It follows that implicit knowledge and skills, in combination with
reduced explicit understanding, will instill a distinctive view of the nature of knowledge.
Knowledge and skills that he possesses, he is inclined to attribute, at least in part, to an
external source, rather than to an explicit learning process. For some, ‘inspiration’ may
be a more satisfactory term than ‘supernatural’ for the process he described: however,
Colin resolves his epistemic uncertainty by external attribution to the supernatural.
6.7.6

Values

Colin has a strong sense of what he values and despises: that which is despised is
labelled ‘crap’; that which is valuable is associated with passion, ‘flow’, and meaningmaking. To him, the production of creative artefacts (photographic images, artworks,
music performances) is ‘authentic’ if produced in a state of flow; inauthentic if
produced in a state of conscious self-reflection or by following a formula. Authenticity
is associated with a lack of explicit reflection apart from a consideration of that which is
true and beautiful.
C: Now there’s a funny sense of security when you’re looking at the world through a
camera lens. There’s no sense of fear, no sense of impending danger, nothing, just the shot
you’re trying for no matter how foolhardy. (Undated draft of wildlife magazine article by
Colin)

Being a photographer is associated with a sense of destiny: ‘I think I was always
destined to be a photographer’ (Email); and, in finding meaning through the passion of
producing images and writing that others also find meaningful, Colin has learnt to build
a sense of identity and meaning in his life.
Colin’s core belief statement is ‘if you follow your bliss, all else follows’ (Interview),
meaning that to follow one’s passion is, in his view, the highest expression of humanity.
For Colin, passion and meaning-making are inseparable. This is the major insight he
offered into his giftedness and the understanding he draws upon for his identity. Passion
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is, for him, associated with a lack of conscious reflection, with tasks accomplished by
‘being in the moment’ rather than through consciously acquired learning.

6.8

Conclusion

Colin’s case represents an educational paradox: a published author who has profound
spelling and reading difficulties but produces highly valued written manuscripts. While
sharing general cognitive characteristics with Kahla and Rhoda, he presents a slightly
different cognitive profile: in Colin’s case, during learning and creative production,
there appears to be minimal explicit processing and memory. There is increased reliance
on implicit, bottom-up, holistic processing of extraordinarily enhanced perceptual and
procedural processing. Verbal explanations and top-down understanding for learning
purposes tended to be discounted, whereas being ‘in the moment’ is valued. The
tendency to ascribe his abilities to supernatural intervention could be the outcome of
temporal misattribution of knowledge of events and poor theory of own mind capacity,
although it is difficult to account for Colin’s partner’s reinforcement of the notion of his
psychic ability. This implicit profile of holistic processing and memory could be
described as ‘presemantic’ (Markowitsch & Staniloiu, 2011; Schacter & Tulving, 1994),
as it does not rely on symbolic representation or explicit memory of personal experience
and stands in contrast to the cognitive profile of Kahla and Rhoda, whose memory and
learning profile, as described by themselves, relied heavily on semantic-style explicit
thinking (although, their narratives also indicated enhanced perceptual functioning).
However, it should be noted that Colin’s key informant highlighted his prodigious rote
memory, indicating strong semantic processes, which, combined with probable poor
theory of own mind and source memory for attribution, illuminates his account of his
memory and learning. Colin’s narrative indicates serious disruption to the formation of
his identity during his childhood and adolescence that continued into adulthood,
however, in his fifties, he has been able to formulate a stronger identity narrative on the
basis of his diagnosis of AS.
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Chapter 7 Case 4 ‘Nadia’
Nadia is a young woman who was 18 years old at the time of the interview. She was
still attending school and was studying a half load of subjects for the high school
leaving qualification (the New South Wales Higher School Certificate, known as the
‘HSC’); her final year of high school was conducted over two years with three subjects
being studied each year, instead of six over one year. Nadia was accompanied to the
interview by her mother, Lydia, who had proposed their participation in the research via
a personal contact, although the researcher had not met either woman previously.
Nadia’s case is of interest because of her proximity to her school experience, unlike the
other four cases, where memories of their school experience were moderated by the
long time period since.
The two interviews were conducted on a single occasion at the researcher’s home. Each
interviewee elected to wait in another part of the house during the other’s interview but
there was some checking of facts and discussion between interviews. As with the other
interviews, these interviews were recorded and transcribed, with the data being coded in
NVivo.
The key informant, Lydia, indicated that Nadia has two siblings, both of whom are
some years older. The second sibling is a young adult male, whom Lydia described as
being almost non-verbal during childhood and intensely shy and withdrawn. In
hindsight, she feels he would have qualified for a diagnosis of ASD. While Lydia
described his current progress as a successful electrical apprentice, there were, as she
recounted, clear, pervasive autistic traits evident throughout his childhood. As a young
adult, he had found satisfaction in working on lifts (elevators) in high-rise buildings but,
having mastered this field towards the end of his apprenticeship, he was looking for
new challenges and considering an electrical engineering degree. As for each of the
other four cases in this doctoral study, indications of the broader family phenotype are
apparent in Nadia’s case.
One thing that was clear from both Lydia’s and Nadia’s accounts is the extensive and
successful advocacy by Lydia and her husband in realistically addressing Nadia’s social,
communication and educational needs, perhaps based on their negative prior experience
with Nadia’s older sibling. Nadia’s case appears to demonstrate the value of expert,
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prolonged, targeted interventions and successful advocacy. She was diagnosed with AS
at the age of twelve after an extensive period of bullying and disruption to her primary
schooling. Since that time, she received regular social skills training, emotion
management coaching, and school accommodations. The social skills training and
emotion management coaching were provided by a practice of psychologists who
specialise in AS: in fact, it transpired that it was the same group that provided Kahla’s
coaching.

7.1

School experience

Following her difficult experiences in upper primary school that led to her diagnosis of
AS, Nadia attended a Catholic girls’ high school catering for Years 7 to 10 and then,
along with her cohort, transferred to a co-educational senior high school at another
campus. Lydia indicated that the support and accommodations received at the school
from Years 7 to 10 were outstanding, with the school arranging for Nadia’s teachers’
attendance at training sessions each year, provided by Nadia’s psychologists. This
training was tailored to professional development of teachers so they could provide an
educational environment that would support Nadia’s learning and development and
indicates a high level of commitment by the school to cater for Nadia as an individual.
The senior high school was viewed by her mother as not being as proactively supportive
of Nadia as the junior high school, however, Nadia continued to receive extensive
accommodations for learning and assessment that enhanced her participation and
contribution to the school.
An example of the strategies employed, as designed by the psychologist in consultation
with Nadia and her teachers to assist with stress and emotion management in class, was
a green piece of cardboard (green as a representation for ‘go’ as in traffic lights) that she
could hold up momentarily to the teacher, which then entitled her to leave without
further talking. This strategy was utilised to address Nadia’s history of meltdowns in the
classroom, which had occurred due to her rising frustration at not being able to
understand the teacher’s expectations or instructions. The goal was to facilitate Nadia’s
implementation of self-calming techniques before she had a meltdown: the school
allowed her to leave the room and spend time outside or in the quiet space of the library
until she was able to self-regulate her emotional state. This strategy first required Nadia
to be taught painstakingly how to recognise and respond to her own emotional states.
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Nadia reported that, as time progressed, she had decreasing need to resort to this green
card strategy.
When she was younger, Nadia reported that she coped with the stress of being at school
by constant reading. Every opportunity was employed in reading and this minimised the
requirement to interact socially with her peers. In more recent times, Nadia has actively
cultivated a social group of other students whom she considers ‘outsiders’.
N: … I went around and grabbed all the ‘oddities’ and put them together and we made
this huge group.
Res: How many people in that group?
N: There’s about 13.
Res: All at school or in other places?
N: That’s my school group … Most of my out-of-school friends are neurotypical because
they were from before this school but these friends, a lot of them are odd, oddities, weird,
different, slightly abnormal and we have a saying that we’re the normal ones and nobody
else is. Because we understand each other and nobody else does. And it’s fun because
we’ll do something that we understand is acceptable for our group and everybody will be
like, ‘What the…?’ (Interview)

She now finds social acceptance with her ‘tribe’ and does not appear to be troubled by
the necessity of moving between year cohorts for different subjects as she undertakes
her alternative study pathway. The school has apparently been successful in
engendering a culture of acceptance among the students as well as the staff.
N: … All the teachers are very observant. They will understand and accept that I am not
going to be neurotypical, I’m going to be different and it’s going to be a bit harder on me
and it’s a very good school because they all understand and accept it. … Yeah, even the
students, once it’s explained to them, even they understand and sometimes point out to
me [when] I’m getting stressed. Last year when I was doing English, I used to sit next to
a girl and I got stressed at one point and she goes, ‘Nadia, use your green slip,’ and I’m
like, ‘Right, thanks,’ got up and went out. She stopped me from having a major meltdown
at that point. (Interview)

Nadia and Lydia both indicated high levels of satisfaction with the support they
received from the school and expressed that the overwhelming majority of teachers
were understanding and supportive. However, there were two instances recounted
where Nadia found it difficult to learn: the first was with a teacher who had a heavy
accent. Nadia finds it demanding to interpret what her teachers are saying and, in one
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class, this process was made even more complex by the teacher’s accent. Nadia lacked
the capacity to adapt and ‘went from being an A student to being a D student’ (Lydia:
interview). The second instance was when the class had a particular substitute teacher.
Lydia felt that the teacher was very rigid and did not believe that Nadia had a disability,
or that she should receive accommodations. The school responded by ensuring that that
particular teacher was assigned to other classes.
L: But [the school leaders] were fantastic … they really tried to work to find teachers that
she got on well with and that she had a bonding with and they kept giving her the same
teachers after that. (Interview)

Despite overall happiness with the level of understanding and accommodations Nadia
was receiving, Lydia indicated her frustration with teachers who do not understand the
communication problems that are an element of AS.
L: She has such a hard time sometimes understanding the little bits in between what a
person’s saying, that it really has a massive impact on how she’s learning. … If the
homework or the assignment isn’t specific in what it wants, and I mean 100% specific,
she’ll go off on a tangent that has nothing to really do with what they want in the end.
And she gets so angry and frustrated because they didn’t write exactly what they wanted.
(Interview)

Lydia’s statement, ‘She has such a hard time … understanding the little bits in between
what a person’s saying’ is a reference to sub-text in the teachers’ verbal (written and
oral) instructions. Such things as meaning derived from: previously established
expectations; prior knowledge; and, gestures; those elements of language that enhance
meaning, where such meaning is not communicated via words. Lydia stressed that the
wording of assignments, text displayed during lessons and the teacher’s verbal
instructions, should all take into account Nadia’s need for literal, direct language and
explicit explanation of ideas. Teachers being aware, or not aware, of the nature of the
communication issues inherent in AS is a critical component of a successful learning
environment for Nadia.
Nadia receives assessment accommodations for formal examinations; extra time and a
room by herself with a supervisor. She was diagnosed with dyspraxia, which, for the
purposes of this study, is understood to be canvassed in the autism literature as
‘proprioceptive’ problems (Francis, 2005; Kushki, Chau & Anagnostou, 2011; Paton, et
al., 2012), and sometimes struggles with the cognitive and physical tasks of writing
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under time pressure, so her teachers have, where appropriate, allowed her to
demonstrate her learning by doing viva voce assessment tasks instead of in-class written
assessments.
N: Sometimes, like recently, I haven’t been able to write it down. I can’t get the
information from my brain to my hand. So I sat down with the teacher and they’ve
recorded it and I’ve answered the question verbally. (Interview)

Facilitating alternative forms of assessment is another indication of a school that has
strongly invested in creating a learning environment that enhances Nadia’s
opportunities to learn. Nadia has been able to pursue her love of writing, drama and
fashion through her school studies: she shared with the researcher photos of fashion
outfits she had made, modelled by her friends, and a copy of the stage play she was
writing as a major work for her HSC Drama course. These artefacts show clear evidence
of a keen and questing intellect, an eccentric sense of humour, and individualistic
artistic ideas.

7.2

A sense of difference, alienation and isolation

Nadia speaks in terms that indicate a deep sense of difference and alienation.
N: [Neurotypicals are] like an alien race to me. It’s the little green men. They look
humanoid but they’re different. It’s like I was a little green man and I was on a
completely other planet and sometimes it’s still like I have green showing through.
Sometimes it’s like, ‘You [neurotypicals] are so weird,’ and it turns out it’s me being
weird.’ (Interview)

She is, however, anything but resigned, and proactively cultivates other people who are
the ‘oddities’. She tends to celebrate her differences, based on the understanding she has
gained through extensive interventions and the support of a family who value her as a
person.
N: Sometimes I feel like an alien. My friend has this book … and it says 9 [out of 10]
child[ren] will be a horrible little monster, one was abducted by aliens. And my friend
and I turned to each other and went, ‘We were abducted by aliens!’ cause we’re one of
those 10 that is completely different to everybody else. And I like to think I’m completely
and absolutely different. There is nobody else like me. And that’s a good thing because
there’s no criteria for me to live by so I can think how I want, speak how I want and I
don’t really mind now how people interact with me. Cause I know with my social training
what not to do and that’s the only thing I need to know, is what not to do. (Interview)
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Although Nadia’s utterance has an air of nonchalance, it is clear that she cares deeply
about social interaction with people she likes and her mother confirmed that this is the
case. Nadia is an example of a well-coached young adult with realistic aspirations and
hard-won social knowledge. Knowing what not to do or say in social situations has
allowed her to gain confidence. Within the framework of support provided by the
school, the psychologists and her family, she enjoys and values a measure of social
interaction, relying heavily (and apparently successfully, at least from her own
perspective) on her social training. However, her overall direction in life is still guided
by the desire for minimal social demands.
N: I guess, my ideal life would be in a library with very little interaction with the outside
world. Everybody else would rather go to ‘schoolies’ [a week-long party attended by
students after completing their HSC]. I guess, I’m just completely different. (Interview)

Excellent coaching has enabled Nadia to develop substantial social skills and enjoyment
from social interaction, however, this is compensatory, not corrective. She is strongly
aware of her differences from the ‘mainstream’ (Nadia’s term) and is proud of her
individuality.

7.3

Language

Nadia is highly verbal and had precocious language development. Lydia stated that
Nadia began to speak confidently around 9 months of age and was speaking in full,
carefully enunciated sentences at 18 months. Nadia is fluent and comfortable with
spoken language, is a voracious reader, and loves to write. During her relatively short
monologues, there were signs that she has attained a level of mental self-discipline that
overcomes any tendency toward purely associative thinking, as described by Temple
Grandin (Section 4.7.2) and demonstrated in Colin’s case (Section 6.2), where one idea
leads to the next without any reference back to the original utterance or topic. In the
following utterance about her love of dance (she has learnt to dance in many different
styles) and the role of emotion in dance, Nadia demonstrated the capacity to fluidly
maintain and elaborate the central idea of the utterance, developing her argument as she
speaks and reaching a coherent conclusion.
N: Now that I’ve learnt from [my psychologist] all these ways that people interact, how to
pinpoint an emotion that I would have accidentally thought was another, I am becoming
even more in love with dancing because I can actually feel it. Every dance is something
that I can feel and imagine. Kind of like when I read a book, I don’t see the words after
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about a page, I see images as if it’s a movie in my head. Sometimes I’ll become so
absorbed in the book that it’s all that exist[s] until I stop reading. With dance it’s similar.
Once I’m on stage, it’s the only thing that exists at that point in time. And I don’t have to
think about anything confusing about the way people are going to interpret it because
they can interpret how they want. It’s just liberating. (Laughs) (Interview)

As she appears to have developed a measure of central coherence in speech through
explicit learning, this raises the question of whether coherence learnt at such an early
stage of maturation (between the ages of twelve and eighteen in Nadia’s case) impacts
upon the neural networks that support top-down thinking: in other words, is Nadia’s
capacity to demonstrate coherence in her speech purely reflective of compensatory
learning or has it also had an influence on her neural development? Further research is
needed. On another level of meaning, this utterance is interesting for the window it
provides into Nadia’s awareness of her own mental states, attention, ‘flow’, and
awareness of other people’s perspectives.
It is difficult to posit whether Nadia is natively a verbal thinker: she certainly did not
appear to be translating between thought and speech like Colin and Rhoda; although,
like the other cases, she described her thinking in terms of pictures and movies. Her
speech during the interview appeared to act as a tool for her thinking as she constructed
ideas through passages of fluent speech.
Res: What’s the difference for you between autism and Asperger’s syndrome?
N: Autism is a brick wall where Asperger’s is a glass wall. Asperger’s you can already
see though, you can already punch through holes and sometimes fix some problems. But
with autism, it’s more so that there’re a few bricks missing but most of the wall’s there
and you need help.
Res: Is that your idea or have you heard that from someone?
N: I just made that up on the spot. (Interview)

This statement about autism and AS may represent fluid production of ideas through the
medium of speech or, alternately, it may represent an attribution problem: attributing an
idea to herself in the moment. However, Nadia’s speech gave the impression of being
constructive talk, possibly representing externalised thought-processing, while Colin’s
and Rhoda’s speech left the impression of a verbal struggle to articulate thinking, with
their speech representing the output of the struggle rather than being an intrinsic part of
the process of thinking. Perhaps Nadia is natively processing thought using a
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combination of verbal and visual processing, although no evidence from the research
literature with which to support this statement was discovered. The style of Nadia’s
speech shared more with Kahla’s than Colin’s or Rhoda’s: however, Kahla was very
specific in describing the way she thinks in visual terms so there appears to be more
evidence for visual processing in her case. Kahla’s utterances were very wellconstructed and delivered, as though rehearsed, while Nadia’s speech appeared more
spontaneous. This poses the query, worthy of further research, whether Nadia’s
compensatory learning, which began so early in her maturation, may have influenced
the development of her cognitive processing style. Other explanations are possible: for
example, heterogeneity between cases; the possible mildness of Nadia’s AS; her stage
of development; and so on.
As mentioned above, Nadia loves reading but, unlike Rhoda and Colin, she is only
interested in reading fictional literature. She reads fantasy literature, which she
consciously uses as a form of escape to help her tolerate social situations. Reading
fiction also appears to act as a way of accruing social scripts or playing out possible
social scenarios in Nadia’s imagination with her focus being ‘What if…?’
Res: What are your favourite topics for books?
N: Fantasy, sometimes with a mix of reality in it. Basically, ones that I know could never
really happen; with magic or futuristic science that probably would never really work;
medieval times which I’ve never experienced. I like to, when I read a book, become part
of a world or go to a place I’ve never experienced.
Res: Is that still for escape or is there some other attraction?
N: I guess it’s kind of escape but I don’t want to read information on a real place because
it’s happened: it’s got certain guidelines and therefore I wouldn’t be able to imagine
much different. But if I read something about the round table with King Arthur and
Merlin and magic and stuff, I can make up a million storylines in my head. … Once I’ve
read a book I want to be able to imagine situations that didn’t happen. I want to imagine a
life for these characters that never happened in the book. But if I read about King Henry
VIII, his life has already been lived. Everybody knows everything about it.
Res: It’s not going to change.
N: It’s not going to change. So how could I make that character or that person do
something that I know they probably would never have done? …
Res: So you like to ask the question ‘What if?’ for yourself?
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N: Yeah, that’s kind of my favourite question when I read a book. What if this happened,
would this character have been different? If that person never died would everything have
changed? So I like to take one thing and change it and change the whole storyline.
(Interview)

Nadia’s central focus in her reading and writing is on fictional characters and their
behaviours. This focus appears to afford her the imaginative capacity to play out
alternate behaviours and events in a safe way, providing the environment and narrative
structure that enable her to rehearse alternatives. Non-fictional accounts, for her, are too
structured and leave no room for this process.
Nadia, like Kahla and Colin, loves to write and she develops her thinking through
writing. Whereas the purpose of Colin’s writing was chiefly descriptive (wildlife
encounters, photographic techniques), Nadia’s writing appears to serve another,
distinctive purpose; that is, the study of people in order to accrue social skills that
facilitate her interaction with her environment (Section 4.8.4). The unfinished play that
Nadia was writing for her HSC Drama major work is a very revealing artefact. It is
based around three pairs of characters: one of each pair is a famous person in history,
suspected of having AS, who is contrasted with a present-day, mute, autistic-savant,
child-self version of themselves. Nadia described her characters in in the following way.
N: My script … is basically about six main characters. Three of them are based on real
lives: Einstein, Leonardo da Vinci and Beethoven. I know that Einstein was probably
autistic but I made him an Asperger character. These three characters have Asperger’s …
and I’ve put them in an Asperger context, how they interact with the world, in that setting
of their time; because they didn’t have any help, they didn’t have any diagnosis for it.
Then I’ve got three characters, … they’re younger versions and they’ve also got very
severe autism and it’s how the modern world interacts with them … To tie it together,
I’ve got the three from the past in the afterlife playing a poker game and inbetween every
few scenes, they discuss what’s going on, how it’s affected them and how it’s affecting
their younger doppelgängers, … three [autistic savant] characters. (Interview)

Having established the contrasts in temporal context and cognitive profile between the
three pairs, Nadia uses her play as a medium to work through issues of acceptance and
rejection of AS and autism.
N: There’s a mother figure and she plays a part in both times. She’s the mother of one
child, Beethoven. Beethoven and his doppelgänger version, his name’s Brian, and in the
path with Beethoven, she is very confused, disoriented. Why is my son so different?
Why? … but, with the modern version of it with this child called Brian, she’s accepted it,
she’s comfortable with it and there’s a line in my script that she declares that it is her
‘normal’ now, with this autistic child. … But there are other characters that reject the
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autism or Aspergers. There’s characters that misinterpret what’s going on, there’s some
characters that try to accept it but are only half way there. (Interview)

Nadia has written her stage play with the purpose of educating the audience about the
value of human genius, whether in the form of AS, or autistic savantism. The
conversations between the characters in the play perform the function of addressing
Nadia’s reality and exploring the question ‘What if?’ in a similar way to her explicit
purpose for reading fictional literature. This is an enlightened and intelligent utilisation
of reading and writing for social problem-solving and demonstrates Nadia’s
commitment to working proactively to achieve social competence and a sense of
belonging. There are certainly elements of enjoyment in Nadia’s discussion of her
favourite books but the task-oriented aspects of her reading and writing dominated her
account.

7.4

Learning

From Nadia’s narrative, it is apparent that, like Kahla, she proactively studies people,
even though she may be unaware of doing this. It appears that this study of people
provides her with social scripts and ways of functioning that have allowed her to
achieve success in her own terms. This is a form of learning that she is highly motivated
to undertake and, as previously described, she uses drama, dance and writing to play out
and rehearse emotional and social scenarios. Nadia has learnt compensatory strategies
that support her social and academic learning. For instance, she is poorly motivated to
learn maths and anything to do with numbers but highly motivated to learn through
language and in areas of special interest (fashion, dance). So, in lieu of executive
function processes, she employs explicitly learned rationales provided by her mother,
teachers and psychologists, in order to tolerate maths classes, where she has low
motivation to learn.
With strong semantic memory, it is easy for Nadia to learn using semantic processes
such as repetition, re-stating in different words, visual processing, and so on, and she
reported that her teachers encourage her to utilise these strategies.
Res: What would you say that you need in order to learn successfully?
N: It’s good to try different ways to approach the situation. Sometimes … repetitions
[are] needed, sometimes it’s a different way of thinking. I learn things a lot through visual
images, little doodles in the borders of my books so I can remember. Sometimes I need a
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way to remember like a rhyme. Sometimes I just learn it straight away. … Usually trying
a different approach often works and that approach can often be manipulated to other
situations.
Res: What do you mean by that?
N: During drama you learn rhymes to remember how to move a certain way … In ancient
history there was a certain war that it’s very hard for people to remember it, so my
teacher decided to create a rhyme for it and everybody remembers it. Especially
somebody like me, I can repeat it word for word. (Interview)

Nadia has been taught to vary her mental approaches to learning, which indicates that
she has formed some compensatory metacognitive strategies, including the use of
mnemonic devices. She may also have built some basic understanding about
appropriately generalising a strategy to another context (‘that approach can often be
manipulated to other situations’). If this is the case, it is indicative of some extremely
successful coaching strategies, as difficulties of generalising learning for individuals
with AS are well-established in the literature (Klinger & Dawson, 2001; Loth, Gomez &
Happé, 2011; Minshew, et al., 2002; Williams, E., 2004).
Through dance, Nadia has learnt much about emotion. The attraction of dance for her is
its structure and scripted-ness.
Res: So what do you love about dance?
N: Probably how it’s so predictable. You learn steps then somebody tells you how to do
the steps. They tell you when to do it, where to do it and all I have to do is do it.
(Interview)

The highly structured and explicit nature of dance training accommodates Nadia’s
learning needs. She had recently discovered that teaching dance is an entirely different
proposition, introducing elements of unpredictability.
N: I am now learning to teach [dance] with my sister and it’s the most confusing, scary
thing I’ve done in a few years. Because I don’t know how somebody’s going to react to
what I tell them to do. But for my whole life I’ve loved dancing especially when I’m the
one doing the moving. I love it that I can just move my body and interpret an emotion
that I used to have no clue what I was doing to. I could dance an angry dance and I knew
anger. I could dance a happy dance and I knew happiness but they would tell me a few
steps to a certain piece of music and it would be an emotion that I didn’t understand but I
still loved it because I could for a moment pretend I felt it. (Interview) [Emphasis
added]
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While acknowledging that she does not necessarily feel the emotion (see emphasis),
dance has been a medium through which Nadia has learnt to further differentiate
between emotions. Dance could be said to be an external representation, through
movement, of emotion, which has made it an ideal training ground for Nadia. It is also
likely that dance training has assisted in rehabilitating her proprioceptive problems.
Lydia’s perspective on Nadia’s learning revolved around the success or failure of
teachers provided by the school and their capacity to facilitate Nadia’s learning. Her
summation supports the merit of ‘cherry-picking’ (for the origin of this idea, see
Humphrey & Lewis, 2008) teachers for students with AS and is a partial re-statement of
the educational problem that initiated the current study.
L: We’ll find that the teachers that are really great with [Nadia] are the ones that will tell
her the way she understands it. The ones that don’t understand her at all, she struggles
with continuously because I don’t think they can talk to her on the same wavelength …
(Interview)

Nadia’s learning capacities would appear to have been greatly extended through the
intervention of explicit coaching, school accommodations and the advocacy of a family
committed to providing her with optimal outcomes. She employs many compensatory
strategies that benefit her learning and she displayed high self-efficacy beliefs in her
capacity to learn subjects in which she is interested.

7.5

Cognitive profile: Processing style

Nadia’s cognitive style is characterised by cognitive inflexibility: problems in being
able to ‘set-shift’ (Van Eylen, et al., 2011, p. 1390), or mentally ‘change gears’, in order
to get past a blockage in thinking. She provided a succinct example of this problem.
N: I often have to do my exams alone in solitary [solitude] because external annoyances
will distract me and I’ll forget. Whereas somebody [else] goes, ‘OK, I’m going to write
this,’ and then they forget something half way, they’ll go to the next part, I can’t do it. I
hit a brick wall and I’m stuck and it often results in me having a stress attack or having to
completely remove myself from the situation. (Interview)

Cognitive inflexibility in AS is subsumed under executive function in the theoretical
framework and is associated with sensory sensitivities, difficulty with filtering out
extraneous sensory information, perseveration, and distress. Explicitly learned
compensatory strategies appear to have enabled Nadia to identify her mental state, at
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least in retrospect, in this context. Examination accommodations provided by her school
were an effective means of addressing the problem with regard to timed assessments.
Nadia is hyper-verbal, with early complex language development, in contrast to her
brother, who had high tested IQ and was almost non-verbal in his early childhood.
Nadia’s use of speech as a vehicle for her thinking demonstrates strong verbal reasoning,
however, she identified herself as a picture thinker with strong visual processing.
During a discussion of books that had been turned into popular movies, such as The
Lion, the Witch and the Wardrobe (Lewis, 1950), Nadia described her processing and
her memory recall in terms of a movie that she watches and can control, as if on a DVD
player.
Res: What happens if you tell me the story [of a book you’ve read or a movie you’ve
watched] – what’s happening in your mind?
N: I remember flickers of the movie, pieces.
Res: Do you mean the real movie or the movie that was in your head when you read the
book?
N: Both, both. If it wasn’t a movie, I’d remember the movie in my head, how I imagined
it and sometimes there might be something slightly different from the book that I
remember but it’s basically the same. But if I’ve seen a movie, I often see the moving
images, the pictures, in my head, like a flashback, and it’s kind of how it works in my
brain. (Interview)

Nadia referred to imagination to describe the act of visualising a story: here,
imagination is equated with working memory. Movies she has seen in real life she
recalls as ‘flashbacks’ but she prefers to read the books first and imagine the story for
herself, even becoming incensed at what she regards as poor movie interpretations of
some of her favourite books. Although imagining the narrative of a book being played
out as a movie is not indicative of a particular visual style associated only with AS, the
indications are that Nadia’s processing style is predominantly visual, supplemented by
high verbal reasoning skills. This interpretation is supported by her ‘documentary’
(Newman, et al., 2010, p. 269) verbatim recounts of personal memories from early
childhood (Section 7.6) and many visual processing references, in the absence of
recalled memories with a ‘sense of self-involvement’ (Boucher, 2007, p. 261).
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It is difficult to be as conclusive in Nadia’s case as for the other cases as her reflections
on her own thinking were minimal and tended to be stated in terms of metaphors, actual
events, or strategies she had learnt through coaching: indicative of an externally
oriented thinking style. The same was true for Lydia’s account as she focused on
recounting events rather than offering descriptions and interpretations of Nadia’s
thinking. The participants in the other cases of this study, perhaps as a result of their
greater maturity, were able to provide more developed descriptions and interpretations
of their thinking. Nadia’s use of metaphors was descriptively rich but caution was
applied in the analysis of this case because of lack of further explanation, whereas
metaphors used by the other participants were subjected to discussion and clarification.

7.6

Cognitive profile: Memory

In line with her visual processing style, Nadia spoke about her memory using
metaphoric terms that indicated a visual memory style. The researcher reflected these
terms back to Nadia for elaborative purposes but there was only one direct reference to
the internal characteristics of her memory.
Res: Is that like pressing the recorder on the DVD player again when you do that?
N: It’s kind of like one of those old movies where there’s bits of fuzz in between, some
bits are a bit hazy and then there’s some really bright clarity pieces and that’s kinda like
how my mind is. All the boring stuff is fuzzed out but all the important facts are still clear
or only a little bit hazy. (Interview)

Anecdotally, some individuals with AS may claim that they remember every detail of
their life as if it were video-recorded and available for playback at any time. (This
assertion emerged from a presentation on memory given to a group of high-functioning
individuals with AS by the researcher in March 2013.) It is reasoned that this claim may
be the result of a form of mind-blindness where the individual is blind to their own
capacity to forget: put simply, they ‘don’t know what they don’t know’ or, with reduced
theory of mind, they cannot imagine themselves having a mental state that is different
from their current ‘knowing’ mental state. In contrast, Nadia’s statement above
encapsulates some understanding of the capacity to forget, stated in visual terms: ‘all
the boring stuff is fuzzed out’; with ‘important’ and ‘boring’ indicating salience or lack
of it.
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Lydia claimed that Nadia’s long-term memory stretches back to infancy and this was
confirmed by Nadia.
L: Memory like an elephant. She can remember when she was tiny … really little.
(Interview)

To clarify what age Lydia meant by ‘tiny’, she indicated at another point that Nadia’s
memories stretch back to when Nadia was two. Nadia’s way of recalling the early
memories is by giving verbatim recounts of what was said at the time, or by describing
other details, such as the clothes that were worn.
L: She’ll remember stuff that’s not important, … she’ll remember everyday
conversations. ‘No you didn’t, Mum. You said ‘blah, blah, blah,’’ … and specifically no
changing of the words that you said.
Res: So, verbatim.
L: Yeah, so you can’t lie and say you said something else. (Interview)

Like Kahla, the operation of childhood amnesia is significantly and atypically reduced
and Nadia’s personal memories are characterised by verbatim semantic-memory-style
recounts. Unlike Kahla, the early memories described were identified only with Nadia’s
development of speech, whereas Kahla also described memories that appear to be preverbal.
Lydia asserted that Nadia has extraordinary rote memory and Nadia’s report indicates
the explicit use of mnemonic rote memory techniques in her learning. While the use of
mnemonics is a powerful and effective learning technique highly suitable for Nadia, this
memory style has limitations that significantly affect learning: conceptual understanding
built upon facts and general knowledge committed to rote memory are, by nature,
inflexible: conceptual frameworks based on abstract reasoning are, by nature,
generalisable to other contexts (Klinger & Dawson, 2001). Reliance upon rote memory
accompanied by cognitive inflexibility poses the following pedagogical problem.
School knowledge curricula are usually enacted by building conceptual understanding
over time in ways appropriate to age and development. This means that explanations
given in Year 7 (where the students are aged twelve or thirteen), for example, on the
geography topic of ‘tidal wetlands’, will be less sophisticated than the explanations
given in Year 11 or 12 (senior high school). Rote memory characterised by cognitive
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inflexibility may cause the effect, over time, that colloquially is known as ‘the
whiteboard effect’: a metaphor for cognitive inflexibility in long-term memory in AS.
The whiteboard effect refers to the notion of permanent marker pen, which cannot be
erased, being used on a whiteboard: that is, the first version of a new idea or piece of
information that is planted and retained in the memory of an individual with AS will be
very resistant to change and development. Therefore, the development of more
sophisticated understanding over time through the curriculum may be problematic for
learners with a memory profile similar to Nadia’s. This issue is highlighted in the
following description by Lydia of a dispute with a teacher over a senior school
assignment on tidal wetlands.
L: … and [Nadia] didn’t explain the first bit [in her assignment] which a Grade 2 person
would explain what a wetland is or a sand dune was, it’s ‘sand pulled up from bleh bleh
bleh’. She didn’t do that opening little bit because it’s assumed knowledge. … and in
[the] HSC they’re just going to know that already, and then she didn’t do it, she lost
points, she got cranky. Now don’t say things you don’t mean because they are going to
remember it word for word … and like 5 years later they’ll remember it word for word.
(Interview)

At some point prior to this assignment, Nadia was told by her geography teacher about
‘assumed knowledge’ and, it seems, encouraged to move beyond basic knowledge about
tidal wetlands. She interpreted this to mean that she didn’t need to give basic definitions
in an important assignment, lost marks as a result and felt this was very unfair. The
teacher’s first explanation may have been given with the intention of helping Nadia
produce better assignments but Nadia has possibly applied this explanation to a
different context inappropriately, demonstrating the perseverative effect of cognitive
inflexibility and its impact on learning. While this is illustrated through a very specific
example in Nadia’s case, it is proposed that this same effect will impact upon learning
through the ‘spiral curriculum’ (Bakhurst & Shanker, 2001): over the years of education,
as topics are revisited with the goal of deepening understanding, earlier, simpler,
memorised explanations may be resistant to development and incorrect understanding
will be resistant to correction. The literal interpretation of teachers’ language and
explanations from past learning, faithfully remembered by rote, may cause problems in
the more complex learning contexts of senior high school and this was certainly
indicated, to some degree, in Nadia’s case. Therefore, for students like Nadia, teachers
may need to persist in gentle correction and repetition of new ideas in a way that would
be unsuitable for other students.
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7.7

Philosophical questions

Consideration of the themes within the framework of the four philosophical questions
(Lincoln & Guba, 2013) are addressed under the following headings of: identity;
knowledge and the knower; and, ‘Am I smart, or am I dumb?’
7.7.1

Identity

Nadia sees herself as different but seems to feel a sense of distinction in her difference
that might be termed ‘Aspie pride’. With her diagnosis and extensive interventions, she
expressed a sense of identity based around her perceived difference. Her narrative
contrasted her sense of rejection by ‘the mainstream’ with a sense of acceptance and
finding her ‘tribe’, which, at school, was her social group called the ‘Oddities’. The
contrast between acceptance and rejection is one of the major themes enacted in her
HSC Drama major work, the script for a stage play with three autistic characters, each
of whom has two states: a socially ‘accepted’ gifted version and a ‘rejected’ autisticsavant version. Her play, at one level, can be interpreted as a means of working through
the issues of acceptance and rejection, with the goal being to normalise difference.
Nadia’s self-narrative is evident in the following statement.
N: Sometimes, I’ll have to do something different. Sometimes, I won’t be able to do
something that other people can. Sometimes, the way something affects me won’t affect
another person. And I had to accept that, understand that, and I accepted it and
understood it really easily because I wanted a reason. I wanted a reason to understand so I
could look at how to fix it. It wasn’t exactly, like, broken, it was just cracked. [Laughs] I
had a slight crack in me that needs to be fixed but I wasn’t falling apart. I find it sad that
some people refuse to accept that they have a problem that they will never be able to
completely cure. Just because it’s a disability in one area doesn’t mean it’s horrid. …
When I found out [I had AS], I was relieved, I guess. Even though I was young, I was
relieved that I wasn’t a freak, I wasn’t broken, I wasn’t defective … that it wasn’t only
me. I go to a group … to meet others with problems similar, and sometimes more
extensive, than mine … they’re so much like me and so different. And yet, when I meet
neurotypical people, they’re so different to me and yet there’s only a few things that are
like me. (Interview)

Nadia demonstrates resilience based on her framework of understanding about her
differences. She elsewhere described having AS as ‘a bump in the road’ that she has
learnt to navigate around and, without minimising the impact of disability, displays an
energetic passion for meeting her challenges, changing societal attitudes around her and
supporting others.
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Nadia has future plans. She has a part-time job after school shelving books in the local
library and her goal is to be a librarian. The quiet environment, muted social
interactions and focus on literature is a safe, comfortable place where she has the
potential to thrive. Forming clear, future, realistic life goals is an area of difficulty for
individuals with AS as this operation, known as ‘prospection’, shares a neural network
with episodic memory (Spreng, Mar & Kim, 2009). The conclusion to be drawn is that,
through compensatory pathways discovered via extensive intervention and support,
Nadia has overcome many of the hurdles faced by young people with AS: including the
over-representation of gifted students in school drop-out rates (Jensen, 2008; Peterson,
2009).
In speaking about her likes and dislikes, Nadia said, ‘I like to keep true with what I
know’ (Interview), and, in saying this, she appears to benchmark her sense of self
against factual knowledge. There is an undercurrent of identity formation that has been
mapped to factual knowledge (the realm of semantic memory); rather than to personal
experience (the realm of episodic memory), supported by factual knowledge. There is
also a sense of confidence in ‘what I know’ and pride in her identity. The level of
support and intervention that Nadia has received appears to have been efficacious in
helping her develop external representations of identity: odd, eccentric; valued by self
and others; social interaction (the ‘Oddities’); gifted (writer, fashion-designer); and,
with future plans (librarian).
7.7.2

Knowledge and the knower

When specifically asked about how she learns and the conditions that impede or
enhance her learning, Nadia commented ‘I need to keep with what I know’ (Interview),
indicating a measure of general uncertainty in the reliability of knowledge and this is
reminiscent of Kahla’s narrative.
N: I guess the way I think is normally completely the opposite of most people. I don’t
want to say ‘narrow’ but I need to keep with what I know. I like to learn but I won’t
talk about it till I’ve learnt it.
Res: Oh, that’s interesting! So while you’re learning something…
N: I’ll talk about what I’ve learnt but not what I’m going to learn. Because I have no
information on it. (Interview) [Emphasis added]
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Whereas Kahla’s account indicated her continual trial-and-error methods for testing the
reliability of knowledge, Nadia appeared more reserved and chooses to wait until she
achieves a sense of completeness before she acts upon knowledge. While their
responses are different, this highlights the background of uncertainty that exists for both
Nadia and Kahla in their learning: to establish that which is real, true and reliable. From
their learning narratives, it appears that Nadia and Kahla are engaged in a quest for
epistemic certainty that is more difficult because of their cognitive style (this
proposition also applies to Rhoda’s and Colin’s cases). It is a struggle for them to
incorporate new knowledge into their constructed understanding of the world.
Approaches to explicitly learned knowledge, such as Kahla’s and Nadia’s, stand
alongside the traits of ‘social naivety’ (Hedgcock, 2010; Humphrey & Lewis, 2008),
where individuals with AS have a tendency to accept socially transmitted knowledge as
true without subjecting the information to any form of reliability testing, thereby
becoming a target for bullying and manipulation (Attwood, 2008; Bradshaw, 2013).
These epistemic polarities indicate the challenge of constructing reliable knowledge
frameworks with the cognitive profile of AS, where abstract reasoning (top-down
processing) is diminished. Yet, such knowledge construction is central to educational
endeavour in schools in Australia, where rote-learned, fact-based knowledge is assigned
a lower value.
7.7.3

Am I smart, or am I dumb?

Just as in Kahla’s, Rhoda’s and Colin’s cases, the same core question of self-worth,
‘Am I smart, or am I dumb?’, is enacted in Nadia’s account. One of the ways this
question is expressed is through the characters in Nadia’s play.
N: … in the scene that I’ve already written, [one of my autistic characters is] playing
piano and he refuses to acknowledge anybody else until he’s finished the tune. An elderly
man comes on[stage] and basically insults him, saying that he’s dumb, he can’t have a
conversation, why bother? (Interview)

Nadia appears to be utilising avatars to act out representations of central questions in
her life, including the question of worth, through the medium of her stage play. The
adult-genius and the autistic-child characters are representations of the same people: one
is the ‘smart self’ (in the eyes of society) and the other is the ‘dumb self’ or autistic self.
The conclusion reached by Nadia is summarised in the following statement.
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N: … these autistic kids aren’t dumb or retarded. They’re learning, breathing, emotional
characters. … my mum told me … that a woman said that autistic kids have no empathy,
and it’s not true. (Interview)

In relationship to herself, Nadia indicated that she had been called ‘dumb’, but was
dismissive because this was said by ‘idiots, bullies’. Instead, she based her reasoning on
academic testing and exam results. The following passage demonstrates the verbal
reasoning Nadia applied as she worked through issues of self-worth.
N: I’m intelligent but not brainy, intelligent for my age, I’ve been told. I understand
things that other people don’t but that’s because I’ve learnt it. I go to a psychologist, she
explains life. I go to dance and I’ve tried nearly every style. I read a thousand books. So, I
see things from so many different angles that I can understand it. I am not extremely
brilliant … but, then again, I’m not dumb. I know the basics to sometimes quite a high
level compared to other people but sometimes they know heaps more than I do. … I
guess I am about average in some things, above average in others. The best way to say
that is my reading skills on one of my … end-of-term reports … were above the charts, I
was one of the best readers in my school. But my spelling and grammar [result] was one
of the worst. So just because I’m good at one thing doesn’t mean I’m brilliant and if I’m
bad at one thing doesn’t mean I’m dumb. (Interview)

The question of self-worth (‘Am I smart, or am I dumb?’) demonstrates, for Nadia, the
difficulty of resolving Lincoln and Guba’s methodological and axiological questions:
‘How does one go about acquiring knowledge?’ and, ‘Of all the knowledge available to
me, which is the most valuable…?’ (2013, p. 37). As she debated with herself, Nadia
reached a hesitant conclusion: ‘but, then again, I’m not dumb’, based on external
representations of academic worth, in place of internal self-references and identity.

7.8

Conclusion

Nadia has had an exemplary background of support and intervention since her diagnosis
of AS, aged twelve. She is well-schooled in social skills, emotion management and
compensatory learning strategies. Her verbal skills are a great asset and she has worked
hard to achieve competence in social interactions through explicit coaching, such as
being taught that a conversation between two people is like a game of ping-pong (table
tennis), with the ‘ball’ being passed back and forth. Nadia relies on metaphors as an aid
to her own understanding and the articulation of self-generated metaphors as external
representations of mental ideas is common throughout Nadia’s speech.
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In her interview, Nadia gave the impression of youthful energy and hopefulness,
coupled with a realistic view of her capacities. She has a determination to proactively
address issues that arise. This is summarised in the opening statement of Lydia’s
interview, which was conducted immediately after Nadia’s.
Res [speaking to Lydia about Nadia]: She shows a great energy. She called [AS] the
‘bump in the road’ and it was just a matter of finding a way around that particular bump
and that shows a great energy in her spirit to accommodate the problem and she doesn’t
come across as being burdened. (Interview)

As Nadia has had so much successful intervention and helpful support, it raises the
question of the impact this has had on her cognitive development during her adolescent
years; that is, the extent to which Nadia is experiencing an altered developmental
trajectory based on the expert, prolonged intervention and support she has received
since diagnosis. There appears little doubt that Nadia is set up for a more fulfilled and
self-aware adulthood than those experienced by Kahla, Rhoda and Colin.

226

227

Chapter 8 Case 5 ‘Riley’
Case 5’s primary participant is ‘Riley’, a male in his 60s, who is married to ‘Renae’, the
key informant. They have three adult children and a number of grandchildren. The
relationships within the family are strong: between husband and wife; themselves and
their children; and, themselves and their grandchildren. This family is distinctive among
the cases for the longevity of the primary relationship: couples in the other cases had
experienced the breakdown of life partnerships before settling into their current longterm relationship. At the time of the interviews in 2012, Riley was nearing the end of
his career as a distinguished veterinary scientist specialising in particular diseases of
certain animal species. He has an extensive list of publications in peer-reviewed
research journals and has co-written a hefty reference book in a highly specialised
knowledge domain. Riley does not have a formal diagnosis of AS, however, Renae is a
special needs teacher, experienced in teaching children with AS and learning disorders.
Through Renae’s professional experience, and from extended experience with their own
children and grandchildren’s diagnosed conditions, they reached the conclusion in
recent times that AS is the ‘bottom line’ condition in Riley’s case. As Riley’s
professional career was drawing to a close, they felt there was then nothing to be gained
by seeking a formal diagnosis. Both are extremely well-read and informed on many
issues to do with disability and AS. Riley was formally diagnosed with dyslexia as a
school student and recognises that he has a learning disorder. He is also colourblind in
the pink region but has enhanced green perception. He suffers from chronic pain
stemming from severe injury in early childhood in a serious car accident.
Renae is justifiably proud of Riley’s achievements but is also a knowledgeable realist.
Her understanding and support appears to have contributed enormously to Riley’s
capacity to participate socially and professionally, and to have the strong family life
they have built together. Their story might be a rarity as individuals with AS with
successful long-term life partnerships and strong relationships are not well-represented
within the research literature, nor is there much known about factors contributing to
such success where so many fail. Renae and Riley’s narrative is inspirational: this is not
to minimise the challenges and difficulties they face but is a testament to their
determination and resourcefulness in meeting and navigating the obstacles attributable
to AS. Renae spoke of Riley’s achievements with admiration.
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Renae: …for me, I see a man with incredible courage to just keep going, you know, six
years, or five years of university, I don’t know how he did it. I watched him with his
Masters and his Fellowship and Membership and PhD … (Interview)

Courage was required because of the mountainous obstacles of language and social
cognition. Given Riley’s achievements, his cognitive profile and learning are of great
interest to this study.
The key participant interview was conducted at the participants’ home, followed two
months later by the primary participant interview, which was conducted at the
researcher’s home. The delay was due to ill-health, family and housing issues. After
Riley’s interview, he sent an email to the researcher with further information that he
wished to be included in the data. Riley and Renae requested a copy of the interview
transcripts so their interviews were transcribed as a priority. They also requested
another meeting and this was arranged in order to deliver the transcripts. It took place at
the participants’ home and, at the same time, there was an impromptu consultation,
which, being unanticipated, was not recorded: the content consisted of queries about
diagnosis and behaviours but did not contribute new data.
Riley and Renae have a grandson with a diagnosis of ADHD and sensory sensitivities.
Gastrointestinal problems are experienced by a number of family members. Their theninfant son, now a successful aero engineer working in the United States, had severe
proprioceptive problems in infancy that responded well to targeted interventions
throughout childhood and adolescence. Riley recognised that he had the same problems
as those being addressed in his son but chronic pain prevented him from undertaking
similar interventions. Renae now recognises traces of the broader phenotype in their
own family and in Riley’s biological family. Renae stated that Riley’s parents were
distant and he spent a lot of time alone growing up. His siblings were older and not
closely involved with him apart from his middle sister’s ‘emotional abuse’. Although
no-one in the family has been formally diagnosed with AS, there are patterns of
giftedness, high achievement and related conditions such as dyslexia, proprioceptive
problems and ADHD. Riley and Renae’s assertion that he has AS was accepted and
many characteristics were evident throughout the data collection process without
contradictory evidence being detected.
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8.1

School experience

Riley was able to recount many memories of school experience, although he does not
claim to remember every autobiographical experience in the way claimed by Kahla. He
struggled at school with handwriting legibility and language tasks but excelled in tasks
using numbers. He has extraordinary mental calculation ability and Renae testified that
she has no need of an electronic calculator in the house as she can read out a list of
amounts and Riley can tell her the total. Riley experienced bullying at school and at
home. He recalls being tested in primary school for selection for a school for gifted
learners but was told by his mother that he had ‘failed’.
R: In Year 4 at primary school, two of us were sent to a test centre: I presume this was the
result of some sort of IQ test I can vaguely remember doing … I remember the interview
with the headmaster about some of it afterwards, even to words and phrases used: I
insisted on [saying] ‘Is-land’ … Later I was told by mum that I had failed because my
writing was so bad: if I had passed it would have let me into an accelerated learning
stream in a school for the gifted. Since then, we have uncovered numerous instances in
the family of white lies to cover not being allowed to go off and do other things a little
different, so I suspect I may have got in but they would not allow me to participate.
(Email)

Feedback that Riley received at secondary school confirmed his giftedness.
R: I remember an interview with the careers teacher at school in Year 11 … and he was
reading my report card … all I remember was that he read ‘mathematics – says
“extraordinarily gifted”’, and he then looked at my report card just after I had come first
in the latest set of tests for Maths 1 and Maths 2, and he let out an exclamation. (Email)

Riley received a scholarship that allowed him to attend a selective secondary
agricultural school. Although he was not formally accelerated, he matriculated to
university at the youngish age of seventeen and received a scholarship that allowed him
to attend.

8.2

Handedness

The issue of handedness was raised independently by both Renae and Riley. Renae
believes Riley is left-handed but Riley spoke of himself as right-handed or
ambidextrous, which is an advantage in his profession as intricate surgical procedures,
such as tying sutures on tiny animals, have to be performed with either hand,
independently of the other. As the incidence of left-handedness was so prominent in the
cases of this doctoral research, a brief literature review was conducted that confirmed
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the higher incidence of left-handedness and lateralisation problems in autism and AS
(Gillberg, 1983; Hauck & Dewey, 2001; Markoulakis, Scharoun, Bryden & Fletcher,
2012). Speaking of interventions for proprioceptive problems for their son when he was
an infant, Renae said:
Renae: The diagnosis provided for [our son] was that he’s left-handed, and by the way, I
think Riley should have been left-handed but wasn’t permitted to be, because he does a
lot of things with his left hand. But with [our son], what the [therapist] did was gave him
exercises to do extremely slowly that allowed the infant reflexes to move out and the
adult ones to come in. (Interview)

Renae stated that their son reported significant improvements in dyslexia symptoms
following proprioceptive interventions throughout childhood and adolescence. Once this
option became known to them, Riley was unable to participate in similar interventions
because of a back injury accompanied by chronic pain, so this avenue of potential
assistance was not available to him.
Riley’s ambiguous hand-preference is an advantage in surgical procedures.
R: Well, I was probably a left-hander when I started but I can remember being hit over
the knuckles with a ruler. I still do quite a lot of things left-handed but partly that’s as,
learning surgery, if you’re right-handed you had to learn to do things left-handed, so we
had to shave left-handed, had to tie knots left-handed. We used to practise that on the
train on the way in. We had pieces of string and [practised tying] a knot single-handed
left-handed, so you could do everything. (Interview)

However, Renae indicated that Riley has motor coordination issues that are a concern.
Renae: [Riley] has the tension, he should have been a left-hander [but he’s] had to be a
right-hander. … So that opened up this can of worms, I think. … he’d been forced to be
right-handed and I think he’s actually a left-hander … So he has a lot of those sort of
motor issues. (Interview)

Riley considers himself to be a right-handed person who sometimes does tasks with his
left hand but Renae views him as having motor problems that are compounded by his
being forced into right-handedness.

8.3

A sense of difference, alienation and isolation

Riley’s narrative builds on the theme of alienation in the previous cases. Being told by
significant people in his life that his perception is wrong has caused him to question his
own experience and, along with Colin, his sanity.
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R: I’m also colourblind … I remember [my] mother-in-law say[ing], ‘But what colour do
you see in that?’ And I said, ‘But that’s the colour I see’. That’s it. That’s what all my life
I’ve called pink, or red, or whatever. People who are colourblind have a different profile
of colours and they can see some patterns easier than others, and being told, ‘No, that is
not what you should be seeing.’ This is what I see.
Res: When the world tells you, ‘That’s not what you should be seeing’, what’s going on
inside your head and your heart at that point?
R: Am I crazy? (Very quiet voice) … What is wrong with me? Why am I stuck with this?
It’s not an antagonism or rebellion [against other people], it’s very inward focused.
What’s wrong with me? (Interview)

Invalidation of one’s own experience by other people is a source of the philosophical
problems already noted. The conflict between Riley’s experience and what other people
tell him he should be experiencing causes him to question his experienced reality, his
relationship with knowledge, and the value of his experience and knowledge. In Riley’s
approach to learning and knowledge, he is methodical and evidence-based to extremes,
regardless of the subject or context. Renae related, for instance, that, when his daughter
asked him if he knew about a certain topic she was about to teach as a school music
teacher, he responded by working through the night to compile an extensively detailed
catalogue of information and resources, even though she was casually asking for a brief
amount of information. This is Riley’s usual approach: indeed, a number of excellent
resources and the offer of more were supplied to the researcher following the interview.
This is perhaps a perseverative over-response to the philosophical problems (Section
8.13), reinforced by many instances of invalidation of his perception and experience
throughout his life, which contribute to his sense of difference.

8.4

Giving and receiving social cues

Renae and Riley’s relationship includes the giving and receiving of social cues. Renae
seems to have an unlimited capacity to support Riley in this way and Riley is grateful
for these cues. In her interview, Renae’s description of Riley’s perseverative
monologues on factual topics indicates how the giving of social cues operates between
them.
Renae: You usually get quite a detailed [monologue], which socially can be quite
impacting because people don’t necessarily want to know everything about Sibelius or
the common flu or whatever it is that they’ve asked him about. … I’ve had to say, ‘Okay
darling, maybe next time you don’t need to give that much detail because people just
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want a little bit of information.’ [Riley:] ‘Oh really? They’re not interested in the whole
lot?’ [Renae:] ‘No. They just want a little bit.’ (Interview)

Following a social outing, Riley and Renae may review the event in order to clarify
social meaning and behaviours, including Renae indicating appropriate social event
scripts for Riley to consider using in the future. This process appears to occur without
any sense of control or power difference between them; rather, it is the giving and
receiving of information with the purpose of supporting the other’s well-being and it is
an opportunity for Renae to act as a ‘sounding board’ for Riley to make sense of social
interactions for himself. Such conversations between them appear to act as a natural
learning opportunity.

8.5

Non-verbal language and social insight

Riley is aware of his lack of social insight and self-consciously works to interpret nonverbal cues. He finds the use of telephones difficult for this reason and avoids them if
possible.
R: Phone conversations – these scare the willies out of me; talking to people face to face
is bad enough, but over a phone … all the non-verbal cues are gone. These confuse me at
the best of times, but in this situation they are not even there. The hardest thing I have to
deal with. I will avoid even simple [phone calls], or at least procrastinate a lot. (Email)

Social conventions that accompany such social interactions are problematic for him.
R: … like talking to people on telephones. When I’ve finished talking to my wife and
kids, I hang up. I don’t say goodbye or anything, I just stop. And conversations, … I
don’t know, I can’t read into them. I miss cues that people give. I find it really difficult to
read between the lines. (Interview)

Poor reading of non-verbal cues, along with reduced theory of mind capacity, has
resulted in Riley not being able to complete pastoral care training in his church.
R: I did a pastoral training course which I failed because I could not read people. They
would present their stories and [we would] share with them and I would just go totally
blank. … I found it extremely difficult because you had to think about what other people
were saying and empathise with them and help them to develop what they were saying
and come through to a solution and all that sort of thing and I just couldn’t get it.
(Interview)

Riley demonstrated awareness of his lack of insight, as did Nadia (Case 4). It is
suggested that this could be the result of respectful, thoughtful feedback given to him by

233

his wife, which has resulted in him possessing greater compensatory awareness than
was demonstrated by Rhoda (Case 2) and Colin (Case 3). Nadia appears to have
acquired this awareness through feedback from her mother and coaching by
psychologists. Nadia’s and Riley’s awareness contrasts with Rhoda’s and Colin’s,
whose accounts had undertones of puzzlement or bewilderment about many aspects of
social cognition, whereas Kahla’s account (Case 1) had a measure of this kind of social
awareness but she seems to have developed it largely through hostile social encounters
and the support of psychologists rather than a close family member. The difference
between the compensatory awareness of the individuals appears to support the value of
a trusted mentor, friend or family member as a key strategy for life-long, compensatory
learning of social skills.

8.6

Social conversations and thinking

From many references throughout the data, the researcher gained a sense of the
mountainous obstacle that language represents for Riley. He explained that his difficulty
with social communication and interaction is a result of his way of processing language
and ideas from conversation. He has to ‘correct’ the form of other people’s language
and the content of their speech before he can understand the words that are said and
process them for meaning. This makes participation in conversations frustrating and
inefficient. Speaking of a professional conversation with colleagues in a social setting,
Riley explained this process.
R: I’m reconstructing their English as well, and critiqu[ing] the construction of their
sentences and everything as well as the information.
Res: Right. So once you’ve heard what they have to say, … you’ve reconstructed or
translated it into something that makes sense, proper sense to you
R: and corrected
Res: yes, and then you’re responding to your construction and translation. …
R: and then the conversation moves off. (Interview)

In the time taken for the ‘correction’ process and for Riley to construct a response, the
conversation topic has evolved, making it difficult for him to contribute. In addition to
‘correcting’ the form of the language, he also has to ‘correct’ the information supplied
by other people before he can process it.

234

R: When I was undertaking counselling by a pain psychologist, he had asked me to
document my pain with maps: this I did in great detail; their maps were not correct (i.e.
not fully inclusive, anatomically incomplete, etc.) so I made my own. He then stated very
firmly that I was fixated on my pain. But he had told me to track it this way. I just got
totally confused and bamboozled. What was I supposed to be doing? (Email)

This detail-focused way of processing language and meaning was interpreted by the
psychologist as a ‘fixation’, whereas, for Riley, it is a process needed for him to be
certain of meaning. The response of the psychologist became yet another invalidating
experience that added to his sense of alienation.

8.7

Translation

Riley agreed that the process that he described as ‘correcting’ was equivalent to a
process of ‘translation’. In conversation, words and meaning are translated into a visual
representation, described by Riley using terms such as ‘blocks’ or ‘skyscrapers’, which
are then mentally manipulated visually. Whatever this process is, it is how Riley
describes his native mode of thinking. Translating back into words is always difficult,
sometimes impossible, and, during the interview, he frequently resorted to noises made
with his tongue (transcribed as ‘splat’) and hand gestures in place of words, which were
noted in the transcript where possible. There is a time lag while this three-step process
of translation to and from visual representation takes place (see Figure 8.1). The time
lag, itself, then further disrupts his participation in conversations because the flow of a
conversation has moved along in the time taken to translate, and the opportunity to
respond to an idea is lost.
The idea of ‘constructing skyscrapers’ was explored further in Riley’s interview
because he referred to it a number of times and it appeared to represent his thinking
process, which is visual, not verbal. The process he described also illuminates the lack
of fluency in his speech throughout the interview. Renae explained that Riley’s process
of learning new information requires him to undertake a lot of in-depth reading and
thought before he can talk about the new ideas, so the process of articulating ideas is
challenging, even without the time pressure of conversation. The previous utterance
about Riley’s experience with the pain psychologist demonstrates that he also ‘corrects’
written material, so the translation process is not exclusive to speech or social situations.
Learning about a new topic requires time to process and construct ‘skyscrapers’ to
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represent and remember those ideas before Riley is able to articulate to others what he
has been thinking about. The translation process he described is very tiring.
R: … I can be in a conversation with people and not actually say anything but will be
totally exhausted just from trying to keep up with the conversation. (Interview)

It is also very disruptive to his participation.
R: … everyone assumes that I haven’t had anything to contribute but by the time I’ve
constructed my ‘skyscraper’, which is what I call it, the conversation’s moved on, and it
crumbles. (Interview)

Riley clarified that by ‘skyscrapers’ he meant the ideas and relationships that make up
his thoughts.
R: [My colleagues] say something and so I work out what they’re trying to say, because
what they’re trying to say is actually not what they’re saying, or [not] in my head
[anyway], and so I try to respond that that’s what they’re saying, therefore that needs this
sort of response, that’s how I should say that. And then a third person interjects and
[I’ve*] got to try and answer that one as well so [I*] build another skyscraper here
(indicates a space in the air). How [am I*] going to respond to that one? And then they
respond back and it’s different, they’ve changed tack so [I’ve*] got to start dismantling
this [skyscraper] and suddenly [my*] head is full of all these different responses and
pseudo-responses, what I should have said ten conversations ago. And it just gets bigger
and bigger. It explodes. (Interview – *Inconsistent pronoun use has been corrected)

Translating words into ‘skyscrapers’, Riley’s term for his visual thinking process, and
then back into words requires a timeframe not conducive to participation in
conversation, particularly in groups. Even in non-social situations, it can be seen from
his description of ‘constructing skyscrapers’ that Riley’s thinking process is more timeconsuming when he needs to articulate his thoughts than for verbal thinkers. The
process is, for him, exhausting. Although at the time of the interview this was not
explored, presumably Riley’s thinking is efficient and less effortful if he is not
translating to and from words.
Riley’s articulation of this process in these terms, with the accompanying cognitive
burden, suggests that learners with AS who are non-verbal thinkers should be
considered in the same light as second language speakers, as proposed by Wendy, the
key informant for Case 3. Accommodations for teaching, learning and assessment
should factor in the extra time required for these learners to demonstrate their learning
authentically and accurately as they are clearly disadvantaged by timed assessments that
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have been designed for individuals who do not have to undertake mental translation of
some kind.

8.8

Reading

Riley is an avid reader and was said by Renae to ‘devour books’. However, the act of
reading is significantly disrupted by dyslexia. Riley’s preferred reading material is nonfiction, with his favourite topic being animals. The exception is fictional representations
that allow him to pursue his study of ‘how people tick’ (Riley: Interview). He reads
novels to study human behaviour, with a similar intent to his study of animals, through
the fictional novels of Jane Austen, or by watching movies of the novels. Jane Austen’s
novels and movies, and others that are similar, appear to serve an important function for
Riley. These novels make the thinking and morals of the characters explicit and align
their thinking and morals with their behaviour. The Count of Monte Christo (Dumas &
Coward, 2008) was cited as another favourite novel where there is ample opportunity to
witness the development of the human characters within the story set over a long time
period and to study the behaviour and interactions of the characters.

8.9

Dyslexia

Dyslexia causes severe disruption to Riley’s reading and stands in contrast to his expert
capacity with mathematics, including his savant-like calculation ability. Riley described
his experience of dyslexia in terms of the words and letters moving on the page, in a
spiral, always in the same direction, which makes it difficult to differentiate the letters
and words.
R: Occasionally [the words] flap all around the wrong way. … [When] I’m reading, if
I’m more stressed it’s always more of a problem and … the whole of the page will jumble,
literally in front of my eyes. … and if I’m trying to read out loud … [the words] move.
They’re moving … which makes it really complicated cause nothing’s still … and [I*]
read a paragraph and think, ‘I haven’t got a clue what that said, because the words [are]
all jumbled up, they don’t make any sense’. …
Res: Just for the tape, you’re moving your hands around in a semiR: It’s spiralling in … It’s always (gestures) … clockwise. (Interview – *Inconsistent
pronoun use has been corrected)

Riley’s processing difficulty does not apply to numbers, which suggests that his visual
thinking process encompasses numeric-symbolic thinking but not language. For
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mathematical calculations, no translation process is required so his verbal response is
very quick when he acts as a ‘human calculator’ for Renae’s shopping and finances.
Unlike Colin, who was unable to describe his method for calculation, Riley is able to
articulate his mathematical methods and processes. Renae attributes this capacity to his
ability to work with patterns.

8.10

Learning

When writing about affordances and obstacles to learning, Riley stated that his physical
location in the classroom or lecture hall may have been a significant factor in his ability
to learn.
R: I can remember where I sat in various class rooms at school, primary and secondary,
and also various lectures at uni. I had not seen a connection, but the classes at high school
I did not do well at (i.e. just failed in mid year, just passed at end of year) were all with
me in what I would now consider a ‘bad’ place: middle of back left quarter for Year [8],
failed English and French; and for Year [9] mid right half, failed history … had not
connected these before. Maths in Year [11], I was in top 5, I was front right second table
in on row of 6. (Email)

This supposition by Riley evokes the suspicion that he has a limited perceptual field: the
optimal visual and auditory field for him was obtained by sitting at the right side of the
room, towards the front. This appears to be an additional factor to the sensory
sensitivities that also disrupted his learning.
Riley explained that an essential part of his learning process is to manage information
through extensive note-taking. In his note-taking, he goes through the same ‘correction’
process as for spoken language. He does not transcribe verbatim because, from his
perspective, the language needs to be corrected. Rather than the usual process of
paraphrasing that is common to note-taking tasks, it seems that Riley requires every
statement by a speaker, whether they are a lecturer, preacher or colleague, to assume a
‘correct’ form. As he is listening, his attention is on the ‘incorrect’ parts of the utterance
and his focus is on correcting these with the corrected version being transcribed into
notes for his memorisation. This is a detailed-processing approach to managing
knowledge. The mental construction of ideas and development of conceptual
understanding appears to take place at a later time, based on his notes, rather than in real
time.
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With the quantity of notes required to document the extensive reading that Riley
conducts and the lectures or sermons he attends, memorisation is based on mental
activities he described using the terms ‘indexing’, ‘categorising’, and ‘filing’.
R: So if I wanted to learn something now, I would probably get a book on it or start to
read on it but it wouldn’t be one item, I go for collections. So I will read ten books and
will try and understand it in a fair degree of depth. In the past, I kept a lot of card indexes
with summaries. I would make notes. I would try and tie bits together. I … search out
books, pamphlets, ideas, discussions that are opposites so that there is a balance rather
than just one side of something. And I would certainly catalogue it in my head.
(Interview)

Riley’s mental catalogue is paralleled by his development of extensive physical filing
systems at work. He employed his concrete filing system as a metaphor for his thinking
and memory processes (Section 8.12.1): this highlighted a feature of Riley’s memory
processes described in Boucher’s case study as ‘state dependency’ (Boucher, 2007, p.
256) (Section 8.12.4), which is an expression of an externally oriented thinking style
that is an important feature of his learning.
While he was at school, Riley reports that he ‘would go to the library and read an
encyclopaedia’ (Interview) but that he could also, as long as the classroom conditions
were suitable, learn from teacher-directed classroom lessons (unlike Colin). He
recounted his profile of success and failure across subject areas and over time.
R: When [the teachers] actually gave the work, mathematics was dead easy, maths,
chemistry and physics and biology, you know anything like that, fine. History I found
difficult. French I failed, because it’s words … But I did advanced maths at one stage in
school and I quit because the concept … i the square root of -1, it allows you to solve the
equations but it’s wrong, it’s nonsense because you can’t have a square root of -1. It will
allow you to do the maths and that’s nice and I can do the maths but I have this
philosophical conflict, the square root of minus one is actually nonsense so therefore
everything else that derives from it, even though you can solve, is nonsense. That was the
… thing that really struck me. I was what, 16 at the time, 15. You can do it but it doesn’t
make sense. Anyway, so I had a struggle with that. I never did very well at school; never
did very well at university. I struggled all the way through. I could learn the work by very,
very hard [work], by concentrated learning, by lots of notes, by lots of reiterating, by
summarising things, I’ve still got the books where I summarised everything, and just
rehashing it. But it was very hard all the way and if a subject didn’t actually make sense
or didn’t hold together well by the presenters, I struggled with it all the way through.
(Interview)

The need for knowledge to be ‘correct’, in his own terms, is apparent within this
monologue and certain ‘philosophical conflicts’ presented an obstacle to Riley’s
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participation in some forms of learning at school. The corrected knowledge appears to
be a requirement in order for ideas to become amenable to his thinking processes and
meaning-making, even where those ideas are theoretical mathematical notions. Those
things that are not amenable to such processes are apparently excluded or avoided.
Riley’s detailed approach to knowledge management has resulted in a thorough grasp of
the research literature that is the basis for his professional practice. He contrasted his
own comprehensive, perseverative, approach to learning with the apparently piecemeal
approach employed by the young trainees he supervises.
R: … [the young trainees are] smart, there’s no question. They’re smart and sharp as a
tack. Whether they’re any good or not is another matter. … I spend a lot of time just
trying to explain to our trainees the basics, the pathogenesis, what’s actually happening at
the base level. … People reading it in a book, read the process and they know the end
result or a couple of snippets along the way but they don’t understand the whole process.
(Interview)

Implicit in Riley’s account is a lack of awareness of the value of learning processes
other than his own detail-processing approach. He has a self-consciously systematic
approach to learning: wide reading; comprehensive note-taking; and, an indexing and
filing system, upon which he is heavily reliant. These essential learning aids constitute
an externalised process to facilitate memory recall and, most likely, stand in place of
mentalised abstract representations of knowledge.

8.11

Cognitive profile: Processing style

Riley’s processing style is documented under a number of separate headings covering
sensory issues, attention, perseveration, perfectionism, his three-step thinking process,
visual processing style, inner speech and mental rehearsal.
8.11.1

Enhanced perceptual functioning and sensory sensitivities

Riley documented his difficulties with sound levels and gating auditory input when he
is in a room where concurrent conversations are taking place. His descriptions of the
impact caused by this difficulty are similar to those described by Colin and Rhoda.
R: If the room [is] very noisy, I am listening to this conversation, and others in immediate
proximity, and even further afield, and the music … can readily become a cacophony of
sound and [I] cannot delineate any of it, let alone follow. (Email)
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In his interview, Riley noted that if he is in a social setting and is overwhelmed, he will
cover his head with his coat to dampen the sound.
R: … what I want to do is just curl up in a ball and put a blanket over my head. I have
done that in prayer meetings occasionally. We go to a pentecostal church. This [church] is
fairly quiet but I’ve been in some very expressive and noisy prayer meetings and I just
literally pull my coat over my head and (grunts), ‘Shut up.’ (Interview)

Colourblindness was an issue raised by both Riley and Renae that did not arise in the
other four cases. The problem with colour extends to choosing clothes to wear each day
so Renae has arranged matching sets of clothes that Riley does not vary.
Renae: He’s also colourblind. … I’ve said, ‘Right, those trousers go with that shirt’. … I
can’t get patterns that are too busy because they stress his mind. So checks that are
reasonably big are fine. Stripes are fine but I have to be careful which colours they are
because he’s colourblind, red shades and green shades, so it’s not a red-green, it’s a
shaded thing. So if I tell him that that pair of trousers goes with that shirt, they’ll always
go together even if I’ve got another pair of trousers and I can say to him, ‘They’ll go with
that as well’. … So you’ve got the added issue of not quite seeing the changes in colour
which is great for work, for reading slides because he can actually see things that other
people can’t see. (Interview)

As in Kahla’s and Colin’s cases, it can be seen that enhanced perceptual functioning
confers both advantages and disadvantages, depending on context. Riley’s enhanced
perception for shades of green, for patterns and for tiny changes in cells give him a
perceptual advantage in the diagnosis of diseases but make it difficult for him to choose
matching clothes. Renae is aware of Riley’s visual sensitivities, demonstrated by her
statement: ‘I can’t get patterns that are too busy because they stress his mind’
(Interview).
Riley, an amateur musician, has a strong preference for instrumental music instead of
music with lyrics as the words interfere with his cognitive processing, particularly if
they are ‘free-form version so the words don’t rhyme or anything ...’ (Interview).
Instrumental music of particular genres is soothing and is used as a background while
he is working or reading but the added component of language is sensually aggravating
for him.
8.11.2

Attention and language processing

From Riley’s case, interpreted in the light of the literature, the relationship between
language processing and poor executive control of attention can be seen, resulting in an

241

increased load on working memory. The implications of this insight are profound for
classroom environments, where so much of the delivery of teaching and learning
activities relies on the capacity of the student to attend to, and process, verbal
information. Like Rhoda, Riley has a problem with selective attention and executive
control of attention (Section 5.4.2), including controlling the track his thoughts are
taking and resuming a thread after a distraction.
Renae: Often he loses where he’s up to [in his work] and he’ll have to re-track, even
though it might be marked, he has lost the string [thread] … in his head. (Interview)

In his language during the interview, he displayed associative thinking, in Temple
Grandin’s terms, to some extent but was able to keep himself on-track as he had
prepared what he wanted to say and mentally rehearsed for the interview as if for a
lecture he would deliver. Riley directly indicated his attentional difficulties in the
following statement.
Res: I was just about to ask you about the noise [of a party] and noise-filtering.
R: It doesn’t filter. … selective attention, can’t do it. Or if I can, it’s so short and so
exhausting. (Interview)

Closing his eyes is a strategy he consciously uses to help him focus on his thoughts.
R: I often shut my eyes, which I have been doing quite a lot in this discussion, in order to
focus [on ‘thoughts and concepts’]. … with conversations and other things, if there’s loud
music, it can be extremely ‘ehh!’ (sighs audibly) or in a room full of other conversations,
I am trying to listen to the music and I am trying to listen to the other conversations and
I’m trying to listen to the conversation I’m involved in. So suddenly I can be talking to
you but someone’s got a conversation going on here so I start constructing skyscrapers
again relevant to that lot (gestures), I’m listening to the music and thinking, ‘Well, that’s
nice. What’s the pattern there?’ (Interview)

The problem of poor executive control of attention has a profound affect on Riley’s
language processing and consequently on social interaction. This has also been reported
in the literature: ‘One of the most commonly reported auditory problems in individuals
with autism is an inability to understand speech when background sounds are present’
(Plaisted, et al., 2003, p. 380). Iarocci, et al., (2010) elaborated on this issue.
Plaisted and colleagues found that individuals with ASD have difficulty understanding
speech embedded in background noise, due to a wide auditory filter that creates a greater
susceptibility to interfering sounds during speech processing (Plaisted et al., 2003). Thus
a subgroup of persons with autism may have difficulty with both the auditory processing
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of speech signals as well as the visual lip reading of speech in background noise.
Alternatively, difficulties dividing attention between speech and non-speech noise may be
integral to our understanding of communicative development in persons with ASD
(Kenworthy et al., 2009). (Iarocci, et al., 2010, p. 316)

Maintaining a single focus, requiring the filtering out of other sensory information,
particularly background speech, is problematic for Riley and this can be understood as
having an impact on working memory: the reduced ability to selectively attend when
there are multiple inputs undermines information-processing efficiency. The load is
further increased by the need to integrate non-verbal information, difficult for Riley in
conversation with a single speaker such as the researcher but overwhelming in
situations where there is background noise.
In summary, Riley has a problem attending to salient information in social settings and
rigorously rehearses for expected social encounters, such as the research interview. He
expends increased mental effort in order to participate in a conversation, even with a
single speaker. Against a background of other speech, the task of interpreting and
responding within a conversation can be overwhelming. The mental and physical
exhaustion that results from social interaction was a major theme of Riley’s account and
is attributable to perceptual processing, attentional issues and language processing.
Teachers of students with similar issues should be mindful of the increased effort
required in order to process verbally delivered input, particularly against any
background noise. A quiet classroom is, therefore, a pre-requisite for mental
engagement for such students. Clear, slow speech and economy of words are likely to
be more effective as a means of instruction for individuals with a cognitive profile
similar to Riley’s, rather than rapid, rich language.
8.11.3

Perseveration

In Riley’s case, there are some indications that perseveration applies to his thinking as
well as behaviour and speech. Whereas perseveration is most often discussed within the
research literature in relationship to behaviour (Frith, U., 2004) and speech (Perkins, et
al., 2006), thinking is also implicated: this suggestion is embedded in reports such as
that by Landa and Goldberg (2005). The notion of perseverative patterns of thinking is
supported by a recent research study that investigated the relationship between
autobiographical memory in ASD, depression and ruminative thinking (Crane, Goddard
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& Pring, 2013). Ruminative thinking is a real problem for Riley and contributes to his
mental effort and exhaustion.
Res: Can I ask you about concepts? Renae said that you say that a concept will often go
round and round in your head and it’s like it’s on a continuous loop. Does that mean
anything to you? … that’s her interpretation. …
R: Well, [the idea is] probably correct, so I’ll just keep on wearing it out. I can’t get off
off off the loop. … I can’t stop it. The only way to stop it is to shut up. … Otherwise it
just keeps going around and around and around, I say the same thing four times. … Then
I can re-gather my thoughts and concepts and I often shut my eyes, which I have been
doing quite a lot in this discussion, in order to focus. (Interview)

It may, therefore, be helpful in educational settings to consider perseveration not just in
behavioural terms but also in cognitive terms. Students will require clear cues and
assistance in moving their thoughts from one idea to another during the course of a day
of instruction, particularly if there are no obvious external cues such as moving from
room to room. Indeed, the need for preparation and clear cues is well understood in the
classroom strategies employed by many teachers of students with AS, as evidenced by
the plethora of commercially available visual aids for this purpose.
8.11.4

Perfectionism

Perfectionism is a trait commonly associated with AS (Cash, 1999; Konza, 2005) and,
along with behaviour patterns such as hoarding, can be conceptualised in terms of
perseveration.
R: I tend to create extensive collections of things and I just added to my parasite
collection today (laughs) cause that’s what I do. I … often find that is an obsessive thing
and it just creeps in and I don’t realise it’s happening until it is well down the track and
it’s ‘Okay, I’ve got to stop’, otherwise I’ll just keep adding more. They’re all interesting,
and all different variations on the theme but I’ll just keep adding. … [I tell myself that
I’ve] got to stop because this is crazy, it’s got a life of its own and it will drive me.
(Interview)

As Riley described it, his ‘obsessive’ collecting habits revolve around a need for
completeness in his areas of special interest. There seems to be a polarised belief (that is,
‘either/or’) underlying this behaviour that the collection, information or knowledge is
not reliable unless it is ‘complete’. The flaw in operating out of this belief is that most
collections, whether they are of music CDs or knowledge about a topic, can never be
complete, and therefore the notion of ‘completion’ is elusive. The black-and-white
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belief in the notion of ‘completion’ does not allow for other possibilities and is possibly
the ‘drive’ Riley referred to that gives the act of collecting a sense of urgency or
compulsion. Such collections also may be acting as an external representation of
knowledge or even identity. If this suggestion is accurate, it would assist understanding
of the personal hurt that is caused if someone other than the individual themselves
throws out, or even re-arranges, a collection, as depicted so poignantly in the movie
Mozart and the Whale (Bass, 2001), when the main character’s girlfriend, Isabelle,
tidies up his collections of newspapers and Donald’s furious response is, ‘You stole my
life!’ This movie was submitted by Riley as an artefact for his case as it portrays aspects
of his experience he found difficult to articulate, including the scenes depicting
compulsive collecting.
Riley acknowledged that his perfectionism is a positive trait in his work, where he has
collected information fastidiously, but a negative trait in other areas of his life, leading
to task-avoidance.
R: Now some of those things come back to perfectionist streaks. If I have a new task to
do and if I think I can master it, I will pursue it. If I know it is going to be difficult or if I
think I will not be able to do it perfectly—I have it up on my wall that ‘perfection is the
enemy of excellence’, so I know my weakness—… if I don’t think I can do it perfectly, I
will not do it at all. And I will do anything to avoid it. (Interview)

Riley tries to challenge himself to attempt activities that he avoids. The example he
gave was learning to fly a remote-control helicopter he was given as a gift. He described
such challenges as ‘dragons in the basement’.
R: … there are lots of things in my life that are like that: dragons in the basement.
Res: So your life is a constant series of self-challenges to overcome obstacles.
R: Repeatedly. Probably daily. … it’s exhausting. I mean I’ve used that word on
numerous occasions today … but it actually is. There is no other way, other than running
away from it and if I run away from it today it’s still going to be there tomorrow. If I
challenge it today there’ll be different one tomorrow. There’s no letup. There is no letup.
(Interview)

Perfectionism is another characteristic of Riley’s thinking that contributes to his sense
of exhaustion.
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8.11.5

Three-step thinking process

Information-processing load is evident in Riley’s account. He is mentally working very
hard despite having considerable intellectual capacity, as demonstrated by his career
achievements, and yet the ‘nuts and bolts’ of daily functioning are, for him, infused
with anxiety, effort and exhaustion. The burden on his working memory can be
described as a compilation of: enhanced perception combined with inefficient filtering
of sensory input; poor attentional control; language processing difficulties; and, the
need to ‘translate’ between his native mode of thought, which is visual, and language. In
order to explore this sense of exhaustion further, a detailed discussion of Riley’s
thinking processes ensued.
Res: [referring to participation in conversations and attending church meetings] Is it the
‘barrage of sound’ that is the problem or is it that you’re having to work so hard? …
where you’re talking about skyscrapers, are you having to translate from what other
people say into the ‘right’ way of saying it and then respond to that? So you’re going
through a three-step process?
R: Oh yes. I’m reconstructing their English as well, and critique[ing] the construction of
their sentences as well as the information. …
Res: … is that also happening to you when you’re not actually in conversation but you’re
in a situation where you’re thinking?
R: Oh, yeah. (Interview)

To participate in a conversation, or when reading a book, Riley described a three-step
cognitive process: translation from language; conceptual thinking (‘constructing
skyscrapers’); and, translation back to language. This three-step process is illustrated in
Figure 8.1.
Res: I’m interested in what I’m calling ‘translation’ [and] you’re calling ‘correcting’ …
[an utterance has] passed your screening test so you go straight to constructing the
skyscraper and the skyscraper is about the ideas?
R: Yes. That’s my analogy of it … the skyscraper is big and it’s complex and it’s all the
other things and it takes time, and by the time it gets to the third floor it’s ‘Splat’ (makes
a noise and a gesture to indicate a big construction).
Res: So the skyscraper is a mental construction of ideas?
R: Mm, mm, and it will often give rise to other ones, and other bits will flow out from
that which really have nothing to do with that.
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Res: Is there a problem when you’ve got other bits flowing out of your skyscraper? How
do you stick with the main idea? Do you bother sticking with the main idea or do you just
let it go?
R: Sometimes it just disappears … it gets left behind. I’m off on a tangent somewhere
else and that becomes very embarrassing because … I’ll come out with this (‘splat’ noise)
and no one knows the connections and they don’t know that this is the fourth idea in a
line that I’ve had. I know them all and I’ll sort of blurt out something and they all look at
me. …
Res: Are you using extra mental resources then in order to do that screening process,
when you decide not to respond out loud? So that’s another layer of mental effort?
R: Mm, it’s absolutely exhausting to say nothing. (Interview)

Both the ‘barrage of sound’, which is how Riley described sensory input in a room with
other people, and the ‘correcting’ process load up working memory, which causes a
delay in his responses in conversation and make it ‘absolutely exhausting to say
nothing’.
A significant feature of this account is that, discounting the ‘translation’ steps, Riley’s
thought takes place in a non-verbal way, apparently through visual processing. This is
assumed to be his ‘native’ mode of thought. The necessity of dealing with other people
via language requires a translation process from, and to, language. The presumption
here is that, where Riley does not have to interact with other people, his thought
processes would be much more streamlined and efficient within the ‘native’ visual
processing mode. However, under the time pressure of social situations (for example,
listening to a sermon or participating in a conversation with colleagues or friends), he is
going through a three-step thinking process: 1) ‘Correcting’ or ‘translating’ the
language used by others; 2) Constructing ‘skyscrapers’, his native mode of thinking and
processing meaning; and, 3) Mentally translating his thoughts back into language so
that he can give voice to his thoughts.
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Figure 8.1 Language and thinking in Case 5

The mental demands of this process upon thinking and learning are considerable and
supply an explanation for the delays and hesitations in Riley’s speech in the interview.
He agreed that he was working very hard mentally and needed extra time to respond
compared to other people. This insight reinforces the proposition of this thesis that
individuals with a similar cognitive profile to Riley are learners situated within a
minority ‘cognitive culture’ and, if this is the case, then they should be given
comparable considerations to second-language speakers: for example, with regard to
time constraints (extra time or untimed assessments) and learning environment
(reducing social cognition demands during learning by, for instance, assigning solo
tasks instead of group work).
8.11.6

Visual processing style

During the interview, sometimes there was a delay in responding to the researcher’s
question that Riley indicated was the time required for him to locate and play back the
correct ‘video’ before recovering the memory. In an email sent as a follow-up to the
interview, Riley described his ‘field of view’ for his autobiographical memories.
Although he indicated that the ‘video’ is not replayed verbatim, he uses visual terms,
with an observational stance, to describe memories for personal experience, rather than
speaking in terms indicating mental time travel. The following email excerpt is
reproduced as it was written, in truncated note form.
R: Video in my head or spirit is not re-play: it is re-worked to some degree. Mostly from
left 07:30 looking forward over my head as quadrant at angle of 30° to ground plane; less
frequently from right; rarely from above behind as sector at about 60° looking close in
front. Recent interview visit with you is from right looking forward in quadrant to left
from about 4:30, but you were at about 1:00, so just on the edge. And I cannot change it.
These are never from front looking back on myself. Facial features of others not clear,
although I know who they are. (Email)
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The significance of the actual field of view, described with degrees and elevation, is
beyond the capacity of this research to interpret but may be of interest to others with
expertise in this area.
In describing notions involving relationships, such as his family, Riley spoke with many
hesitations, appearing to hunt for the correct word and frequently resorted to gestures
and noises made with his tongue in place of words.
Res: It looks like you’re drawing a family tree in the air there with your hands, so that’s
how you think about it?
R: Yeah. And even my own [family], you know, Renae’s there, and T— and the kids are
all independent and they’re all separate, they’ve got kids, they’re all inter-related but
they’re separate. Yeah, I just thought that was normal. Anyway. Okay. (Laughs) Yes, this
sort of, I, I, I don’t like to do a lot of things with my hands but I end up doing it with my
hands because I can then, as you said, the family tree, I can create it and then, ‘Splat’
(makes noise with tongue) and then suddenly I can visualise it. (Interview)

The task of describing conceptual relationships within the family required Riley to
gesture as though forming a family tree in the air: he said this allowed him to visualise
it as he struggled to articulate the relationships. Throughout the interview, which was
nearly two hours long, he resorted many times to such gestures and tongue noises,
which appeared to function as visual strategies in place of expressing those ideas in
words.
An aspect of Riley’s visual processing relates to his colourblindness. He described how
his colourblindness, and that of his colleague, afforded them the capacity to see detail
and patterns in stained cells on a microscope slide that others cannot detect. Together
they published a major work of histopathology in which a slight change to the colour
tints of the illustrations by an editor created a significant problem.
R: A friend and I published a colour atlas … [of histopathology] … we’re both
colourblind in the same areas and so we perceived things and saw things similarly and …
after the second galley proof from the printer, they put a scientific editor on it and he
changed the tints to make them more acceptable to everyone else and we both went off
and [were] cross about this. That’s when we both discovered we’re colourblind in the
same area, because we see the colours and the hues and the changes differently. … The
pinks are the areas where we have difficulties, we can’t distinguish so many pinks as
other people … but the strengths are around the greens. … Well, they tend to put a lot of
[unknown technical term] pink stain on everything, so everything’s pink, and it’s a fairly
intense pink so that’s fine, we can all see that … but the other subtle changes happen [in
the] greens. … What I’ve noticed with the trainees that I have is they miss patterns. So
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you look over the tissue and say, ‘See that, there’s a pattern here, there’s necrosis there
and there’s changes here and some things over there. … [I tell them] ‘You’ve just gone
over a field and it’s actually got an inclusion body in it.’ [The trainees say] ‘What!? No.
Where do you see that?’ And I [say], ‘Saw it as we went over it. We scooted over it,’ but
I can see it.
Res: So by ‘patterns’, do you mean the texture of what they’re actually seeing on the
slide?
R: Mmm, the texture, the colours, the arrangements of things at a minute level and I will
see often will see bacteria or parasites or protozoa or something or inclusion bodies.
Partly that’s experience … but, even with colleagues that have equivalent experience, I’ll
often pick things up much before they do. (Interview)

Riley’s enhanced visual functioning in perceiving miniscule patterns and irregularities
in cells confers giftedness in the diagnosis of diseases in his field and aligns with the
detail-focus processing of AS.
8.11.7 Inner speech and mental rehearsal
There appears to be very little internal verbal dialogue in Riley’s cognition. His
descriptions of his thinking and memory processes revolved around visual thinking
strategies instead of verbal. He explained that the visual construction of ideas has
‘snippets of dialogue’ within it but the majority of his own conceptual thinking was
described as ‘blocks of concept’, which he also named ‘skyscrapers’. Interestingly,
Kahla also used similar terms to describe aspects of her cognition: ‘block of memory’
(Section 4.7.2); ‘block of speech’ (Section 4.7.5); and, she spoke of retrieving a ‘block’
(Section 4.7.5). The mental rehearsal that Riley described consisted of rehearsing
possible alternate behaviours and planning a script as a guide for him to follow in his
speech. These are rote memory strategies and not necessarily evidence of inner speech
as a mode of thought. The ‘snippets of dialogue’ are possibly further rote-remembered
elements within his mental rehearsal.
Res: … What I’m interested in is the idea of an internal dialogue in your mind … say,
rehearsing for today, did that involve a dialogue in your head? What were you actually
doing in that rehearsal?
R: There are snippets of dialogue, yes. But largely ideas, concepts, block, blocks of
(makes ‘splat’ noise) concepts.
Res: What is a ‘block of concept’?
R: Well it’s just a block of concept, well you know this is…
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Res: You’re seeing a block, idea of some kind in your head?
R: Yeah. Well, like the skyscraper thing … so that was just sort of (‘splat’ noise), that’s
there, um, the conversations and the constructions, the rehearsals, that’s there. …
Res: So there’s like a mental mind map in your head with…
R: Yes. Things that we want to address and talk about. (Interview)

Moving beyond Riley’s explanations that involved gestures and noises, a ‘mental mind
map’ of ideas was the closest agreed phrase to describe his natural way of thinking.
Even though he is a visual, possibly pattern thinker (in Temple Grandin’s terms), Riley
mentioned that he gave himself a ‘talking to’, by which he meant that he mentally
delivered a lecture-like speech to himself with the purpose of exhorting himself to
attempt a task he was avoiding. This might be construed as an internal dialogue
representative of inner speech according to Vygotsky’s original description (Vygotsky,
1962). The experimental and theoretical literature is divided on whether inner speech is
diminished in individuals with autism and AS (Hurlburt, et al., 1994; Whitehouse,
Maybery & Durkin, 2006; Williams, D., 2010; Williams, D., Happé, et al., 2008;
Williams, D. M. & Jarrold, 2010). Williams, et al., (2008) provide an interesting
discussion on ‘the verbal recoding of visual information’ (p. 56). In contrast to previous
studies, they found intact inner speech in autism and AS, however, their experimental
conditions tested children only and a later analysis of the same data modified these
findings to suggest a more complex relationship between the use of inner speech and
autism (Williams, D. M. & Jarrold, 2010). Studies with adults over a wider range of
conditions are needed. Distinguishing between what this doctoral study describes as the
‘native mode of thought’, which in Riley’s case appears to be non-verbal, and the use of
a ‘talking to’ as a self-talk script, are features of Case 5 that contribute to the debate.
The ‘talking-to’ may be following a verbal script adopted, for instance, from his spouse
and could represent an event script rather than true inner speech that indicates a verbal
thought-processing style.

8.12

Cognitive profile: Memory

Significant emergent themes of memory in Riley’s case are presented here and, as with
the other cases, should be considered against the backdrop of the memory and autism
literature.
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8.12.1

Semantic-style memory and temporality

Riley recounted that his memories are filed away in a ‘mental filing cabinet’. To
retrieve a memory, even an autobiographical memory, he mentally runs a ‘video’ of
himself opening the mental filing cabinet and pulling out the file containing the memory.
Many memories are time-stamped.
R: When Renae and I went for counselling at one stage … the counsellor said … ‘You
have a filing cabinet and everything in your life is filed away in a filing cabinet and you
can open the drawer and pull it out and it’s the third one back and you can remember the
event.’ … Because, even just talking about that, … I [can] see myself with a bank of
filing cabinets pulling the things out and saying, ‘This happened on the 11th of January
1976,’ or whatever. Happened at 3 o’clock in the afternoon. Cause I can do that. …
Res: So your memories are time-stamped?
R: Yeah. Morning, afternoon and evening: certainly within a couple of hours of when
they happened. (Interview)

Salience, for Riley, is determined by the amount of detail attached to an event or piece
of information: more associated factual detail results in greater likelihood that a
memory will be available for retrieval from his mental filing cabinet. For
autobiographical memories, Riley did not express any language indicating mental time
travel or subjective temporal elements. The measured-time ‘time stamp’ that he ‘sees’
on the mental file as he retrieves a memory is rote-remembered, factual knowledge
about the event or information and is therefore an act of noetic consciousness indicating
semantic-memory recall.
8.12.2

Autobiographical memories

Autobiographical memories are replayed as videos in Riley’s mind with his ‘presentself’ as an observer. These memories exhibit a lack of emotional content, even for
traumatic, remembered incidents. Other contextual elements of autobiographical
memories are sometimes present, but in a limited way.
R: I can remember vividly some birthdays: 21 (me, mum and dad and a single cup cake),
40, 50, 60, (I only have pictures of the 60th, none from the others so remembrance not
dependent upon those) … I can remember lots of [childhood] playtimes by myself,
making my own castles out of wood, even to the music that was playing at the time.
However, [the] detail of grass under [my] feet whilst playing is rare, although walking
through the bush alone, the trees and branches and tufts of grass and the water are real
clear, and what I did or [what] happened to me. But almost no sound, no smell. And
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usually alone. Very clear now even as I type. Mostly just the event itself. Little of the
emotional stuff that accompanied whatever was going on. (Email)

Unlike the previously noted anecdotal reports arising from a presentation delivered to a
group of adults with AS, indicating verbatim rather than episodic autobiographical
memories, Riley does not claim to have comprehensive visual memories of his
childhood autobiographical experiences. He had recently been shown some childhood
family photographs by a sibling, of which he had no memory so he is factually aware of
gaps in his autobiographical memories.
8.12.3

Rote memory

Riley displays evidence of a powerful rote memory capacity. This is a feature of his
professional life that has contributed to an excellent reputation in his field; a claim that
is supported by an extensive academic publication list.
R: I gave a presentation to the [name] club in the UK which is probably the most
prestigious in Europe. You have to give your presentation, by invitation, not allowed any
notes, you just had to know it ‘off pat’ and then when you’ve finished, they bombard you
with questions. So I gave my presentation and there were almost no questions, negligible,
nothing of any substance afterwards because I’d been thorough, covered all the known
options … But the other thing was when I did my Fellowship exams, so that’s four years
of intense study, [I] did all the written ones and then the oral or the vivas that go with it
… when I’d finished and I got up and walked out, they had an observer there from the
college, and before I’d shut the door he said, ‘I’ve never seen a performance like that
before, in any of the disciplines’. … It still blows me away because I was doing what I
was supposed to do. (Interview)

Powerful rote memory is a feature of cognition that is highly prized in many
professions: for example, pilots, who must perform rigorous, extensive procedures
under pressure; surgeons, who must remember procedures learnt from textbooks and
observation, and adhere closely to detail in the replication of those procedures; and,
actors and barristers, who need to reproduce long, complex, technically detailed
speeches principally from memory. In the current school climate in Australia, rotememory capacity is not highly valued except in fields such as music and drama
performance, therefore, it behoves teachers, who are steeped in active learning
pedagogy, to remember that students who do not respond well to active learning
strategies at school may nonetheless enjoy future success in professions that value
powerful rote-memory capacity.
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8.12.4

State-dependent memory

The ‘mental filing cabinet’ metaphor previously referred to is reflective of Riley’s use
of extensive physical filing systems, both at home and at work, using a complex
indexing system. Although his filing system is comprehensively indexed and crossreferenced, the physical location of the files within a cabinet and the location of the
cabinet itself are critical features of Riley’s memory system. If a filing cabinet is moved,
the whole system breaks down: it takes him a long time to accommodate any physical
change.
R: At work I had to vacate my office and the stuff is still all currently in storage and it
causes me much grief and anxiety but I have 24 four-drawer filing cabinets of stuff filed
away. It’s all catalogued and indexed and I know where everything is within those
drawers. …
Res: Right, so to cross-reference you duplicate the copies and file [them both]? … Then
you’re remembering their actual position, the look of them in the cabinet, in the drawer?
R: Yeah. I know it’s [for example] third folder in, and that one is the tenth one in. …
Res: … When [your filing cabinets] come out [of storage], if they got put in your office
by mistake in the wrong order, would that muck everything up?
R: Ooh, yeah. (Interview)

The move to digitisation strategies of knowledge management within his workplace was
a major source of stress for Riley. Digitisation of information removes the concrete,
physical triggers that are a key element of his retrieval strategies, for which he has been
renown. Riley’s memory system for encoding and retrieval is highly state-dependent,
therefore, changes of context are extremely disruptive. The notion of state-dependent
memory is explicated in the case study of ‘JS’, who is a researcher diagnosed with AS
(Boucher, 2007). Boucher reported how JS is unable to voluntarily remember how to
navigate locations such as Heathrow airport, despite having been there many times. His
memory is prompted by the physical state of being at, for example, the baggage reclaim
area and this cues his memory of previous visits. At each stage of his journey, the
process is repeated. In this formulaic manner, JS is able to navigate through the airport
and to his destination without being able to freely recall how to do it.
In addition to Riley’s method of filing information, his recovery of some
autobiographical memories, like JS, displays a high degree of state-dependency.
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R: Until I was [aged] eleven, we were in a house in [suburb name]. It’s still standing. I’ve
been back and parked out the front of that house a couple of times. The house from there,
from [age] twelve till twenty, is empty, is demolished. It’s now replaced by a suburban
sprawl. I don’t want to go back there. I’ve driven past a couple of times. It’s gone.
Res: By going and parking out the front, is that helping you access memories in the same
way? And now you can’t do that?
R: With that one that’s gone, it’s gone. … It’s definitely not pleasant because I can
remember, ah, you know, it’s where I learned to ride a horse and all sorts of things like
that. It could bring me to tears very quickly. I’m not going to get angry about it but, but I
am quite stressed just talking about it. … And seeing the photos is not enough. I can see
the photos of the house and I took them and I know the house is there and that’s the car I
drove and there’s the dog and all the other things. But it’s not the same. (Interview)

Riley expressed deep distress at the demolition of the home of his adolescence as its
physical presence was necessary in order for him to experience those emotional
memories in a way that was meaningful to him and, from time to time, he liked to visit
the house and sit outside in his car to recover those memories. When asked about
whether photographs are an aid to memory recovery, he indicated that photographs do
not help with the recovery of emotion-laden autobiographical memories. However, he
appears to have no problem remembering significant details related to his work,
captured on photographs. Photographs related to professional matters that do not
contain personal emotional memories are useful in recovering memories.
R: When I was doing my exams, because they’d accumulated the best photos that were
available, they trotted out quite a few of my own photos and threw them back at me and
so I told them where we’d taken it and the histories of the animals and all that. Just from
the photos (snaps fingers), it’s enough to give quite a lot of information. (Interview)

Therefore, for Riley, photographs act as a successful memory trigger for factual
information but, for certain personal memories, they are insufficient. Personal, emotionladen memories appear to be state-dependent: that is, they require the physical presence
of the object (or for him to be in a physical location) in order for him to experience the
memory in any way that is meaningful to him, demonstrating a higher reliance on statedependency than is typical. This feature of Riley’s autobiographical memory highlights
the potential importance of external objects for key areas of memory and identity: that is,
emotions experienced at the memory’s source are mediated by the physical state of an
object, whereas factual, time-stamped information about events is easily retrieved
mentally through the use of visual strategies, such as the ‘mental filing cabinet’. The
state-dependency of such memories for Riley is contrasted with the capacity for mental
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time travel in typically developing individuals, who experience emotional memories
effortlessly through the mechanism of autonoetic consciousness. Although a level of
state-dependency operates for all individuals, Riley’s autobiographical memories in this
instance are unusually state-dependent: he can think factually about the memories but is
unable to experience them in a meaningful way. Figure 4.5 illustrates the relationship
between

source

memory,

autonoetic,

and

noetic

consciousness:

autonoetic

consciousness is the ‘hallmark’ of episodic memory (Bowler, et al., 2000, p. 295) and
stands in contrast to the ‘noetic’ form of human consciousness that is the hallmark of
semantic memory retrieval. Riley has noetic awareness but lacks autonoetic awareness,
thereby increasing the state-dependency of his autobiographical memories.
Riley’s externally oriented memory profile is consistent with the stronger semantic
memory and diminished episodic memory of the other cases in this doctoral study. His
account of autobiographical memories that are dependent upon a physical state
contributes to descriptions of state-dependency as outlined by Boucher (2007).
Furthermore, the notion of state-dependency of personal memories sheds light on the
issue of hoarding behaviours in AS. The catastrophic impact of the changed state of
personal possessions was portrayed within the movie Mozart and the Whale (Bass,
2001) (Section 8.11.4). One of the propositions of this doctoral thesis is that moving or
removing personal possessions may be an assault to an individual’s identity because of
the changed state of an object that constitutes an external representation of identity. This
is apparent in Riley’s case as demonstrated by the grief associated with his filing
cabinets being moved in and out of storage and the loss of his adolescent home.
Boucher’s account of the state-dependency of personal memories in JS’s case highlights
this key characteristic of memory in Riley’s case.
8.12.5

Childhood amnesia and source attribution

Riley described his memories of the serious car accident that happened when he was
three years old. The entire sequence is encoded as a ‘video’ that he replays in his mind.
Riley’s stance within the following utterance shifts between observer and protagonist.
R: I was in a severe car accident when I was [aged] three. I can replay that in my head. I
can replay that right now. But it’s me on the [median strip of the road] with all the people
around me and the camera is out here (indicates to the left or the right slightly above eye
level with his hand) and I know that is false because I’m not out there, I’m down here. So
why am I looking at the crowd around the car and the smash? So that’s a reconstruction
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and it’s not the real thing and I know it’s not but it’s playing now because I’ve mentioned
it. And so I know that that one is a reconstruction and it’s false but it’s well-entrenched.
Res: So [do you have] first-hand memories from three, from this car accident?
R: No, I can’t remember it. Well, I can remember the ride in the ambulance … and the
anaesthesia and being locked in the room with the boogie man because I wouldn’t eat my
eggs and all that sort of stuff … and your parents came to visit you once on Sunday
afternoons for an hour. I remember getting a [toy] car once. My sister tells me that my
parents used to hear me screaming and they’d all be crying out in the grounds and not
allowed to come in. … I know I was in and out [of hospital] for about 6 months.
(Interview)

Employing Tulving’s distinction between ‘remember’ (autonoetic consciousness) and
‘know’ responses (noetic consciousness) (Tulving, 1989), Riley’s description is a
curious mixture of ‘remember’ responses (the ride in the ambulance, the anaesthesia,
being locked in a cupboard at the hospital) and ‘know’ responses. He calls the ‘know’
responses a reconstruction. There is an attribution problem apparent in the statement:
‘So why am I looking at the crowd around the car and the smash?’ At this point he is
confusing the ‘camera’s’ observational perspective of a ‘known’ act of recall with his
first-hand experience. Using the term ‘construction’ to describe this kind of memory has
validity as it is an act of recall that has been visually encoded in his memory based on
other people’s narratives of the event. However, interestingly, Riley voluntarily
attributed some external sources (for instance, his sister) for this compiled memory even
though the entire sequence is encoded and retrieved as a ‘video’ (semantic-type
memory) rather than through an act of mental time travel that affords source attribution
(episodic-type memory). It is reasoned that this event was such a defining event in
Riley’s childhood that family members have contributed to his reconstruction of the
event in discussions over the years and it has been repeatedly mentally rehearsed. This
extensive rehearsal has perhaps allowed Riley to mentally shift between a first-person
and an observational stance in his recount of the memory and has conferred limited
attribution capacity, although some attribution confusion remains.
The analysis of this passage initially focused on childhood amnesia, however, it is
difficult to draw conclusions relating to lack of childhood amnesia as, unlike Kahla’s
and Nadia’s early memories, Riley’s recalled early memories were infused with trauma
and are clearly subject to other people’s contributions. Activation of the amygdala and
the release of stress hormone boost the retention of traumatic experiences in long-term
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memory (Cahill, 2008) and the contribution of family members to the construction of
the memory needs to be accounted for. In his interview, Riley did not recount many
personal memories of childhood that were not associated with the accident, however,
the passage was included for its additional illumination of the nature of Riley’s
autobiographical memory, rather than as evidence for diminished childhood amnesia.

8.13

Philosophical questions

The philosophical issues in Riley’s case are considered under the headings of: identity;
knowledge and the knower; acquiring knowledge; and, value.
8.13.1

Identity

As in the other four cases, Riley’s sense of difference and alienation cause him to
question his identity so that he asks himself questions such as, ‘What’s wrong with me?’
and, ‘Am I crazy?’ He does not appear to have arrived at a sense of resolution or
positive self-acceptance and his narrative has a negative flavour similar to Rhoda’s.
This is contrasted with Nadia’s sense of acceptance and celebration of her difference,
Kahla’s hard-won self-acceptance in adulthood and Colin’s begrudging self-acceptance
since his diagnosis of AS.
There are two features of Riley’s narrative that distinguish his account from the other
cases with regard to his sense of self: his solid and enduring relationship with his spouse,
Renae, who he has been with since young adulthood; and, his strong belief system. Both
of these factors appear to ground him and provide a stable environment within which he
functions and manages his perceived differences. Riley’s church environment provides
a strong, supportive social milieu for him where he experiences acceptance, although
sensory issues that arise within that environment are challenging. Within his family
(spouse, three children and grandchildren), he experiences acceptance and validation of
his identity as a gifted individual with AS. His wife, particularly, acts as a
‘knowledgeable mirror’, reflecting self-knowledge back to him and assisting him to
interpret his experiences within the framework of her professional understanding. His
strong belief system, coupled with solid, committed, family relationships, could be
credited with facilitating a successful lifestyle of career, family and interests, while he
also manages the challenges of AS and significant health issues.
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8.13.2

Knowledge and the knower

The epistemological problem is restated here as the question, ‘How can I know what is
true?’: that is, Riley’s relationship with knowledge and the issue of trustworthiness of
that knowledge. He has dedicated a lot of time and effort in his life researching and
accruing reliable knowledge. Management of the accrued knowledge is clearly an
important element in Riley’s account. In his profession, he was, prior to digitisation,
valued for his memory, knowledge and skill: particularly his capacity to retrieve
relevant and comprehensive research materials from his extensive filing system for use
in his own and his colleagues’ publishing, teaching and research. The workplace
demand for digitisation of these resources has undermined this aspect of his identity and
he stated that he had strong feelings of sadness and stress as a result. At the time of his
interview, his filing cabinets were in the process of being put into storage and he now
experiences intolerance from younger colleagues who are technology-reliant. This is
associated with a sense of angst over the loss of perceived personal value.
R: Today, Friday, [I] was told when I arrived at work that I had too much stuff in my
office, this is what I was able to salvage from the previous move and de-bulk … and I had
to remove a lot of it, today. Broke my heart. Something deep within cried out. Grief, yes.
Perhaps even something more than that. A defining event. My style of knowledge
accumulation and dispensing and use being eroded and rejected and thus I feel out of
control as well as rejected and/or not needed or not wanted or not accepted as a totality –
they need me because I am knowledgeable and committed, but they want me in their
mould – or something like that. A very, very sad day. (Email)

Riley experienced the move to digitisation and the attitudes of his colleagues towards
his traditional methods of knowledge management as an assault on his identity. Where,
previously, his colleagues have reflected admiration for his memory and knowledgemanagement capacity, they now reflect impatience with his rigidity in wanting to persist
with the methods that have been successful throughout his career. For his part, Riley is
critical of the digitisation process as he feels that important information will be lost or
overlooked through electronic search techniques that avoid the need for the individual
to be directly familiar with every aspect of a body of literature. He seems to associate
digitised knowledge with lack of trustworthiness and interprets his colleagues’ attitude
as diminishing the value of all reliable knowledge. This is unsurprising since Riley’s
thinking, memory and learning relies heavily on the concrete and literal aspects of
memory. Riley has focused his life and sense of self around mastery of defined bodies
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of knowledge upon which he can rely: factual and evidence-based. Changing
knowledge management methodologies represent a challenge to his sense of self.
8.13.3

Acquiring knowledge

The methodological question, ‘How does one go about acquiring knowledge?’, is easily
answered in Riley’s case as he explained his learning process in detail. He uses the
research process to acquire factual knowledge like a ‘sponge’ (Renae: Interview), reads
as much as possible, takes extensive notes about what he has read, files and indexes the
notes with cross-references. This process applies to special interests and his professional
life. It also impacts on his interactions with other people as he enjoys supplying family,
friends and colleagues with material on their topics of interest. Indeed, following his
interview, Riley supplied the researcher with a bundle of resources (articles and movies)
as an act of support for the research: these were accepted as artefacts for his case. In this
way, shared knowledge acts as a relationship ‘bridge’ for Riley to other people. Riley
positioned himself as a very active learner utilising research methods for every area of
his life, including a study of ‘what makes people tick’ (Interview) through books and
movies in order to facilitate his social interactions.
8.13.4

Value

Regarding the axiological identity question ‘Am I valuable or not?’, Riley has received
equivocal messages throughout his life. At work, he was formerly valued but now feels
profoundly devalued due to the changing methods of knowledge management and
learning in the workplace. His school and university experiences contrasted with his
parents’ apparent lack of support and have contributed to his ambivalent sense of
personal worth: instances of feedback by teachers and advisors that communicated
admiration for his intelligence and career preferences conflicted with received messages
from his family, who did not support his eligibility for selective (gifted) education or his
career choice. A sense of distance, even disinterest, by his parents and siblings is
evident in his account. Even though Riley’s wife and family now reflect to him his
value in a much more positive way, this does not seem to have overwritten the messages
of his early family life. Like Rhoda, Colin, Nadia, and Kahla, the question of self-worth
is an area of great uncertainty for Riley.
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8.14

Conclusion

An uneven cognitive profile is apparent in Riley’s case, with language representing a
profound challenge to his thinking, memory and learning. Externally oriented strategies
are evident in his account through his descriptions of memory, which draw extensively
upon concrete metaphors. His personal, emotional memories display an unusual degree
of state-dependency compared to typically developing individuals. Heterogeneity
among the cognitive profiles of the five cases is apparent: for instance, Riley retains
very limited early childhood memories while Kahla claims to remember most things
about her infancy.
Riley’s mental processes have been described in this doctoral thesis as a three-step
process of ‘translation’ between language and visual mode of thought. This process is
further complicated by the challenge of enhanced perceptual function combined with
poor executive control of attention, meaning that, like Rhoda and Colin, he has
difficulty gating or filtering sensory information particularly when language is involved,
such as when attending to a conversation against a background of other conversations.
Engaging in the mental translation necessary for social participation is, for Riley,
exhausting. Riley’s ‘compensatory’ form of thinking creates a processing time lag that
affects his participation in conversation and the way he conducts his learning. As a
result of his thinking style, he employs a process-oriented, perseverative approach to
manage personal knowledge and finds it difficult to understand the learning of
individuals with a different approach.
Riley’s memory style has been advantageous in previous work environments where the
development of physical filing systems allowed him to rote-remember huge quantities
of data via visually representing the physical act of retrieving the data: by picturing
himself retrieving a particular file from its place in the filing system, he could recall the
contents of the file (or personal event), including the date and time of many memories
in the form of a time-stamp on the ‘file’. Therefore, his physical filing system supported
and reflected his mental storage and retrieval system. With the move to digitisation of
knowledge in his professional life, he finds himself greatly disadvantaged because the
externally oriented memory methods, for which he was renown, are no longer helpful.
He experiences this as a loss of personal worth and an assault on his identity.
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Riley’s cognitive profile, as was also evident in the other cases, demonstrates increased
reliance on semantic-style memory strategies with reduced reliance on episodic
strategies. Learning through the use of explicit research methods is Riley’s modus
operandi for work, social and personal matters. However, strong family relationships
and religious beliefs appear to be a key factor contributing to Riley’s overall success,
rather than compensatory learning alone. The factors that contribute to, and are
hallmarks of, the success of a long-term life partnership between an individual with AS
and a TD individual in the face of obstacles that overwhelm so many such relationships,
would be a topic of great interest for future research using an IPA research design.
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Part	
  C 	
  
Part C is the final section of the thesis and includes Chapters 9 and 10. Chapter 9,
‘Discussion & Findings’: discusses the key components of the conceptual framework,
the Thinking, Memory and Learning Framework (TML), that is the theoretical output of
this study; employs the TML to frame a discussion of the emergent themes; and,
proposes a representation of the cognitive profile of the five cases in the light of the
conceptual framework. Chapter 10, ‘Conclusion’, draws the thesis to a close. Chapter
10: discusses the super-ordinate theme, ‘Knowledge and the knower’; addresses the
research question and sub-questions; offers pedagogical insights based on the findings
of this research; and, poses questions and directions for future research.
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Chapter 9 Discussion & Findings
Essential elements of the conceptual framework that is the output of this doctoral study
are presented at the beginning of this chapter. The conceptual framework is presented in
full in Appendix C. The themes emerging from the case studies are discussed in light of
the conceptual framework, which is further utilised to characterise the cognitive profiles
of the five primary participants.

9.1

Conceptual framework

As this doctoral study presents a new perspective, utilising first-hand accounts of
thinking and learning by individuals with AS, it sought to ‘map the landscape’ of the
participants’ experience within the parameters set by the research questions. The
conceptual framework, the ‘Thinking, Memory and Learning Framework’ (TML) is one
of the practical outcomes of this doctoral study: it is a series of diagrams and
explanations, with literature references, to be utilised for professional development (PD)
presentations. The TML framework:
(a)

draws the cross-disciplinary research literature together to allow insights from
other disciplines to be available to an educational audience (teachers, parents,
individuals with AS, life partners);

(b)

is a professional development tool for communicating conceptual understanding
to teachers and other stakeholders in order to address the educational problem that
initiated this doctoral study;

(c)

is a summary of the literature reviews conducted in response to the call for
firsthand accounts of ‘Mind’ from individuals with autism (Gardiner, 2008)
(Figure 1.4);

(d)

facilitates a means to describe and compare the cognitive profiles of the cases in
this doctoral research in a way that is helpful to stakeholders for a consideration
of the cognitive profile of their student, family member or self with AS; and,

(e)

is a useful framework for the consideration of questions for future educational
research.
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The TML began, early in the study, as an attempt to compile the relevant literature for
the purpose of PD presentations to teachers. However, the act of making sense of the
cross-disciplinary literature seemed, of itself, to represent knowledge construction. The
development of the TML was, therefore, driven by the desire to bring to light important
concepts that are familiar within the research but not yet readily available to teachers
across disciplinary boundaries. Yet such concepts have an important bearing on the
provision of learning environments for gifted students with AS: for example, the
concept of ‘theory of mind’ (ToM) is closely aligned with the concept of ‘metacognition’
as generally understood by teachers, particularly teachers of gifted learners, and yet
ToM was not a familiar concept for many teachers in the local educational environment.
The researcher’s relief at finding even a single reference, Neihart (2000) in the case of
metacognition, to confirm a seemingly obvious relationship, was great. So it was
valuable through the course of this study to continually ‘map’ conceptual ideas from the
different bodies of literature against each other in order to see what insights this would
produce, and how it might expedite explanations to teachers, parents, adults with AS
and life partners. The process is an obvious ‘fit’ with the theory development activity of
collective case studies, according to Punch (2009), which allows for the possibility of
some measure of generalisability.
9.1.1

Thinking, memory and learning

To represent the relationship between thinking, memory and learning from the literature,
the following word algorithm was constructed:
Information processing + Memory = Learning

This can be expanded to:
Information processing (i.e. thinking) in working memory + successful encoding, storage
and retrieval in long-term memory = learning (i.e. acquisition of knowledge,
understanding and skills).

Effortful thinking takes place in working memory, which is time limited. If anything of
that thinking is encoded in long-term memory for future retrieval, the form of the
thinking will determine the memory system deployed: for example, the memory
resulting from personal experience will be handled by episodic memory and symbolic
encoding will be handled by semantic memory. However, an instance of thinking or
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learning does not naturally conform to one memory system: the memory systems work
together during encoding to, and retrieval from, working memory.
Different types of thinking or reasoning are characteristic of particular long-term
learning and memory systems. The characteristics of a type of thinking (for example,
rote remembering) align with the characteristics of the long-term memory system in
which it will be remembered (or not remembered). Based on the five human learning
and memory systems illustrated in Figure 4.3, Figure 9.1 was created by moving
working memory underneath the other four memory systems. Working memory is the
interface with the long-term memory systems and is the location of information
processing or ‘thinking’. From the literature, the characteristics of thinking that align
with, or are ‘native’ to, each memory system are listed in columns within working
memory: this produced the representation shown in Figure 9.1. The horizontal arrows in
Figure 9.1 indicate contrasting thinking processes: for example, the ‘remember
responses’ of episodic memory contrasted with the ‘know responses’ of semantic
memory.

Figure 9.1 Characteristics of thinking associated with the learning and memory systems
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The mapping process represented in Figure 9.1 is theoretical and indicative. It is useful
for PD of educators and contributes to an understanding of the learning processes of the
mind and brain. Amnesia studies have demonstrated that learning is severely
compromised when there is damage to episodic memory as a result of brain injury
(Tulving, 2002). As memory systems are discrete, yet work in harmony to encode and
retrieve experience and knowledge, if there is damage or impairment to one system, it
stands to reason that learning will be compromised or take on different characteristics:
this is indeed the case with Tulving’s participant ‘K.C.’. It would be informative, but
beyond the scope of this doctoral study, to compare the literature on further cases, such
as Phineas Gage (Damasio, 1994), to see the impact on the learning characteristics of
those individuals.
9.1.2

A learning hierarchy

There is a hierarchy between the learning and memory systems that is reflected within
the mental activities that are native to each system. From an extended reading of the
literature, it became apparent that terms such as ‘bottom-up’ and ‘top-down’, ‘early
developing’ and ‘later maturing’, imply this hierarchy. Bloom’s taxonomy of
educational objectives in the cognitive domain (Bloom, 1974), commonly referred to as
‘Bloom’s hierarchy of thinking skills’, has been critiqued for lack of evidence from
learning research (Ritchhart, et al., 2011). In contrast, the TML is an evidence-based
hierarchical approach as it was constructed from a review of definitions and concepts
from more than sixty research articles: the full list of references is provided in Appendix
B as numbered footnotes and a reference list. Evidence for a hierarchy within long-term
memory systems was presented in Section 4.4.8. Incidentally, although this framework
is profoundly different from Bloom’s taxonomy of thinking skills, it supports his notion
of a hierarchy within cognitive activity and therefore conflicts with the view that ‘the
idea that thinking is sequential or hierarchical is problematic’ (Ritchhart, et al., 2011, p.
6).
Figure 9.2 (also Figure 4.8) shows the developmental order of the three memory
systems of interest and the hierarchy in their associated forms of consciousness.
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Figure 9.2 Hierarchy of learning and memory systems and their associated forms of consciousness

The hierarchy is indicated by the developmental progression of anoetic consciousness
(raw sensory experience) to noetic consciousness (single-item symbolic representation)
and, finally, to autonoetic consciousness (mental time travel). It is indicated, for
example, by terms such as ‘top-down modulation’ vs. ‘bottom-up processing’, which
are references to strong and weak central coherence. In line with the hierarchy between
learning and memory systems, there is also a hierarchy within the corresponding mental
activities: these are the activities and characteristics listed in Figure 9.1 as taking place
in working memory, such as the progression from experiential (perceptual memory) to
symbolic (semantic memory) to abstract (episodic memory).
9.1.3

‘Learning Ladder’

The evidence for a hierarchy between different mental activities (see the table in
Appendix B; see also Table 4.3) was distilled and the hierarchical ‘ladder’ of thinking
and learning activities that resulted allows a series of inverse relationships pertaining to
learning to become apparent, as shown in Figure 9.3. Memorising isolated facts relies
on the single-item processing of semantic memory with each rung up the ladder drawing
more upon episodic memory processes.
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Figure 9.3 Learning Ladder: inverse relationships

As shown in Figure 9.3, memory for facts is reliant on semantic-memory representation,
whereas formation of schemas and personal knowledge constructs (concept formation)
are reliant on episodic thinking: conceptual relationships, simultaneous processing and
memory binding are functions of episodic memory. Central coherence equates to a topdown processing style, whereas individuals with AS most likely have a bottom-up, or
detailed-focus, processing style and therefore are said to have weak central coherence.
A top-down processing style is represented by the top of the ladder: a bottom-up
processing style is represented by the bottom of the ladder. Some writers refer to strong
central coherence in terms of high-level information processing, meaning that
increasingly sophisticated mental organising strategies, such as categories, prototypes
and schemas, are employed in thinking, memory and learning: low-level information
processing style refers to processing that is literal, tied to the ‘concrete’ and does not
require the use of organising strategies.
An instance of learning that employs mental activity from the bottom of the learning
ladder is the recognition of the object in Figure 9.4 as familiar: this draws upon
perceptual and semantic memory.
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Figure 9.4 Photograph of fruit: an orange. Used under licence

Naming it as an ‘orange’ represents the application of language (a semantic system
function) to the notion. Classifying an orange as ‘fruit’ requires the development of
categories and the correct designation to a single category or multiple categories: for
example, round objects, food, plants, orange-coloured objects. This is a low-level use of
an organising strategy or a simple schema. Moving up the ladder in Figure 9.3,
prototype development is a more sophisticated organising strategy involving the
memorisation of a summary representation of a category, which may not be an actual
instance, and comparing newly encountered instances with the prototype. This is an
efficient deployment of memory compared to memorising each instance of every
category. Concept development is a yet more efficient means of knowledge construction
and relies more on abstract reasoning than the mental activities lower on the ladder. The
highest rung of the ladder represents personal meaning-making incorporating the
application of values, beliefs and worldview as part of personal knowledge construction.
As long as an individual’s schemas and conceptual understanding are reliable (that is,
they accurately represent reality), then abstraction higher up the ladder affords
generalisability to new situations and circumstances that is not available to knowledge
construction at the lower levels of the ladder.
In Figure 9.5, the Learning Ladder is employed to characterise the likely cognitive
profile of gifted individuals with AS showing cognitive strengths and weaknesses that
impact upon thinking and learning.
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Figure 9.5 Learning Ladder: inverse relationships showing likely cognitive strengths and weaknesses
for gifted individuals with AS

Figure 9.5 illustrates that a gifted learner with AS will, most likely, demonstrate a
superior capacity in learning activities that require memory for discrete factual
knowledge but once organising strategies such as prototype development or concept
formation are required in order to mentally represent knowledge, then they will be
increasingly challenged. The pedagogical implications of the Learning Ladder and its
inverse relationships are discussed in Chapter 10.
The literature that was reviewed to construct the TML is listed in full in Appendix B
and the complete set of diagrams and explanations that make up the TML is given in
Appendix C.

9.2

Emergent themes

The TML serves as the theoretical framework for the interpretation of the five emergent
themes, which are: Compensatory learning; Self-referential thinking vs. externally
oriented thinking; Enhanced perceptual functioning and giftedness; Temporality; and,
Language.
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9.2.1

Compensatory learning

Compensatory learning is significant because it indicates how the primary participants
have adapted to ‘fit’ an education system and culture evolved principally for typically
developing individuals. One of the goals of the teacher PD activities of this doctoral
study is that teachers will have the capacity to recognise, facilitate and reward the
authentic learning of their students with AS, even when the learning is compensatory. It
is proposed that teachers, as educational problem-solvers, should explore the learning
needs of each individual student and, where there are learning blockages, facilitate
compensatory pathways of learning, as demonstrated so clearly in Nadia’s case.
Evidence of compensatory learning was apparent within the accounts of the participants.
(a) Through prolonged tutoring and careful explanations by her psychologists, Kahla
learnt to overcome her usual way of talking, which was based on the belief that: (i)
‘You say everything you think’; and, (ii) ‘The more important something is, the
louder it is said’, accompanied by larger gestures. From Kahla’s case, the lesson to
be learnt is that compensatory learning may be needed to alter incorrect beliefs
before more extensive learning can occur. The motivation to accept change was
strong in Kahla’s case at this point in her life and she was able to learn the new
principle, ‘You don’t have to say everything you think’, which has significantly
enhanced her social interaction.
(b) Kahla taught herself to recognise the faces of people she met socially by taking a
mental photograph of the face and storing it effortfully in her visual memory. She
practised retrieving the ‘photos’ and found that she had an increased capacity to
recognise natural faces through this process. This was a specific instance of
compensatory learning based on a premise that was personally meaningful to her:
‘Since I can remember faces from a magazine or television, can I learn to remember
the faces of people I meet using a similar technique?’
(c) Compensatory theory of mind to account for the behaviour of other people is
expressed in Kahla’s narrative (Section 4.8.4).
K: You are right in thinking that I think a lot about how I and my sons think. I constantly
evaluate and assess and pull apart our minds and events. At about age 4, I realised
something was wrong, and by age 5 I was certain. It was then I began to study human
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behaviour intently. Unfortunately, I also decided to study animal behaviour by reasoning
that we are animals, and, for many years, applied what I had learned about cats, dogs and
birds, to people, with dismal results. (Email)

(d) The ‘study of people’ as a special interest was explicitly raised by Kahla and Riley
and is an example of compensatory learning. Nadia’s play script and descriptions of
her interactions with her peers at school indicated her close observation of people
and attempts to make sense of human social interaction and behaviours. Riley said
that he conducted his study of people through watching movies of period dramas
from Victorian England, such as those based on Jane Austen’s books: the rules of
social interaction and human behaviour are structured and explicit. Nadia
experimented with human behaviour through her written play characters and, like
Riley and Kahla, through reading fiction: her fantasy and fiction reading catered for
her interest in studying behaviour and potential outcomes when unpredictable things
happen. At a basic level, the study of people from television, movies and books
provides potential social scripts but Kahla, Nadia and Riley appeared to be
searching for knowledge beyond social scripts, desiring insight and understanding.
(e) The effort of working with language through the research interview was a
demanding task for Rhoda and Riley. Rhoda, like Temple Grandin, may be using
language in a compensatory way, as illustrated by Figure 5.1, where an object is
remembered symbolically and the word is remembered only by being visualised as
attached to the object: rather than the word symbolically representing the object in
memory. Wendy discussed the possibility that Colin might be able to mentally
picture a word as a label attached to its object to overcome his spelling problem but,
for him, this was not a useful strategy.
(f) Nadia had received social coaching, from the same psychology practice attended by
Kahla, regularly since she was 12 years old. She had embraced this learning as it
smoothed her schooling and social life but she was aware that it was compensatory,
not corrective, and was proud at being different from the ‘mainstream’. She, like
Kahla, was extremely well spoken in her interview, with excellent diction, positive
body gestures and well-regulated prosody. With the dual elements of strong
motivation and excellent coaching, the compensatory learning of Kahla and Nadia
in the area of speech and social interaction appeared to be profound.
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(g) Nadia’s capacity to speak at length on a subject and give a coherent presentation
contrasted with the associative speech of Colin. The structure and substance of one
of Nadia’s monologues demonstrated her capacity to keep her subject in mind,
return to it, build on it and draw a conclusion. This raises the question as to whether
this is a learned compensatory skill or whether, having had intervention since preadolescence, she has developed ways of thinking and speaking more characteristic
of typically developing children. Being the youngest participant, who had received
intense interventions over a long time, sets Nadia’s case apart from the others.
(h) Nadia had learnt to employ some simple metacognitive strategies in managing her
learning at school, which indicates significant gains of mental control and selfreflection.
(i) If the proposal of this thesis regarding ‘native’ modes of thought is accurate, then
the use of language itself is a compensatory strategy for those participants who are
not verbal thinkers: Rhoda, Colin and Riley.
Compensatory strategies are not as flexible as the competencies they are catering for.
One hallmark of compensation, unlike cognitive competence, is that it will be
inconsistent across different situations. (Williams, D. M. & Bowler, 2014, p. 3)

Riley displayed a level of factual knowledge about himself (rather than ‘selfknowledge’) in his interview that he explained came from Renae in the form of a series
of statements. Whereas Nadia has acquired dynamic compensatory skills that allow her
to socially interact in a sophisticated way, for example, in giving a short, engaging,
well-constructed, impromptu monologue on a topic of interest to her listeners, Riley’s
compensatory social learning had been reflected to him by Renae to make sense of a
specific situation. Nadia’s learning is a flexible skill that she can employ in many
spheres of her life, while Riley’s learning pertains to particular social situations and he
remains reliant upon Renae for social cues in new situations. Therefore, from these
cases, it appears that not all compensatory learning is equal. The nature of successful
compensatory learning will be individual to each person, as is indicated by the
heterogeneity of AS. Again, a hierarchy can be proposed, this time of the
generalisability of learning: Nadia’s speech construction skills have wider
generalisability to other situations than Riley’s learned feedback from his wife about a
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particular social situation. From an educational perspective, it is desirable to facilitate
the development of higher-order knowledge and skills as well as factual information
and the distinction should be kept in mind by teachers.
Many authors refer to the compensatory learning of individuals with AS: for example,
learning social ‘rules’ to compensate for lack of theory of mind. As noted earlier,
compensatory learning is a ‘slow and painstaking learning process’ (Frith, U. & Happé,
1999, cited in Lind & Bowler, 2008, p. 178) and contributes to a different form of selfconsciousness, founded on cognition that relies on external referents in place of selfreferential processing.
9.2.2

Self-referential thinking vs. externally oriented thinking

One of the major characteristics of thinking and learning in AS is the reliance on
externally oriented thinking strategies. Self-referential thinking processes are
diminished in AS and the flipside appears to be increased reliance on the external,
concrete world, even for matters of personal experience and identity. Phenomena
usually thought of as being internal to oneself were described by the primary
participants as if external. Externally oriented thinking was expressed in the case studies
in many ways.
(a) Colin’s belief in a supernatural force that may be responsible for his giftedness
indicates attribution of an internal reality to an external phenomenon.
(b) Riley’s state-dependent emotional memories associated with his demolished family
home are a demonstration of externally oriented thinking and align with the statedependent, associative mental states ascribed to ‘JS’ (Boucher, 2007).
(c) Riley related his difficulties at work when his filing cabinets were moved. His
memory of what is in the filing cabinets is significantly dependent upon their
location. When a filing cabinet is moved he is unable to remember its contents as
effectively as before. This is a further expression of the state-dependency of his
memory processes.
(d) Kahla referred to her memory as though it was an external entity: either a twin or
another identity. There was no threatening implication in this reference: it is as
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though she cannot believe her good fortune to have so much, where she perceives
others as having so little.
(e) Rhoda stated that she relied on maps to navigate to a new location, even if only a
short distance away. If Steve tries to explain a nearby location to her, she
experiences a mental sense of being ‘lost’ the moment she attempts to imagine
leaving a known location: she is unable to navigate using landmarks or verbal
directions, even over a short distance. The rehearsal of having physically travelled
every part of a route is required before she can imagine any variation to the route,
indicating a reliance on concrete experience for mental manipulation.
(f) The use of self-generated metaphors during interviews was a surprise finding that
was particularly prominent in Kahla’s, Nadia’s and Riley’s accounts. The metaphors
accomplished the work of reifying abstract concepts, making it possible for them to
be articulated. The use of metaphors in this way represents externally oriented
thinking: external objects within the metaphors are employed to represent internal
experience in place of direct descriptions of first-hand experience. Some of the
metaphors employed by the participants are listed below.
(i)

All the primary participants referred to their memory recovery using
metaphoric terms such as: video; movie; tape; play; recorder; or, camera.

(ii)

Kahla described her memory as a vast storehouse of information like a library.

(iii)

Riley and Kahla both stated that their memories were like filing systems.
Riley closely associated his memory to his physical filing cabinets at work
and, when speaking of his memory, made references to indexing, crossreferencing, opening a filing cabinet drawer, pulling out a file and seeing a
time stamp on the file.

(iv)

Kahla described switching from a more recent memory state to an earlier
infantile memory as being ‘like when you hop into a bath’, which is
interesting for itself and because she is describing a mental activity rather
than an object or fact.

(v)

Kahla described her life as being like a circle, rather than a line, meaning that
she feels very close to her infantile memories regardless of the passing of
time, whereas she observes that others seem to move further away from their
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memories as time passes and memories decay. Her memories, being arranged
in a circle, are always fresh, no matter how distant they are in time.
(vi)

Rhoda offered The Cabinet of Dr Caligari as a metaphor for her horror of
certain objects. She was able to communicate the factual information that she
has a horror of certain objects but when she tried to communicate the
emotional impact of her phobias, she instead offered the Dr Caligari
reference, which her partner, Steve, explained.

(vii)

Riley described his study of how people ‘tick’, using a clockwork metaphor,
evoking the allusion of a clock being taken apart.

(viii) Colin used the metaphor of mixing colours to describe his thinking process:
‘if yellow and red make orange, then …’
(ix)

Nadia spoke of AS as a ‘bump in the road’ and like there is a ‘glass wall
between [me] and everybody else’.

(x)

Riley described his thinking processes as constructing ‘skyscrapers’ or
building ‘blocks’ of thought. Kahla used similar terms, such as ‘block of
speech’, ‘block of memory’ and retrieving a ‘block’.

Self-referential processing is portrayed in the neuroscience literature as an operation of
episodic memory that confers a memory advantage, the self-referencing effect: that is,
an event, skill or item of knowledge that has a personal meaning for the individual will
be processed and remembered favourably compared to an event with which the
individual has no personal connection. Teachers will recognise the outworking of this
phenomenon in education as active learning, which is engaging and productive for
learners compared to passive ‘book learning’ (the learning of material with low personal
relevance for the learner). Individuals with AS do not benefit from the self-referencing
effect to the same extent as TD individuals.
During the course of this doctoral study, an association was observed between selfreferential processing and externally oriented thinking that is not clear in the literature:
the phenomena of self-referential processing and externally oriented thinking appear to
be complementary phenomena (Figure 9.6).
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Figure 9.6 Self-referential processing vs. externally oriented thinking4

If, as the literature asserts is the case in autism, self-referential processing were absent
or markedly diminished, on what, then, would an individual rely? The answer, in the
case of AS, appears to be that external objects become invested with personal meaning,
of which the individual themselves may be unaware, never having known any other
state of being. Change, even a slight change, such as an object being moved, would
change the ‘state’ of the object in the mental representation of the individual and could
be significant and distressing to them.
Furthermore, self-referential processing is a building block for identity formation: being
able to answer the question ‘Who am I?’ to one’s own satisfaction. Without selfreferential processing, ‘Who am I?’ must be answered with reference to externalities.
Therefore, any object that holds significance for an individual’s identity (these objects
are dubbed ‘identity-holders’) would present a particular vulnerability for that person if
the object were to be changed in any way (moved, broken, stolen) that results in their
mental representation of the object no longer matching the object’s physical state: their
mental representation, most likely, being visual and inflexible. If an object that is an
identity-holder is changed, then the individual’s sense of self, invested in the object, has
been breached.

4

http://lostpedia.wikia.com/wiki/File:Scales_of_justice.jpg Cubes added to original
Creative commons CC BY-NC-ND 2.5 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/
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Venturing a step further, the life partner or parent, without knowing, may act as an
‘identity mirror’ for an individual with AS by reflecting back representations of the self.
Perhaps a partner may even represent the ‘self’ to the individual with AS in the same
way an object might be an ‘identity holder’. Therefore, one of the propositions
emerging from this doctoral study is that the tendency to externally oriented thinking
processes in place of self-referential processing suggests that objects and even another
person can represent the identity of an individual with AS, to that individual.
Change to the state of an object, or a person (for example, a change of hair style), may
therefore have potentially catastrophic consequences for the individual with AS.
Typically developing individuals are partly insured against this vulnerability by an
internal sense of self, supported by the specialised neural network for self-referential
processing that is underactive in individuals with AS.
9.2.3

Enhanced perceptual functioning and giftedness

Part-way through the data analysis and interpretation of Case 3 in the light of Tulving’s
memory systems framework, it became evident that the explicit long-term memory
systems of semantic and episodic memory were not sufficient to interpret some of the
phenomena within Colin’s narrative. At this point, attention turned to the perceptual
representation system (perceptual memory) and further reading uncovered the
proposition of enhanced perceptual functioning in autism (Mottron, et al., 2006).
Colin’s existential descriptions of taking superb wildlife photos, such as the osprey in
Figure 6.3, and his assertions that he had never consciously learnt anything (Section
6.4), pointed to mental experience that is either (or both): opaque to him due to an
attribution problem; or, relies less on explicit memory processing and more on implicit
memory processing (perceptual memory and procedural memory). The phenomenon of
procedural memory was beyond the boundaries of this doctoral study but Colin’s
narrative could be interpreted in the light of implicit memory processing, specifically
enhanced perceptual functioning. In an earlier era, this form of memory was described
as ‘unconscious’ or ‘subconscious’: within the current memory research, this form of
memory is described as being characterised by anoetic consciousness or ‘without
awareness’, and ‘non-declarative’, meaning that it cannot be spoken about.
The other cases were then reconsidered in the light of enhanced perceptual functioning
and immediately it became clear that Kahla’s account of ‘dots’ and her enhanced colour
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perception belonged in this category: Rhoda’s artistic capacities and Riley’s heightened
perceptive ability to see minute indications of disease passed over by others are further
evidence of enhanced perceptual functioning. An association with the superior gifts of
the primary participants became apparent. From an educational perspective, this implies
that gifted students with AS may be perceiving phenomena in the environment that are
not commonly perceived by their teachers: Kahla’s query about the researcher’s
‘colourblindness’ is an example. Enhanced perceptual functioning is understood within
the literature in relation to sensory sensitivities but recognition of the connection with
giftedness within the educational literature is also needed. Teachers will, quite
reasonably, discount things they themselves cannot perceive: the challenge for teachers
arising from this association is how to recognise, facilitate and nurture their student’s
gifts when essential phenomena of the giftedness are beyond the teacher’s perception.
9.2.4

Temporality

The differences in temporal processing and temporality in gifted students with AS, with
the flow-on affect to theory of mind and episodic thinking, have a heavy impact on
learning. Temporality is a function of episodic memory: its impairment has the result
that a personal sense of the passing of time, of one’s self as situated in time, and relative
time judgements (such as ‘before’, ‘after’, ‘a few days ago’) will be impaired,
apparently resulting in an increased reliance on the measured ‘clock time’ of semantic
memory. Indeed, children with AS are described by their parents ‘as living as if “time
did not exist”’ (Zukauskas, et al., 2009, p. 85). The findings of Zukauskas, et al, are
supported by the case studies of this doctoral research, where the participants’
utterances were concentrated into semantic-style, ‘documentary’ recounts of personal
memories, accompanied by lack of recounts of personal experience indicating ‘mental
time travel’. Furthermore, the issue of identity formation is impacted by temporality as
identity formation is founded upon a subjective sense of one’s self in the past, one’s self
in the present and one’s self in the future.
The issues concerning temporality noted within the cases of this doctoral study follow.
(a) Temporality differences are indicated by the nature of personal memories from
infancy (that is, the lack of childhood amnesia) in Kahla’s and Nadia’s accounts
(Section 4.7.6 and Section 7.6). Kahla gave clear descriptions of her babyhood
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memories as ‘watching’ or ‘playing’ a video tape. Loss of eidetic memories from
infancy and the switch to mental time travel for personal memory recovery were not
indicated in Kahla’s and Nadia’s accounts.
(b) Riley’s ability to see a time-stamp on his recovered memories is an example of
superior clock-time and calendar-time, the domain of semantic memory, and was
accompanied by lack of subjective temporal terms, and hesitations in his speech
when expressing temporal shifts (Section 8.12.1).
(c) Riley’s account of his car accident at age three was given in language lacking
problems of temporal-shifting and perspective-shifting (Section 8.12.5). It is most
likely the case that this particular account is well-rehearsed, having been repeated by
family members since childhood: whereas in other less-rehearsed segments in his
interview, he struggled with the language required to indicate temporal shift, as well
as pronoun usage to indicate changes in perspective.
(d) With a diminished sense of subjective time to aid memory recovery, recovery of
personal memories becomes reliant instead on external objects, locations and cues:
for example, Riley’s struggle to recover emotional memories from his childhood
home because the house had been demolished. This feature of memory in AS has
been described as ‘state-dependency’ (Section 8.10 and 8.12.4).
(e) The attribution of the source of knowledge (‘Did I say that or did someone else say
it?’) relies, in part, on a personal subjective sense of time (‘Did I think that before
or after I heard someone else say it?) (Section 4.4.2). Colin tends to attribute his
knowledge and skill to supernatural intervention instead of himself. Negative selfworth beliefs appear to foster the supernatural attribution although those negative
beliefs are accompanied by high self-efficacy beliefs about his capacity as an artisan
(Sections 6.6 and 6.7.5). The question of Colin’s lack of awareness of his own
knowledge was canvassed in Chapter 6 from the perspective of temporal attribution:
‘Does his awareness of his knowledge of an event come before or after the event?’
Colin’s cognitive profile (see Figure 9.8) could be interpreted as conferring his
knowledge, or noetic awareness, of an event (such as taking a brilliant wildlife
photograph) before the event to after the event. In other words, he doesn’t
‘consciously’ think about taking the photograph until after it has been taken: the act
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of planning and capturing the photograph has relied upon implicit memory
processes instead. The phenomenon of ‘flow’ and the change to one’s personal
sense of time experienced in ‘flow’ were noted in this context (Section 6.7.1).
(f) Colin’s attribution to the supernatural, an external entity, suggests that the
temporality issues in AS may contribute to the reliance upon external objects,
locations and representations: this proposition contributes a fresh perspective on the
phenomenon of externally oriented thinking in AS.
(g) Nadia’s use of temporal shifting in her play script is interesting: she reifies the
temporal shift of childhood to adulthood by having the child-self and the adult-self
as separate characters in her play (Section 7.3). Rather than showing the characters’
incremental change over time, she has reified just two ‘now’ states. Her choice of
this means of representation could be a characteristic of temporality issues in AS, as
discussed by Zukauskas et al., (2009).
In comparing features of Kahla’s recall of personal memories to Riley’s, temporal
shifting issues in Kahla’s language may have been compensated for by her enormous
expediency in language and a huge capacity to access her own semantic-style personal
memories. To use a metaphor, it is as though she has a high-speed, high-resolution
television studio at her disposal ready to replay any one of her vast library of ‘video
recorded’ memories, while Riley’s ‘playback’ is achieved through a single video
machine where time, experienced as hesitancy and repetition in his speech along with
closing or covering his eyes, is required to select and play back the correct ‘tape’ in
order to recall the memory. This hesitation may be compounded by the multiple
demands of accessing the memory and then ‘translation’ of the memory into words for
the interview: neither of these demands appeared to burden Kahla.
9.2.5

Language

Kahla and Nadia, both hyperlexic, were the only participants who did not spontaneously
offer the information that they struggled with conversation or handwriting. This appears
to set them apart from the others: early language development and high levels of
interaction with their mothers was noted in both these cases, in contrast to the other
cases where the mothers were remote or absent during early childhood; and, both had
benefitted from extended periods of social skills coaching. Rhoda, Colin and Riley are
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challenged in any task where language is a requirement layered over other cognitive
activity: handwriting, creative writing, spelling, spoken language (for example, pronoun
use and deictic shifting problems), auditory processing of language, and conversation.
Language difficulties and the impact upon their thinking and learning were a common
thread in these three cases when recalling their school experiences. Language is further
considered in the light of cognitive profiles later in this chapter (Section 9.3).
9.2.5.1

Dyslexia and dyscalculia

Dyslexia was diagnosed in childhood in three cases, Rhoda, Colin and Riley, and there
is a clear association in the narratives between the participants’ experience of
handedness and dyslexia: that is, they raised the issue of handedness unsolicited while
describing their dyslexia. In addition, Kahla gave a clear description of dyscalculia
(Section 4.2.2): her description of the experience of dyscalculia accorded with the other
cases’ descriptions of dyslexia. Numbers, or words, were described as sliding off the
page, moving as if animated, rotating in a spiral, or moving in some way that made it
very difficult for the eye to track and decode them. Rhoda also told how she read the
digits of a number in the reverse order while at school, which led to calculation errors,
even though she was very competent at mathematical processes. Rhoda spoke about her
eyes and brain as having a ‘skitter’ that made it difficult to read music notation from
one stave to the next: while Rhoda described the problem with musical notation as
being in her own eyes and brain, Kahla, Colin and Riley spoke of the words or numbers
as being animated.
9.2.5.2

Handedness

All five cases were left-handed, with the exception of Riley, Case 5, who, in his wife’s
expert opinion, was coerced into right-handedness as a child. The significance of this
was not noted until after data collection was finalised and handedness was not a factor
in the research questions, so the high incidence of left-handedness is noted here for
future studies. However, it is evident that lack of a strong preference for left or righthandedness translates to visual processing as well as behaviours and confers
advantages: for Riley (Section 8.2), in surgery; for Colin (Section 6.3), in studio
photography; and, Rhoda (Sections 5.3.3 and 5.3.4), in hand drawing 3D realisations
from 2D plans; in being able to visualise and mentally rotate objects regardless of
direction.
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9.3

Cognitive profiles of cases

Against the backdrop of the TML framework and the emergent themes, the cognitive
profile of the five case studies is now considered. The human learning and memory
systems framework affords the opportunity to represent the cognitive profile of the
primary participants as shown in Figures 9.7, 9.8 and 9.9. The characteristics of
memory as described by the primary participants reflect their reduced reliance on
episodic memory, accompanied by greater reliance on semantic memory, including
semantic-memory style strategies (that is, eidetically recorded, third-person
observational stance) for remembering personal experience, usually the domain of
episodic memory. Profound superiorities in perceptual processing became evident that
appear to be a key factor in the giftedness of the participants.

Figure 9.7 General cognitive profile of primary participants

Figure 9.8 illustrates that, within the overall profile shared by the primary participants,
Colin’s profile can be distinguished from the others.

286

Figure 9.8 Cognitive profile: strengths and weaknesses

Colin’s profile has been represented differently in Figure 9.8, as displaying greater
reliance on perceptual memory and less reliance on semantic memory, as his narrative
pointed to greater implicit processing and reduced explicit processing.
To represent the cognitive profile of the primary participants alongside their contrasting
language capacities, Figure 9.9 includes the apparent language facility of each
participant, gauged through their recorded speech and written communication.

Figure 9.9 Cognitive profile: language

Language is a symbolic system in which two participants were fluent and three were not.
Within the general cognitive profile (episodic—weak, semantic—strong, perception—
enhanced) shared by the gifted participants with AS, there were differences. These
within-group differences hold significant insights that impact the way each person
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learns. Figure 9.9 demonstrates the similar profiles of Kahla and Nadia: both
hyperlexic; both of whom appear to have external modes of thought via speech, that is,
their speech acts as a ‘stream of consciousness’ for them; they know what they think by
hearing themselves say it aloud; and, through the medium of (their own) speech, they
manipulate their thoughts and arrive at conclusions. In addition, Kahla noted that by
speaking aloud, the things she says are retained in memory. Rhoda and Riley have
similar profiles to each other that are distinguishable from Kahla’s and Nadia’s. They
struggle with all tasks involving language at any level and it is suggested that they are
native picture-pattern thinkers (in Temple Grandin’s terms) and that their active,
constructive modes of thought do not involve language and therefore require constant
interpretation that imposes a heavy cognitive load wherever language is necessary (in
reading, handwriting, conversation, and so on). Colin’s profile stands apart: he shares
language issues with Rhoda and Riley but, overall, he appears to be less reliant on
explicit semantic memory and more reliant on implicit memory.
Representing the cognitive profile of each participant in this way facilitates the
generation of pedagogical insights for educators and aligns with the cognitive profile
described here.
… blockage of the normative social adaptive trajectories will bias the child to forms of
learning that are not grounded in social interaction: for example, preponderance of
learning about the physical environment (e.g., physical over social contingencies), rote
speech over contextualized communication, hyperlexia over conceptual reading, and
memorization of facts and information over episodic and personal information—all of
which are features well noted in the later-life clinical expression of autism. (Jones, W. &
Klin, 2009, p. 473)

However, as static diagrams, Figures 9.7, 9.8 and 9.9 do not capture the processing
integration problems of the different sensual modalities and the cascading impact of
poor integration upon higher-order processes such as language (Stevenson, et al., 2014).
Also not captured is the missing or reduced temporal processing and binding governing
both sensory input and processing across memory systems (Brock, et al., 2002).

9.4

Chapter conclusion

This chapter discussed the key elements of the conceptual framework, the Thinking,
Memory and Learning framework (TML), that was the theoretical development activity
of this doctoral study: the complete framework is supplied in Appendices B and C. The
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five themes that emerged from the case studies were then considered in the light of the
TML and, finally, the cognitive profiles of the gifted participants with AS were
represented, allowing some comparison. Pedagogical insights arising from this
discussion and these findings are considered in Chapter 10.
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Chapter 10 Conclusion
This doctoral study has provided a preliminary phenomenological map of the broad
landscape of human experience of thinking and learning in five gifted individuals with
Asperger syndrome. Importance was placed on preserving the voice and intention of the
participants, however, inexorably, the emergent themes led to life questions of
knowledge and identity: ‘knowledge and the knower’ is designated as the super-ordinate
theme for this study. The accounts of the primary participants about their learning
indicated ontological, epistemological, methodological and axiological problems in
relation to knowledge of the world and identity formation. Questions of existence that
are challenging for all human beings are even more profoundly challenging when there
are qualitative differences in cognitive profile: when the mechanism of knowing that
humans employ to establish answers to life-questions functions differently. Tenets of
human existence usually beyond question—‘I know’—are called into question when
the means of knowing is altered and the dominant culture is mindblind to the difference
in the few. In this chapter, the super-ordinate theme of ‘knowledge and the knower’ is
discussed, the research questions posed in Chapter 3 are addressed, pedagogical insights
arising from the findings are presented and questions for future research are posed.

10.1

Knowledge and the knower

The trustworthiness of one’s knowledge and its relation to identity formation is the
point at which the primary participants of this doctoral study have experienced profound
issues. Epistemic uncertainty has resulted from constant challenges throughout their
lives to their perceived reality, both in their formative years and as adults. Tanweer,
Rathbone and Souchay (2010) state that: ‘the integrity of autobiographical knowledge
and the self is essential for normal functioning, as autobiographical knowledge is the
knowledge base for the self’; and, ‘the relationship between self and memory [is
viewed] as a reciprocal one’ (p. 901). Along with Lind and Bowler (2008), they noted
that diminished autonoetic consciousness in individuals with AS leads to a qualitatively
different experience of identity.
Epistemic uncertainty is expressed in Kahla’s naïve assumptions about the reality of
unicorns and the gods and goddesses of ancient myths, based on her reading about them
in books. It is expressed in her adoption of personas from books, such as ‘Pollyanna’, in
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her pursuit of a functioning identity that would confer social acceptance. It is expressed
in Nadia’s use of characters in her play script to wrestle with issues surrounding identity
and social acceptance, factoring in autistic perspectives, in parallel with her own
struggle for social and self-acceptance. It is expressed in what has been termed in this
thesis ‘the quest for epistemic certainty’. It exists covertly in the accounts of Rhoda,
Colin and Riley: Riley’s perseverative and pedantic indexing of knowledge before it is
accessible to him for learning and his angst, ‘What’s wrong with me?’; Colin’s belief in
supernatural intervention to account for his exceptional gifts in wildlife photography
and his view of himself as a ‘freak’ and a ‘fraud’; and, Rhoda’s dogmatic adherence to
process-based, ‘logical’ thinking, where a narrow, clearly defined frame of reference is
necessary in order to acquire knowledge.
10.1.1

Learning and knowledge

In terms of the findings of this doctoral study and the literature that has been reviewed,
it is asserted that learning can be defined as the acquisition and application of
knowledge (whether learnt in the form of knowledge, understanding or skills) that is
retained and accessible through the major systems of human learning and memory.
Where one or more of those systems is compromised, learning will have qualitatively
different characteristics. In the case of AS, robust findings have established a cognitive
profile of diminished episodic memory with possibly superior semantic memory and
enhanced perceptual memory.
The TML framework (Appendix C) provides a new perspective on the phenomena of
learning, knowledge and identity. The following propositional statements flow from the
TML and the findings of this study.
(a) Information processing + Memory = Learning
(b) Learning is the acquisition of knowledge, skills and understanding, which is
demonstrated by appropriate application to authentic, real-world situations.
(c) Learning, knowledge and identity formation rely upon the human learning and
memory systems, therefore: there is no learning without memory; and, there is no
identity formation without memory.
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(d) ‘Knowledge’ (including skills and understanding) is the result of successful learning.
(e) Compromise to one memory system will result in qualitative differences to learning,
mental representation of knowledge, and identity formation.
(f) In the absence of a robust internalised sense of self, external representations of
knowledge and self are necessary.
10.1.2

Identity

An individual’s identity is formed from personal, embodied experience, incorporating:
consciousness (anoetic, noetic, autonoetic) over time (past, present, future), represented
(encoded, stored, retrieved) within the human learning and memory systems and applied
to the interpretation of one’s past, application to one’s present, and hope for one’s future.
To draw these elements together, Figure 10.1 represents the Self as a house sitting on its
foundation, which is constructed from consciousness, memory, learning and
temporality: according to the reviewed literature, these are formative elements for
identity development.

Figure 10.1 Identity. Photo used and adapted under licence

The development of trustworthy knowledge, upon which to base one’s sense of self, is
problematic for individuals with AS as there is: diminished autonoetic consciousness;
differences in autobiographical memory; altered learning characteristics; and,
compromised temporality. Trustworthy knowledge will be biased away from the
elements of identity formation within episodic memory and towards semantic-memory,
eidetic-style ways of knowing. This conclusion supports the suggestion that identity
formation is ‘qualitatively different in individuals with ASD’ (Lind & Bowler, 2008, p.
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178) and clarifies the philosophical relationship between identity, learning and
knowledge.
10.1.3

The philosophical questions

The narratives of the primary participants demonstrated that they have an ontological,
epistemological, methodological and axiological problem, which is summarised here as
the super-ordinate theme of ‘knowledge and the knower’. Lincoln and Guba’s (2013)
philosophical questions were adapted in Table 10.1 to frame the issues of reality,
identity, knowledge and worth and to propose preliminary statements, based on the
research literature, to illuminate the nature of the life questions for the participants.
Table 10.1 Lincoln and Guba’s philosophical questions adapted and rephrased

1. The ontological question ‘What is there that can be known?’ Or, to rephrase the
question, ‘What is the nature of reality?’
Rephrased question: What is
real?
What is the nature of the
participants’ beliefs about
reality? How do they experience
the reality of being themselves?
How do they answer the
question: Who am I?

Some key points:
•

Participants’ inevitable framing of knowledge in terms of their
cognitive profile

•

Reliance on literality and facticity for meaning-making vs
abstraction and meta-representation

•

Enhanced perception and semantic-memory bias and biased away
from episodic memory

•

Single perspective (AS) vs. multiple perspectives (TD)

2. The epistemological question: ‘What is the nature of the relationship between the
knower and the knowable?’
Rephrased question: What is
true?
What is the nature of knowledge
to the participants? What is the
nature of knowledge of the self
to the participants?

Some key points:
•

Lack of awareness of own beliefs and knowledge (ToM)

•

Reduced capacity to account for multiple perspectives, others’
and own states of mind—across time (past, present, future)

•

Problems with attribution of knowledge

•

Problems with trustworthiness of knowledge: other people
disagree with the knowledge that I believe is true: differences in
perception, social understanding, emotion management

•

Development of identity biased towards implicit memory
systems (anoetic consciousness) and semantic memory system
representations (noetic consciousness); and away from episodic
memory system representations (autonoetic consciousness)

•

Externally oriented representations of identity through objects,
locations and people (e.g. life partners, not through relationship
per se but as external representations of identity)

3. The methodological question: ‘How does one go about acquiring knowledge?’
Rephrased question: How can
I find out what is true?
Given their cognitive profile,

Some key points:
•

Unable to autonoetically draw meaning out of autobiographical
memories and personal experience through self-referential
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how have the participants’
approached the acquisition of
knowledge to answer the identity
question: Who am I?

processing, therefore approach search for identity as an object of
(noetic) scientific study
•

Study of people may lead to strategy of mirroring expectations of
people around them, e.g. ‘masquerading’ (Carrington & Graham,
2001)

•

Adoption of identity roles or models from general fiction
(Pollyanna) or fantasy (Mr Spock, Data).

4. The axiological question: ‘Of all the knowledge available to me, which is the most
valuable, which is the most truthful, which is the most beautiful, which is the most lifeenhancing?’
Rephrased question: Am I
smart, or am I dumb?
In the face of the previous
philosophical questions, how
have participants resolved the
question of their own human
value? Am I valuable?

10.2

Some key points:
•

Difficulty of arriving at a definitive answer

•

Internal conflict set up by ambivalent feedback of circumstances
and other people

The research questions

With the over-arching question ‘How do gifted adults with Asperger syndrome think
and learn?’, this doctoral study investigated the accounts of learning from five gifted
adults with AS, supported by key informant interviews and artefacts. To describe the
complex answer to this research question, the TML conceptual framework was
developed as an explanatory and theoretical framework for understanding the thinking
and learning of gifted individuals with AS. The TML is documented in full in
Appendices B and C. Outcomes of the research sub-questions are addressed in this
section.
10.2.1

Sub-question 1: Articulating thinking processes

Can gifted individuals with AS describe how they think and learn? Given the ToM issues
noted in the autism research literature, what means will they use to describe their thinking
and learning?

The five primary participants in this research were very keen to make a contribution to
this study despite the social and communicative challenges the interview situation posed.
The interviews, in all cases, were much longer than anticipated but this was required for
the participants and researcher to be satisfied that adequate ground had been covered.
Some participants struggled to articulate their meaning in words over a sustained period
of time (some interviews exceeded two hours and all exceeded one hour) and extra time
was allowed to cater for this. Although an interview schedule was given to each
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participant prior to the interview, the participant dictated the direction of the interview,
to a large extent, to give ample opportunity for participants’ experience to be expressed
in their own words.
The participants were highly motivated and invested significant time and effort in order
to make successful contributions to the research by articulating and communicating
their mental experience. Some of the means used by participants to express cognitive
experience were somewhat surprising, having not been first encountered in the
background literature review. Deeper searches of the literature were required to build an
understanding of these phenomena, which were: (a) the extensive use of self-generated
metaphors to describe aspects of participants’ thinking, memory and inner experience
(Section 9.2.2f); and, (b) the descriptions of memory displaying lack of childhood
amnesia (Section 4.7.6).
10.2.2

Sub-question 2: Cognitive profile

Is there a distinct cognitive profile (information-processing style, memory, and learning)
that emerges from the case studies of gifted individuals with AS?

The distinct cognitive profile of the five cases is discussed in detail in Section 9.3
Cognitive profiles of cases and illustrated by Figures 9.7, 9.8 and 9.9. In summary, the
narratives of the five primary participants, informed by the research literature, indicated
a distinct shared cognitive profile: diminished episodic memory accompanied by strong
semantic memory with enhanced perceptual functioning. Within this overall profile,
Colin’s narrative appeared to indicate greater reliance on implicit processing
(procedural and perceptual memory) and reduced reliance on explicit processing
(semantic memory). A further variation between the cases was indicated by language,
which is just one of hypothetically many symbolic systems. Two cases, Kahla and
Nadia, were hyperlexic and appeared to be verbal thinkers while three cases, Rhoda,
Colin and Riley, appeared to be ‘translating’ between language and their native
symbolic ways of thinking.
10.2.3

Sub-question 3: Pedagogical insights

What pedagogical insights emerge from the case studies?

The shared cognitive profile across the five cases promoted many pedagogical insights.
These are canvassed, separately, in Section 10.3.
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10.2.4

Sub-question 4: Theory development

Do neuroscience, autism and memory research inform educational theory development
with respect to learning as it is understood by teachers? Can understandings of thinking,
memory and learning from neuroscience and psychology be mapped to a framework that
has meaning for teachers seeking to understand differences between the thinking,
memory and learning of their typically developing students and their students with AS?

The cross-disciplinary areas of neuroscience and psychology have much to offer the
development of learning theory. Over the six years of this study, wide reading of the
research literature was conducted. The researcher’s school environment for the first four
years was the original field for the study and so her knowledge is benchmarked against
pedagogical practice at that school at that time: mainstream teachers and pedagogical
practice at the school had not yet been significantly impacted by the relevance of
neuroscience research for learning. Pedagogical decision-making, which was based on
psychological theories that pre-dated newer brain-imaging techniques that call those
theories into question, was observed. This is not stated as a criticism, but a reflection of
the professional need for a closing of the theory-praxis division. At the school, while
engaged with the day-to-day necessities of providing a rigorous education and
implementing sound learning theory in many areas, there was little room to reconsider
over-arching issues of learning in the light of new research, and yet theoretical
understanding about learning itself, to inform pedagogical practice in keeping with
current research evidence, is a mission-critical priority for education generally, and for
teachers particularly. The development of the TML as an explanatory framework for
teacher professional development evolved to meet this need.
The TML has been road-tested with different audiences: feedback from those audiences
demonstrates acceptance of the framework as a powerful tool for a consideration of
learning and for comparative considerations of the different learning needs of TD
students and gifted students with AS. The content matter of the TML is the core
business of education and has the potential to contribute significantly to teachers’
understanding of thinking and learning. The cross-disciplinary areas of neuroscience
and psychology do indeed powerfully inform educational theories of learning and the
TML was developed with the aim of applying this understanding to teaching practice
and school culture through professional development. The TML is explicated in full in
Appendix C.
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10.3

Pedagogical insights

With knowledge of the mental processes of thinking, learning and memory that have
been presented in this thesis, summarised in the TML framework, it is anticipated that
educators will be able to better account for the individual learning characteristics of
their gifted students with AS. In answer to research sub-question 3 (Section 10.2.3),
major areas of insight arising from the findings of this doctoral study are presented here
for consideration by teachers with the purpose of developing their existing frameworks
of pedagogical understanding.
10.3.1

Language and different mental cultures

The suggestion of ‘translation’ between the ‘native’ symbolic mode of thought and
spoken/written language has been raised throughout this doctoral study: by the
literature; within the narratives; and, directly by Wendy, Case 3’s key informant. A
number of implications flow from this. Hyperlexia and strong verbal capacity indicate
that Kahla and Nadia are either excellent ‘translators’ or they natively, at least in part,
are verbal thinkers as well as visual: perhaps ‘bilingual’ (to extend the cultural
metaphor). For ‘picture thinkers’ or thinkers in modes other than language, it appears
most appropriate to consider those students as though they are second language
speakers who are ‘translating’. Time allowed for learning activities, and expectations as
to quantity and type of content covered, should be considered in setting achievable
learning goals for each student. Further, this perspective repositions teachers as crosscultural interpreters of ideas and knowledge.
10.3.2

Symbolic modes of thought other than language

As ‘language translators’, Rhoda, Colin and Riley are at a disadvantage when
articulating their own thought processes in words. However, their native modes of
thinking, which can’t be described in words, do not indicate that an authentic symbolic
system of thought is not operating. Support for this proposition from eminent quarters is
provided by this reflection from Guba.
Years ago I read a book, whose author and title I have long forgotten … that dealt with
the question, ‘Can one think without using language to do it?’ The book consisted of a
series of case studies intended to demonstrate that ‘language-less’ thought was possible. I
was especially struck by the case of a British mathematician, who claimed that he thought
not only without language but without the notational systems common to mathematicians.
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Indeed, he argued, he developed his proofs at some inner level of mind that eschewed
both words and symbols. But when the proof had to be written down so that it could be
communicated to others, it ‘lost in the translation’; that is, it communicated only the
surface of the thought and failed to communicate the deeper mental experience. There
was much that remained behind, and it was that residue that subsumed much of the
‘beauty’ and ‘elegance’ of the formulation, and perhaps something of its meaning. (Egon
G. Guba: My aim and hope, in Lincoln & Guba, 2013, p. 30)

The evidence for wonderful human thought processes is represented by the artefacts the
primary participants have produced as a natural outflow of their thinking. Indeed, it is
well recognised that AS can confer genius upon an individual as, freed from the
constraints of top-down thinking, thinking ‘outside the square’ appears to be intuitive
for individuals with AS: Albert Einstein and Temple Grandin are oft-quoted exemplars.
However, modes of thought other than verbal and the easy-to-understand ‘thinking in
pictures’ may be opaque to verbal-only thinkers.
10.3.3

Concepts and concept development

The cognitive profile of diminished episodic reasoning (indicating problems with
abstract thinking) does not imply that learners with AS cannot learn concepts. Several
authors distinguish between concept identification (or rule-learning that allows
category identification: such as Temple Grandin’s dog example in Section 5.6.1) and
concept formation (Gastgeb, et al., 2012; Meyer & Minshew, 2002; Minshew, et al.,
2002). Concepts can be learnt as discrete items of knowledge by relying on semanticstyle memory strategies, however, the active personal construction of conceptual
understanding requires the use of abstract reasoning and organising strategies that are
the domain of episodic thinking.
Many complex conceptual relationships can be represented visually: for instance, as a
concept map that can be memorised and reproduced by an individual with strong visual
processing and memory. However, the reproduction, application and generalisation of
that knowledge will have different characteristics and be more limited because of the
inflexible nature of the way the knowledge was learned. A memorised mind map that
shows conceptual relationships is an instance of learning at the lower end of the ladder
of mental activities (Figure 10.2). Concept formation, being a personal, trustworthy,
generalisable act of learning leading to meaning-making, is located near the top of the
ladder. This insight helps to explain the rigidity and inflexible thinking of gifted
students with AS and highlights that the question for educators may not be ‘What does
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my student know?’ but, rather, ‘How has my student learnt that?’ This approach is
likely to give valuable insights to teachers of gifted students with AS on individual
ways of thinking and learning.
10.3.4

The learning ladder

The ladder of mental learning activities with inverse relationships, repeated here as
Figure 10.2, is the concluding point of this study’s investigation of thinking and
learning.

Figure 10.2 Learning Ladder: inverse relationships

Pedagogical insights arising from Figure 10.2 are:
(a) Within the hierarchy of mental activities, one or more of which will be employed in
every lesson given by a teacher, activities focused at the bottom of the ladder will
draw upon semantic memory more than episodic memory. Students with AS are
likely to shine in these kinds of learning situations: for example, in biology lessons,
remembering the facts about plant and animal species, naming and classifying them.
(b) Learning tasks focused on mental activities at the top of the ladder will greatly
disadvantage students with AS and much greater scaffolding will be required for
them to learn effectively: for example, a Year 9 English poetry lesson where the
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students were instructed to write a ballad based on their own experience. Assuming
that the features of a ballad were understood, then this task required the student to
understand, construct and articulate a personal perspective employing complex
language devices requiring meaning-making and conceptual understanding. This
kind of abstract thought is the domain of episodic thinking and a student with AS is
unlikely to have developed the neural networks required to think the way one must
think if one is to write such a ballad. Therefore, an activity such as this would
require extensive scaffolding.
(c) The inverse relationship shown between literality and abstraction corresponds with
the strong semantic and weak episodic memory profile. Literality refers to an
externally oriented focus and is also described in the literature using the terms
‘facticity’, ‘concrete thinking’ and ‘black-and-white thinking’. Therefore, learning
environments that draw upon concrete materials and notions that can be represented
concretely (for example, through visual diagrams) will assist learners with AS,
whereas learning tasks that draw upon abstract notions without some form of
concrete representation will most likely disadvantage learners with AS.
(d) Rote learning of facts relies on semantic processing and is likely to be a strength in
gifted students with AS.
(e) Since students with AS do not benefit from self-referential processing to the same
extent as typically developing students, active learning environments are most likely
a less effective means of learning for students with AS. In addition, active learning
activities may introduce factors that impede learning for these students, such as:
successful completion of the task being dependent upon social interaction; or,
environmental factors like noise levels that interfere with the student’s thinking and
learning.
The other inverse relationships shown in Figure 10.2 relate to the literature on central
coherence and information processing, with varying descriptions of the same
phenomena: top-down processing vs. bottom-up processing; and, high-level information
processing using organisational strategies (such as concept development) vs. low-level
information processing. All the inverse relationships shown in Figure 10.2 correspond
to the research on the mental learning activities in the learning ladder and indicate likely
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strengths and weaknesses in the function of students with AS in lessons that require
students to engage in those mental activities.
10.3.5

Teacher perceptual limitations

Two of the questions raised by the findings of this thesis are:
(a) Given the enhanced perceptual functioning that potentially confers giftedness upon
students with AS, how do teachers create learning environments that foster such
giftedness, elements of which may be beyond the teacher’s own perception?
(b) How should such work be assessed and evaluated?
In order to account for the cognitive profile of their gifted students with AS, teachers
need to allow for the possibility that their own limitations may inhibit them from being
able to directly appreciate their students’ giftedness. Withholding judgement and
conferring respect by learning from the student will be the most appropriate approach.
This is an uncomfortable position for teachers to adopt, given that their professional
standing positions them as the expert in the classroom, rather than the learner. A
genuine commitment to lifelong learning by teachers is called for.
10.3.6

The value of rote memory

It is timely for educators to re-evaluate the post-Bloom de-emphasis on rote learning
and factual knowledge. The pendulum-swing towards placing value on active learning
and conceptual understanding has unintentionally disadvantaged gifted learners with AS.
In many occupations and professions beyond school, vast rote memory for facts remains
a huge advantage: law, politics, the sciences, medicine, acting; occupations where the
capacity for instant recall of factual information without reference to a book or digital
device is valuable.
This thesis contends that the mental learning activities in the learning ladder are all
legitimate learning activities that are valuable in their place, from rote learning to
meaning making. The de-emphasis of one over another should not be dictated by
educational trends but rather each kind of mental activity should be facilitated as a
thinking skill to be used in appropriate situations for problem solving and navigation of
one’s world. Conceptual understanding, by its nature, is more generalisable than factual
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knowledge and is certainly crucial for this reason, however, rote-learned knowledge
also has a place of value within education that should not be overlooked.
10.3.7

Heuristics

This section concludes the pedagogical insights by distilling further ideas into heuristic
form for teachers’ consideration as a summary of key ideas from this thesis.
(a) The mainstream curriculum and school environment was designed for students with
typically developing cognitive profiles: students with AS have a different cognitive
profile.
(b) The diminution of episodic memory has negative implications for: learning through
experience; identity formation; temporal judgments; source attribution of
knowledge; and, memory retrieval through mental time travel. Teaching methods
and learning activities that assume students’ capacity in these areas are unlikely to
be effective as the thinking and learning characteristics of students with AS have not
been taken into account.
(c) Gifted students with AS are using huge amounts of mental and emotional energy to
compensate: socially, communicatively and in their learning. This feature of their
learning should be recognised with accommodations such as extra time and
favourable environments to facilitate their learning.
(d) Students who natively think in symbolic modes other than language are mentally
and emotionally working much harder than verbal thinkers in verbally mediated
learning environments. Extra time and consideration should be factored in, as for
second language speakers.
(e) Gifted students with AS will most likely self-direct their learning for things they are
interested in. Kahla’s, Rhoda’s and Riley’s education was enhanced by extended
periods of time (months) spent at home recuperating from illness and accident.
During this time, they directed their own learning based on interest and selfmotivation, and developed a lifelong love of learning.
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(f) Being at school presents perceptual, social, and communication challenges that are
the main impediments to learning, rather than the intellectual learning process itself.
(g) Providing an accommodating learning environment entails catering for the
perceptual, social and communication challenges to allow gifted students with AS to
capitalise on their intellectual strengths and be supported appropriately in their
weaknesses.
(h) Teachers can be considered as cross-cultural interpreters of ideas and learning as
gifted students with AS, most likely, experience a different mental culture. In
parallel with students experiencing education delivered in a language that is not
their native language, it is appropriate that students with AS should be given
accommodations for learning and assessment.
(i) The most suitable teacher for a gifted student with AS is one who is proactively
understanding and respectful of the student’s capacities and needs, who maintains
routine and consistency but retains the capacity for institutional flexibility when the
student is effectively engaged in learning.
(j) Students with AS are said to be ‘mind blind’ but schools that do not account for the
different cognitive profile of students are themselves ‘mind blind’.

10.4

Questions for future research

An unresolved question arising from this doctoral study is the nature of the learning
experienced by young people who have received a diagnosis and intervention early in
their development. The case of Nadia, a young woman of 18 years and still at school at
the time of her participation, poses this question. Nadia’s capacity to engage in
reciprocal, spoken interaction with the interviewer and to deliver a short, well-structured
monologue of interest contrasts to the long, single-track, linear monologues of Colin
and Riley. A feature of Nadia’s case was the expert social and communication skills
coaching she had received throughout her formative years.
The questions posed by Nadia’s case are: ‘Is the learning that Nadia demonstrated
compensatory or corrective?’; ‘Has Nadia’s brain developed differently (along a more
typical developmental path) as a result of the interventions during her formative years?’;
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or, ‘Is it simply the case that the combination of expert invention and her hyperlexia
enabled her to demonstrate nuanced communication and thinking skills unusual in an
individual with AS?’

10.5

Informing future research

This doctoral study informs future research by providing interpreted first-hand accounts
of human lived experience as a wide frame of reference: a phenomenological ‘map of
the landscape’ in the realm of cognition of gifted individuals experiencing AS. As an
open-ended investigation of a phenomenon, the study covered a lot of ground and more
questions were posed than answered (see, for example, Table 10.1). The metaphor of an
explorer mapping unknown terrain as a first draft, perhaps not to a great degree of
accuracy, comes to mind. Even so, the early map may be a valuable scaffold that points
the way to the work needed in the future to fill in the detail. Quantitative studies, by
their nature, focus an intense research ‘gaze’ on minute parts of the ‘pixelated
landscape’. As Gardiner has suggested (see Section 3.2 and Figure 3.1), quantitative
research studies may well be guided by the broader map of the landscape provided by
studies such as this one so that overall direction and purpose of the research effort is
situated within the scaffold of real-life human experience. Interestingly, building an
understanding of broader human experience into a quantitative researcher’s awareness
equates to incorporating a top-down view of the research endeavour itself to balance out
the ‘bottom-up’, detail-focused processing of scientific research.
The unfolding conceptual understanding of what it is like to be autistic, first posited by
Frith and Happé (1999), is of great interest to the individuals with AS in this study. The
value to learners with AS of having teachers who share this understanding, even though
the individuals themselves may be unable to reflect upon, or articulate characteristics of,
their own thinking and learning, cannot be underestimated. Such teachers could be
cherry-picked for mainstream classes with individuals with AS, a feature of Nadia’s
schooling that she reported as highly effective. Teacher knowledge of the cognitive
characteristics of AS is potentially of profound importance to students with AS.
Furthermore, as one pupil observed …: ‘It is the teachers [that] are rubbish – they know
about their subject but they know nothing about us with Asperger’s syndrome but then
why should they – they’ve never been told – they’re not specially trained to deal with
people with special needs’. (Humphrey & Lewis, 2008, p. 39)
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The viewpoint expressed by this student was embedded in all five case studies of this
doctoral study: none of the older four primary participants felt understood by their
teachers, with only one or two exceptions. Nadia experienced greater acceptance and
understanding from her teachers but described the trauma associated with having one
substitute teacher who did not share this understanding. Therefore, with the lowresolution ‘pixelated’ view provided by this study comes the opportunity for future
educational studies to ‘sharpen the view’, filling in the detail and making these insights
available so that educators can work with, not against or in ignorance of, their learners’
cognitive strengths and weaknesses.
Arising from this doctoral study, some examples of possible future research directions
are: (a) diminished episodic memory and the learning characteristics of individuals with
AS with regard to temporality; (b) the role of a different sense of self-consciousness and
identity, and its impact on learning; (c) the effect of increased understanding of
cognitive learning characteristics by teachers upon student learning; (d) an examination
of the proposal of ‘native’ modes of thought and the possible need by some learners to
translate to and from language; (e) investigation of enhanced perceptual functioning and
the triggers for phobias and meltdowns; (f) characteristics of long-term successful
relationships between an NT partner and an individual with AS; and, (g) the high
incidence of left-handedness among individuals with AS and the impact of this
phenomenon on learning.
The massive research effort currently underway worldwide is well justified for the
conceptual understanding it has already delivered in the decades since Lorna Wing first
used the term ‘Asperger’s syndrome’ in 1981 and the publication of Frith’s translation
of Hans Asperger’s work in 1991 (Happé, 1994). The five explanatory theories (see
Figure 4.10): theory of mind; central coherence; executive function; amygdala theory;
and, enhanced perceptual functioning; each represent a promising school of thought
within the research community that is of potentially high value to education. Translating
some of the value of that ongoing research effort into an amenable form for teacher
professional development has been one of the challenges undertaken by this doctoral
research, upon which future educational research could expand.
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10.6

Conclusion

This thesis contributes a new perspective to educational research through five
phenomenological case studies utilising interpretative phenomenological analysis. The
case studies were analysed in the light of an iterative literature review of neuroscience,
autism and education research pertaining to thinking, memory and learning. The
findings have relevance for all educators through the theory development of the
Teaching, Memory and Learning Framework (TML) that was the theoretical output of
the study. During the course of the study, the relevance of the content matter to parents,
life partners and gifted individuals with AS was uncovered.
The study presents a series of challenges to educators.
(a) How do we learn to value modes of thought other than our own?
(b) How do we learn to respect and nurture the enhanced perception and giftedness of
gifted individuals with AS when our own perception is more limited?
(c) Without an understanding of the thinking and learning of gifted students with AS,
assumptions about learning have been imposed upon our least cognitively flexible
students, forcing them to adapt to learning environments constructed for TD learners.
Where this is the case, those schools have a ‘mindblind’ pedagogical approach to
the learning of those students. This study exposes the irony of our own
mindblindness, while gifted students with AS have been characterised as mindblind.
The challenge is to rectify this problem through a culture-shift within education,
taking distinct cognitive profiles into account.
(d) Our challenge is to side-step those educational trends that are not based on solid
evidence and instead align our pedagogical practice with the robust findings of
cross-disciplinary research pertaining to thinking and learning.
(e) A further challenge is to enter into the mental world of our gifted students with AS
and afford their learning the same consideration and respect that we confer upon TD
students, based upon their cognitive profile: constructing teaching and learning
environments that cater for all students’ ways of learning.
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The final word in this thesis is imparted to Oliver Sacks, commenting on Temple
Grandin’s own descriptions of her memory. Professor Sacks captures the many
idiosyncrasies of the debate surrounding the qualitative characteristics of mental
experience this thesis has attempted to describe and interpret: externally oriented
thinking; eidetic imagery; visual processing; sensory integration; sense of self;
perceptual processing; semantic memory; episodic memory; and, the different forms of
consciousness, autonoetic, noetic and anoetic. Sacks commented:
The psychologist Frederic Bartlett writes of remembering as ‘reconstruction’, but for
Temple (as for Stephen [Wiltshire]), seemingly, this does not occur, or occurs to a much
smaller extent than usual. Nor is memory, for her, entirely internalized as part of the self - thus her frequent allusions to ‘videotapes’ and ‘computer records’, and other external
forms of memory storage.
Temple’s self-description here is intriguingly at odds with some of the current
formulations of imagery and memory, as conceived by Damasio, Edelman, and others.
Thus Damasio writes, in Descartes’ Error:
Images are not stored as facsimile pictures of things, or events, or words, or
sentences. The brain does not file Polaroid pictures of people, objects,
landscapes; nor does it store audiotapes of music and speech; it does not store
films of scenes in our lives. … In brief, there seems to be no permanently held
pictures of anything, even miniaturized, no microfiches or microfilms, no hard
copies.
Yet this, Damasio emphasizes, ‘must be reconciled with the sensation … that we can
conjure up’ such reproductions or facsimile images. One must wonder, if this is the case,
whether Temple – and also Franco and Stephen (and Luria's Mnemonist) – are merely,
like the rest of us, susceptible to an illusion of reproduction, or whether in fact (as Jerome
Bruner suggests) there may be in them some failure of integration of perceptual
systems with higher integrative ones, and with concepts of self, so that relatively
unprocessed, uninterpreted, unrevised images persist. (Sacks, 1995, p. 269) [emphasis
added]
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Appendix A: Interview schedules

II

Interview Schedule for Primary Participants
Semi-structured interview: Apart from the first question, questions are designed to
elicit personal narratives containing relevant biographical data, experiences,
reflections, memories, beliefs, opinions.
1.

Please tell me if there are other questions I should ask you to find out how you
think and learn.

2.

How did your diagnosis or suspicion of Asperger syndrome come about?

3.

This study is investigating how people with Asperger syndrome learn. What are
your thoughts about learning and Asperger syndrome?

4.

Tell me about your ‘mind’. Memory.

5.

Do you learn in the same way as a person without Asperger syndrome?

6.

Do you have a learning disability or disorder? (Diagnosed or suspected)

7.

Are you gifted/intelligent/smart?

8.

What are your gifts and areas of interest?

9.

What are your memories of your school experience?

10.

Did school recognise/foster/nurture your intelligence/giftedness?

11.

Do you have particular learning needs or requirements?

12.

When/how/where do you learn best?

13.

What impedes your learning?

14.

What do you think Asperger syndrome is?

15.

How does having Asperger syndrome affect your life?

16.

If you could go back in time, knowing what you know now, and speak to your
school teachers and parents, what would you want them to know so they could
make learning highly effective for you?

17.

Do you have any other thoughts or reflections about Asperger’s and learning
which might contribute towards a better understanding of how people with
Asperger syndrome learn?
Thank you for your valuable contribution!

Appendix A: Interview schedules

III

Interview Schedule for Key Informants
Semi-structured interview: Apart from the first question, questions are designed to
elicit personal narratives containing relevant biographical data, experiences,
reflections, memories, beliefs, opinions.
1.

What is your relationship to the person with Asperger syndrome?
Husband

Wife

Partner

Mother

Father

Sibling

Friend

Other:
2.

How did the diagnosis or suspicion of Asperger syndrome come about?

3.

This study is investigating how people with Asperger syndrome learn. What are
your thoughts about learning and Asperger syndrome?

4.

Tell me about their ‘mind’. Memory.

5.

Do they learn in the same way as a person without Asperger syndrome?

6.

Do they have a learning disability or disorder? (Diagnosed or suspected)

7.

Are they gifted/intelligent/smart?

8.

What are their gifts/areas of interest?

9.

What are your memories of their school experience? [Establish age/stage of
schooling for each reflection]

10.

School issues and experiences, positive and negative

11.

Did school recognise, foster or nurture their intelligence and gifts?

12.

Do they have particular learning needs or requirements?

13.

When, how and where do they learn best?

14.

What impedes their learning?

15.

What do you think Asperger syndrome is?

16.

How does having Asperger syndrome affect their life?

17.

If you could go back in time, knowing what you know now, what would you want
school teachers to know so they could make learning highly effective for people
with Asperger’s?

18.

Do you have any other thoughts or reflections about Asperger’s and learning
which might contribute towards a better understanding of how people with
Asperger syndrome learn?
Thank you for your valuable contribution!
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Type of thinking &
learning activity

Type of
knowledge

Description

Memory storage implications

AS vs TD

References

Development of
beliefs and values
systems

Philosophy

Interaction with the world based
on ‘intuitive’ world view.

AS may not be able to engage consciously in the same way as
TD due to impaired complex information processing, reliance
on semantic memory / literality / facticity.

1234

Self-referential
processing
Meaning making

Autonoetic
consciousness,
source memory,
prospective
memory

Conceptual frameworks very
efficient, incorporate experience,
account for facts, strive for
internal consistency, seat of
learning, understanding.

Meaning-making in AS is impaired in favour of perceptual
processing. Memory in AS impaired in relatively more
complex high-level information processing, intact in less
demanding cognitive processing tasks. Temporal concepts
impaired in AS while clock & calendar time intact.

5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

Concept formation
Generativity
(creativity)

Conceptual
understanding,
generalisable
knowledge

Beliefs as basis for
understanding and
interacting with
one’s world
World view: active,
constructed
knowledge of the
world tested over
time against
experienced reality
Relating ideas into a
meaningful ‘whole’
or higher
representation

Episodic memory encodes
relationships & dynamic elements
such as time & change, not
possible in semantic memory.
Ability to generalise adds layer of
efficiency.

20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27

Prototype formation

Pre-concept
based on
categorisation

Summary
representation

Categorisation
Grouping
Classifying
Sorting
Naming
Labelling

Active mental
manipulation of
ideas

Shared criteria

Binding is a process of episodic memory. AS most likely roteremembers each instance and its grouping. TD most likely
indexes by category criteria.

46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53

Language

Language contains/
represents objects,
ideas

Prototype formation memoryefficient as it avoids the need to
memorise every instance or
variation.
Indexing requires ‘memory
binding’ or ‘relational memory’
and is more efficient than rote
memory.
AS’s principal storage process
may be visual (‘eidetic’) rather
than language-based. Language
processing affected in ASD.
Rote-learned facts stored in
semantic memory.

Problem in AS with concept formation, complex information
processing, abstraction, organising strategies in learning. Weak
central coherence in AS results in greater focus on detail
without context. Central coherence equates to concept
formation. Generating novel ideas is impaired, required for
problem solving and schema formation. Capacity to generalise
impaired in AS.
TD form prototypes for efficient memory encoding & retrieval.
Prototype formation impaired in AS.

Impaired language processing in AS, e.g. pronoun confusion,
intentional cues, pragmatics, prosody.

59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66

Rote learning

Facts

Literal
Concrete

Semantic memory intact or superior in AS. AS traits of
literality, preference for sameness, state-dependent recall
(‘associative learning’), cued recall. AS preference for routine
and rote-learned sequences.
Abbreviations: TD = typical development (neurotypical), AS = Asperger syndrome, ASD = Autism spectrum disorders, ToM = Theory of Mind

15 16 17 18 19

28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35
36

37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44
45

54 55 56 57 58

67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74
75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82
83 84
85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92
93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100
101 102 103 104 105
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The Thinking, Memory and Learning Framework (TML)
In this appendix, the conceptual framework—the ‘Thinking, Memory and Learning
Framework’ (TML)—that is the theoretical output of this doctoral study, is presented in
full. The TML is intended as a professional development (PD) package. The
components of the TML have been ‘road-tested’ in PD sessions with stakeholder
audiences, including teachers, family members and individuals with AS, throughout the
study.

Theoretical framework
From a phenomenological perspective, the starting point of the conceptual framework
was the theoretical framework for this doctoral study, shown in Figure 1. The original
version (Figure 2.6) did not capture all the nuances within the literature that are of value
to an educational audience.

Figure 1 Moving beyond Wing's Triad

The addition of ‘Enhanced Perceptual Functioning’ to the explanatory theories in the
theoretical framework (see also Figure 4.10) was indicated by the problem of locating
the literature on the phenomenon of sensory sensitivities within the other theories:
aspects of sensory sensitivities could be explained but there was not a complete and
comfortable ‘fit’. With increased understanding of Tulving’s memory systems
framework, accompanied by the discovery of the proposition of enhanced perceptual
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functioning in autism (Mottron, Dawson, Souliéres, Hubert & Burack, 2006), this
problem was resolved and Enhanced Perceptual Functioning was added as the fifth
explanatory theory.
Attempts to map more complex insights about thinking, memory and learning from the
neuroscience and autism literature onto the theoretical framework were unproductive.
This provided the impetus that led to the creation of further sections in the TML
framework.

Memory systems
Tulving’s human learning and memory framework is the second component of the TML
and provides the basis for an understanding of the research on memory in autism (see
also Figures 1.5 and 4.3). It affords a consideration of the cognitive profile of the
primary participants so that the cognitive profiles can be compared with each other and
contrasted to typically developing individuals.

Figure 2 Human learning and memory systems showing autonoetic consciousness and source memory

Autonoetic consciousness, mental time travel, identity, temporality and source memory
have been added to the memory framework in Figure 2 to reflect key elements of
episodic memory that are impaired in AS.
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Mapping autism theories to memory systems
Based on a literature review, a conceptual map of key terms was compiled as a table.
Originally presented as Table 4.3 in the thesis, the table is repeated here to show its
location in the development of the TML framework.
Table 1 Mapping autism theories to Tulving's memory systems

Episodic memory

Semantic memory

Perceptual memory

Type of consciousness
Autonoetic consciousness

Noetic consciousness

Anoetic consciousness

Explanatory theories associated with this memory system
(Strong) Central coherence
Executive function

Weak central coherence

Enhanced perceptual functioning

Mental construct functions
Prototype formation
Concept formation
Meaning-making

Naming, labelling, classifying
Simple category formation
Critical features

Source memory
Temporal memory
Prospective memory
Relational memory
Autobiographical memory
Greater role of self-referential
processing

Single-item memory
Item-specific memory
Symbolic systems e.g. language,
mathematics, visual symbols
Rote memory
Associative thinking

Sensory processing
Experiential

Processes and descriptions associated with this memory system

Mental representation
Top-down, global processing
High-level processing
Complex information processing
Memory for personal experience
Subjective
Contextual (spatial, temporal,
affective)
Memory binding
Abstract reasoning
Organising strategies
Interpretative, constructive
Metacognitive

Mental representation
Bottom-up, local, detail-focused
or low-level processing
Not contextual
No memory binding
Not interpretative
Literal, concrete
Object-focused

No mental representation
Direct perception
Low-level processing
Raw experience
Being ‘in the moment’
Registration of sensory input
Sensory sensitivities in ASD
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A learning hierarchy
A conceptual hierarchy became apparent from further extended reading of the literature.
The extended body of literature was summarised into a table for ease of reference to
confirm and support the emergent hierarchical relationships (see Table 2 on the
following page). The full version of Table 2 is presented with footnoted references and
a bibliography in Appendix B.

Language contains/
represents objects, ideas

Active mental
manipulation of
ideas

Language

Categorisation
Grouping
Classifying
Sorting
Naming
Labelling

Literal
Concrete

Summary representation

AS’s principal storage process may be
visual (‘eidetic’) rather than languagebased. Language processing affected in
ASD.
Rote-learned facts stored in semantic
memory.

Prototype formation memory-efficient
as it avoids the need to memorise every
instance or variation.
Indexing requires ‘memory binding’ or
‘relational memory’ and is more efficient
than rote memory.

Episodic memory encodes relationships
& dynamic elements such as time &
change, not possible in semantic
memory. Ability to generalise adds layer
of efficiency.

Conceptual frameworks very efficient,
incorporate experience, account for
facts, strive for internal consistency, seat
of learning, understanding.

Interaction with the world based on
‘intuitive’ world view.

Memory storage implications

Page 1 of 1
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Semantic memory intact or superior in AS. AS traits of literality,
preference for sameness, state-dependent recall (‘associative learning’),
cued recall. AS preference for routine and rote-learned sequences.

Impaired language processing in AS, e.g. pronoun confusion, intentional
cues, pragmatics, prosody.

Binding is a process of episodic memory. AS most likely rote-remembers
each instance and its grouping. TD most likely indexes by category
criteria.

Problem in AS with concept formation, complex information processing,
abstraction, organising strategies in learning. Weak central coherence in
AS results in greater focus on detail without context. Central coherence
equates to concept formation. Generating novel ideas is impaired,
required for problem solving and schema formation. Capacity to
generalise impaired in AS.
TD form prototypes for efficient memory encoding & retrieval. Prototype
formation impaired in AS.

Meaning-making in AS is impaired in favour of perceptual processing.
Memory in AS impaired in relatively more complex high-level information
processing, intact in less demanding cognitive processing tasks. Temporal
concepts impaired in AS while clock & calendar time intact.

AS may not be able to engage consciously in the same way as TD due to
impaired complex information processing, reliance on semantic memory /
literality / facticity.

AS vs TD

Abbreviations: TD = typical development (neurotypical), AS = Asperger syndrome, ASD = Autism spectrum disorders, ToM = Theory of Mind

Rote learning

Facts

Shared criteria

Pre-concept based
on categorisation

Prototype formation

Concept formation
Generativity (creativity)

Autonoetic
consciousness,
source memory,
prospective
memory
Conceptual
understanding,
generalisable
knowledge

Self-referential processing
Meaning making

Beliefs as basis for
understanding and
interacting with one’s
world
World view: active,
constructed knowledge
of the world tested over
time against experienced
reality
Relating ideas into a
meaningful ‘whole’ or
higher representation

Philosophy

Development of beliefs and
values systems

Description

Type of knowledge

Type of thinking &
learning activity

For the references associated with each category see Appendix B.
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Table 2 Hierarchy of thinking and learning activities in education
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Figure 3 shows a simplified version of Table 2 that is suitable for teacher PD
presentations: the blue arrows indicate later-developing memory systems.

Figure 3 Hierarchy within long-term memory systems

Figure 4 (see also Figures 4.8 and 9.2) is a yet more simplified version of the hierarchy
within the three memory systems of interest to this doctoral study: it shows the
relationships between the memory systems and the three forms of consciousness. It also
factors in the human developmental pathway and provides indicative references.

Figure 4 Hierarchy of learning and memory systems and their associated forms of consciousness
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Characteristics of thinking associated with learning and
memory systems
The next development of the TML framework was to correlate literature references
about characteristics of processing, which occurs in working memory, to the long-term
memory systems. Figure 5 illustrates this. Working memory is the interface with each
of the other memory systems (Baddeley, 1994; Markowitsch & Staniloiu, 2011),
therefore, from its place in Figure 2, working memory was moved beneath the other
four memory systems. Major characteristics of thinking that recurred in the literature
were then mapped to the long-term memory system to which each characteristic aligns.
This allows the characteristics of thinking and learning that will be compromised when
one memory system is compromised (episodic memory in the case of AS) to become
apparent.

Figure 5 Characteristics of thinking associated with the learning and memory systems

Figure 5 was presented within the thesis as Figure 9.1.
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‘Learning Ladder’
The hierarchy of thinking and learning activities listed in the first column of Table 2
was simplified: the hierarchical ‘ladder’ of mental activities allows a series of inverse
relationships to became apparent. Figures 6 and 7 were presented in Chapters 9 and 10
in the thesis as Figures 9.3 and 9.5/10.2.

Figure 6 Learning Ladder: inverse relationships

Figure 7 adds the inverse relationship for learners with AS.

Figure 7 Learning Ladder: inverse relationships showing likely strengths and weaknesses
for learners with AS
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Figure 7 illustrates that a gifted learner with AS will, most likely, be disadvantaged
when required to understand the relationship between facts or, further, to bind
knowledge together to form concepts and construct meaning, while being unimpaired or
superior at tasks reliant on rote memory or simple categorisation.

Self-awareness and episodic memory
To confirm the relationship within the research literature between identity, which is the
super-ordinate theme of this doctoral research, and episodic memory, this final
component of the conceptual framework is presented. The work of Lind and Bowler
(2008) provided the conceptual link between memory, temporality, autonoetic
consciousness and identity formation: they showed that the nature of identity
formation in autism is affected by selective impairment of memory. There are three
prerequisites of episodic memory: self-awareness, representational skills and temporalcognitive skills (Figure 8).

Figure 8 Three prerequisites for the development of Episodic Memory

Lind and Bowler employed Neisser’s model (1988) of five forms of self-awareness and
proposed the conceptual link between memory, temporality, autonoetic consciousness
and identity formation. Self-awareness refers to the concept of autonoetic consciousness.
Representational skills refer to the episodic representation of personal experience in
memory (in contrast to symbolic representation in semantic memory). Temporalcognitive skills refer to temporality (the subjective sense of time) which is the domain
of episodic memory (in contrast to the calendar, or measured, time of semantic memory).
In autism, some forms of self-awareness are intact while others are impaired or delayed.
Figure 9 illustrates the significance of temporality and autonoetic consciousness to an
understanding of memory and identity and the selective impairment of episodic memory
(EM) in autism.
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Figure 9 Five forms of self-awareness (Lind & Bowler, 2008)

The five forms of self-awareness provide a different perspective on key phenomena
already discussed: ‘conceptual self-awareness’ can be understood as autonoetic
consciousness; ‘private self-awareness’ can be understood as theory of mind (ToM); the
‘temporally extended self’ can be understood as a personal sense of one’s self in time,
described as ‘temporality’ (Zukauskas, Silton & Assumpcao Jr., 2009); the ‘ecological
self’, said to be intact in autism, is an understanding of one’s self in relation to the
external

environment;

and,

‘interpersonal

self-awareness’

refers

to

social-

communication. Thus, many of the major phenomena of autism that have been
discussed in this thesis are bound together with the development of personal identity:
externally oriented focus; literality; impaired self-referential processing; theory of mind;
central coherence; episodic memory; temporality; source attribution; semantic memory;
and, perceptual memory.

Identity: Knowledge and the knower
The super-ordinate theme of identity and knowledge, ‘Knowledge and the knower’, is
the finishing point in the interpretive journey of the case studies of this doctoral thesis.
To draw together the elements that feed into the development of identity, Figure 10
depicts the Self as a house sitting on its foundation of embodied experience, which is
constructed from consciousness, memory, learning and temporality, the formative
elements for identity development. Figure 10 was discussed in Chapter 10 of the thesis
(Figure 10.1).
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Figure 10 Identity. Photo used and adapted under licence

As illustrated in Figure 10, an individual’s identity is formed from personal, embodied
experience, incorporating: consciousness (anoetic, noetic, autonoetic) over time (past,
present, future), represented (encoded, stored, retrieved) within human learning and
memory systems and applied to the interpretation of one’s past, application to one’s
present, and hope for one’s future.

Conclusion
The diagrams and explanations presented in this appendix are the Thinking, Memory
and Learning Framework that is the theoretical output of this doctoral research. The
TML framework is intended for use in teacher professional development contexts but
also has application for parents, life partners and individuals with AS to facilitate
understanding of the cognitive profile of gifted individuals with AS.
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